Woodard v. O'Brien et al

Filing 93

ORDER Accepting 87 Report and Recommendations granting 82 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Linda Boffeli, Durga Satyavolu, Jerry Connelly, Edward O'Brien, Sally Potter and granting 84 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Robert Dana Woodard. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 4/20/11. (copy w/NEF to pro se filer) (djs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

ROBERT DANA WOODARD,
Plaintiff,

No. C07-0121-MWB

vs.
EDWARD O’BRIEN, JERRY
CONNELLY, DURGA SATYAVOLU,
SALLY PORTER, and LINDA
BOFFELI,

ORDER REGARDING
MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
CONCERNING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
____________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Standard Of Review Of A Report And Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B. Summary Judgment Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Woodard’s Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Robert Dana Woodard alleges defendants
Edward O’Brien, Jerry Connelly, Durga Satyavolu, Sally Potter, and Linda Boffeli
violated his Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs by refusing to provide proper, timely treatment for a severe eye infection.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) Woodard fails to state an Eighth
Amendment claim because there is no evidence of defendants’ deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need; (2) he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and (3)
alternatively, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. In response, Woodard’s
attorney filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), accompanied by a brief and the opinions of experts hired by Woodard
to review the case.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was referred to Chief United States
Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On January 10,
2011, Judge Zoss filed his Report and Recommendation. Judge Zoss recommends that
summary judgment be granted, and that Woodard’s counsel’s motion to withdraw be
granted. Judge Zoss concludes summary judgment should be granted on the merits
because Woodard is unable to show defendants ignored an acute or escalating situation,
or that the defendants’ delays in providing him with treatment adversely affected the
prognosis or ultimate outcome of his eye condition. Judge Zoss also concludes that
defendant are not entitled to qualified immunity, or to summary judgment, on the ground
that Woodard failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Judge Zoss found defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity because Woodard’s claims are based on deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need and his constitutional right to necessary medical
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treatment was clearly established at the time of the conduct here and would have been
known to any reasonable correctional officer. Judge Zoss found summary judgment should
be denied on defendants’ failure to exhaust argument because the penitentiary’s grievance
procedure is ambiguous regarding an inmate’s need to appeal prior to filing a lawsuit and
Woodard complied with the grievance procedure to the best of his ability. Alternatively,
Judge Zoss concluded a genuine issue of material fact had been generated regarding
whether Woodard properly exhausted his administrative remedies, precluding summary
judgment. On January 24, 2011, defendants filed their objections to Judge Zoss’s Report
and Recommendation (docket no. 88). On February 7, 2011, Woodard mailed his pro se
objections to the Report and Recommendation, asserting that he had only received the
Report and Recommendation that day and requesting that his objections be considered
timely. Woodard’s pro se objections were received and filed on February 14, 2011.
Because Woodard claims he did not receive Judge Zoss’s Report and Recommendation
until February 7th, I will consider Woodard’s objections as timely filed. Thus, I review
Judge Zoss’s Report and Recommendation.
B. Factual Background
In his Report and Recommendation, Judge Zoss made the following findings of fact:
Woodard was an inmate at ASP from August 30, 2006,
to October 7, 2008. During that time, the defendant Edward
O’Brien was a physician at the Iowa Medical Classification
Center, acting in a supervisory capacity over physicians within
the Iowa DOC. The defendant Jerry Connelly was Nursing
Services Director at ASP. The defendant Durga Satyavolu was
a doctor at ASP. Sally Potter and Linda Boffeli were nurses
at ASP.

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Woodard began experiencing problems with his left eye
at least as early as June 2006. Dr. Silbermann summarized
Woodard’s pre-incarceration history as follows:
Mr. Woodard initially presented to the
University [of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics] on
June 6, 2006 (prior to his incarceration) with a
history of having been beaten with a tire iron
and having left eye pain. The ocular findings in
the left eye were consistent with an inflammatory
process in this eye and were felt to be unrelated
to the trauma. Later notes (7-11-06) indicate
that there had been a long standing history of
decreased vision in his left eye predating the
present episode. There was a significant past
medical history including tuberculosis, hepatitis
C, and osteomyelitis. This is pointed out
because there are a number of systemic
conditions that may have intraocular
inflammation as part of their presentation and
clinical course. Mr. Woodard was started on
conventional therapy to manage the
inflammation, but, this was not particularly
helpful. Extensive medical work up was begun
in an effort to establish an etiology, so as to be
able to provide more directed therapy. . . . Mr.
Woodard was evaluated by Infectious Disease at
the University several times. The impression
was that there had been multiple epidemiologic
exposures during which Mr. Woodard could
have acquired an infectious agent and his present
situation might be related to one of these with an
organism being the cause of the uveitis.
Doc. No. 84-2, p. 3.

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Thus, when Woodard entered ASP, he already was
experiencing significant problems with his left eye. According
to Woodard, his problems started with floaters in his eye,
redness, pain, and blurriness, which progressed into severe
pain, persistent infections, and blindness in his left eye. Doc.
No. 7, p. 3. Woodard was referred to a specialist in the
Ophthalmology Clinic at the University of Iowa Hospitals and
Clinics (“UIHC”). From his review of Woodard’s medical
records, Dr. Ekwena provided the following summary of the
course of Woodard’s treatment at UIHC:
[Woodard] was referred to UIHC ophthalmology
where he underwent screen tests and cultures
and several eye procedures and was ultimately
diagnosed with chronic uveitis which was at a
point linked to some fungal infection. His vision
progressively deteriorated.
He underwent
various treatments including but not limited to
kenalog injections, anti-fungal medications,
vitrectomy and Retisert implant OS in 12/06,
and pars plana vitrectomy, membranescleral
buckle, endolaser, injection of amphotericin and
voriconazole, gas fluid exchange retinal
reattachment in 01/07. Finally on 07/02/07 he
had enucleation of the left eye and subsequently
received an artificial eye implant.
Doc. No. 84-2, p. 6.
....
Dr. Ekwena observes, in his report, that Woodard’s
interactions with ASP staff did not go well, and he opines “the
staff could have exhibited more empathy given the potential
frustration inherent in a condition such as [Woodard’s].” Doc.
No. 84-2, p. 8. He further noted that ASP staff “should have
been more proactive and caring to Mr. Woodard’s concerns
and exhibited more understanding of his frustration and
needs.” Id., p. 7. He observed that “[t]here were times when
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it appeared there were delays in follow up and in responding
to [Woodard’s] concerns but they do not appear to constitute
medical negligence.” Id. The doctor indicated it was
“difficult to determine if the ultimate outcome of [Woodard’s]
left eye would have been otherwise given the chronicity of his
condition, complexity and the co-morbid pathologies,” noting
Woodard “had compounding medical variables which made it
. . . difficult to identify the etiology of his pathology and that
complicated the treatment process.” Id. In Dr. Ekwena’s
opinion, the defendants’ actions did not rise to the level of
medical negligence, and he found “nothing specific in
[Woodard’s] records . . . that would clearly confirm his
allegations of medical indifference.” Id., pp. 7, 8.
Dr. Silbermann reached similar conclusions, as follows:
In my medical opinion after review of all the
record, is that Mr. Woodard, had a severe long
standing infectious inflammatory process
(predating his incarceration) that resulted in loss
of an eye, despite the best efforts, by all
concerned. The brief interruption in receiving
drops would not have altered the process and
would not have affected the patient’s course.
The outcome would not have been different.
Doc. No. 84-2, p. 5.
Report and Recommendation at 12-16. Upon review of the record, I adopt all of Judge
Zoss’s factual findings.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard Of Review Of A Report And Recommendation
The district court’s standard of review for a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation is established by statute:
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A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (stating identical requirements);
N.D. IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive matters to a magistrate judge
but not articulating any standards to review the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation). The United States Supreme Court has explained this statutory standard,
as follows:
Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III
judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute
does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no
objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the
district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a
de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985).
Thus,
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A district court may review de novo any issue in a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation at any
time. Id. This discretion to conduct de novo review of
any issue at any time makes sense, because the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has “emphasized the
necessity . . . of retention by the district court of
substantial control over the ultimate disposition of
matters referred to a magistrate.” Belk v. Purkett, 15
F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994).

!

If a party files an objection to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, however, the district court
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must “make a de novo determination of those portions
of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis added). In most cases,
to trigger de novo review, “objections must be timely
and specific,” Thompson v. Nix., 897 F.2d 356, 358-59
(8th Cir. 1990): however, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has been willing to “liberally construe[]”
otherwise general pro se objections to require a de novo
review of all “alleged errors,” see Hudson v. Gammon,
46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995), and has also been
willing to conclude that general objections require “full
de novo review” if the record is concise, Belk, 15 F.3d
at 815 (“Therefore, even had petitioner’s objections
lacked specificity, a de novo review would still have
been appropriate given such a concise record.”). When
objections have been made, and the magistrate judge’s
report is based upon an evidentiary hearing, “‘the
district court must, at a minimum, listen to a tape
recording or read a transcript of the evidentiary
hearing.’” United States v. Azure, 539 F.3d 904, 910
(8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jones v. Pillow, 47 F.3d 251,
252 (8th Cir. 1995), in turn quoting Branch v. Martin,
886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989)).
!

In the absence of an objection, the district court is not
required “to give any more consideration to the
magistrate’s report than the court considers
appropriate.” Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150; see also
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991)
(section 636(b)(1) “provide[s] for de novo review only
when a party objected to the magistrate’s findings or
recommendations” (emphasis added)); United States v.
Ewing, 632 F.3d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 2011) (“By failing
to file objections, Ewing waived his right to de novo
review [of a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation on a suppression motion] by the
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district court.”). Indeed, Thomas suggests that no
review at all is required. Id. (“We are therefore not
persuaded that [section 636(b)(1)] requires some lesser
review by the district court when no objections are
filed.”).
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has indicated that a district court should review
the portions of a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation to which no objections have been
made under a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.
See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting when no objections are filed and the time
for filing objections has expired, “[the district court
judge] would only have to review the findings of the
magistrate judge for clear error”); Taylor v. Farrier,
910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting the advisory
committee’s note to FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) indicates
“when no timely objection is filed the court need only
satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of
the record”). Review for clear error, even when no
objection has been made, is consistent with “retention
by the district court of substantial control over the
ultimate disposition of matters referred to a
magistrate.” Belk, 15 F.3d at 815.
Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has not explained precisely what “clear error” review
means in this context, in other contexts, the Supreme
Court has stated that the “foremost” principle under this
standard of review “is that ‘[a] finding is “clearly
erroneous” when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

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Because there are objections in this case, I must conduct a de novo review. Keeping
these standards in mind, I will first briefly review the summary judgment standards,
followed by an analysis of the parties’ objections to Judge Zoss’s Report and
Recommendation.
B. Summary Judgment Standards
Motions for summary judgment essentially “define disputed facts and issues and . . .
dispose of unmeritorious claims [or defenses].” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 585 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (“One of the principal purposes of the summary
judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. . . .”).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). A fact
is material when it “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’”
Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, “the substantive law will identify which
facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine if it
has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)),
or when “‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party’ on the
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question,” Woods, 409 F.3d at 990 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248); see Diesel
Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating
genuineness depends on “whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence”).
Procedurally, the moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which
show a lack of a genuine issue,” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323), and demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment according to law. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323 (“[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the
district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set
forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.”). Once the moving party has successfully carried its
burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to go beyond the
pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate “specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Mosley, 415 F.3d at 910
(“The nonmoving party may not ‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate
on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.’”
(quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995))). In considering
whether a genuine issue of material fact is present the court must view all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences.

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88; Mosley, 415 F.3d at 910.

However, the court does not weigh the evidence, assess credibility, or determine the truth
of the matters presented. Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th
Cir. 2004); Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996).

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C. Woodard’s Objections
In his pro se objections, Woodard reasserts his contention that defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to properly disburse his
medications. Woodard objects to Judge Zoss’s conclusion that his claims do not establish
an Eighth Amendment violation.
The Eighth Amendment places a duty on prison officials to provide humane
conditions of confinement. Weaver v. Clarke, 45 F.3d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). One such humane condition of confinement
is adequate medical attention. Weaver v. Clarke, 45 F.3d at 1255 “[A] prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent either to a prisoner’s
existing serious medical needs or to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious future
harm.” Id. (comparing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (existing medical
needs), with Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993) (risk of future harm to
health)); see Bender v. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133, 1137 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[p]rison
doctors and guards violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with ‘deliberate
indifference to [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’”) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
In a deprivation of medical care case, the inmate must show (1) an objectively serious
medical need; and (2) the defendants actually knew of the medical need but were
deliberately indifferent to it. See Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010);
Jones v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corrections, 512 F.3d 478, 481-82 (8th Cir. 2008); Albertson
v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 2006); Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 808-09 (8th
Cir. 2006).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
An objectively serious medical need is one that either has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or is so
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obvious that even a “layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” See Coleman v. Rahija, 114
F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997), quoting Camberos v. Branstad,
73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995). “‘To establish a
constitutional violation, it is not enough that a reasonable
official should have known of the risk.’ Rather, a plaintiff
must demonstrate the official actually knew of the risk and
deliberately disregarded it.” Vaughn v. Greene County, Ark.,
438 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2006), quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d
811 (1994). The determination that prison officials had actual
knowledge of a serious medical need may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence or from the very fact that the risk was
obvious. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S. Ct. 1970. If
prison officials have actual knowledge of a serious medical
need, and fail to take reasonable measures to address it, they
may [be] held liable for deliberate indifference. See id. at 847,
114 S. Ct. 1970. “However, ‘[a] showing of deliberate
indifference is greater than gross negligence and requires more
than mere disagreement with treatment decisions.” Pietrafeso
v. Lawrence County, S.D., 452 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2006),
quoting Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2006).
Jones, 512 F.3d at 481-82; see Hott v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, 260 F.3d 901, 905
(8th Cir. 2001) (citing elements of an Eighth Amendment claim); Moore v. Duffy, 255
F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing elements and noting that deliberate indifference
required “something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm; it requires
proof of a reckless disregard of the known risk”) (quotation and citation omitted); Jolly v.
Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (setting out elements of Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim and noting “‘[t]he prisoner must show more than negligence,
more than even gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation.’”) (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell,
56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995)). Additionally, “[w]here the complaint involves treatment
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of a prisoner’s sophisticated medical condition, expert testimony is required to show proof
of causation.” Alberson v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762, 765-66 (8th Cir. 2006) (prisoner died
after treating doctors failed to diagnose his Goodpasture Syndrome, “a rare autoimmune
disease that is difficult to diagnose.”); see Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 644-46 (8th
Cir. 2006) (inmate with peripheral diabetic neuropathy, “a disease which causes numbness
in the feet and which makes any injury to his feet a serious health risk”, challenged
treatment for burns to his feet); Robinson v. Hager, 292 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2002)
(inmate argued “lapse in hypertension medication” caused him to have a stroke).
I agree with Judge Zoss that Woodard’s claims fail for a lack of proof of causation.
Woodard’s severe eye infection was a sophisticated medical condition. His eye infection
was complicated, requiring that he be seen and treated multiple times by specialists at the
Ophthalmology Clinic at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. Thus, expert
testimony is necessary to establish causation. See Alberson, 458 F.3d 762, 765-66;
Gibson, 433 F.3d at 644-46; Robinson, 292 F.3d at 564. Woodard has not offered any
expert opinion evidence supporting his claims that defendants’ treatment was
constitutionally inadequate. Defendants, however, provided the affidavit of defendant
Jerry Connelly, a registered nurse and the Director of Nursing Services at the Anamosa
State Penitentiary, attesting that the treatment provided to Woodard was “appropriate and
timely.”

Defendant’s Ex. C., Connelly Aff. at ¶ 3.

Defendants have buttressed

Connelly’s affidavit with reports from Woodard’s own experts, ophthalmologist Neil
Silbermann, M.D. and family practice physician Jason Ekwena, M.D., both of whom
conclude that defendants provided Woodard with adequate medical care for his eye
infection. Woodard’s bare allegations to the contrary are insufficient to substantiate an
Eighth Amendment violation. “In the face of medical records indicating that treatment was
provided and physician affidavits indicating that the care provided was adequate, an inmate
14

cannot create a question of fact by merely stating that [he] did not feel [he] received
adequate treatment.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997); see
Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3d 1115, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 2007) (“‘[A]
prisoner’s mere difference of opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or a course
of medical treatment fail[s] to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.’”) (quoting
Taylor v. Bowers, 966 F.2d 417, 421 (8th Cir. 1992)); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765 (8th
Cir. 1996) (“Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to any particular type of
treatment. Prison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment when, in the exercise of
their professional judgment, they refuse to implement a prisoner’s requested course of
treatment.”). When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Woodard, he has failed
to produce evidence, given the complete lack of favorable expert opinion evidence, which
would permit a reasonable jury to find that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. The circumstances of this lawsuit are obviously unfortunate, but
do not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Therefore, Woodard’s pro se objections
are overruled and defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment granted.

1

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I overrule Woodard’s pro se objections and adopt
Judge Zoss’s Report and Recommendation.

The defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (docket no. 82) and Woodard’s counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
(docket no. 84) are granted, and judgment shall enter accordingly.
1

Having granted summary judgment on the merits, it is unnecessary to consider
defendants’ objections to Judge Zoss’s Report and Recommendation that they are entitled
to qualified immunity, or that Woodard’s claims are barred for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 20th day of April, 2011.

__________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

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