WALP v. COLVIN

Filing 32

ORDER ADOPTING 25 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 9/29/2015.(LBT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION

TRACIE ANN WALP,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

4:14-cv-00093-SEB-WGH

ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This is an action for judicial review of the final decision of Defendant
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) finding Plaintiff Tracie Ann Walp
not entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application for DIB
and SSI after concluding that Plaintiff is capable of performing sedentary work as
“clerical support worker,” “quality control worker,” and “hand packager.” Dkt. No. 9-2
at 36-37. This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Hussmann for initial consideration.
On August 28, 2015, Magistrate Judge Hussmann issued a report and recommendation
that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed because it is supported by substantial
evidence. This cause is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation.

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Standard of Review
We review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to determine whether it was
supported by substantial evidence or is the result of an error of law. Rice v. Barnhart,
384 F.3d 363, 368–369 (7th Cir. 2004); Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,
539 (7th Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d
1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). In our review of the ALJ’s decision, we will not “reweigh
evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [our] own
judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539. However, the ALJ’s
decision must be based upon consideration of “all the relevant evidence,” without
ignoring probative factors. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). In other
words, the ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge” from the evidence in the
record to his or her final conclusion. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. We confine the scope of
our review to the rationale offered by the ALJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
93–95 (1943); Tumminaro v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2011).
When a party raises specific objections to elements of a magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation, the district court reviews those elements de novo, determining for
itself whether the Commissioner’s decision as to those issues is supported by substantial
evidence or was the result of an error of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(b). The district court
“makes the ultimate decision to adopt, reject, or modify” the report and recommendation,
and it need not accept any portion as binding; the court may, however, defer to those
conclusions of the report and recommendation to which timely objections have not been
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raised by a party. See Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 759–761 (7th
Cir. 2009).
Discussion
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that the
Court uphold the final decision of the Commissioner based on the Magistrate Judge’s
finding: (1) that the ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence and determined
Plaintiff’s RFC; and (2) that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility. Because
Plaintiff’s objections merely retrace issues and arguments addressed by the Magistrate
Judge in his well-reasoned and well-supported Report and Recommendation, with which
we find ourselves in full agreement, 1 Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinions of
several doctors and the opinion of a nurse practitioner. However, as the Magistrate Judge
correctly observed, the district court does not reweigh the evidence. See Butera v. Apfel,
173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Rather, our job is to determine whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. Here, for the same reasons detailed in the
Magistrate Judge’s Report, we find that the ALJ followed the statutorily mandated
procedure in weighing the medical opinions, including the opinions of treating physicians
and other medical sources; adequately evaluated those opinions; and accurately
incorporated those opinions into his RFC determination. Accordingly, we agree with the

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As the Commissioner points out, Plaintiff’s objections are merely restatements, often word for
word, of Plaintiff’s original opening brief.

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Magistrate Judge’s analysis which we hereby adopt, finding no error in the ALJ’s
assessment of the medical opinions in Plaintiff’s case.
Nor is there merit to Plaintiff’s second argument, to wit, that the ALJ erred in
assessing her credibility. As the Magistrate Judge recognized, the ALJ’s credibility
determination, while perhaps not perfect, was not so flawed as to necessitate remand. As
long as an ALJ provides “specific reasons supported by the record,” a reviewing court
must defer to a “credibility determination unless it is patently wrong.” Curvin v. Colvin,
778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). A credibility assessment is patently wrong only if it
“lacks any explanation or support.” Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014).
As the Magistrate Judge recognized, the ALJ criticized Plaintiff’s credibility in
part because of the limited course of Plaintiff’s treatment despite failing to question
Plaintiff about any reasons she may have had for pursuing such a conservative course of
treatment. However, we agree with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that to the extent
this represents error, it is harmless, given that the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s
limited course of treatment was only a small part of his overall credibility assessment.
The ALJ thoroughly explained various other reasons to support his credibility
determination, including several inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
that she was too physically impaired to perform even sedentary work and a number of
physicians’ reports noting “excellent strength”; “no evidence of atrophy, and the ability
to use her upper and lower extremities”; and “doing very well with self-care … tend[ing]
to take on much of the family home care.” Dkt. No. 9-2 at 32. Additionally, while
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Plaintiff reported that she had difficulty seeing and hearing, the ALJ noted that she
appeared to have no trouble hearing to answer his questions when she testified before
him. Id. at 33.
Plaintiff cites a number of additional errors she contends the ALJ committed in
assessing her credibility, including, inter alia, that the ALJ ignored substantial evidence
regarding her physical abnormalities and also distorted some of the evidence of her daily
activities. However, the Magistrate Judge thoroughly and correctly addressed and
ultimately dismissed these arguments. Accordingly, for the reasons detailed in the
Magistrate Judge’s Report, we agree that the ALJ’s credibility determination, imperfect
though it may be, does not require remand.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we OVERRULE Plaintiff’s objections and ADOPT the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Judgment shall enter accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

9/29/2015
Date: _____________________________

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Distribution:
Dustin Allen Schock
BINDER and BINDER
[e-mail]
Thomas E. Kieper
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
[e-mail]

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