Rogers v. Palumbo et al

Filing 11

ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Laura Palumbo, Debra Wiethorn, and Karen Johnson. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 5/16/2013. (pac)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
VICTOR RODGERS,
Plaintiff,

No. 12-CV-118-LRR

vs.

ORDER

LAURA PALUMBO, DEBRA
WIETHORN and KAREN JOHNSON,
Defendants.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

IV.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A.
B.
C.
D.

V.

3
4
4
5

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A.
B.
C.
D.

VI.

Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parties’ Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Applicable Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parties’ Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Applicable Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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7
8
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CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Defendants Laura Palumbo, Debra Wiethorn and

Karen Johnson’s (collectively, “Defendants”) “Motion to Dismiss” (“Motion”) (docket
1

no. 6).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 29, 2012, Plaintiff Victor Rodgers filed a Petition (“Complaint”) in the
District Court for Linn County, Iowa, Case No. LACV76992. Complaint (docket no. 3).
In the Complaint, Rodgers alleges that Defendants violated Rodgers’s civil rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
On December 3, 2012, Defendants filed the Motion. On December 19, 2012,
Rodgers filed a Resistance (docket no. 7). On December 26, 2012, Defendants filed a
Reply (docket no. 8). Neither party requests oral argument on the Motion, and the court
finds that oral argument is unnecessary. The Motion is fully submitted and ready for
decision.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Rodgers is a resident of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Rodgers seeks relief against Palumbo,
Wiethorn and Johnson. Palumbo is a resident of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. At times relevant
to the instant action, Palumbo was a case worker with the Iowa Department of Human
Services and was involved in juvenile court proceedings. Wiethorn is a resident of Cedar
Rapids, Iowa. At times relevant to the instant action, Wiethorn was a case worker with
the Iowa Department of Human Services and was involved in juvenile court proceedings.
Johnson is a resident of Iowa City, Iowa. At times relevant to the instant action, Johnson
was an employee of the Iowa Department of Human Services and was the supervisor of
Palumbo and Wiethorn.
Rodgers’s child, K.R., was born in February 2009. Shortly after K.R’s birth, K.R.
was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance and placed in foster care. Wiethorn was
assigned as the case worker for Rodgers. In May 2009, after a paternity test concluded
that Rodgers was K.R.’s father, Rodgers requested custody of K.R.

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Defendants

recommended that K.R. remain in foster care. In June 2009, Rodgers again requested that
K.R. be placed with him, but this request was again denied. Later in 2009, Palumbo
became the case worker assigned to Roger’s case.
On May 17, 2010, the State filed a petition to terminate Roger’s parental rights to
K.R. A juvenile court held hearings to determine whether to terminate Roger’s parental
rights to K.R. on August 30, 2010, and September 24, 2010. A juvenile court terminated
Roger’s parental rights to K.R. on November 16, 2010. Rodgers appealed and the Iowa
Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision on February 9, 2011.
IV. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Standard of Review
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and the threshold requirement
in every federal case is jurisdiction. Godfrey v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 161 F.3d 1137, 1141
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
“Any party or the court may, at any time, raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.”
GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir.
2004). “Without jurisdiction[, a] court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the
court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94
(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A party may move for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

The party asserting

jurisdiction has the burden of establishing its existence. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In assessing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court may
consider matters and submissions outside the pleadings and makes no presumptions that
the allegations in the complaint are true. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729-30

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(8th Cir. 1990).
B. Parties’ Arguments
Defendants argue that the court should dismiss Rodgers’s § 1983 action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine because Rodgers’s “claim
for damages is inextricably intertwined with the [juvenile] court[’s] decisions to remove
his daughter from his care and then terminate his parental rights.” Reply at 3. Rodgers
contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to his § 1983 action because he
does not ask the court to review or overturn the state court’s decision; rather, “he is
seeking damages for the unconstitutional treatment of him by individuals.” Brief in
Support of Resistance (docket no. 7-1) at 10.
C. Applicable Law
In Rooker, the United States Supreme Court held that it is the only federal court that
has the authority to entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a final state court
judgment. 263 U.S. at 416; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (granting the Supreme Court
authority to review final judgments rendered by a state’s highest court). In Feldman, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that district courts do not have jurisdiction to review final state
court judgments. 460 U.S. at 482-86. In Feldman, the Supreme Court further concluded
that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review issues that are
“inextricably intertwined” with the issues previously decided in a state court proceeding
because, in that situation, the district court “is in essence being called upon to review the
state court decision.” Id. at 482 n.16.
The two principles have merged to become the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which
stands for the proposition that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
review final state court judgments and claims that are inextricably intertwined with state

1

See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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court decisions. See Exxon Mobil Corp v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283
(2005) (discussing the formation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is “narrow” in scope and “is confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Id. at 284; see also Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 964 (8th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the limited scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
In Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Department of Children & Family Services, 241 F.
App’x 285 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed facts similar to
those in the instant action and found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not deprive the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the
Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services and others who, he
alleged, among other things, “falsely represent[ed] information to the juvenile court and
other county officials in order to ‘completely cut [the plaintiff] out of the [custody]
process.’” Id. at 287-89 (third alteration in original). The Sixth Circuit held:
[The plaintiff] seeks compensatory damages and a declaratory
judgment stating that [the] [d]efendants’ actions violated the
Fourteenth Amendment; [the plaintiff] does not seek custody
of [the child] or otherwise request a reversal of the juvenile
court’s decision. . . . [The plaintiff’s] claims focus on [the]
[d]efendants’ actions, rather than the outcome of the state court
custody proceedings. We therefore conclude that the source
of [the plaintiff’s] alleged injury is [the] [d]efendants’ actions,
not the state court judgment. Because [the plaintiff] does not
complain of an injury caused by a state court judgment, we
find that he is asserting independent claims, which are not
barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Id. at 288.
D. Application
Like the plaintiff in Pittman, Rodgers seeks monetary compensation for his claims
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against Defendants who allegedly acted unlawfully by, among other things, “l[ying] and
misrepresent[ing] information to the parties and the [juvenile] [c]ourt.” Complaint ¶ 25.
Rodgers is not “inviting district court review and rejection of” the state court’s order
terminating his parental rights. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284. Thus, the court holds that the
“Rooker-Feldman [doctrine] does not bar [Rodgers’s] federal-court challenge to
[Defendants’] improper conduct during a prior state court proceeding.” Pittman, 241 F.
App’x at 288.
The court has federal question jurisdiction over Rodgers’s claim against Defendants,
which arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal on the basis of
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007));
accord B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2009).
A claim satisfies the plausibility standard “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S.
at 556).
Although a plaintiff need not provide “detailed” facts in support of his or her

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allegations, the “short and plain statement” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (“Specific facts are not necessary
[under Rule 8(a)(2)].”). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555). “Where the allegations show on the face of the
complaint [that] there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)).
B. Parties’ Arguments2
In the Motion, Defendants argue that the court should dismiss the Complaint against
them because the applicable statute of limitations bars Rodgers’s claim.3 The parties agree
that Iowa Code section 614.1(2), which provides a two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury claims, sets forth the relevant statute of limitations for Rodgers’s § 1983
claim. See Wycoff, 773 F.2d at 984 (holding that the two-year statute of limitations under

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The court notes that in addition to their statute of limitations argument, Defendants
also assert that the court should dismiss the Complaint against them because the Complaint
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and Defendants are entitled to absolute and
qualified immunity. In addition, Defendants argue that the court should dismiss the
Complaint against Johnson because Rodgers cannot assert a § 1983 claim against an
individual in her supervisory capacity. Because the court finds that the applicable statute
of limitations bars Rodgers’s claim, the court finds it unnecessary to address Defendants’
additional arguments in the Motion.
3

A statute of limitations defense is properly asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen it ‘appears
from the face of the complaint itself that the limitation period has run,’ a limitations
defense may properly be asserted through a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” (quoting R.W.
Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1983))).
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Iowa Code section 614.1(2) applies to all § 1983 actions arising in Iowa). However, the
parties disagree as to when the statute of limitations began to run.
Defendants contend that Rodgers’s cause of action accrued, and thus, the statute of
limitations began to run, at the latest, on the date of the last termination hearing on
September 24, 2010. Therefore, Defendants assert that Rodgers’s claim is untimely
because he filed the Complaint on October 29, 2012—more than two years after the date
his cause of action accrued.
Rodgers claims that the statute of limitations began to run on November 16, 2010,
when the juvenile court issued its order terminating Rodgers’s parental rights because “his
right to action became ripe once the [child custody] process concluded with the November
16, 2010 termination of [Rodgers’s] parental rights.” Brief in Support of Resistance at 6.
In other words, Rodgers contends that his cause of action accrued, not when Defendants
acted wrongfully, but when the juvenile court terminated his parental rights. Thus,
Rodgers argues that the Complaint filed on October 29, 2012, is within the two-year statute
of limitations.
C. Applicable Law
While the state statute of limitations for personal injury tort claims determines the
length of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action, “federal rules conforming in general
to common-law tort principles” govern when the cause of action accrues and the statute
of limitations begins to run. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). A cause of
action accrues “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,’ . . . that
is, when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry &
Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)).
In Wallace, the Supreme Court found:
“Under the traditional rule of accrual . . . the tort cause of
action accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to
run, when the wrongful act or omission results in damages.
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The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the
injury is not then known or predictable.” 1 C. Corman,
Limitation of Actions § 7.4.1, pp. 526-527 (1991) (footnote
omitted); see also 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 112, p.
150 (2005).
Id. at 391 (alteration in original). Stated another way, “[u]nder federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the
basis of the action.” Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1980)); accord Shomo v. City of New
York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2009); Johnson v. Johnson Cnty. Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d
1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975).
D. Application
In the Complaint, Rodgers alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights
by interfering with his parent-child relationship after K.R.’s removal and denying him his
procedural due process rights during the proceedings. Rodgers lists several wrongful acts
Defendants committed throughout the child custody determination process and at the
termination hearings. Rodgers does not allege any wrongful conduct subsequent to the last
hearing on September 24, 2010, nor does Rodgers deny that he became aware of
Defendants’ unlawful actions as they occurred. Thus, Rodgers’s assertion that his cause
of action accrued on November 16, 2010, is without merit because if Defendants’ conduct
violated Rodgers’s constitutional rights, their actions were unlawful regardless of the state
court’s final disposition of the termination proceedings, including any appellate review.
As previously noted, Rodgers does not ask the court to review the juvenile court’s
decision to terminate his parental rights; rather, Rodgers seeks monetary damages for
Defendants’ wrongful actions. Assuming that all of the facts alleged in the Complaint are
true, Defendants injured Rodgers by violating his constitutional rights, if at all, before and
during the September 24, 2010 hearing. Therefore, the court finds that Rodgers’s cause
of action accrued, at the latest, on September 24, 2010. Accordingly, the October 29,
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2012 Complaint is untimely because Rodgers waited two years and thirty-five days after
the final termination hearing to file the Complaint.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Defendants Laura Palumbo, Debra Wiethorn and Karen
Johnson’s “Motion to Dismiss” (docket no. 6) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Laura Palumbo, Debra Wiethorn
and Karen Johnson.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2013.

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