HOFFMAN et al v. JACOBI et al

Filing 283

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WHITNEY NEWTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. We hereby GRANT 215 Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety by DISMISSING Spaulding's remaining official-capacity claims. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 7/6/2017. (LBT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION

DESTINY HOFFMAN,
et al.

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUSAN KNOEBEL,
et al.
Defendants.

No. 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WHITNEY NEWTON’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Whitney Newton’s Motion for
Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiff Lee Spaulding’s claims against her in her
official capacity as the Circuit Court Clerk for Clark Circuit Court No. 3 [Docket No.
215].1 On April 29, 2016, we granted Defendant Newton’s motion for summary
judgment with regard to Spaulding’s claims against her in her individual capacity, but
noted in our Order that because neither party had addressed Spaulding’s claims against
Newton in her official capacity, our ruling was limited only to Spaulding’s claims against
her in her individual capacity. See Dkt. 164 at 3 n.3.2

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This cause is comprised of claims by sixteen Plaintiffs against nine Defendants. We deal here with only
those claims raised by Plaintiff Lee Spaulding against Defendant Whitney Newton.
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The facts and procedural history as they relate to Mr. Spaulding and his claims in this lawsuit are set out
in full in our April 2016 Order and are not repeated here.

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Thereafter, on January 16, 2017, Newton moved for summary judgment on
Spaulding’s claims against her in her official capacity, arguing, among other things, that
as Circuit Court Clerk, she is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and is in any event entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Dkt.
217 at 5. On February 1, 2017, Plaintiffs requested an extension of time to file their
Responses to Defendants’ several motions for summary judgment [Docket Nos. 218, 224,
225, 230], including Defendant Newton’s motion [Docket No. 215]. Magistrate Judge
Baker granted Plaintiffs’ request on February 16, 2017, allowing them until April 14,
2017 to file their Responses. See Dkt. 265. On April 14, Plaintiffs filed Responses to
Docket Nos. 218, 224, 225, and 230, but proffered no Response to Defendant Newton’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 215. Indeed, since that time, no Response
or Reply has been filed in relation to Newton’s summary judgment motion. We GRANT
Newton’s motion, but note that we are issuing a ruling on the merits as well as on
Spaulding’s procedural deficiency.
Section 1983 does not authorize a suit for monetary damages against a state or
state agents acting in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
‘persons’ under § 1983”). In Indiana, circuit court clerks qualify as state officials. See
e.g., State ex rel. McClure v. Marion Superior Court, Room No. 1, 158 N.E.2d 264, 269
(Ind. 1959) (“we have no alternative but to hold that the clerk of the circuit court is not a
county officer, but rather a circuit officer”); Childers v. City of Portage Ind., 2014 WL

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1116887, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2014) (holding that “any claims against the Clerk in
her official capacity for monetary damages may not survive”); Parsons v. Bourff, 739 F.
Supp. 1266, 1267–68 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against clerk of
court because clerk is a state official). Thus, for Spaulding to successfully maintain an
official-capacity suit against Newton, he must, pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), seek “prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law....” Marie
O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir.1997).
“A court applying the Ex parte Young doctrine now ‘need only conduct a
straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Indiana Prot. &
Advocacy Servs. v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 371 (7th Cir.
2010) (quoting Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Pub. Servs. Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635,
645 (2002)).
Spaulding’s claims against Defendant Newton are laid out in the Amended
Complaint as follows:
Defendant “Unknown Clark County Circuit Court Clerk
Responsible for the Erroneous Entry Alleging that Mr.
Spaulding Failed to Appear on July 16, 2013,” was, at all
relevant times, an employee of Clark County, Indiana and
employed as a Court Clerk. This unknown Defendant is sued
in an individual capacity for actions and inactions which
directly caused constitutional deprivations and in an official
capacity for intentional actions in implementing and executing
Clark County’s unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs
and practices, as well as the employee’s unlawful inactions
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which were the result of and represented “deliberate
indifference” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

Dkt. 17 ¶ 36. Spaulding’s official-capacity allegations reference only Newton’s past
behavior and mirror the standards set out in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), which hold political subdivisions and local municipalities financially liable under
section 1983. As previously explained, in Indiana “[t]he court system is separate from
the other branches of the [city] government, and the judges, clerk of court, and
prosecuting attorneys are not officers of the city government.” Holland v. City of Gary,
2011 WL 6782101, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2011). Therefore, Monell does not apply to
the courts and their officers.
Accordingly, because Spaulding’s claims do not seek prospective relief from
ongoing violations, but instead seek monetary damages for constitutional deprivations he
alleges to have already suffered, they cannot be maintained against the Circuit Court
Clerk in her official capacity. Given our prior Order that disposed of Spaulding’s claims
against Newton in her individual capacity, see dkt. 164, we hereby GRANT her Motion
for Summary Judgment in its entirety [Docket No. 215] by DISMISSING Spaulding’s
remaining official-capacity claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________

Date: _____________
07/06/2017

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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Distribution:
Jonathan Paul Nagy
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]
James Michael Bolus, Jr.
JAMES M. BOLUS, JR. P.S.C.
[e-mail]
R. Jeffrey Lowe
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP-New Albany
[e-mail]
Whitney Elizabeth Wood
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP-New Albany
[e-mail]
Elizabeth A. Knight
KNIGHT HOPPE KURNIK & KNIGHT LTD (Schererville)
[e-mail]
Joseph W. Smith
KNIGHT HOPPE KURNIK & KNIGHT LTD (Schererville)
[e-mail]
Brian P. Butler
LAW OFFICE OF BRIAN BUTLER
[e-mail]
Michael A. Augustus
MICHAEL A. AUGUSTUS, PSC
[e-mail]
David A. Arthur
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]
Brennan Soergel
SOERGEL LAW OFFICE PLLC
[e-mail]

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James S. Stephenson
STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER
[e-mail]
Rosemary L. Borek
STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER
[e-mail]

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