LaFontaine v. Iowa Falls Police Department

Filing 16

ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The clerk's office is directed to dismiss the complaint against the Defendant. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 7/18/13. (ksy)(copy w/NEF to Plf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

ANDRE MICHAEL LAFONTAINE, III,
Plaintiff,

No. C12-0108-LRR

vs.
IOWA FALLS POLICE DEPARTMENT,

ORDER

Defendant.
____________________________
This matter is before the court pursuant to the defendant’s motion to dismiss (docket
no. 9). The defendant filed such motion on April 29, 2013. The plaintiff filed a resistance
(docket no. 11) to the defendant’s motion to dismiss on May 8, 2013.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal on the
basis of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).1 When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true
all of the factual allegations in the complaint, “no matter how skeptical the court may be.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ___,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
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The court notes that “[a] motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)] which is limited to a facial attack on the pleadings is
subject to the same standard as a motion brought under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)].” Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also Stalley v.
Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing standard of
review).

(2007)); accord B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir.
2009). Stated differently, “a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .’” Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555); see also Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank
Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007) (examining federal pleading standards).
Although a plaintiff need not provide “detailed” facts in support of his or her allegations,
the “short and plain statement” requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at
555); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (“Specific facts are not
necessary [under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].”). “A pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl., 550
U.S. at 555). And, “[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint [that] there
is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton
v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)).
Having reviewed the record, the court deems it appropriate to dismiss the remaining
claims against the defendant for the reasons stated in its brief. The defendant adequately
sets forth the law and applies such law to the facts that are set forth in the plaintiff’s
complaint. Specifically, the defendant correctly concluded that the plaintiff’s action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not cognizable because he merely alleges negligence and does not
allege that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an official custom, policy
or practice of the defendant.
A fair characterization of the allegations that were included in the complaint indicate
that the plaintiff believes the defendant acted negligently when it failed to follow generally
accepted police practices and the defendant’s officers used excessive force when they
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arrested him. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, may only be imposed “for
violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising
out of tort law.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). The plaintiff’s assertion
that the defendant acted negligently is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).2 Moreover, “[t]o establish municipal liability under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff
must show that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an official custom,
policy, or practice of the governmental entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817-18
(8th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978)).
The plaintiff does not assert that the defendant is liable for an injury that one of its
employees inflicted because “a particular municipal policy or custom itself violates federal
law, or directs an employee to do so” or a particular “lawful municipal policy or custom
was adopted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to its known or obvious consequences.” Id.
(citing Seymour v. City of Des Moines, 519 F.3d 790, 800 (8th Cir. 2008)). Because the
plaintiff’s remaining claims are not plausible and because the plaintiff chose to name only
the Iowa Falls Police Department, rather than an individual, as a defendant, dismissal is
appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.3 Accordingly, the defendant’s
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The court notes that the defendant relies on Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663,
667 (Iowa 1989), Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 414-15 (Iowa 1985), and Smith
v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 301-02 (Iowa 1982), in support of its assertion that the plaintiff
is unable to assert a negligence claim against the defendant. To the extent that the plaintiff
is asserting a state law claim of negligence, the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. See Brown v. Peterson, 156 Fed. App’x 870, 871 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding
decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claim is discretionary); see
also McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1994) (indicating subsection (c) of
28 U.S.C. § 1367 clearly gives a court discretion to reject jurisdiction over supplemental
claims).
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The court notes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afforded the plaintiff
with an opportunity to amend his complaint once as a matter of course. Fed. R. Civ. P.
(continued...)
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motion to dismiss (docket no. 9) is granted. The clerk’s office is directed to dismiss the
complaint against the defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2013.

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(...continued)
15(a). The right to amend once as matter of course, however, terminated 21 days after
service of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. In light of the statements that he made
in his resistance, it appears that the plaintiff carefully considered his options.
Consequently, instead of filing an amended complaint to meet the arguments in the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, he decided that it was wiser to stand by the statements that
he included in his complaint and to resist the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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