Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. CRST Van Expedited Inc - See #453 to set additional brief deadlines

Filing 441

ORDER denying 414 Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)6. (See order text). Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 12/14/15. (ksy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,

No. 07-CV-95-LRR

vs.

ORDER

CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC.,
Defendant.
____________________
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(“EEOC”) “Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)” (“Motion”)
(docket no. 414).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
On September 27, 2007, the EEOC filed the instant lawsuit on behalf of Monika
Starke and a class of similarly situated female employees of Defendant CRST Van
Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”). Original Complaint (docket no. 2) at 1. Pursuant to Section
706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the EEOC brought suit in its own name “to correct
[CRST’s] unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, and to provide appropriate
relief to . . . Starke and a class of similarly situated female employees of [CRST] who
were adversely affected by such practices.” First Amended Complaint (docket no. 8) at
1. On November 30, 2007, CRST filed an Answer (docket no. 11). On May 1, 2008,
CRST filed an Amended Answer (docket no. 36). On August 13, 2009, the court found

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For purposes of the instant Order, the court finds it appropriate to provide only
an abbreviated history of the case.

that EEOC was barred from seeking relief on behalf of 67 individuals because the EEOC
“wholly abandoned its statutory duties” by: (1) failing to investigate those individuals’
claims until after the EEOC filed the Complaint; (2) not including the 67 individuals as
members in the Letter of Determination’s “class” until after the EEOC filed the
Complaint; (3) failing to make a reasonable cause determination as to the specific
allegations of any of the 67 individuals; and (4) not attempting to conciliate the specific
allegations of the 67 individuals prior to filing the Complaint. See August 13, 2009 Order
(docket no. 263). The Clerk of Court entered a Judgment (docket no. 279) on October 1,
2009. On August 1, 2013, the court awarded CRST attorney’s fees and costs. August 1,
2013 Order (docket no. 400). On December 22, 2014, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the attorney’s fees award. See EEOC v. CRST Van
Expedited, Inc., 774 F.3d 1169 (8th Cir. 2014). On May 19, 2015, CRST filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on December 4, 2015. See
Notice of Writ of Certiorari (docket no. 411); CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, ___
S. Ct. ___, ___, No. 14-1375 (2015).
On July 10, 2015, the EEOC filed the Motion. On July 27, 2015, CRST filed a
Resistance (docket no. 415). On August 6, 2015, the EEOC filed a Reply (docket no.
417). On November 11, 2015, CRST filed a supplement (“CRST Supplement”) (docket
no. 431). On November 16, 2015, the EEOC filed a supplement and response (“EEOC
Supplement”) (docket no. 433). On November 18, 2015, CRST filed a response (“CRST
Supplement Response”) (docket no. 435). The Motion is fully submitted and ready for
decision.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Parties’ Arguments
The EEOC requests that the court grant relief from the court’s August 13, 2009
Order and the Judgment of October 1, 2009, to the extent such judgment is based on the
August 13, 2009 Order, vacate the dismissal of the EEOC’s complaint on behalf of 67
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allegedly aggrieved individuals and set the matter for trial. The EEOC argues that Mach
Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S.Ct. 1645 (2015), “clarified the EEOC’s pre-suit obligations”
and that the court’s decision dismissing the 67 allegedly aggrieved individuals is contrary
to that decision. Brief in Support of the Motion (docket no. 414-1) at 3. The EEOC
argues that the court should grant relief because “Mach Mining constitutes a change in
applicable law” sufficient to justify relief under Rule 60 and “the denial of a trial on the
merits strongly weighs in favor of granting a Rule 60 motion.” Id. at 6-10. The EEOC
also argues that litigation in this case is still ongoing with respect to attorney’s fees and the
case would be “close to ready for trial.” Id. at 11.
CRST argues that the court should deny the Motion because “Mach Mining did not
change the law governing the Title VII pre-suit requirements issue in this case” and, even
if it did, relief under Rule 60 requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” which
are not present in the instant action. Resistance at 2-3.
B. Applicable Law
Rule 60(b) allows the court to
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . . ,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released
or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (formatting omitted). Relief under Rule 60 is “an extraordinary
remedy for exceptional circumstances.” City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Bank of Lake
Superior Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147, 1155 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Zimmerman, 869
F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1989)) (quotation marks omitted). “Generally, a change in the
law that would have governed the dispute, had the dispute not already been decided, is not
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by itself an extraordinary circumstance warranting Rule 60(b) relief from a final
judgment.” Carlson v. Hyundai Motor Co., 222 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Kan. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assoc., 194 F.3d 922, 925 (8th
Cir. 1999)) (quotation marks omitted). However, “[a] change in governing law can
represent so significant an alteration in circumstances as to justify both prospective and
retrospective relief from the obligations of a court order.” City of Duluth, 702 F.3d at
1154. Therefore, to determine whether relief in the instant action is warranted, the court
must consider whether extraordinary circumstances exist.
C. Application
1.

Change in the law

The EEOC argues that Mach Mining “changed the governing law and established
the incorrectness of the dismissal of the case.” Brief in Support of the Motion at 6. In
Mach Mining, the Supreme Court considered the question of “whether and how courts may
review” the EEOC’s conciliation efforts in an employment discrimination case. See Mach
Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1649. The Supreme Court held “that a court may review whether
the EEOC satisfied its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before filing suit.
But . . . the scope of that review is narrow, thus recognizing the EEOC’s extensive
discretion to determine the kind and amount of communication with an employer
appropriate in any given case.” Id. In dicta, the Supreme Court also noted that where the
EEOC’s conciliation efforts are insufficient, “the appropriate remedy is to order the EEOC
to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain voluntary compliance.” Id. at 1656.
The EEOC states that dismissal for failure to conciliate is impermissible following
Mach Mining. Brief in Support of the Motion at 6. Furthermore, the EEOC argues that
the court erroneously “faulted the EEOC for not telling CRST the size of the class and the
identity of class members, . . . a requirement Mach Mining specifically rejects.” Brief in
Support of the Motion at 6. However, the issue in Mach Mining was to what extent a
court may inquire into the EEOC’s conciliation process. The class definition was not a
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contested issue. Here, the court was not inquiring into the sufficiency of the conciliation
process itself, but rather found that no investigation or conciliation with respect to the 67
individual claims occurred at all. See August 13, 2009 Order at 30-31, 36-37 (“Because
the EEOC did not investigate, issue a reasonable cause determination or conciliate the
claims of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons, the court shall bar the EEOC from seeking
relief on their behalf . . . .”). Therefore, Mach Mining is inapplicable to the instant
action, insofar as it concerns inquiry into the specifics of the EEOC’s conciliation process.
Furthermore, it is the court’s opinion that Mach Mining’s statement that “the
appropriate remedy is to order the EEOC to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain
voluntary compliance” does not necessarily prevent a court from dismissing a case where
no investigation occurs. See Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1656. The issue in Mach Mining
was limited to the sufficiency of the EEOC’s conciliation process and the permissible level
of judicial inquiry into that process. Mach Mining did not address the appropriate remedy
when the EEOC fails to engage in any investigation of claims prior to the conciliation
process. See EEOC v. CollegeAmerica Denver, Inc., 2015 WL 6437863, at *3 (D. Colo.
Oct. 23, 2015) (finding that dismissal was not inappropriate in a case involving the
EEOC’s failure to provide notice, as well as a failure to conciliate, even in light of Mach
Mining).

In the court’s opinion, the fact that Mach Mining clarifies a stay as the

appropriate remedy upon a finding that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts were insufficient
would not impact the result in this case. Cf. EEOC v. OhioHealth Corp., ___ F. Supp.
3d. ___, ___, 2015 WL 3952339, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 29, 2015) (finding that
conciliation efforts did not occur and ordering a stay of proceedings so the parties could
conciliate, but noting that if the EEOC “fails to engage in good faith efforts at conciliation
as ordered,” the district court would “impose any or all consequences available,
including . . . dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute”). But see EEOC v.
Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 5697315, at *10 n.12 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2015)

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(noting that if “the EEOC did not attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating a
claim, the proper remedy is not dismissal” following Mach Mining).
The EEOC argues that EEOC v. Autozone, Inc. demonstrates that the court went too
far by “not limit[ing] its review to the letter of determination but examin[ing] the kind and
extent of investigation conducted and whether the investigation supported the EEOC’s class
finding in its reasonable cause determination.” See EEOC Supplement at 2; EEOC v.
Autozone, Inc., 2015 WL 6710851, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2015) (applying Mach Mining
to an EEOC investigation and finding that such investigation was sufficient to support a
pattern-or-practice claim against the defendant). However, Autozone concerned a patternor-practice claim alleging that the defendant employer’s attendance policy discriminated
against certain applicants. The Autozone court found that an adequate investigation had
occurred with respect to that claim. Here, the issue was not that the EEOC’s conciliation
discussions or investigation were merely inadequate, but that no investigation of the 67
claims was conducted and therefore no conciliation actually occurred with respect to those
claims. Indeed, as noted in the court’s August 13, 2009 Order, 27 of the individuals had
not even been sexually harassed prior to the filing of the Complaint. See August 13, 2009
Order at 31-32. Under these circumstances, dismissal could still be an appropriate remedy
even in light of Mach Mining. However, even if the court assumes that dismissal is
unavailable post-Mach Mining, and that the only appropriate remedy is now a stay, the
change in the law would have to constitute extraordinary circumstances to justify
retrospective relief under Rule 60.
2.

Extraordinary circumstances

Even if the court assumes that Mach Mining constitutes a change in the law
applicable to the instant action, such a change does not normally constitute the
extraordinary circumstances required for Rule 60(b) relief. See Kan. Pub. Emps. Ret.
Sys., 194 F.3d at 925 (“Generally, a change in the law that would have governed the
dispute, had the dispute not already been decided, is not by itself an extraordinary
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circumstance. Society’s powerful countervailing interest in the finality of judgments
simply requires that each case have an end, though the law continues to evolve.” (citations
omitted)).
The EEOC argues that a Supreme Court decision “may constitute exceptional
circumstances for granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion” and that Mach Mining is “just such a
case.” Brief in Support of the Motion at 6. The EEOC also argues that the denial of a
trial on the merits of the 67 claims “strongly weighs in favor of granting” the Motion. Id.
at 10. Finally, the EEOC argues that the following factors weigh in favor of granting the
Motion: “the importance of injunctive relief to remedy discriminatory workplace
conditions; that the parties have not changed their positions as a result of the judgment . . ;
that discovery has been completed, there is a fully-developed factual record, and the case
is close to ready for trial; and that litigation is ongoing with respect to one aspect of the
case (attorney’s fees).” Id. at 11. CRST argues that a change in the law does not
normally constitute extraordinary circumstances and that the fact that the 67 claims were
not decided on the merits does not justify relief. Resistance at 14-15.
Relief under Rule 60(b) is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. See Jones
v. Ferguson Pontiac Buick GMC, Inc., 374 Fed. App’x 787, 789 (10th Cir. 2010). Such
relief “is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of
litigation.” Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Ben. Fund, 249 F.3d
519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Waifersong Ltd., Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976
F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992)) (quotation marks omitted). “This is especially true in an
application of subsection (6) of Rule 60(b) . . . .” Id. “This is because ‘almost every
conceivable ground for relief is covered’ under the other [five] subsections” and,
“[c]onsequently, courts must apply Rule 60(b)(6) relief only in ‘unusual and extreme
situations where principles of equity mandate relief.’” Id. (quoting Olle v. Henry &
Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)). “Rule 60(b) relief is . . . appropriate

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only when it offends justice to deny such relief.” Jones, 374 Fed.App’x at 789 (quoting
Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv. Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005)).
The court finds that the general proposition that a change in the law “is not by itself
an extraordinary circumstance” governs in the instant action. See Kan. Pub. Emps. Ret.
Sys., 194 F.3d at 925. The parties fully briefed this issue when it arose in 2009 and
argued their respective positions to the court. See August 13, 2009 Order at 23-24.
Judgment entered on October 1, 2009. See Judgment. Whether Mach Mining constitutes
a change in the applicable law is, under these circumstances, a moot point in the instant
action. It has been six years since this issue was decided by the court.2 To grant relief in
the instant action would open the floodgates for countless other decisions that were issued
based on laws that may have changed in the interim. This scenario is the basis for the
importance of the “finality of judgments” and the need for limiting relief under Rule 60(b)
to truly extraordinary cases, cases where the denial of relief offends justice. See Jones,
374 Fed. App’x at 789.

The instant action does not present such extraordinary

circumstances to warrant relief. Accordingly, the court shall deny the Motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the “Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6)” (docket no. 414) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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The court notes that the EEOC did not pursue Supreme Court review of the Eighth
Circuit’s decision regarding presuit requirements in this case, despite requesting and
receiving a stay of the Eighth Circuit’s mandate for that purpose. See EEOC Motion for
a 90-Day Stay of Mandate, EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 09-3764 (8th Cir.
June 13, 2012).
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DATED this 14th day of December, 2015.

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