THORNTON v. PRATT et al
Filing
4
ENTRY Discussing Selected Matters - There is no need for the trial judge's disqualification in this matter. Because the claim against the undersigned fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and/or seeks monetary relief against a d efendant who is immune from such relief, the claim against the trial judge must be DISMISSED. No partial final judgment shall issue at this time as to the claim dismissed in Part I.A. of this Entry. The plaintiff shall have through 2/11/2013 in whi ch to identify the circumstances which establish that the Southern District of Indiana is the proper venue for this lawsuit or why, if venue in the Southern District of Indiana is not proper, the action should not be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404 to the district where venue is proper. See Entry for details. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 1/23/2013 (Copy mailed to plaintiff).(LBT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
RICHARD B. THORNTON,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
TANYA WALTON PRATT, et al.,
Defendants.
4:13-cv-008-TWP-TAB
Entry Discussing Selected Matters
I.
A.
Mr. Thornton’s request to proceed in forma pauperis was granted in Dkt. #3.
In an action filed in forma pauperis, the court may raise on its own volition
the issue of whether an action is malicious or frivolous under § 1915(e), and may
test the complaint even before service of process. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) grants the
court the authority to dismiss the case at any time if the action is frivolous or
malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. If a complaint is based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, it lacks an arguable basis in law and may
be dismissed as frivolous. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992).
B.
The undersigned is among the defendants in this lawsuit. The claim against
the undersigned is based on judicial rulings issued in No. 1:12-cv-01092-TWP-DKL.
As an initial matter, the Court must address the issue of whether the action should
be assigned to a different Article III judge since the undersigned is a named
defendant. The court concludes that reassignment is not required here. Judges need
not indulge a pattern of automatically disqualifying themselves every time their
name appears in a case caption or a complaint. In Jones v. City of Buffalo, 867 F.
Supp. 1155, 1163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), Judge Skretny made this point: "[T]his tactic of
suing federal judges and then seeking their disqualification is nothing more than a
tactic to delay and frustrate the orderly administration of justice. Judges should not
be held hostage to this kind of tactic and automatically recuse themselves simply
because they or their fellow judges on the court are named defendants in a truly
meritless lawsuit. . . . [28 U.S.C. § 455] has been repeatedly construed by the courts
as not requiring automatic disqualification of a judge in circumstances such as
this." Id. See also Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981)
("'A judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.'
Such an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or
allowed.")(quoting United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977),
and rev'd on merits, Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984)). This reasoning applies
in this case. Thus, there is no need for my disqualification.
As to the claim against the undersigned, it is frivolous because the
undersigned is immune from actions (judicial rulings) taken in the course of No.
1:12-cv-01092-TWP-DKL. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ("Judicial
immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of
damages."). Judicial immunity can only be overcome in two circumstances: (1) when
the actions were not taken in the judge’s official capacity; or (2) if the action is taken
in complete lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 11-12. Neither of those circumstances are
present with respect to the rulings in No. 1:12-cv-01092-TWP-DKL.
Because the claim against the undersigned fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted and or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief, the claim against the trial judge must be dismissed.
C.
No partial final judgment shall issue at this time as to the claim dismissed in
Part I.A. of this Entry.
II.
On the issue of jurisdiction and venue, the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
provides the following:
A civil action may be brought in-(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants
are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant
is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such
action.
The plaintiff shall have through February 11, 2013, in which to identify
the circumstances which establish that the Southern District of Indiana is the
proper venue for this lawsuit or why, if venue in the Southern District of Indiana is
not proper, the action should not be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1404 to the
district where venue is proper.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
01/23/2013
Date: __________________
________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
Richard B. Thornton
P. O. Box 144
Mauchport, IN 47142
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