POWELL v. GEORGETOWN, INDIANA et al
Filing
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ENTRY DENYING MOTION TO RECUSE - 29 Motion to Recuse is DENIED. See Entry for details. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 11/5/2014. (LBT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
REV. PAUL R. POWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF GEORGETOWN, INDIANA,
MIKE MILLS, JAMES E. TRIPURE, JR.,
PATTI DENISON, KATHY HALLER, and
JERRY BROCK,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:14-cv-00004-TWP-WGH
ENTRY DENYING MOTION TO RECUSE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Rev. Paul R. Powell’s Motion to Recuse (Filing
No. 29) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Federal law provides that “[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall disqualify h[er]self in any proceeding
in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “The standard
in any case for a § 455(a) recusal is whether the judge’s impartiality could be questioned by a
reasonable, well-informed observer.” Id. In Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1996),
the court stated that § 455(a) “asks whether a reasonable person perceives a significant risk that
the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits. This is an objective inquiry.” The
purpose of the statute “is to preserve the appearance of impartiality.” United States v. Johnson,
680 F.3d 966, 979 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 672 (2012).
In order to justify recusal under § 455(a), the impartiality of which a judge is accused will
almost always be extrajudicial. Id. at 554; O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 988
(7th Cir. 2001); In re Huntington Commons Assocs., 21 F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus,
“[w]hen a motion for recusal fails to set forth an extrajudicial source for the alleged bias and no
such source is apparent, the motion should be denied.” Sprinpangler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
759 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (S.D.Ind. 1991) (citing Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1465 (11th
Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff seeks the recusal of the undersigned judge because at a discovery conference the
Magistrate Judge cautioned the parties that “Defendant Mike Mills either did or might have an
impermissible conflict with the judges of the Southern District, namely Judge Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge William T. Lawrence, Judge Jane Magnus, and Senior Judge Larry J. McKinney, since
Defendant Mills was employed by the Court.” Noticeably, the undersigned judge is absent from
the list of the judges who might have a potential “impermissible conflict.” With this information
in hand, Plaintiff states that his counsel made inquiries to the Human Resources director of this
Court and he has obtained no information that Defendant Mills is, in fact, an employee of the
Court. Moreover, the Court is not familiar with a “Mike Mills” even if he were an employee or
past employee in the Southern District of Indiana. Rarely does a judge’s mere acquaintance with
a party or witness justify recusal. United States v. Kehlbeck, 766 F.Supp. 707, 711 (S.D.Ind.,
1990).
The Court concludes that there is no legitimate basis for Plaintiff to seek the
disqualification of the undersigned judge. The motion to recuse thus fails under § 455(a)(1)
because the circumstances reviewed above do not demonstrate an objectively reasonable basis for
questioning this judge’s impartiality.
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (Filing No. 29) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 11/5/2014
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DISTRIBUTION:
Frank Yates, Jr.
frankyatesjr@insightbb.com
Paul Michael Summers
SUMMERS LAW OFFICE LLC
msummerslawoffice@gmail.com
R. Jeffrey Lowe
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP – New Albany
jlowe@k-glaw.com
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