MAINS v. CITIBANK, N.A. et al

Filing 130

ORDER on Pending Motions to Dismiss - For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the following motions WITH PREJUDICE: 29 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, 38 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, 41 Motion to Dismiss for Failur e to State a Claim, 86 Motion to Dismiss, 102 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we lack federal subject matter jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff's claims. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. Final judgment shall enter accordingly. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 3/31/2016. (MAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
ERIC P. MAINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A. As Trustee for the
WAMU-HE2 Trust,
CHASE BANK, N.A.,
CYNTHIA RILEY,
NELSON & FRANKENBERGER, P.C.,
BLACK KNIGHT FINANCIAL
SERVICES, LLC formerly doing business
as LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES,
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP,
JOHN DOES (Unknown),
WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS LLP,
Defendants.

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4:15-cv-00036-SEB-WGH

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the court on the following motions to dismiss:
·

Docket Number (“Dkt. No.”) 29 – Defendant Black Knight Financial
Services, LLC (“Black Knight”)

·

Dkt. No. 38 – Defendant Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP (“Bose McKinney”)

·

Dkt. No. 41 – Nelson & Frankenberger, P.C. (“N&F”) 1

·

Dkt. No. 86 – Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs LLP (“Wyatt”) 2

1

N&F incorporate the arguments of Black Knight in its Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff
does the same by incorporating his response. [See Dkt. Nos. 42, 45, 71.]
2

Wyatt incorporates the arguments of Black Knight in its Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff
does the same by incorporating his response. [See Dkt. Nos. 87, 104, 111.]

·

Dkt. No. 102 – Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and Citibank, N.A.
(“Citibank”) 3

Collectively, Black Knight, Bose McKinney, N&F, Wyatt, Chase, and Citibank are
referred to herein as “Defendants”. Bose McKinney, N&F, Wyatt, and Citibank joined in
Black Knight’s Motion to Dismiss and Memoranda in support thereto, and shall be referred
to as the “Joinder Defendants.” The motions have been fully briefed. For the following
reasons, we GRANT Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. [Docket No. 29, 38, 41, 86, 102.]
Background and Facts
Despite the hundreds of pages dedicated to seeking dismissal of the 90 page, ten
count amended complaint with its accompanying 100 pages of exhibits brought against
nine named defendants and an unknown number of “John Does”, this case is a simple,
straightforward foreclosure action based on a $200,000 mortgage and note secured by
Plaintiff’s home in Clark County, Indiana. This litigation has proceeded through an Indiana
trial court, the Indiana Court of Appeals, the Indiana Supreme Court, and now has found
its way onto our docket. It is more than time to bring some finality to these issues and
claims.

3

Chase and Citibank make many of the same arguments contained in Black Knight’s
motion to dismiss, but include a more detailed analysis of the application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. [Dkt. No. 103, 114, 120.]

2

According to the First Amended Complaint, Docket Number 23 (“FAC”), 4 on
December 19, 2006, with the help of a loan officer for First Meridian Mortgage (“FMM”),
Plaintiff Eric Mains 5 executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Washington
Mutual Bank (“WAMU”) as the lender thereby encumbering as collateral his primary
residence, 2635 Darien Drive, Jeffersonville, Indiana. [FAC ¶ 20.] Two years later
WAMU failed as a banking institution, on September 25, 2008, and the FDIC became the
receiver.

[Id. ¶ 35.]

Chase purchased and was assigned WAMU’s loans and loan

commitments, including Mains’s mortgage and note. Black Knight, whom Mains alleges
to have been an undisclosed agent for Chase, provided Chase with computer software and
forms, contracted on behalf of Chase, and directed the debt collection attempts of law firms
hired by Chase, in this instance, N&F and Bose McKinney. [Id. ¶ 184.] In May of 2009,
Mains received correspondence sent by Chase indicating that it had become the servicer of
his loan. [Id. ¶ 38.] Chase later assigned Mains’s mortgage and note to Citibank. Mains
v. Citibank, NA, 18 N.E.3d 319, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

4

We note that Plaintiff’s Memoranda as well as the FAC contain multiple unfounded,
inflammatory, and/or exaggerated arguments and conclusions. For example, Plaintiff argues that
“[b]y Citibank and Chase’s definition, it would be perfectly fine to shoot Mains to claim his home
if they had a secured interest in it, but since none of the large banks seem to particularly care that
people have indeed committed suicide due to the stress of illegal foreclosure tactics (See footnote
3), this may not be too far a stretch.” [Dkt. No. 114 at 12.] Such rhetoric has no place in court
filings.
5

Ann V. Mains also signed the promissory note and was a party to the state court
foreclosure action. She is not a party in this case and thus, we shall reference, as Plaintiff does,
Eric P. Mains only. See Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 18 N.E.3d 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

3

Mains alleges that on three separate occasions he attempted to request a loan
modification, but was told each time that his request was “incomplete” or “lost.” [FAC
¶ 36.] Because Mains failed to make a mortgage payment for 90 days, an “acceleration
notice” was generated by Chase notifying Mains that his loan payments had increased.
Mains notes that despite his lack of payment, his loan statements inexplicably reflected an
overall decrease in his loan balance. [Id. ¶¶ 39-40.] In 2009, Mains received a notice of
default issued by Chase’s attorney, N&F. [Id. ¶ 41.] On April 20, 2010, Citibank filed a
mortgage foreclosure action against Eric and Anna Mains in the Clark Circuit Court (“State
Court”), cause number 10C01-1004-MF-000248 (“State Foreclosure Action” or “State
Court Judgment”). [Id.]
After a failed pre-foreclosure settlement conference in the State Foreclosure Action,
Citibank filed a motion for summary judgment on August 30, 2010, which it later withdrew
on November 1, 2010 because, as alleged in the FAC, Citibank was under investigation for
its alleged improper foreclosure practices. [FAC ¶¶ 45, 47.] Mains avers that Citibank
agreed to consent orders which deferred foreclosure actions between 2009 to 2010 to allow
time to identify any procedural defects and/or insufficiencies in the documentation. [Id.
¶ 48.] Citibank re-filed its motion for summary judgment on February 11, 2013, and Mains
responded on March 11, 2013. [Id. ¶¶ 50, 51.] Following oral argument on April 30, 2013,
the State Court granted summary judgment in favor of Citibank on May 3, 2013. [Id. ¶ 52.]
Mains’s motion to correct errors was denied on August 8, 2013, after briefing and another
hearing. [Id. ¶ 53.]

4

Mains filed an appeal of the trial court’s foreclosure decision with the Indiana Court
of Appeals on September 12, 2013, contending, inter alia, that Citibank was not the proper
party to foreclose the loan and that the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” should have
precluded the foreclosure.

[Dkt. No. 103-3 at 21.]

Mains argued that Defendants

“instructed employees to fraudulently sign documents to prove ownership” and that
Citibank committed fraud by attending a pre-foreclosure settlement conference when it was
not the real party in interest. [Dkt. No. 103-3 (Mains’s Appellant Brief to the Indiana Court
of Appeals) at 42; FAC ¶ 54 (stating that he “brought up” on appeal Citibank’s HDC
(holder in due course) status); Dkt. No. 30-1 (Mains’s June 17, 2010 Answer to Citibank’s
State Foreclosure Action) at Affirmative Defense No. 1 (“The Plaintiff [Citibank] may not
be the real party in interest, the true owner of the obligation, and may have failed to name
necessary parties that are entitled to enforce the terms and obligations of the Note and
Mortgage).] 6 Rejecting Mains’s arguments, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s order, ruling that Citibank was entitled to enforce the note and mortgage and that
“[t]he trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law that Citibank was entitled to
summary judgment.” Mains, 18 N.E.3d at *3. On October 4, 2014, Mains sought to

6

Defendant “Bose’s sole role in connection with the State Court Ligation [sic] was as
appellate counsel for Mains’s opponent in the Indiana Court of Appeals.” [Dkt. No. 39 at 9 (citing
FAC ¶ 83; State Court Judgment; Court of Appeals Opinion).] Indeed, Mains’s response to Bose
McKinney’s Motion to Dismiss points to his allegations against other defendants, but does not
specifically address Bose McKinney. [See Dkt. No. 61 at 5-7 (explaining his fraud allegations
against Black Knight and N&F and the reason that those claims were not brought in the State
Litigation).]

5

transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was denied on January 22, 2015 (“State Court
Judgment”). [FAC ¶¶ 55-56.]
Mains alleges in the action before us that while reviewing loan documents in
December 2014, he discovered “incontrovertible evidence of fraud and forgery, and
possibl[e] backdating” knowingly withheld from the State Court by Defendants. [FAC
¶ 61.] He recounts an example involving his having signed his note and mortgage on
December 19, 2006, which documents were endorsed by Defendant Cynthia Riley on
behalf of WAMU. However, according to Ms. Riley’s 2013 deposition in another case,
Ms. Riley’s employment with WAMU had been terminated in November 2006, so she was
not employed with WAMU or Chase between November 2006 and the time of her
deposition. [Id. ¶¶ 62-64.] Mains concludes from this that the means by which his note
was transferred and assigned contained errors and evinced fraud. [Id. ¶¶ 65-77.] It is his
position that the January 5, 2007 assignment by WAMU via a “Deed of Trust” was also
defective. [Id. ¶ 65.] Mains further claims that the assignment of his note from Chase to
the WAMU HE-2 Trust (i.e., Citibank) on June 14, 2010 was “fraudulent” on the grounds
that it was robo-signed by a processing party, and not the lender.

[Id. ¶¶ 66-67.]

Consequently, Mains insists that his mortgage was legally flawed/deficient and thus could
not be foreclosed.
Mains asserts in this case various claims for violations of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”), violations of the Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”), violations
of Indiana Code § 32-30-10.5 (Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Agreements for Residential
Mortgages), Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent
6

Misrepresentation, Common Law Fraud, Negligence, violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO) violations. Defendants move to dismiss Mains’s FAC on the grounds that his
claims seek to undo the State Court Judgment and thus are barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
Analysis
I.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction – The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
At the core of Mains’s FAC are his allegations that Defendants: (1) improperly

transferred and assigned the note, (2) were not the real parties in interest in seeking to
foreclose the mortgage, and (3) committed fraud on Mains and the State Court in their
efforts to foreclose the mortgage and note. A thorough review of the FAC and the parties’
arguments convinces us that we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate Mains’s claims because they
seek an adjudication in this court that would, if granted, substantively nullify the State
Court Judgment.
A.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. 7 and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 8
provides that the federal district courts must decline to entertain “cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

7

263 U.S. 413 (1923).

8

460 U.S. 462 (1983).

7

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006); Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions
LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008). The doctrine stems from the Supreme Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from state high-court judgments, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257;
it thus requires district courts to steer away from cases in which a plaintiff’s claimed injury
directly results from, or is “inextricably intertwined” with, a state court judgment. See
Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (7th Cir. 1996). Even if it concludes that a decision
by the state court was clearly misguided or unconstitutional, a district court must decline
to exercise jurisdiction in a case where it is unable to “rule in [the] plaintiffs’ favor without
holding that the state court erred.” Bullock v. Credit Bureau of Greater Indianapolis, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
Federal district courts must decline to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims “not
raised in state court or [that] do not on their face require review of a state court’s decision”
but are nonetheless “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment. Brown v.
Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012); Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 759
(7th Cir. 2003). Although the term “inextricably intertwined” is a “somewhat metaphysical
concept,” whenever success in the federal forum would require the court to overturn a prior
state court judgment, the subsequent federal litigation is deemed to be “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court’s ruling. Taylor v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d
529, at 532-33 (7th Cir. 2004); Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603. Thus, in assessing the applicability
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the central inquiry is “whether the federal plaintiff seeks
to set aside a state court judgment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent
8

claim.” Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996) (cited by
Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, No. 1:07-cv-1245-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 345986, at *3 (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 6, 2008) aff’d, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2008)). State court eviction and foreclosure
proceedings have frequently been held to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, even when
federal claims are subsequently raised in federal court. Linner v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortg., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-558-TS, 2009 WL 2591688, at *2 (Aug. 20, 2009) (collecting
cases) (cited by Davis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1303-JMS-DML,
2011 WL 837048, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 4, 2011)). 9
“If the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies, the Court must dismiss the suit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Frederiksen
v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2004), without considering any other
defenses, Taylor v. Fannie Mae, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004).” Davis, 2011 WL
837048, at *2. In short, the doctrine prevents a party from effectively trying to appeal a
state court decision to a federal district court. Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420,
431 (7th Cir. 2009); Davis, 2011 WL 837048, at *2.

9

Although Mains’s federal litigation includes defendants who were not parties to the State
Court Foreclosure Action, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may nonetheless apply. Russo v. GMAC
Mortg., LLC, 549 Fed. App’x. 8, 10 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It does not matter [to Rooker-Feldman
applicability] that the plaintiff added parties to the federal action who were not parties to the state
action.”) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Joseph
v. Cohen, 66 Fed. App’x 278, 280 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that her federal
action was distinct from her state action because the federal action included additional defendants
and alleged additional improper actions); Roberts v. Perez, No. 13-cv-5612 (JMF), 2014 WL
3883418, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014) (holding that naming additional plaintiffs “is not enough
to get around the Rooker-Feldman bar”).

9

B.

Plaintiff’s Claims Generally.

Black Knight and the Joinder Defendants argue that the factual basis underlying
Plaintiff’s claims is set out in Paragraphs 32 and 34 of the FAC. Mains alleges that his
note and mortgage were not timely transferred into the WAMU HE-2 Trust, for which
Citibank was the trustee, and the foreclosure judgment against him was based upon
defective or missing documents (¶ 32); that it is “possible” that collateral payments from
other sources may not have been credited to his loan (¶ 34A); that the Trust did not properly
acquire his loan (¶ 34B); that the transfer of his loan to the Trust was in violation of the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement and that documents relating to the transfer were flawed
(¶ 34C); and that Citibank as Trustee is not the holder of his note (¶ 34D). [Dkt. No. 30 at
5.] As Defendants view it, Mains asserts that “the plaintiff in his foreclosure was not the
real party in interest and lacked standing to foreclose. All of these issues were or could
have been raised during the foreclosure proceeding and Plaintiff concedes that they were
raised both before the trial court and on appeal.” [Id. (citing FAC ¶ 51 (listing issues raised
before the Clark County Circuit Court), ¶¶ 54-55 (listing questions posed by Mains to the
Indiana Supreme Court)).]
A comparison of Mains’s request for relief in the case before us to the issues decided
in the State Court Foreclosure Action leads us to the conclusion that Mains’s claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mains seeks the following specific relief in this
case:
230. In Summary, PLAINTIFF prays for judgment as follows for the
aforementioned causes of actions, counts, etc. as may be appropriate.
Specifically,
10

a.) For rescission [of his mortgage];
b.) For special damages according to proof at trial;
c.) For compensatory damages according to proof at trial, including
pain, suffering, and mental anguish; and the value of their investment
had it been invested in a well-managed portfolio;
d.) For equitable remedies including disgorgement and recoupment of
unjust enrichment;
e.) For injunctive relief [to prevent Defendants’ from collecting
against Mains and his property];
f.) For punitive damages;
g.) That damages be doubled or trebled as allowed by law;
h.) For lost principal and the losses therefrom;
i.) For costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees;
j.) Demand for Jury Trial; and
k.) For such other, further, and different relief as the Court deems just
and equitable including interest at the legal rate.
[FAC ¶ 230, 226.] The FAC also incorporates allegations relating to the State Court
Foreclosure Action and Mains’s state appeals. Specifically, Mains’s questions posed by
his motion to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court were as follows:
51. On March 11, 2013 Mains filed his Response to Citibank’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. In his response, Mains raised a number of issues which
he argued precluded summary judgment for Plaintiff Citibank. These issues
included: 1.) Plaintiff[’]s failure to prove standing to enforce his note as the
proper party in interest, 2.) Failure to provide proper evidence of mortgage
assignment and chain of title, 3.) Failure to provide a listing that Mains’ loan
was part of the WAMU HE-2 Trust 4.) Claiming to have transferred Mains’
loan into the Trust years after the Trust’s closing date in contravention of the
Trust PSA and IRS REMIC rules which would void the Trust for trying to
transfer non-conforming loans into the Trust more than 90 days after the
close date, 5.) Failure to cite a specific event or date of default as to his
mortgage note, 6.) Failure to specify evidence of amounts due or damages to
11

Plaintiff under his note, or evidence of interest rates applied or payments
applied on his note, other than through a loan detail statement from Chase
Bank’s servicing records (not, conspicuously, the WAMU HE-2 Trust
accounting records, who was the party supposedly claiming it was damaged
via the Trustee Citibank in Mains’ case).
...
55. On October 4, 2014 Mains filed a motion to transfer his case to the
Indiana Supreme Court based on 4 questions.
a. Question #1-Did the court violate Mains’ constitutional rights under
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution through the state court’s action to deprive him
of title to and possession and enjoyment of real property by enforcing a
judicial foreclosure against his economic interests based solely on a
recorded mortgage and attempted mortgage assignments without first
also requiring that the claimed mortgagee prove valid chain of title,
holder, and holder in due course status to be able to enforce the note and
mortgage as is required by the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), and
in order for court to have subject matter jurisdiction?
b. Question #2-Did the court commit reversible error and violate Mains’
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution through the
state court’s action to enforce appellants money judgment claim without
first requiring evidence of actual monetary damage suffered by the
claimant and the validity and accuracy of amounts claimed owed?
c. Question #3-Did the court commit reversible error and violate Mains’
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution through the
state court’s action to deprive him of title to and possession and
enjoyment of real property by enforcing a judicial foreclosure against his
economic interests when basing their judgment in whole or in part upon
hearsay evidence which was required to be excluded from their
consideration under Indiana state statute and Indiana case law?
d. Question #4-Were Mains’ constitutional rights under the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution violated as a result of a pattern practice in Indiana courts that
treats homeowners in mortgage foreclosure actions differently as a class
than it treats other litigants through the disparate application of the UCC
12

in mortgage foreclosure actions, and a disparate application of the rules
of evidence in mortgage foreclosure actions?
[FAC ¶¶ 51, 55.]
Mains unequivocally seeks in this action to have this court undo the State Court
Judgment, a request which is expressly barred by Rooker-Feldman. In fact, the Seventh
Circuit previously considered a case very similar to Plaintiff’s. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533.
In Taylor, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant perpetrated a fraud on the state court
which granted a judgment of foreclosure on her home. Id. To compensate her for this
alleged fraud, the plaintiff sought “to recover her home, or equal monetary value plus
interest of 10% per annum, plus punitive damages.” Id. The Seventh Circuit held that
“[t]he district court correctly determined that requesting the recovery of her home is
tantamount to a request to vacate the state court’s judgment of foreclosure, the form in
which [plaintiff’s] complaint in state court was in fact styled, and that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred granting that relief.” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, Plaintiff requests
here that we rescind his mortgage. Our conclusion mirrors the ruling in Taylor: the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests us of jurisdiction over Mains’s claims.
Mains attempts to breathe life into his claims by complaining that Defendants have
failed to “address the multiple ‘elephants in the room,’ which include: submitting forged
and fraudulent documents in state court to procure a judgment against Mains, knowingly
failing to properly disclose requested parties in discovery and during trial, and doing so
despite signing a National Mortgage Settlement (“NMS”) prohibiting this conduct.” [Dkt.
No. 114 at 2, 12 (arguing that Defendants should not be allowed to pursue allegedly legal

13

rights by committing an illegal act such as forgery, fraud, or misrepresentation).] Mains
contends that he “relied upon the validity of the fictitious documents in evaluating his
claims and defenses in 2012 when the summary judgment process was instituted against
him, and through the appeals process.” [FAC ¶ 108.] Whether the Defendants used
fraudulent documents or failed to disclose pertinent information to the State Court are
questions relating to the merits of Mains’s claims. Before delving into any of the issues
raised by Mains, we must address and resolve the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine because without jurisdiction, we cannot move forward on the merits of Plaintiff’s
claims, even if the State Court got it wrong. Garry, 82 F.3d at 1365.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is to be applied on a claim-by-claim basis. It is
possible for a plaintiff to assert claims that would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, while also alleging claims that would not implicate its bar. The Defendants, with
the exception of Citibank, as well as Mains, have approached this jurisdictional question
using broad strokes, describing Mains’s entire complaint as being barred, without diving
deep into each individual claim. Despite our conclusion that we must decline jurisdiction,
we shall nonetheless analyze each claim independently to ensure that we have carefully
considered all that Mains has alleged.
C.

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Violations Claim (Count 1).

Mains asserts a claim for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”). RESPA is found at 12 U.S.C. § 2601-2617 and, in relevant part, provides that
“[d]uring the 60-day period beginning on the effective date of transfer of the servicing of
any federally related mortgage loan, a late fee may not be imposed on the borrower with
14

respect to any payment on such loan and no such payment may be treated as late for any
other purposes, if the payment is received by the transferor servicer (rather than the
transferee servicer who should properly receive payment) before the due date applicable to
such payment.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(d). Mains alleges that during the 60 day period
following the change in the entity servicing his loan, Chase was prohibited from charging
a late fee or treating any payments as late if they were timely received and that “it is unclear
at this point as [to] what date(s) Mains’ payments were received by Chase during the 60
day window and applied to his account.” [FAC ¶ 115.]
Mains does not seek to recover damages based on his alleged RESPA claims, but
requests an accounting of all of his payments to determine whether his payments included
any late fees. [FAC ¶ 116 (alleging that his “loan cannot be said to be late as to payments,
or late fee’s [sic] charged until a proper accounting is ordered by the court”).] According
to Mains, “his loan [was] NOT in default, or late, with the WAMU HE-2 Trust, [and thus]
it is a mystery as to WHY any late fees show up in the foreclosure judgment at all.” [Dkt.
No. 114 at 14.] Mains also seeks an accounting, claiming that “[w]ithout a proper
accounting, any claims made by any of the Defendants on any debt or security must be
declared void and must not be allowed to proceed.” [FAC ¶ 227.] Alleging a violation of
RESPA, Mains contends that Citibank was prohibited from charging a late fee, which is a
claim separate and independent from the State Court Judgment and not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. [Dkt. No. 114 at 14.] We disagree.
The State Court ruled that “the sum of $271,452.17 as of November 7, 2012” was
due and payable to Citibank as Trustee of WAMU-HE2 Trust and ordered the foreclosure
15

of Mains’s mortgage, a sheriff’s sale of the real estate, and entry of an in personam
judgment against Mains for the remaining balance due, costs, and interest. [Dkt. No. 302.] If a violation of RESPA occurred, it would contradict or conflict with the State Court’s
award to Citibank, or, at a minimum, the State Court’s determination in failing to conduct
the accounting sought by Plaintiff was improper.
Our holding in Bullock v. Credit Bureau of Greater Indianapolis is applicable here.
In Bullock, the plaintiffs defaulted on their repayment of certain “payday loans”. 272 F.
Supp. 2d at 781. The creditor had obtained a state court judgment in its favor. Id.
Thereafter, debtors filed a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim in federal court alleging
that that the creditor sought to collect on void loans. Id. at 783. In that case, we held:
The problem is that plaintiffs’ theory is that [Defendants] violated the federal
law by seeking exactly what the state court awarded. In other words, the
state court determined that the amounts sought were in fact legally due. The
state court might have been right and it might have been wrong under Indiana
law. But this court could not rule in plaintiffs’ favor without holding that the
state court erred. Again, that is what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids.
When the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, “the federal courts lacks subject
matter jurisdiction even if the state court judgment was erroneous or
unconstitutional.”
Id. at 780 (citations omitted). As in Bullock, the problem with Mains’s claims here are that
in seeking a judgment that Defendants violated RESPA, he disputes precisely what the
State Court awarded. The State Court determined that the amounts sought by Citibank
were legally due, late fees included, and entered judgment in Citibank’s favor in the amount
of $271,452.17, as of November 7, 2012. We cannot rule in Mains’s favor on his RESPA
claim without holding that the State Court erred in its Judgment. This is precisely what the

16

Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider and resolve
Mains’s RESPA claim, and it shall be dismissed.
D.

Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)/Regulation Z Claim (Count 2).

Mains also asserts that Defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1631-1651 and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226. The relevant provision in the TILA
provides that the obligor of a credit transaction secured by their principal dwelling “shall
have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following
the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms
required . . . .” [15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).] “Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of
rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest
money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to
reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction.”

[Id.

§ 1635(b).] However, “[a]n obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the
date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs
first . . . .” [Id. § 1635(f).]
Mains alleges that Defendants violated the requirements of TILA and Regulation Z
in two ways: First, that Defendants knowingly misrepresented payments due under the
loan. [FAC ¶ 122.] He claims that Citibank was not the holder and servicer of the loan
and yet still collected loan payments from Plaintiff, that Citibank gave him false
information on the loan, mishandled payments, pressed forward with a foreclosure action,
and refused to disclose information as to the real holder of the loan. [Id. ¶¶ 124-25, 13031.] As explained in the next section of the order, these issues were decided by the State
17

Court. We thus lack jurisdiction over a case that, if won by Plaintiff, would reverse the
judgment in the State Court Foreclosure Action.
Second, Main alleges that on February 27, 2015 – after the Indiana Court of Appeals
affirmed the State Court Foreclosure Judgment and after the Indiana Supreme Court denied
transfer – he filed a TILA rescission to which no interested party responded within 20 days.
[FAC ¶¶ 56, 123.] 10 Mains seeks to enforce his rescission rights through his FAC; it is his
position that such rescissions are effective “when mailed, and no court action is required
to make them effective.” [FAC ¶ 56.] Because Defendants continued to take payments
from him and pressed forward with the foreclosure of his mortgage absent the right to do
so, Mains contends that he is entitled to “restitution, the refund of monies paid, the
disgorgement of ill gotten [sic] monies, and enforcement of Mains’ February 27, 2015
rescission,” non-specific injunctive relief, and termination of the security interest in his
property, among other things. [Id. ¶¶ 124-25, 132; see also Dkt. No. 103 at 9 (citing FAC
¶¶ 124-25, 130-31) (Defendants’ summary of Plaintiff’s TILA claims).]
Following the foreclosure of his mortgage, which was finalized on January 21, 2015,
which was the date the Supreme Court denied transfer of his appeal, Mains no longer
possessed a mortgage to rescind. As stated above, “The trial court granted Citibank’s
motion for summary judgment and entered an in rem judgment against the real estate and
an in personam judgment against Mains for the remaining balance due, costs, and interest.

10

Mains attached to his FAC a letter from Chase’s lawyer dated March 23, 2015, twentyfour days after Mains’s February 27, 2015 purported rescission of his mortgage and note. [Dkt.
No. 23-14.]

18

The trial court also entered an order for the foreclosure of the mortgage and for a sheriff’s
sale of the real estate.” Mains, 18 N.E.3d 319, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans denied
(Jan. 21, 2015). Mains’s aim in pursuing his TILA claim is to reverse the State Court
Judgment. 11 Defendants insist that “Plaintiff would not have suffered any TILA damages
but for Citibank and Chase’s actions against him to enforce the loan.” [Dkt. No. 103 at 9.]
According to Defendants, to grant the relief Mains requests based on his alleged TILA
violations, this court would have to revisit and invalidate the State Court’s Judgment, which
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We agree.
Therefore, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman bar, which deprives us of jurisdiction to
adjudicate Mains’s TILA claim, it must be dismissed.
E.

Violations of Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Agreements for
Residential Mortgages (Ind. Code § 32-30-10.5) (Count Three).

Mains further alleges that because Chase and Citibank were not the proper holder
and servicer of his loan, the pre-foreclosure settlement conference conducted on July 21,
2010 did not meet the requirements of Indiana Code § 32-30-10.5, the Indiana Foreclosure
Prevention Agreements for Residential Mortgages. [FAC ¶ 134.] The Indiana Foreclosure
Prevention Agreements Act seeks to avoid unnecessary residential property foreclosures.
Ind. Code § 32-30-10.5-1. Among other things, it requires that the creditor and debtor
engage in a settlement conference and, if the parties are unable to reach an agreement on

11

Mains’s rejoinder to Defendants’ motions to dismiss focuses exclusively on the law
surrounding TILA rescission. Plaintiff fails to acknowledge the critical timing of his alleged
rescission, i.e., after the State Court Judgment, which finalized the previously-adjudicated matters
related to his mortgage and foreclosed that mortgage. [Dkt. No. 114 at 15-16.]

19

the terms of a foreclosure prevention agreement, only then can a court issue a judgment of
foreclosure. Id. § 32-30-9. Mains alleges that Defendants’ fraud prevented the required
pre-foreclosure conference and, thus, the State Court Foreclosure Action was premature.
[FAC ¶ 134.]
Defendants seek a dismissal of Mains’s Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Agreements
Act claim, citing the fact that “the Indiana Court of Appeals specifically recognized that
‘the settlement conference Mains requested was conducted, but ended unsuccessfully.’”
[Dkt. No. 103 at 9 (citing Mains, 18 N.E.2d at 319).] Despite the State Court ruling on this
issue, Mains nonetheless alleges in the FAC that, at the time of the July 21, 2010 settlement
conference, he had “asked the Chase Bank representative how Chase Bank claimed any
authority to negotiate any proposed modification of his loan.” [Id. at 9-10 (quoting FAC
¶¶ 45-46, 134).]
Mains rejoins that Rooker-Feldman does not prevent this court from considering
this claim because he only “recently uncovered fraud.” [FAC ¶ 134; see also Dkt. No. 43
(Mains’s Resp. to Black Knight’s Motion to Dismiss) at 2 (“Mains is asserting completely
separate and distinct causes of action as against Black Knight in regard to the fraud that it
committed and which was recently discovered by Mains.”); Dkt. No. 114 (Mains’s Resp.
to Citibank’s Motion to Dismiss) at 3, 9 (alleging Defendants used fictitious documents
and knowingly withheld evidence from the State Court), 11.] Mains specifically describes
his claims as “seeking redress against Black Knight because they committed fraud by
fabricating a document used in a legal action against Mains.” [Dkt. No. 43 at 4 (emphasis
added).]
20

“Recently uncovered fraud” is not an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In
fact, “the proper court for an assertion of fraud in the procurement of a judgment is the one
which rendered the judgment.” Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 511 (affirming the district court’s
dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Shaffer v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No.
1:15-cv-0355-WTL-MJD, 2015 WL 5156025, *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 2, 2015) (quoting Iqbal,
780 F.3d at 730) (holding that the thrust of plaintiff’s complaint was that defendant PNC
could not enforce its note and mortgage, plaintiff alleged no extrajudicial injury, and
because fraud does not permit a federal district court to set aside a state court’s judgment,
the court lacked jurisdiction to review the state court’s actions). Subject matter jurisdiction
does not arise on the basis of recently-uncovered fraud in the procurement of a state court
judgment so as to provide an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Both the Court of Appeals decision and Mains’s FAC make clear that Mains has
raised the issue in this litigation relating to Chase’s authority to negotiate modifications of
his loan and the ownership of the loan which were issues in the State Foreclosure Action
that were resolved by the State Court. [Mains, 18 N.E.2d at 319; FAC ¶¶ 45-46, 134.] To
find in favor of Mains on his claim, we would have to conclude that that the requisite
settlement conference did not satisfy Ind. Code § 32-30-10.5-9, which would directly
contradict the findings of the Indiana Court of Appeals. Federal review of such is expressly
prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 886
(7th Cir. 2014) (holding that if the defendant was not the proper owner of the judgment,
then the plaintiff was entitled to a decision in his favor; however, no injury occurred until

21

the state court ruled against plaintiff and such claims are thus barred by Rooker-Feldman).
These claimed violations of Indiana statute are thus subject to dismissal.
F.

Plaintiff’s Tort Claims.

Plaintiff also asserts claims for negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress,
civil conversion, and negligence. Mains contends that “the activity and conduct alleged
throughout this complaint is a deliberate attempt by Defendants to destroy the credit or
interfere with their property ownership including their peaceful enjoyment thereof and is
actionable.” [FAC ¶ 141 (emotional distress).] Mains claims that he was harmed “by
making payments to incorrect parties, that . . . were not applied to the Mains’ benefit” and
that the Defendants were unjustly enriched, all the result of the Defendants’ allegedly false
representations. [Id. ¶¶ 147-52 (negligent misrepresentation claim).] In his negligence
claim (count seven), Mains challenges the Defendants’ assertion that they are the proper
parties in interest in Mains’s mortgage transaction and accuses Defendants of “falsely
creat[ing] a customer relationship with Defendant [sic].” [Id. ¶ 175.] According to Mains,
“Defendants were negligent throughout the handling of Mains’ loan payments, reporting
of his transaction and the foreclosure process,” all of which caused him to suffer various
forms of harm. [Id. ¶¶ 176-77.] In his civil conversion claim based on Ind. Code § 35-434-3 (count 10), Mains seeks “recoupment” of the payments he was “tricked” into making
to Defendants and the attorney’s fees he incurred to “stop defendants [sic] unauthorized
foreclosure action.” [Id. ¶ 219.] Mains argues that his emotional distress “claim also
passes Rooker-Feldman [sic] test because it asserts a Claim for relief outside the scope of
the state court judgment.” [Id. ¶ 143.]
22

Citibank contends that each of Plaintiff’s tort claims is “predicated on, again, the
assertion that Citibank and Chase were not the true holders or servicers of Plaintiff’s loan.”
[Dkt. No. 103 at 10 (citing FAC ¶¶ 137, 147, 158-59, 164, 175, 218).] According to
Citibank, “[a]ll of these counts attack the [judgment] of foreclosure” because Plaintiff
asserts that Citibank “harmed him by enforcing the loan documents,” which is what the
State Court Judgment resolved. [Id.]
In response to Citibank’s motion to dismiss, Mains defends his tort claims to two
brief paragraphs [see Dkt. No. 114 at 18], arguing that he “is not attacking the foreclosure
judgment. The damages incurred would have occurred regardless of the foreclosure
judgment. Mains [sic] damages were not caused by Defendants enforcing their rights under
loan documents, Mains[‘] damages were caused by Defendants[’] illegal and fraudulent
conduct, something that is not a right under any loan contract.” [Id.]
To prevail on his tort claims, the Court must find that Defendants had no right to
payment under the mortgage or to foreclose the mortgage. Negligence, whether it be the
infliction of emotional distress or making misrepresentations or committing conversion,
cannot be deemed to have occurred without a determination that the State Court got it
wrong when it issued a foreclosure order. A finding that Mains was harmed by his making
payments to incorrect parties or incurring attorneys’ fees thereby justifying an order of
recoupment, in Plaintiff’s words, to “stop Defendants[’] unauthorized foreclosure action”
requires that the State Court Foreclosure Judgment be overturned. Mains’s tort claims
plainly seek to address an injury that has arisen directly from the State Court Judgment.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine instructs us to steer clear from entertaining such claims.
23

G.

Indiana Common Law Fraud Claim (Count Six).

Mains asserts a common law fraud claim, alleging that Defendants misrepresented
their rights to collect any alleged debt or to enforce the promissory note and mortgage.
[FAC ¶¶ 158-59.] These misrepresentations, according to Mains, caused him to believe
the Defendants were collecting on a legitimate debt, which was a deception perpetrated
against both Mains and the legal system. [Id. ¶¶ 160-61.] Mains also claims that Citibank
as trustee for the WAMU HE-2 Trust “surreptitiously, purposely and intentionally tricked
the Mains into defending against a lawsuit claiming that it was a controlling entity in the
transaction by colluding with Chase bank.” [Id. ¶ 166.] Further, he contends that Black
Knight misused software and records to interfere with his right to quiet enjoyment of his
property. [Id. ¶ 167.]
The Seventh Circuit has explicitly ruled that “the proper court for an assertion of
fraud in the procurement of a judgment is the one which rendered the judgment.”
Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 511 (affirming the district court’s dismissal based on the RookerFeldman doctrine). To succeed, Plaintiff’s fraud claim, like the others before it, must
obviate the necessity of a finding that the State Court erred in awarding judgment to the
lender. Mains argues that “Defendant’s [sic] fraud and negligence provided the basis for a
lawsuit that otherwise would have been prohibited for lack of foundation.” [Dkt. No. 43
at 8.] He seeks our concurrence in his theory that he was damaged by the State Court
Judgment on the grounds that Defendants had no right to pursue the foreclosure action.
This type of claim, as we have noted previously, is quintessentially that sort that is barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Federal district courts must decline to entertain “cases
24

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464.
In a last ditch effort to stave off dismissal, Mains argues that Defendants
“wrongfully conceal[ed] their actions so that claims were not able to be brought in a state
venue.” [See Dkt. No. 43 at 7; Dkt. No. 61 at 5 (alleging that Mains suffered damages “as
a result of Defendants[’] action in bringing a foreclosure lawsuit they lacked the right to
bring”); FAC ¶ 165 (“The scheme, . . . brought all sorts of issues into the contractual
relationship which were not explained and were in fact, concealed.”).] Mains relies on a
the Seventh Circuit opinion, Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769, 773 (7th
Cir. 2014), in arguing that “Defendants helped to wrongfully conceal their actions so that
claims were not able to be brought in a state venue further affirm the standing and venue
for which Mains has brought his Complaint.” [Dkt. No. 43 at 7.] In Johnson, the Court
held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not ban a federal suit seeking damages for fraud
that resulted in an adverse judgment against plaintiff. The Court reasoned that such a suit
does not require disturbing the state court judgment, but rather, seeks damages for unlawful
conduct that the led to the judgment. Id.
The Seventh Circuit has recently revisited the Johnson holding in its decision in
Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2015). In that case, the Seventh Circuit described
Johnson’s holding as establishing a rule that “fraud (no matter how described) does not
permit a federal district court to set aside a state court’s judgment in a civil suit.” Id. at
730. The Court summarized its holding, as follows:
25

In other words, if a plaintiff contends that out-of-court events have caused
injury that the state judiciary failed to detect and repair, then a district court
has jurisdiction – but only to the extent of dealing with that injury. As we
wrote in Johnson, the federal court cannot set aside the state court’s
judgment.
Id. The material fact that Mains contends was fraudulently concealed by Defendants, to
wit, that Defendants had no right to collect on Mains’s mortgage and note, was raised in
the State Court Foreclosure Action and rejected by the State Court. To the extent Mains
seeks to recover on those same grounds – that the Defendants had no right to pursue
litigation – the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests us of jurisdiction to consider that claim
or to trump or otherwise erode the State Court Foreclosure Judgment.
Although Mains characterizes his claims as those he “reserved” for a federal court
venue during the pendency of the State Court Action, this argument is unsupported in his
FAC. [See contra Dkt. No. 43 at 7.] Mains’s fraud claim does not allege an out-of-court
event that caused an injury which the state court failed to detect and repair. Rather, Mains
alleges that Defendants “did not and do not legally have the right to collect any alleged
debt of the Plaintiff or enforce any alleged security interest” and as a result, 12 Defendants
deceived him and the legal system. [FAC ¶¶ 159, 162.] Mains’s fraud allegations posit
that he was injured by Defendants’ lack of a legal right to collect the debt. The State Court

12

More to the point, Mains argues that he “has clearly not asked the federal court to set
aside a state court action in his case, especially one that is now rendered moot in its effect by
Mains’ valid rescission.” [Dkt. No. 43 at 8.] Mains’s characterization of this action is simply
incorrect. His FAC, filed after his alleged TILA rescission, specifically requests “rescission.”
[FAC ¶ 230(a).] Mains seeks to have us derogate from the State Court Judgment by finding that
he rescinded his mortgage and thus, the State Court’s foreclosure of his mortgage was incorrect.
This we cannot do as we have now stressed on several occasions and contexts in this opinion.

26

held that Citibank did have a legal right to collect the debt from Mains and to foreclose its
security interest in the property. To conclude that Defendants committed fraud, would
entail a contradiction of the State Court Judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine directs
us to dismiss such claims for lack of jurisdiction.
H.

Violations of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Count Eight).

Mains next alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692c.

The FDCPA regulates the manner in which debt

collection may be undertaken. Specifically, the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from
making false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of
any debt.

Id. § 1692(e).

Although the FAC does not identify the specific

communication(s) that allegedly violated the FDCPA, Mains contends in this brief that
Defendants “engaged in their multiple and continuing attempts to collect upon Mains[’]
note and mortgage prior to and post rescission, conduct which were [sic] distinct events
and separate violations of the FDCPA due to the prohibited nature of the conduct under the
act . . . .” [FAC ¶ 182.] He further alleges that Defendants “used false, deceptive, or
misleading representations or means to collect money from Mains and attempt to encumber
or seize his property when they knew they had no right to do so due to defective and
falsified documents.” [Id. ¶ 187.]
Based on a generous reading of the FAC, Mains may be claiming that Defendants
violated the FDCPA in communicating with Mains after the State Court Judgment as well
as before or during the proceedings out of which the State Court Judgment came. In
alleging that Chase, N&F, and Wyatt are “debt collectors”, as defined by the FDCPA,
27

Mains points to FAC Exhibits 3, 16, and 17. Exhibit 3 (Dkt. No. 23-3) is a letter from
Washington Mutual dated March 9, 2009 stating its intent to accelerate the mortgage prior
to the State Court Judgment; however, Mains does not allege that this letter constitutes
evidence of a violation of the FDCPA. [FAC ¶ 183, Ex. 3.] Exhibit 16 (Dkt. No. 23-13)
is a series of letters from Chase dated in February, 2015, after the entry of the State Court
Judgment, in which Chase communicated with Mains regarding his request for mortgage
assistance. [Id. at Ex. 13.] Finally, Exhibit 17 (Dkt. No. 23-14) is a March 23, 2015 letter
from Wyatt, Chase’s attorney, rejecting Mains’s February 27, 2015 post-State Court
Judgment TILA rescission. [Id. at Ex. 14.]
Confusingly, Mains’s allegations relate to his purported February 27, 2015 TILA
rescission in reference to Defendants’ conduct occurring both during and after the State
Court Action. Mains alleges that Wyatt and Chase “knew a rescission had been issued by
Mains and no right to collect existed, and yet they willfully ignored the rescission notice,
ignored the court’s jurisdiction, and maliciously stated their intent to continue with
foreclosure on Mains’ home.” [FAC ¶ 187.]

This allegation suggests that his FDCPA

claim is rooted in actions that occurred both during and after the State Court Action. [See
id. at ¶ 185 (alleging that defendants “knew the right to collect the debt was invalid due to
the defective and falsified documents”); id. ¶ 191 (alleging that Chase “fail[ed] to cease its
communications with Mains and [tried] to collect a debt that no longer existed via the
notice it sent,” after Mains rescinded the mortgage); Dkt. No. 114 at 19.] Similarly, Mains
contends that Chase violated the FDCPA “by sending a notice that instead of recognizing
Mains’ lawful rescission, falsely represented the legal status of the debt as still active, that
28

their home could still be foreclosed on, that they could modify a debt that no longer existed
(OR that they had any right to modify in the first instance), and using threats that their
agent law firm(s) . . . could still legally proceed with sheriff’s sale.” [FAC ¶ 191; see Dkt.
No. 23-14]
If Mains’s FDCPA claims had ripened prior to entry of the State Court Judgment
and were independent of that Judgment, they would not be barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.

The court in Hochstetler v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

considered this issue, holding:
Plaintiffs’ claims made under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) pass the Rooker–Feldman bar. The FDCPA provides a form of
relief that can be granted without setting aside the judgment of foreclosure.
The FDCPA in § 1692k provides relief for damages as allowed at common
law, additional damages up to $1,000, and court costs. Thus, as long as the
alleged violations of the FDCPA were complete before the state court
judgment, this Court would be able to provide relief for those violations. The
claims also allege injury before the foreclosure action. As a result this Court
cannot dismiss these claims pursuant to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
No. 3:12-CV-772-JVB, 2013 WL 3756502, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 16, 2013) (citing Long v.
Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1999)). But here, the FAC explicitly
alleges that Defendants violated the FDCPA after entry of the State Court Judgment and
in conjunction with the collection of that judgment, which Mains contends was invalid.
Based on the FAC allegations, therefore, Mains’s FDCPA claims are not independent of
the State Court Judgment and were not complete prior to the State Court Judgment.
Although Mains’s FAC lacks clarity, the crux of his claim appears to be that
Defendants violated the FDCPA when they ignored his TILA rescission. [Dkt. No. 114 at
11.] Summarizing his FDCPA allegations, Mains contends that Defendants’ “violations
29

post his rescission and filing of his federal complaint” violated the FDCPA. [Id.] The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests us of jurisdiction over FDCPA claims based on the
collection of state court judgments where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he was
barred from raising this contention in state court. Witt v. Westfield Acceptance Corp., No.
IP 00-1001-C S/H, 2002 WL 826372, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2002) (citing Hamid v.
Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker, Moore & Pellettieri, No. 00 C 4511, 2001 WL 1543516, at
*10-11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2001)). Typically, the situations in which the Rooker-Feldman
bar is inapplicable are those where “either some action taken by the state court or state
court procedures in place have formed the barriers that the litigants are incapable of
overcoming in order to present certain claims to the state court.” Long, 182 F.3d at 558.
No such impediment has been alleged here. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider
Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim here.
I.

Violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”) (Count Nine).

In Count Nine of the FAC, Mains asserts a RICO claim against Defendants. The
RICO Act provides civil remedies for persons injured by a pattern of racketeering activity
“or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a
principal.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964. Mains alleges that “Defendants and their coconspirators are a group of persons associated together in fact for the common purpose of
carrying out an ongoing enterprise which committed fraudulent acts and attempted to
collect on unlawful debt from Mains within the meanings of the RICO statutes.” [FAC
¶ 203.] Mains complains that Defendants collected loan payments they did not have a right
30

to collect and transferred money they knew to be stolen, converted, or taken by fraud. [Id.]
It is Mains’s position that N&F was responsible for “prosecuting the sham litigation in
Mains’ foreclosure action” and that Chase and Citibank “directed the prosecution to try to
collect this unlawful debt in the name of the WAMU HE-2 Trust.” [Id. ¶ 204.] Mains
insists that “[i]f Defendants had no right to file the foreclosure action, it makes no
difference whether Mains previously had defaulted on his mortgage and note as they
claim.” [Id. ¶ 211.] In an effort to position this claim outside the restrictions of the RookerFeldman doctrine, Mains argues that the state court was not aware of the fraud when it
reached its decision and seeks damages resulting from Defendants’ “attempts to collect
unlawful debt from him.” [Id. ¶¶ 211-12.]
For all of the reasons explicated fully above, Mains’ RICO claim runs afoul of the
Rooker-Feldman bar. To find that a conspiracy to defraud Mains existed among the
Defendants requires a finding that the State Court erred in ruling in favor of the Defendants
by ordering the foreclosure of Mains’s mortgage. To grant Mains relief for “Defendants’
attempts to collect unlawful debt from him,” we would have to determine that the State
Court Judgment was erroneous and that Citibank and Chase were not the proper holders of
the loan and had no entitlement to the debt. A claim seeking such relief is prohibited by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
II.

Remaining Bases for Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
Finally, Defendants move to dismiss the FAC on various other grounds, including

res judicata, lack of standing, violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9, and
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Based
31

on our conclusion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Mains’s substantive claims, we
also lack jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ affirmative defenses. Taylor, 374 F.3d at
535 (“We have held that ‘[w]here Rooker-Feldman applies, lower federal courts have no
power to address other affirmative defenses, including res judicata. . . . [W]e . . .
recognize[] that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not be confused with res judicata
(which we sometimes term ‘preclusion’) and that where Rooker-Feldman applies, the res
judicata claim must not be reached.’”) (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th
Cir. 1996)).

Consequently, we shall not, indeed, we cannot, consider Defendants’

remaining defenses.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the following motions WITH PREJUDICE:
· Dkt. No. 29 – Defendant Black Knight Financial Services, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss
· Dkt. No. 38 – Defendant Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP’s Motion to Dismiss
· Dkt. No. 41 – Nelson & Frankenberger, P.C.’s Motion to Dismiss
· Dkt. No. 86 – Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs LLP’s Motion to Dismiss
· Dkt. No. 102 – Chase Bank, N.A. and Citibank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss

32

Based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we lack federal subject matter jurisdiction over all
of Plaintiff’s claims. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. 13 Final judgment
shall enter accordingly.

Date: _____________
3/31/2016

13

Cynthia Riley filed a separate Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) bars courts from
exercising jurisdiction over claims based on acts or omissions of depository institutions that have
been placed in receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over her on the grounds that she has no connection with the State of
Indiana. [Dkt. No. 52.] This motion is denied as moot.

33

Distribution:
Derek R. Molter
ICE MILLER LLP
[e-mail]

Jonathan Michael Schulte
[e-mail]
Kathleen L. Matsoukas
BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
[e-mail]

Thomas Eugene Mixdorf
ICE MILLER LLP
[e-mail]

Kyle W LeClere
BARNES THORNBURG LLP.
[e-mail]

Jonathan M. Weiss
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
[e-mail]

Fred O. Goldberg
BERGER SINGERMAN LLP
[e-mail]

Amanda Warford Edge
WYATT TARRANT & COMBS
(Louisville)
[e-mail]

Nathan T. Danielson
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
Vilda Samuel Laurin, III
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
Jordan S Huttenlocker
DYKEMA GOSSETT
[e-mail]
Louis S Chronowski, Jr
DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC
[e-mail]
Michael A. Dorelli
HOOVER HULL TURNER LLP
[e-mail]
Patrick A. Ziepolt
HOOVER HULL TURNER LLP
[e-mail]

34