COYLE NISSAN, LLC v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.

Filing 289

ORDER denying 286 Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment. SEE ORDER. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 4/15/2022. (JRB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
COYLE NISSAN, LLC,

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Plaintiff,
v.
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant.

No. 4:18-cv-00075-TWP-TAB

ENTRY ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. ("NNA") (Filing No. 286). Plaintiff
Coyle Nissan, LLC ("Coyle") initiated this action to assert claims for breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and other statutory and common law claims against NNA, arising out of the parties'
automobile manufacturer-dealer relationship. Following a motion to dismiss, motion for summary
judgment, and supplemental pleadings, only three claims and two counterclaims remain for trial,
which is scheduled to begin on June 28, 2022. The claims set for trial are Coyle's claims for breach
of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under California law, and
violation of the Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Act as well as NNA's counterclaims for
breach of contract and declaratory judgment. One and a half months after the Court held the final
pretrial conference, NNA filed its Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment. For
the following reasons, NNA's Motion is denied.
I.

Discussion

NNA asserts that the remaining supplemental claims "can be decided more quickly on the
papers than through Plaintiff Coyle Nissan LLC's ('Coyle') proposed 5 days of trial and the

testimony of twenty witnesses." (Filing No. 286 at 1.) NNA contends that "the supplemental claims
can be resolved on summary judgment, sparing the Court the time and expense of conducting a
trial." Id. at 2. NNA further argues, "due to the timing of Coyle's supplemental claims (which were
served after the deadline for dispositive motions), NNA has not had any opportunity to move for
summary judgment," and it should be given the opportunity to do so "as a matter of procedural
fairness." Id. at 2–3.
Lastly, NNA argues,
[T]he impending trial date which was an impediment to allowing a summary
judgment motion has now been removed in light of the rescheduling of trial to June
2[8], 2022. The Court denied NNA's previous requests to file a motion for summary
judgment on the supplemental claims because trial was fast approaching and the
age of this case counseled against extending the dispositive motion deadline. See
Dkt. 225; Dkt. 276 at 7. Now that the trial has been rescheduled to take place more
than three months after filing of this motion, the trial date would not need to be
postponed in order to consider the motion.
Id. at 3.
Coyle responds that allowing a summary judgment motion to be filed at this late stage of
the litigation is inappropriate. Coyle asserts,
For the third time, NNA asks this Court to grant it leave to file a dispositive
motion on Coyle's Supplemental Pleading. For the same reasons that this Court has
twice previously denied such requests, it should deny the request again. This case
is ripe for trial, and the fact that the Court had to continue the start of that trial from
March 7 to June 2[8] because of conflicting criminal matters has no bearing on the
propriety of a dispositive motion at this late stage of the case. The Court already
has determined, in great detail, the issues to be tried, the witnesses who will testify,
and the evidence that may be presented. While NNA may attempt to present the
theories that form the basis of its proposed motion for summary judgment to the
jury, those issues are not appropriate for a dispositive motion, as this Court
previously held.
(Filing No. 287 at 1.)
Coyle further points out,

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On October 18, 2021, nearly five months before the originally scheduled
trial date of March 7, NNA moved this Court for leave to file a dispositive motion
on Coyle's Supplemental Pleading. (Document 220). On October 28, 2021, the
Court denied that request, noting that "[g]iven the March 7, 2022, trial date and that
this case has been pending nearly 3 ½ years, the Court will not extend the
dispositive motions deadline." (Document 225). Then, at the February 4, 2022 Final
Pretrial Conference, NNA again moved, orally, for leave to file a dispositive
motion. In its February 8, 2022 Entry Following Final Pretrial Conference, the
Court denied that second request, noting that "this case is old and must proceed to
trial." (Document 276 at PageID 4359). The Court further noted that the issues
NNA believes entitle it to summary judgment "are relevant factual considerations
to be decided by the jury." (Id.).
Id. at 2.
Coyle also argues that nothing has changed that would make a dispositive motion
appropriate now, and while NNA suggests that the case may be resolved more quickly through a
dispositive motion than through Coyle's "proposed 5 days of trial and the testimony of twenty
witnesses," NNA ignores that eleven of those twenty witnesses appear on NNA's witness list,
including two proffered expert witnesses. And while Coyle believes that three days is not a
sufficient amount of time to try this matter, that has no bearing on whether a dispositive motion is
appropriate.
The Seventh Circuit has unequivocally explained, "[t]he district courts must manage a
burgeoning caseload, and they are under pressure to do so as efficiently and speedily as they can,
while still accomplishing just outcomes in every civil action. . . . Necessarily, they must have
substantial discretion as they manage their dockets." Reales v. CONRAIL, 84 F.3d 993, 996 (7th
Cir. 1996). "District courts have considerable discretion to manage their dockets and to require
compliance with deadlines." Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2012). See
also Stevens v. United States Dep't of State, 20 F.4th 337, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2021) ("As we often
have said, district courts have considerable discretion to manage their dockets and to require
compliance with deadlines. It is true that in this case the parties never set an explicit deadline for

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[plaintiff] to object to the adequacy of the filtered results. But that fact did not strip the district
court of all power to manage the case; to the contrary, it remained entitled to take reasonable steps
to keep the case moving forward." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
The Court already twice has rejected NNA's request to file another summary judgment
motion. The Court previously explained that the trial date is fast approaching, and this case is old—
it has been pending nearly four years. The Court has considered that it may not adjudge the
credibility of witnesses nor the weigh the evidence when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment—and the remaining issues are relevant factual considerations to be decided by the jury.
The Court already has held the final pretrial conference. The parties already have filed final witness
and exhibit lists, and the parties already have filed pretrial motions in limine, upon which the Court
already has ruled. This case is ready for trial in two months. Given the briefing schedule for a
summary judgment motion and the Court's heavy case load, another summary judgment motion
would inevitably delay the trial date set on June 28, 2022. And if a motion was permitted but
summary judgment was denied, that would only further delay the final resolution of this old case.
II.

Conclusion

The issues that remain pending for resolution are best to be decided by the trier of fact 1.
For all the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.'s
Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 286).
SO ORDERED.
Date:

4/15/2022

1
This matter is scheduled for trial by jury June 28, 2022 on Coyle's claims for breach of contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under California law, and violation of the Indiana Deceptive Franchise
Practices Act as well as NNA's counterclaims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Considering the nature
of these claims, the parties might consider the option of waiving jury if they believe a bench trial would be more
efficient.

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Distribution:
Anna K.B. Finstrom
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
[e-mail]

Brad S. Keeton
STOLL KEENON OGDEN, PLLC
[e-mail]

Evan Livermore
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
[e-mail]

Ronald C. Smith
STOLL KEENON OGDEN, PLLC
[e-mail]

Steven J. Wells
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
[e-mail]

Kirby A Black
STOLL KEENON OGDEN, PLLC
[e-mail]

William C. Wagner
TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER
[e-mail]

Christopher DeVito
MORGANSTERN, MACADAMS &
DEVITO CO., L.P.A.
[e-mail]

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