UNDERHILL v. LAWRENCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT. et al

Filing 26

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL - The defendants' motion for partial dismissal, dkt. 18 , is GRANTED. Mr. Underhill's claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are dismissed with prejudice. No partial j udgment shall issue. This action shall proceed solely with Mr. Underhill's medical deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment (See Order). Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 6/7/2021 (Copy mailed per distribution list). (TMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
RICKY L. UNDERHILL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
LAWRENCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT., et al. )
)
Defendants.
)

No. 4:20-cv-00125-SEB-DML

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL
Presently pending before the Court is the defendants' unopposed motion for partial
dismissal. Dkt. 18. For the reasons below, the defendants' motion, dkt. [18], is GRANTED.
I.
Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint need only "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
"state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing the sufficiency
of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all permissible
inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Tucker v. City of Chicago, 907 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2018).
II.
Discussion
Plaintiff Ricky Underhill initiated this action against the defendants alleging that he was
denied medical treatment for his psychiatric conditions and gastrointestinal issues while housed at
the Lawrence County Security Center. In his Complaint, Mr. Underhill asserts claims under the

Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See dkt. 1. In its Screening Order, the Court allowed the following
claims to proceed:
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Claims against Sheriff Mike Branham and the Lawrence County Sheriff's
Office pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–
213, or the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794–794e.

•

Fourteenth Amendment claims against Sheriff Mike Branham and the
Lawrence County Sheriff's Office pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These claims
shall be based on the theory that Mr. Underhill was denied medical treatment
for his psychiatric conditions and G.E.R.D. while housed at the Lawrence
County Security Center.

See dkt. 11 at 3. In the presently pending motion, the defendants have moved to dismiss Mr.
Underhill's claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against "qualified individuals with disabilities
in all programs, activities, and services of public entities." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." The analyses of claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are
essentially the same except that the Rehabilitation Act includes an additional element, requiring
that the entity denying access receive federal funds. See Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667,
671–72 (7th Cir. 2012); Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (ADA and
Rehabilitation Act standards are "functionally identical").
Here, as the defendants correctly point out, the only allegations in Mr. Underhill's
Complaint which plausibly relate to a program, service, or activity are those allegations concerning
inadequate medical care provided by the defendants. But inadequate medical care cannot serve as
the basis for a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246,

249 (7th Cir. 1996); Resel v. Fox, 26 Fed. Appx. 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Ruffin v.
Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 181 F. App'x 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2006) (a plaintiff "cannot challenge a
medical treatment decision under the ADA") (citations omitted). Furthermore, Mr. Underhill has
filed no response to the Defendants' motion attempting to clarify how he has stated a claim under
either the ADA or the Rehabilitation, and the time to do so has long passed.
The Court therefore finds that while Mr. Underhill has sufficiently alleged claims of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he
has failed to state a claim against the defendants under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for partial dismissal, dkt. [18], is GRANTED.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the defendants' motion for partial dismissal, dkt. [18], is
GRANTED. Mr. Underhill's claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are dismissed
with prejudice. No partial judgment shall issue.
This action shall proceed solely with Mr. Underhill's medical deliberate indifference claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:

6/7/2021

_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
RICKY L. UNDERHILL
953146
IDOC BLOOMINGTON PAROLE DISTRICT
1500 N. Packing House Rd.
Suite #100
Bloomington, IN 47404