Jones v. United States of America
Filing
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ORDER denying re 1 PRO SE MOTION to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (2255) (Criminal Action 08-cr-0066) filed by Chad Edward Jones. A certificate of appealability is denied. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 8/26/11. (Copy w/NEF to Plf) (ksy)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
CHAD EDWARD JONES,
Movant,
No. C11-0023-LRR
No. CR08-0066-LRR
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
ORDER
__________________________
This matter comes before the court on Chad Edward Jones’ motion to vacate, set
aside or correct sentence (docket no. 1). On March 2, 2011, Chad Edward Jones (“the
movant”) filed his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the
movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied,1 and a certificate of appealability shall
be denied.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows a prisoner who is in custody and under a sentence of a
federal court to move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. To
1
No response from the government is required because the motion and file make
clear that the movant is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Rule 4(b), Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Similarly, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.
See id.; see also Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating
that district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
without an evidentiary hearing “if (1) the . . . allegations, accepted as true, would not
entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they
are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements
of fact”); United States v. Oldham, 787 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that district
court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner must establish: (1) the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral
attack. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417
(1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
Although it appears to be broad, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not provide a remedy for
“all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178, 185, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is intended
to redress only “fundamental defect[s] which inherently [result] in a complete miscarriage
of justice” and “omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”
Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996)
(“Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and
for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct
appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.”) (citing
Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987)). A collateral challenge
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not interchangeable or substitutable for a direct appeal. See
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982)
(making clear a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will not be allowed to do service for
an appeal). Consequently, “[a]n error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not
necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In addition, movants ordinarily are precluded from asserting claims that they failed
to raise on direct appeal. See McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001).
“A [movant] who has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review
may raise the claim in a [28 U.S.C. §] 2255 proceeding only by demonstrating cause for
the default and prejudice or actual innocence.” Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523
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U.S. 614, 622, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)); see also Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003) (“[T]he general
rule [is] that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review
unless the [movant] shows cause and prejudice.”). “‘[C]ause’ under the cause and
prejudice test must be something external to the [movant], something that cannot be fairly
attributed to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (emphasis in original). If a movant fails to show cause, a court need
not consider whether actual prejudice exists. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 501, 111
S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). Actual innocence under the actual innocence test
“means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24;
see also McNeal, 249 F.3d at 749 (“[A movant] must show factual innocence, not simply
legal insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction.”).2
Here, the movant contends that a sentencing error occurred, he did not knowingly
and voluntarily enter a guilty plea and defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.
None of those contentions are valid. The court concludes that the movant knowingly and
voluntarily pleaded guilty and that, apart from his ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
the movant’s claims are procedurally defaulted. See McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d
747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing when claims are procedurally defaulted); Walker v.
United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A] valid guilty plea forecloses an
attack on conviction unless ‘on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the
conviction or impose the sentence.’”); United States v. Jennings, 12 F.3d 836, 839 (8th
Cir. 1994) (a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea waives all defects except those
related to jurisdiction). Additionally, the court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
2
The procedural default rule applies to a conviction obtained through trial or
through the entry of a guilty plea. See United States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th
Cir. 1998); Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1997); Matthews v.
United States, 114 F.3d 112, 113 (8th Cir. 1997); Thomas v. United States, 112 F.3d 365,
366 (8th Cir. 1997); Reid v. United States, 976 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1992).
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fully addressed the sentencing issues that the movant identifies in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion. The movant is unable to raise issues that the court addressed prior to judgment
entering against him or that Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals conclusively resolved against
him on direct appeal. See United States v. Wiley, 245 F.3d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 2001)
(“Issues raised and decided on direct appeal cannot ordinarily be relitigated in a collateral
proceeding based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” (citing United States v. McGee, 201 F.3d 1022,
1023 (8th Cir. 2000)); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that claims already addressed on direct appeal could not be raised); United
States v. Kraemer, 810 F.2d 173, 177 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that movant “cannot
raise the same issues [. . .] that have been decided on direct appeal or in a new trial
motion”); United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir. 1981) (“It is well settled
that claims which were raised and decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated . . . .”);
Butler v. United States, 340 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1965) (concluding movant is not entitled
to another review of his question). Lastly, the court concludes that the conduct of counsel
fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and counsel’s performance
did not prejudice the movant’s defense, id. at 692-94. The movant fails to identify any
action that defense counsel should have undertaken that would have changed the outcome
of his sentencing. Considering all the circumstances and refraining from engaging in
hindsight or second-guessing counsel’s strategic decisions, the court finds that the record
belies the movant’s claims and no violation of the movant’s constitutional right to counsel
occurred. Thus, none of the alleged errors that are asserted by the movant warrant relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Based on the foregoing, the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
shall be denied.
In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding before a district judge, the final order is subject
to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is
held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
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appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d
518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability
may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.
Ed. 2d 931 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000);
Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565,
569 (8th Cir. 1997); Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues
must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently,
or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing Flieger v. Delo,
16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating
standard).
Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds.
“‘[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the [movant] must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a
federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying
constitutional claim, “the [movant must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the movant
failed to make the requisite “substantial showing” with respect to the claims that he raised
in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
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Because he does not present a question of substance for appellate review, there is no
reason to grant a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability
shall be denied. If he desires further review of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the movant
may request issuance of the certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 520-22.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (docket no. 1) is DENIED.
2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
DATED this 26th day of August, 2011.
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