HOFFMAN et al v. JACOBI et al
Filing
73
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JEROME JACOBI'S MOTION TO DISMISS - Defendant Judge Jacobi has neither demonstrated that Plaintiffs' claims against him in his official capacity are moot nor rendered a persuasive argument that our review of Plaintiffs' claims as a whole should be barred by the doctrine of Younger abstention. 38 Motion to Dismiss is accordingly DENIED. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 10/17/2014. (LBT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
DESTINY HOFFMAN,
et al.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JEROME JACOBI,
et al.
Defendants.
4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JEROME JACOBI’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Jerome Jacobi’s motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim [Docket No. 38], filed on June 5, 2014 pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is DENIED.
Background
The factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are extensive, but we
need not discuss them at length here; the motion to dismiss concerns only one Defendant and
focuses on jurisdictional issues.
Defendant Judge Jerome F. Jacobi is an elected judge in Clark County, Indiana. At the
time of the incidents alleged in the Amended Complaint, Judge Jacobi served as the presiding
judge of Clark Circuit Court No. 2 and the Clark County Drug Treatment Court. Am. Compl. ¶
27. The Clark County Drug Treatment Court was created under the auspices of a 2010 Indiana
statute as a “problem solving court focused on addressing the substance abuse issues of
defendants . . . in the criminal justice system by . . . bringing together substance abuse
1
rehabilitation professional, local social programs, and intensive judicial monitoring.” Ind. Code §
33-23-16-5(a)(1).
Plaintiffs allege several types of misconduct by officials of the Clark County court
system and other county officials. 1 Four of these allegations relate to Judge Jacobi. First, a
number of Plaintiffs who were participants in the Clark County Drug Treatment Court allege that
they suffered periods of detention without hearing, notice, counsel, the consideration of bond, or
the opportunity to hear evidence against them or cross-examine witnesses—all in violation of
their rights to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Am. Compl.
¶¶ 145–154. Second, Plaintiff Jesse Hash alleges that he was incarcerated for 60 days as a
pretrial detainee by order of officials of Clark Circuit Court No. 2 without any appearance before
a judicial officer, without a probable cause hearing, without consideration of bail or the
appointment of counsel, and without notice of the charges against him—in violation of his due
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at ¶¶ 155–161. Third, Plaintiff
James Bennett, a convict serving a portion of his sentence on a work-release program, alleges
that he was re-arrested and held for 74 days without ever having been told the reason for his
detention, and in violation of his due process rights to a hearing, counsel, confrontation, and
cross-examination. 2 Id. at ¶¶ 162–171. Finally, four Plaintiffs allege that they were arrested by
Clark County officials who lacked lawful arrest powers, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at ¶¶ 172–178. Plaintiffs sue Judge Jacobi in his official capacity, and they state with respect
to each of these four claims that they are suing him “for the sole purposes of obtaining a
1
Judge Jacobi’s co-Defendants are Susan Knoebel, Henry Ford, Clark County Sheriff Danny Rodden, Danielle
Grissett, Stephen Mason, the Clark County Board of Commissioners, Josh Seybold, and two unknown Clark County
officials.
2
Plaintiff Bennett alleges in the alternative that these conditions of detention violated his Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. Am. Compl. ¶ 164.
2
declaration” that the actions taken under the aegis of his courts violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. See id. at ¶¶ 148, 157, 165, 174.3
On February 14, 2014, shortly before Plaintiffs initiated this action, the Indiana Judicial
Center informed Judge Jacobi that it had suspended the operations of the Clark County Drug
Court in light of the allegations of “unlawful conduct by drug court staff and drug court practices
harmful to participants.” Docket No. 39, Ex. 1. The letter went on to state that “[s]hould the
allegations involving drug court practices prove to be unfounded, the Judicial Center will lift the
suspension and work with you to restore drug court operations.” Id. As of April 10, 2014, an
electronic directory issued by the Indiana Judicial Center listed Judge Vicki Carmichael, rather
than Judge Jacobi, as the presiding judge of the Clark County Drug Court; the directory did not
indicate that the court was inactive or in suspended operations. Docket No. 39, Ex. 2.
Legal Analysis
Standard of Review
Defendant Jacobi seeks dismissal both on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 12(b)(1), and on the basis of Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). Because he seeks dismissal only on the basis of jurisdictional
and justiciability issues, we weigh his motion to dismiss according the standard provided by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of
Indianapolis, 970 F. Supp. 655, 657–658 (S.D. Ind. 1997). See also Stroman Realty, Inc. v.
Grillo, 438 F. Supp. 2d 919, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Manos v. Caira, 162 F. Supp. 2d 979, 986
3
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint also includes four sets of class allegations, constructed as follows: (1) Class A,
consisting of Clark County Drug Court participants who were incarcerated for more than 72 hours without hearing
or other due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Class B, consisting of all those who are,
or will be in the future, subject to the violations suffered by the members of Class A; (3) Class C, consisting of all
those who were arrested by state actors under the aegis of Clark Circuit Court No. 2 acting without lawful arrest
authority; and (4) Class D, consisting of all those who are, or will be, subject to unlawful arrest at the hands of Clark
Circuit Court No. 2 officials who lack arrest authority. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131–143.
3
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (“Abstention doctrines are jurisdictional in nature.”) (additional citations
omitted).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure command that courts dismiss any suit over which
they lack subject matter jurisdiction—whether acting on the motion of a party or sua sponte. See
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), we “must accept
the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences from
those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” Franzoni v. Hartmax Corp., 300 F.3d 767, 771 (7th
Cir. 2002); Transit Express, Inc. v. Ettinger, 246 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001). We may,
however, “properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view
whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter
jurisdiction exists.” See Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993);
Estate of Eiteljorg ex rel. Eiteljorg v. Eiteljorg, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
Discussion
Defendant Judge Jacobi seeks dismissal on two grounds. First, he asserts that he no
longer presides over the Clark County Drug Court, and he therefore contends that Plaintiffs’
allegations against him are moot. Second, he urges that the Court abstain from considering the
claims against him pursuant to the doctrine established by the United States Supreme Court in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. We address first the question of subject
matter jurisdiction raised by Defendant Jacobi’s mootness argument, before turning to Defendant
Jacobi’s argument that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction it may possess with
regard to the claims involving the Clark Circuit Court. Ultimately, we find neither of
Defendant’s arguments persuasive.
I.
Mootness
4
The doctrine of mootness is a temporal manifestation of the jurisdictional limits imposed
by Article III—that courts “may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.” Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). “A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S.
277, 287 (2000) (citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). Regardless
of the circumstances present when the acts or omissions giving rise to a cause of action occurred,
a federal court must abjure decision on a question that intervening factual events have rendered
moot, lest it run afoul of the judiciary’s longstanding prohibition on rendering merely “advisory”
opinions. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199 (1988); City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 287;
A.B. ex rel. Kehoe v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, 683 F.3d 844, 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief with respect to Defendant Jacobi. As the Seventh
Circuit has explained:
A demand for present or prospective (declaratory or injunctive) relief imposes a
substantial burden on the plaintiff to show survival of the controversy. Thus,
when a public official is sued in his official capacity and the official is replaced or
succeeded in office during the pendency of the litigation, the burden is on the
complainant to establish the need for declaratory or injunctive relief by
demonstrating that the successor in office will continue the relevant policies of his
predecessors.
Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514,
520–523 (1974)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Salazar v. City of Chi., 940 F.2d
233 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, where a plaintiff can show that an official’s actions reflect an
institutional policy that could be assumed to persist under that official’s successor, the suit may
continue and the defendant in question may be substituted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d). See, e.g., Rowe v. Davis, 373 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828 (N.D. Ind. 2005). Where the
5
plaintiff has failed to meet that burden, the suit against that official is moot and must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Kincaid, 670 F.2d at 741.
Here, we conclude that Defendant Jacobi’s mootness argument is, at the very least,
premature. Defendant has attached to his motion a February 14, 2014 letter from the Indiana
Judicial Center informing Judge Jacobi that allegations of unlawful conduct necessitated “an
immediate suspension of Clark County Drug Court operations,” remaining in effect “until further
notice from this office.” Docket No. 39, Ex. 1. “Should the allegations involving drug court
practices prove to be unfounded,” the letter continued, “the Judicial Center will lift the
suspension and work with you to restore drug court operations.” Id. Defendant has also
submitted a document indicating that, as of April 2014, the Indiana Judicial Center listed Judge
Vicki Carmichael, rather than Judge Jacobi, as the presiding officer for the Clark County Drug
Court. Docket No. 39, Ex. 2.
Taken together, these documents establish that the Judicial Center temporarily suspended
the Clark County Drug Court in February 2014; we do not know how long the suspension lasted,
or which judge currently presides over the court, if it has been fully reinstated. We also do not
know whether Judge Jacobi, who apparently remains in office as the presiding judge of Clark
Circuit Court No. 2, 4 will resume his duties over the drug court in the future, if indeed he has not
already. “It is the defendant’s burden to prove that the offending activity has stopped and will not
be repeated before a court may dismiss an action for mootness.” Nat’l People’s Action v. City of
Blue Island, Ill., 594 F. Supp. 72, 73 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).5 Defendant Jacobi disclaims any argument that the Drug Court has ceased
4
See “Clark County Indiana: Circuit Court #2,” www.co.clark.in.us/courts-2.html (accessed October 9, 2014). The
court’s website currently lists the Honorable Jerry Jacobi as its sole presiding judge, together with two magistrates.
5
Defendant, citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), insists that in fact Plaintiffs bear the burden of
proving that the claims against Judge Jacobi are not moot. Docket No. 49 at 2. In Lyons, the Supreme Court briefly
6
operations permanently, or that the alleged constitutional violations committed by its various
officers have permanently abated; rather, he asserts only that the claims are moot with respect to
him because he no longer presides over the Drug Court. See Docket No. 39 at 6; Docket No. 49
at 2–3.6 If Defendant Jacobi establishes his permanent removal from the Drug Court, then the
dismissal of the official-capacity claim for declaratory relief against him—or the substitution of
his successor under Rule 25(d)—may be warranted. 7 As of now, however, it is unclear whether
such permanent removal from office has occurred. 8
II.
Younger Abstention
Alternately, Defendant Jacobi argues that, with respect to the claims against him
concerning the administration of Clark Circuit Court No. 2, this Court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction according to the doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), and progeny. 9 Docket No. 39 at 6. Neither party has devoted serious discussion
considered and rejected the possibility that a moratorium on the LAPD’s use of chokeholds on suspects had mooted
the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief against the Department’s engagement in that practice. The Court found that
the “moratorium by its terms is not permanent. Intervening events have not ‘irrevocably eradicated the effects of the
alleged violation.’” 461 U.S. at 101 (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). The Court
went on to explore—in the portion of the decision that Defendant quotes—the question of standing. 461 U.S. at
101–113. The standing of the various Plaintiffs here, some of whom have suffered completed harm and some of
whom purport to be subject to continuing or future harm if prospective relief is not granted, is not a question
presented by this motion.
6
As Plaintiffs have noted, it is possible that even if the constitutional violations complained of have permanently
ceased, their allegations regarding the conduct of Drug Court personnel are within the scope of the exception to
mootness doctrine for actions “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Docket No. 47 at 5; Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975). We do not reach this broader question, which Defendant Jacobi has not raised as it
does not relate to his sole argument that claims against him are moot because of his replacement in office.
7
Whether substitution or dismissal is appropriate would depend upon whether Plaintiffs have produced evidence
that the successor in office has continued or will continue the allegedly unconstitutional practices that occurred
under Judge Jacobi’s supervision of the court—or whether, alternately, such practices were “idiosyncratic” and
expired along with Judge Jacobi’s tenure. See Moore v. Watson, 838 F. Supp. 2d 735, 761–762 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(citing Kincaid, 670 F.2d at 741).
8
We note, as well, that two of the claims against Judge Jacobi, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 157, 165, relate to his status as
the presiding judge of Clark Circuit Court No. 2 rather than his role with the Drug Court. Even in the event that his
permanent removal from any role with the Drug Court were established, these two claims would not thereby be
mooted.
9
Defendant Jacobi does not specifically contend that the Court should abstain from considering the claims of
Plaintiff Lee Spaulding relating to his allegedly erroneous and unconstitutional detention for failure to appear before
Clark Circuit Court No. 3—a claim that does not name Judge Jacobi, who did not preside over Clark Circuit Court
No. 3, as a Defendant. Nonetheless, the same considerations apply to the Spaulding claim as apply to the claims
7
to the question of abstention. Defendant’s argument in favor of abstention in his brief is cursory
and largely unsupported by citations to authority, and Plaintiffs’ response on the question is little
less perfunctory. Nevertheless, we expand our discussion beyond the limited scope of the parties’
submissions, in keeping with the respect that federal courts must pay to the boundaries imposed
by the principles of comity and federalism embodied in the Younger doctrine. Having done so,
we conclude that those principles are not implicated here.
“Federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given
them.” Trust & Inv. Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Certain well-defined
exceptions to this principle exist, however, and the Supreme Court recognized one such basis for
abstention in its decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). At its core, the Younger
doctrine forbids federal courts, under most circumstances, from enjoining a pending state
criminal prosecution. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 594 (7th Cir.
2012). The doctrine has been extended to apply to other state proceedings as well; formulated
more broadly, it states that federal courts should “abstain from enjoining ongoing state
proceedings that are (1) judicial in nature, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) offer an
adequate opportunity for review of constitutional claims.” 10 Forty One News, Inc. v. County of
Lake, 491 F.3d 662, 665–666 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 711
(7th Cir. 1998)). In such a situation, abstention serves as a bulwark of federalism. See Middlesex
relating to allegedly unconstitutional practices in Clark Circuit Court No. 2, and our ruling below applies equally to
both sets of claims. As with a number of other Plaintiffs, Spaulding’s claim alleges unconstitutional detention; in his
case, the detention was caused by a clerk’s error that erroneously labeled him as having failed to appear for a
hearing. Also as with the other Plaintiffs, Spaulding’s claim does not challenge his underlying criminal conviction.
According to Spaulding, his case in Clark Circuit Court No. 3 has been closed, pursuant to a pretrial diversion
agreement, since September 2013. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88–91.
10
Defendant Jacobi does not contend that Younger abstention should bar consideration of Plaintiffs’ challenges to
the constitutional violations they allegedly suffered at the hands of the Clark County Drug Court or its officers. See
Docket No. 39 at 6.
8
Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 436 (1982). “[I]f a person is
believed to have violated a state law, the state has instituted a criminal, disciplinary, or other
enforcement proceeding against him, and he has a federal defense, he cannot scurry to federal
court and plead that defense as a basis for enjoining the state proceeding.” Nader v. Keith, 385
F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2004).11
It is true, as Defendant asserts, that the Plaintiffs are, or have been, defendants in state
criminal proceedings in Clark Circuit Court. The allegations they bring in this suit, however, are
not roundabout challenges to the state charges against them or the validity of their convictions on
those charges. Rather, Plaintiffs claim that the practices engaged in or countenanced by officials
of the circuit court—periods of detention without due process of law and arrest by officials
lacking arrest authority—violated their constitutional rights independent of Plaintiffs’ underlying
guilt or innocence. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 156, 163, 173, 180. As Plaintiffs affirm with respect to
one of their claims, “[n]o Plaintiff is challenging or contesting the state law which allows Indiana
judges to revoke probation for those properly and fairly found guilty of violating the terms, or
any other Indiana statute or law. Rather, they are challenging the state actors’ failure to abide by
state and federal laws that require findings of probable cause and due process before taking away
a person’s liberty.” Docket No. 47 at 7.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, entertaining a challenge “to the legality of pretrial
detention without a judicial hearing”—as a request for injunctive or declaratory relief that is “not
directed at the state prosecutions as such”—does not run afoul of the principles of Younger
abstention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107 n.9 (1975). Cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 83–85 (1971) (disapproving a district court’s “interference with a state prosecution” where
11
Younger abstention can apply to requests for purely declaratory relief as well. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971).
9
the court had declared arrests invalid and ordered the suppression of invalidly seized evidence in
an ongoing state matter). 12 Courts have applied the Supreme Court’s statement in Gerstein to a
number of similar circumstances in finding Younger abstention unwarranted. See, e.g., Flynt v.
Leis, 574 F.2d 874, 879–882 (6th Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 439 U.S. 438 (affirming a
district court’s decision not to abstain from a challenge to a state rule barring out of state
attorneys’ appearance pro hac vice in criminal cases); Carter v. Doyle, 95 F. Supp. 2d 851, 856–
857 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (allowing a suit challenging a juvenile court’s use of unsworn statements in
determining probable cause for pretrial detention to go forward).
As an equitable doctrine of restraint, Younger abstention rests on the premise that
“ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for
vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 684 (6th
Cir. 1985) (quoting Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977)) (additional citations
omitted). Abstention thus “serves no legitimate purpose where, as in this case, the constitutional
claims raised in the federal complaint cannot be resolved in the state proceedings.” Bickham v.
Lashof, 620 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1980). Here, the prospective relief Plaintiffs seek is: (1) a
declaration that the Clark Circuit Court’s systematic practices—primarily unlawful detention, the
deprivation of procedural protections pertaining to detention, and arrest without proper
authority—violated Plaintiffs’ right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and protection from unreasonable arrest under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) an injunction
12
Four of the Plaintiffs here—Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, Michael Campbell, and Robert Upton—do contend
that they were arrested contrary to law. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 172–178. They do not present the claim as a defense to
their state prosecutions, however; rather, they seek money damages and “preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief enjoining further violation of their constitutional rights.” Am. Compl. ¶ 178 (emphasis added). Thus, an
injunction, if granted, would protect them from any future illegal arrest at the hands of the Clark County court
officials in question, but would have no effect on the disposition of any of their state criminal charges that remain
pending. See Carter, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (where a plaintiff alleges an “independent violation” of his constitutional
rights and is not presenting an “appeal . . . through the back door of the federal courts,” abstention is inappropriate).
10
against the employment of such practices in the future. 13 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 154, 161, 171, 178. As
the Supreme Court noted in a similar context in Gerstein, the alleged unconstitutionality of the
state court’s detention practices is not a defense to the Plaintiffs’ state prosecutions, 420 U.S. at
108 n.9, and the only relief available in state court, if any, would be through collateral
proceedings. Such circumstances, where the issue raised by the federal complaint is “ancillary to
disposition of the underlying cause of action,” are outside of Younger doctrine’s primary
concern. See Traughber, 760 F.2d at 684 (holding abstention inappropriate where, “[u]nlike the
classic Younger situation, the plaintiffs’ claim . . . cannot serve as a defense in the tort trial upon
appeal”) (emphasis original). A ruling in favor of Plaintiffs here would not involve this Court’s
intercession in any of Plaintiffs’ ongoing criminal adjudications or appeals from the resulting
convictions. See Lewis v. Zoeller, 2012 WL 5384704, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 1, 2012) (“Petitions
to enjoin state courts from completing criminal prosecutions represent the core of
the Younger abstention doctrine”). Nor would an order that the proceedings of the Clark Circuit
Court must conform to the commands of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments with regard to arrest
and detention represent undue federal court “supervision” of state court business. See Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 108 n.9 (noting that an order requiring courts to hold preliminary hearings upon
detention “could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits”). Cf. O’Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (holding that an injunction directed at alleged racial discrimination by
state courts in setting bond, sentencing, and imposing jury fees would impose “unwarranted
13
Plaintiffs also seek damages. While the Seventh Circuit is among the Courts of Appeal that have held that suits at
law may implicate Younger abstention—or at least a stay of the federal suit during the pendency of state
proceedings, see Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the issuance of a stay where a
plaintiff brought a Section 1983 alleging an unreasonable search and false arrest in connection with pending state
charges against him)—our conclusions about the lack of disruptive effect of the claims for prospective relief here
apply with equal force to a request for damages. As we state elsewhere, the claims for which Plaintiffs seek an
award of damages are not “potentially subject to adjudication” in a state criminal proceeding or appeal, since they
are not actual or potential defenses to the Plaintiffs’ underlying criminal charges. See Hill v. City of Hammand, Ind.,
2012 WL 5304177, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2012) (distinguishing Simpson on similar grounds).
11
anticipatory interference in the state criminal process by means of continuous or piecemeal
interruptions of the state proceedings”).
Any injunctive relief we would grant in this case would be directed towards the
prospective cessation of unconstitutional practices rather than halting or altering the course of the
state prosecutions against any of the Plaintiffs. As the Seventh Circuit has held, Younger
abstention is appropriate “only when there is an action in state court against the federal plaintiff
and the state is seeking to enforce the contested law in that proceeding.” Forty One News, 491
F.3d at 665 (emphasis added). Here, there is no nexus between Plaintiffs’ claims and Indiana’s
prosecution of the (mostly) drug-related criminal charges against them in the circuit court. Cf.
Palmer v. City of Chi., 755 F.2d 560, 575 (7th Cir. 1985) (if the federal issues raised by the
federal complaint are, or could be, presented in the ongoing state court proceeding, then
abstention is warranted absent “extraordinary circumstances”).
In sum, Plaintiffs do not challenge the state laws under which they were charged or raise
their constitutional claims as defenses to those charges. Cf. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425–
435 (1979) (holding that abstention from a challenge to the state statute under which a childprotection action was pending in state court was proper); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,
445–448 (1977) (upholding district court’s abstention from a challenge to the constitutionality of
a state property attachment statute under which the federal plaintiffs’ property had been
attached). Nor, as we have discussed, would our exercise of jurisdiction over the matter represent
undue meddling in state court business or duplicate readily available state remedies in a manner
contrary to our federalism-based respect for the integrity of parallel state processes. For these
reasons, Younger does not compel our abstention.
Conclusion
12
Defendant Judge Jacobi has neither demonstrated that Plaintiffs’ claims against him in his
official capacity are moot nor rendered a persuasive argument that our review of Plaintiffs’
claims as a whole should be barred by the doctrine of Younger abstention. The motion to dismiss
is accordingly DENIED.
October 17, 2014
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
13
Distribution:
Douglas Alan Hoffman
CARSON BOXBERGER
hoffman@carsonboxberger.com
James Michael Bolus, Jr.
JAMES M. BOLUS, JR. P.S.C.
bo@boluslaw.com
R. Jeffrey Lowe
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP-New Albany
jlowe@k-glaw.com
Michael A. Augustus
MICHAEL A. AUGUSTUS, PSC
mike@boluslaw.com
David A. Arthur
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
David.Arthur@atg.in.gov
Brennan Soergel
SOERGEL LAW OFFICE PLLC
brennan@boluslaw.com
Rosemary L. Borek
STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER
rborek@stephlaw.com
Wayne E. Uhl
STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER
wuhl@stephlaw.com
14
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