Coker v. Parker Hannifin Corporation

Filing 16

ORDER granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Parker Hannifin Corporation and against Muctaru Coker and to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 8/21/2014. (skm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

MUCTARU COKER,
Plaintiff,

No. 13-CV-6-LRR

vs.

ORDER

PARKER HANNIFIN CORPORATION,
Defendant.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

III.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

V.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A.
B.

C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
VI.

Parties.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Coker’s Employment at Parker Prior to the Dispute at Issue. . . . . . . 5
1.
Reviews.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.
Errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.
Attendance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.
Wasting time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.
Unsafe work practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.
Other misconduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.
Sexual harassment complaint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Coker’s Relationship with R.Y.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
R.Y.’s Sexual Harassment Complaint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Coker’s Voicemail to R.Y.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Coker’s Termination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Coker’s Knowledge of Parker’s Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Coker’s Complaint to Iowa Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”). . . . 16

ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A.

Title VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.
Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a.
Parties’ arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b.
Applicable law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c.
Application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.
Pretext. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a.
Was there a basis in fact for the proffered explanation?.
b.
Did a prohibited reason more likely
motivate the employer?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.
Parties’ arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ii.
Applicable law and application.. . . . . . . . . . . .
(1)
Comparators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2)
Shifting explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(3)
Other evidence of discrimination. . . . . . .
B. ICRA Claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII.

16
18
18
18
19
19
20
22
22
23
23
25
26
29

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Defendant Parker Hannifin Corporation’s (“Parker”)

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (docket no. 13).
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 27, 2012, Plaintiff Muctaru Coker filed a two-count Petition
(“Complaint”) (docket no. 4) in the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Case No.
LACV77420. In the Complaint, Coker alleges that Parker wrongfully terminated him
because of his race and national origin in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, codified
in pertinent part at Iowa Code section 216.11, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. On January 29, 2013, Parker
removed the action to this court on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction.
Notice of Removal (docket no. 2). On May 29, 2014, Parker filed the Motion. On June
23, 2014, Coker filed a Resistance (docket no. 14). On June 30, 2014, Parker filed a
Reply (docket no. 15). Neither party has requested oral argument and the court finds that
oral argument is unnecessary. The Motion is fully submitted and ready for decision.
2

III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The court has federal question jurisdiction over Coker’s claim that Parker violated
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”). Since the court has federal question jurisdiction over Coker’s claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Coker’s
claim arising under Iowa Code section 216.11, because the claim “form[s] part of the same
case or controversy” as Coker’s federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.”).
The court also has diversity jurisdiction over Coker’s claims against Parker pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Coker is a citizen of Iowa. Complaint ¶ 2. Parker is an Ohio
corporation with its principal place of business in Cleveland, Ohio, and therefore, an Ohio
citizen. Notice of Removal ¶ 9. The Complaint does not allege an amount in controversy,
but based on statements in the Notice of Removal and the fact that Coker has not resisted
the removal of this case to federal court, the court is satisfied that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 11-15. Accordingly, there is
complete diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Therefore, the court finds that it has diversity jurisdiction over both of Coker’s claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”).

3

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects
the outcome of the case.” Amini v. City of Minneapolis, 643 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir.
2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986)).
“[U]nsupported, self-serving allegations and denials are insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact.” Anuforo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 614 F.3d 799, 807 (8th
Cir. 2010). “To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must
substantiate [its] allegations with sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding
in [its] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Barber v. C1
Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted). If there is a genuine dispute about a material fact, the
court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and afford
it all reasonable inferences. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009). However,
“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 586 (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“The [Supreme] Court has reiterated that district courts should not ‘treat
discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.’” Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)). “There is no ‘discrimination case

4

exception’ to the application of summary judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to
determine whether any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial.” Id.
V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Coker and affording him all
reasonable inferences, the facts are these:
A. Parties
Coker was born in Gambia, Africa, and considers his ethnicity African and national
origin Gambian. Coker’s native language is not English. In late 2004, Coker was
assigned by Kelly Services, a temporary staffing agency, to work at Parker’s Hiawatha,
Iowa plant. While a temporary worker, Coker submitted an application for a full-time
position to Steve Point, Parker’s warehouse supervisor in Hiawatha. Brian Odean,
Parker’s plant manager, hired Coker to a full-time position as an assembly worker and
material handler. Point was Coker’s supervisor throughout Coker’s employment at Parker.
Parker is responsible for the design, manufacture and marketing of a variety of
applications that control the flow of fluids in various markets, such as aerospace,
agriculture, construction and industrial areas. Parker’s plant in Hiawatha produces hoses
and fittings for hydraulics. Assembly workers at the Hiawatha plant work in one of six
cell work stations and often rotate through the cells. Material handlers move inventory
with a forklift or their hands from the dock area to trucks for shipping or from trucks to
the dock area to be used by the plant. Material handlers also verify the inventory received
matches the same materials listed on the packing slip.
B. Coker’s Employment at Parker Prior to the Dispute at Issue
1.

Reviews

Point reviewed Coker’s work numerous times from 2005 until the end of Coker’s
employment at Parker. Coker generally received high ratings in most of the categories and
he received a wage increase in most years. However, Coker also received several negative

5

reviews. On May 16, 2011, Point conducted a quarterly one-on-one evaluation with
Coker. Point noted that Coker needed to manage his time better and to avoid distractions,
nonproductive conversations and cell phone use. On July 19, 2011, Coker received an
annual performance review. The review listed mostly positive attributes about Coker’s
work but also stated that Coker needed to improve his dependability and avoid
nonproductive conversations. On December 12, 2011, Point indicated to Coker in a
quarterly one-on-one evaluation that Coker needed to manage his time better on the
production floor, focus on his work and avoid distractions and nonproductive
conversations. Coker acknowledged that he understood the comments made during the
one-on-one evaluations.
2.

Errors

Parker disciplined Coker for various errors committed at Parker. On April 25,
2005, Parker issued Coker a counseling because he committed three quality-related errors
from January 28, 2005 to April 13, 2005. On February 8, 2006, Parker issued Coker a
second counseling for committing seven quality-related errors in a twelve-month period.
On April 10, 2006, Parker issued Coker a verbal warning for committing three qualityrelated errors from April 13, 2005 to March 20, 2006, for a total of ten errors in a rolling
twelve-month period. Finally, on August 30, 2011, Parker issued Coker a counseling for
committing three quality-related errors in a rolling twelve-month period.
3.

Attendance

On December 21, 2010, Parker issued Coker a written attendance warning for six
attendance points for taking an extra six days off of work to visit Africa.1

1

The parties agree that Coker received a written warning and five attendance points
on December 21, 2010 for taking an extra six days off of work. However, the record
indicates that Coker received six attendance points. On December 21, 2010, Coker
received a verbal warning and five attendance points. Attendance Warning, Parker
(continued...)
6

4.

Wasting time

On June 16, 2011, Parker issued Coker a counseling for wasting time and leaving
the work area during work hours to have nonproductive social conversations with coworkers. On August 30, 2011, Parker issued Coker a verbal warning for unnecessary
wandering, wasting time, having nonproductive conversations and for not maintaining a
consistent productivity level. Notice of Unacceptable Performance, Parker App’x at 200.
5.

Unsafe work practices

On October 6, 2005, Parker issued Coker a counseling for unsafe work practices
after he struck a water fountain while operating a forklift.
6.

Other misconduct

On September 13, 2006, Parker issued Coker a counseling for workplace violence
after he raised his voice toward another employee in a nonprofessional manner.
On May 22, 2007, Coker was involved in a verbal altercation with his lead person,
D.P., a white male, after D.P. told Coker to remain productive. Coker became angry with
D.P. and said, “I’m tired of your shit and I’m not going to take it anymore!” Verbal
Reminder, Parker App’x at 196. Coker was notified that his behavior was considered
insubordination and unacceptable under Parker’s Workplace Violence Policy. Coker
acknowledged that he must follow the directives of the lead person, must communicate in
a professional way and that outbursts would not be tolerated at Parker.

1

(...continued)
Appendix (“Parker App’x”) (docket nos. 13-3 through 13-4) at 197. The record further
indicates that on December 22, 2010, Coker received a written warning and an additional
attendance point. Attendance Warning, Parker App’x at 198. Coker signed both forms on
February 11, 2011, and states that he received six attendance points. Coker Deposition,
Parker App’x at 110.
7

7.

Sexual harassment complaint

On March 20, 2008, Parker issued Coker a warning and a one day/partial day off
with pay for inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace toward S.J., a female coworker. The warning detailed Coker’s inappropriate sexual conduct toward S.J.:
With this notification, you are now in a very serious and
critical position relative to your continued employment at
Parker.
The performance/behavior standards at issue are:
On Dec. 13, [2007,] you were telling co-workers that you had
slept with a female co-worker and kept pushing the issue. On
Dec. 14[, 2007,] you asked [the] same co-worker why she was
feeling her tits (which her shirt was dirty) then asked twice if
her tits were real. Then you said that they were nice. Then
you tried to have [a] co-worker join in your inappropriate
discussion of [the] female co-worker[’]s anatomy.2
....
. . . Violation of Sexual Harassment Policy going forward will
result in Termination.
Decision-Making Time Off Notification, Parker App’x at 180. Coker admitted he made
repeated comments to S.J. about her “tits,” including asking her why she was “feeling her
tits,” asking her if her “tits were real” and telling her that her “tits” were “nice.” Coker
Deposition, Parker App’x at 63-64, 98. Point described the incident as a couple guys
“razzing” and “giving a hard time” to S.J. Point Deposition, Coker Appendix (“Coker
App’x”) (docket nos. 14-4 through 14-5) at 67. Yet, Coker understood that Parker was
treating the incident as a serious issue and that he could lose his job because of the

2

The parties agree that the warning dates listed are incorrect and should read March
13 and 14, 2007, rather than December 13 and 14, 2007.
8

incident. Coker was neither terminated for this incident nor ordered to undergo treatment.
Coker received several positive performance reviews after this incident.
C. Coker’s Relationship with R.Y.
Coker first met and worked with R.Y., a white female, at Parker in 2004. Coker,
R.Y. and their spouses went out as couples. At some point, a sexual relationship
developed between Coker and R.Y. while both were employed at Parker. The relationship
mutually ended in 2010.
D. R.Y.’s Sexual Harassment Complaint
On April 17, 2012, R.Y. filed a sexual harassment complaint with Parker
management concerning J.M., a black temporary worker at Parker. R.Y. told Point that
J.M. had grabbed her butt, asked if she was constipated, mouthed “I love you” to her and
intentionally prevented her from exiting her work area. Supervisors Report, Parker App’x
at 279-80; Investigation by Steve Point, Parker App’x at 281-82. After receiving R.Y.’s
complaint, Point reassigned J.M. to the other side of the facility.
Over the lunch hour, J.M. told Coker about R.Y.’s complaint. While speaking to
Coker, J.M. denied that he had grabbed R.Y.’s butt and claimed that he had bumped into
her. At his deposition, Coker admitted that because he was working in a different area at
the time, he is unable to contradict R.Y.’s claims. Coker doubted that R.Y.’s allegations
were true but acknowledged that it would have been inappropriate for J.M. to grab R.Y.’s
butt and that he understood why Parker would terminate J.M. if he had grabbed R.Y.’s
butt.
Later on that same date, Point and J.M. discussed R.Y.’s allegations. J.M. denied
that he had grabbed R.Y.’s butt and explained that he had been carrying boxes and bumped
into R.Y. J.M. initially denied mouthing “I love you” to R.Y. but later admitted that he
had done so. When asked whether he believed that J.M. had grabbed R.Y.’s butt, Point
responded, “I would say yes, I did believe it.” Point Deposition, Parker App’x at 256.

9

However, no one witnessed J.M. grab R.Y.’s butt. After discussing the matter with
Odean, Point ended J.M.’s assignment with Parker.
That same date, J.M. called Coker shortly after Coker’s shift ended at 3:30 p.m.
and informed him that Parker had ended his assignment.
E. Coker’s Voicemail to R.Y.
At 4:02 p.m. on that same date, Coker called R.Y., but she did not answer. Coker
returned to Parker and discussed R.Y.’s behavior with Point. Coker told Point that R.Y.
had made sexual references and engaged in sexual conduct in the workplace. Coker
informed Point that R.Y. commented about J.M.’s penis, including telling him to “whip
it out,” told people that J.M. was gay and made J.M. smell her armpit. Coker Deposition,
Parker App’x at 83. Coker told Point that he felt R.Y. should have discussed this
information with him when R.Y. filed the complaint against J.M.
After speaking with Point, Coker returned home and called R.Y. at 4:35 p.m.
After R.Y. did not answer, Coker left the following voicemail, as transcribed by Tammy
Seltrecht, Parker’s human resources manager:
Hey [R.Y.], um, it’s (sorry???) to hear about [J.M.] but, um,
I guess, I think you need to correct what you did. It’s wrong
what you did and it was just bad. Um, if you don’t fix it I
guess I’ll have to talk to your husband about all your cheating
and all your lying. I’m willing to go that far. So you better
call Steve Point, or whatever you do, or I will be talking to
[your husband] and I will tell him everything, EVERYTHING.
Coker Voicemail to R.Y., Parker App’x at 181. At his deposition, Coker admitted that
the voicemail was referencing R.Y.’s sexual harassment complaint against J.M. Coker
Deposition, Parker App’x at 77. Coker contended that the purpose of the voicemail was
to get R.Y. to “do the right thing and tell the truth.” Id. at 74. However, Coker
confirmed that the voicemail did not contain the word “truth” and that he was

10

“threatening” to tell R.Y.’s husband about her cheating and lying unless she told Point the
truth. Id. at 130-31.
F. Coker’s Termination
On April 18, 2012, R.Y. played the voicemail for Point. Point reported Coker’s
voicemail to Odean, and eventually Seltrecht became involved.
On that same date, Point and Coker discussed the voicemail and more of R.Y.’s
behavior. Point told Coker that Parker has a retaliation policy, to not say anything further
to R.Y. and to leave her alone. Coker Deposition, Parker App’x at 86. Coker then told
Point that he saw R.Y. grab guys’ butts, shake her boobs in front of guys, powder two
employees’ butts, take candy and “rub it on her tits in front of guys and shake her tits and
rub it on her pussy.” Id. at 84-85. After their conversation, Point escorted Coker off the
property and sent him home with pay while Odean and Seltrecht investigated the incident.
Later that night, Seltrecht e-mailed her boss, Tom Emig, and explained the
situation.3 Seltrecht Deposition, Coker App’x at 84-85. At her deposition, Seltrecht stated
that she wrote in the e-mail that “[t]he point is that [Coker] called [R.Y.] and left the threat
AFTER . . . [Point] warned him of the zero tolerance for [r]etaliation.” Id. at 86.
Seltrecht also confirmed that the e-mail mentioned that “[Coker] is a minority.” Id. at 90.
Seltrecht stated that she included the information about Coker being a minority because
Parker’s legal department wants employee demographics in these situations. Id. Seltrecht
could not confirm that the e-mail was also sent to Parker’s legal department, but she stated
that she treats Emig and the legal department as “one in the same.” Id. at 91.
On April 19, 2012, Coker called Seltrecht, who told him that he was suspended for
three days with pay pending an investigation.

3

The court notes that the e-mail is not included in either parties’ appendix.
However, the e-mail is discussed in Seltrecht’s deposition.
11

On April 20, 2012, Odean, with Seltrecht, Point, and another manager in the room,
notified Coker that he was being terminated for violating the retaliation policy. Coker
Deposition, Parker App’x at 90. At her deposition, Seltrecht initially stated that Coker
was

terminated

for

violating

three

company

policies:

(1)

the

Anti-

Harassment/Nondiscrimination Policy (“Anti-Harassment Policy”), which has a provision
for retaliation; (2) the Anti-Retaliation Policy; and (3) the Workplace Violence Policy.
Seltrecht Deposition, Coker App’x at 91.
The Anti-Harassment Policy identifies conduct that is not tolerated and outlines the
procedure an employee should use to report harassing or discriminatory conduct. The
Anti-Harassment Policy states that “[n]o employee will be retaliated against for bringing
such conduct to Parker’s attention or for participating in any investigation of such
conduct.” 2011 Employee Handbook, Parker App’x at 167. Immediately following, in
a new paragraph, the Anti-Harassment Policy states that “[a]ny manager, supervisor or
team member who engages in such objectionable conduct4 is subject to disciplinary action,
up to and including termination.” Id.
The Anti-Retaliation Policy states that “Parker . . . strictly prohibits any form of
retaliation [by any employee] against an employee who in good faith makes a complaint
. . . regarding any conduct that he or she reasonably believes to be in violation of Parker’s

4

The Anti-Harassment Policy is ambiguous as to what “objectionable conduct”
refers to. Throughout the Anti-Harassment Policy, “conduct” refers to sexually harassing
or discriminatory conduct; however, the Anti-Harassment Policy also makes clear that no
employee “will be retaliated against for bringing such conduct,” presumably referring to
harassing or discriminatory conduct, to Parker’s attention. Id. A reading that the use of
the term “objectionable conduct” in the penalty provision refers to retaliatory conduct, as
well as sexually harassing or discriminatory conduct, is consistent with the AntiHarassment Policy language, especially considering that the term in question immediately
follows the reference to retaliation. However, regardless of whether “objectionable
conduct” refers to retaliatory conduct, Parker had a legitimate reason for terminating
Coker’s employment, for the reasons discussed below.
12

Code of Conduct or policies.” Anti-Retaliation Policy, Coker App’x at 49. The AntiRetaliation Policy goes on to state that “[n]o employee should be . . . threatened . . . or
retaliated against in any other manner as a result of his or her making a good faith
complaint . . . that a Parker policy [or] the Code of Conduct . . . has been violated.” Id.
The Anti-Retaliation Policy notes that “Parker prohibits employees from being retaliated
against even if their complaints are proven unfounded by an investigation, unless the
employee knowingly made a false allegation, provided false or misleading information in
the course of an investigation, or otherwise acted in bad faith.” Id.
The Workplace Violence Policy states that “[a]ny acts or threats of violence will not
be tolerated. Anyone engaging in violent behavior will be subject to discipline, up to and
including discharge.” Workplace Violence Policy, Coker App’x at 53. The Workplace
Violence Policy defines violent behavior as including, inter alia, the following:
“[p]hysically harming or threatening to harm an individual” and “[a]ny other conduct that
a reasonable person would perceive as constituting a threat of violence.” Id.
The record contains no contemporaneous account of the specific policy upon which
Parker terminated Coker, and there is not any other documentation in the record of
Coker’s termination. However, in Seltrecht’s deposition, she noted that in the e-mail to
Emig, she wrote, “The point is that [Coker] called [R.Y.] and left the threat AFTER . . .
[Point] warned him of the zero tolerance for [r]etaliation.” Seltrecht Deposition, Coker
App’x at 86. Similarly, on April 19, 2012, Point wrote that on April 18, 2012 he “became
very concerned for [R.Y.]” after hearing the voicemail that Coker left her because he had
“just stressed to [Coker] that Parker has a No Retaliation policy when addressing such
issues.” Supervisors Report, Parker App’x at 279. Coker also noted in his deposition that
Odean told him he was being terminated for retaliation.
With respect to the specific policy pursuant to which Parker terminated Coker’s
employment, representatives from Parker provide different accounts. Seltrecht confirmed
13

that there is “no allegation of [Coker] harassing anyone.” Seltrecht Deposition, Coker
App’x at 92. Rather, Seltrecht agreed that “[t]he justification for the [use of the] [A]nti[H]arassment [Policy] was that it had a provision for retaliation.” Id. When showed the
Anti-Retaliation Policy, Seltrecht confirmed that it was “one of the policies that [Coker]
was terminated under,” but, when asked specifically what provision of the policy Coker
violated, she stated, “I’ll be honest, I—I went by the Anti-Harassment Policy’s provision
because . . . [R.Y] made a claim for sexual harassment, and [Coker] left her a threatening
message that said retract it or else.” Id. at 92-93. When Seltrecht was asked to clarify
whether she, in fact, relied on the Anti-Retaliation Policy, Seltrecht stated that “it’s part
of the process” and that Coker violated the provision of the Anti-Retaliation Policy that
states that “[t]he Company strictly prohibits retaliation against any person by another
employee . . . for . . . reporting harassment.” Id. at 93-94. With regard to the Workplace
Violence Policy, Seltrecht stated that Coker violated the provisions about “threatening to
harm an individual” and “[a]ny other conduct that a reasonable person would perceive as
constituting a threat.” Id. at 97-98 (citing Workplace Violence Policy, Coker App’x at
53). Seltrecht admitted that the voicemail was not a “threat of violence,” but Seltrecht also
testified to the following:
Q: Okay. Would you agree that Mr. Coker is actually—his
conduct was not in violation of the Workplace Violence
Policy?
A: He’s basically threatening to ruin her life.
Q: But he’s not threatening violence.
A: Okay.
Q: So you would agree that his conduct was not in violation
of the Workplace Violence Policy?
A: [R.Y.] felt that it was a threat.
Q: Okay. What did you feel?
A: She was so shaken up, how could I not believe her?
Q: Did she feel it was a threat of violence, or a threat that her
husband would find out that she had allegedly been cheating
and lying to him?
14

A: I guess both. Apparently he already knew.
Id. at 98-99.
At Odean’s deposition, he agreed that it was the Anti-Retaliation Policy that “Coker
was terminated for being in violation of,” and that Coker violated this policy when he left
the voicemail for R.Y. Odean Deposition, Parker App’x at 288-89. Odean also agreed
that he “felt that [R.Y.]’s complaint was . . . in good faith” and that the “voicemail was
a threat against someone who made a good faith complaint.” Id. at 289. When asked
about the Anti-Retaliation Policy, Point stated that he considered Coker’s voicemail to be
in violation of that policy because it was threatening R.Y. for bringing a complaint to his
attention. Point Deposition, Coker App’x at 262-64. Odean and Point did not mention the
Anti-Harassment Policy or the Workplace Violence Policy with respect to why Parker
terminated Coker’s employment.
G. Coker’s Knowledge of Parker’s Policies
At his deposition, Coker admitted that he received the Employee Handbook several
times throughout his time at Parker. On August 10, 2011, Coker received a copy and
acknowledged receipt of Parker’s 2011 Employee Handbook.

The 2011 Employee

Handbook contains Parker’s Anti-Harassment Policy. Employee Handbook, Parker App’x
at 166. On that same date, Coker attended an ethics training course conducted by Seltrecht
that covered discrimination, respect in the workplace, retaliation and other employment
topics.
Coker agreed at his deposition that “if you engaged in retaliation against a coworker who reports sexual harassment, you could be terminated” and that “you couldn’t
retaliate against employees who reported sexual harassment.” Coker Deposition, Parker
App’x at 28-29. Furthermore, Coker indicated that he did not need a policy to know that
Parker would not tolerate retaliation against an employee who reported sexual harassment
and that he could be terminated for retaliating against such employee. Id.

15

H. Coker’s Complaint to Iowa Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”)
On May 29, 2012, Coker filed a complaint with the ICRC pursuant to Iowa Code
section 216.16. The complaint listed Coker’s previous positions at Parker, his work
history and past discipline, his version of the events that led to his termination, other
allegations of race and national origin discrimination, other employees he believed engaged
in the same conduct yet were treated more favorably and why he felt race and national
origin were a factor in Parker’s decision to terminate his employment.
On October 10, 2012, the ICRC issued Coker a right-to-sue letter. The letter,
attached to the Complaint, states that “[t]he Right-to-Sue Letter is not a finding by ICRC
on the merits of the charge. ICRC will take no further actions in this matter.” Complaint
at 4 (emphasis omitted).
VI. ANALYSIS
Coker brings claims against Parker for race and national origin discrimination under
federal and state law.
A. Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
In a claim based on discrimination under Title VII, “‘a plaintiff may survive the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment in one of two ways. The first is by proof of
direct evidence of discrimination.’” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Griffith v. City
of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“But if the plaintiff lacks evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive,
he [or she] must avoid summary judgment by creating the requisite inference of unlawful

16

discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of
pretext.” Id. (quoting Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: “(1) [he or] she
was a member of the protected group; (2) [he or] she was qualified to perform the job; (3)
[he or] she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances permit an
inference of discrimination.” Bearden v. Int’l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.
2008).
If the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, then the burden “shifts to the
defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Pye v. Nu
Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011). “If the defendant provides such a
reason, the [rebuttable] presumption [of discrimination] disappears, and the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was pretext for discrimination.” Id.;
see also Lake v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 596 F.3d 871, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2010).
Since Coker does not offer direct evidence of discrimination,5 his claim must be
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The court assumes,
without deciding, that Coker has established a prima facie case of race and national origin
discrimination.

The court now turns to address the second and third steps of the

McDonnell Douglas framework, that is, whether: (1) Parker has provided a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Coker’s termination; and (2) whether Coker has shown that
the proffered reason is pretext for race or national origin discrimination.

5

In the Brief in Support of the Resistance (docket no. 14-1), Coker does not argue
that he has direct evidence of discrimination and the court finds that such evidence does
not exist.
17

1.

Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
a.

Parties’ arguments

Parker argues that even if Coker can establish a prima facie case of race or national
origin discrimination, Parker has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Coker’s termination: Coker retaliated against R.Y. for reporting that J.M. had sexually
harassed her in violation of company policy.
Coker asserts that Parker “has failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for [his] termination.” Brief in Support of the Resistance at 12. Coker argues that
Seltrecht admitted that he did not violate the Workplace Violence Policy or the harassment
provision of the Anti-Harassment Policy. Coker further argues that he could not have
violated the Anti-Retaliation Policy because “[d]ue to the relationship he had with [R.Y.],
the discussions he had with [J.M.], and his own observations of the two at work, [he], in
good faith, reasonably believed that [R.Y.] had provided untruthful and misleading
information.” Id. at 13. Coker notes that the “Anti-Retaliation Policy has an exception
providing that employee conduct in reaction to a claim of harassment which included false
or misleading information is not prohibited.” Id.
b.

Applicable law

“The burden to articulate a nondiscriminatory justification is not onerous, and the
explanation need not be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.” Torgerson,
643 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Floyd v. State of Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Div. Of Family
Servs., 188 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This
burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.”
Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Reeves, 530
U.S. at 142) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
“ha[s] consistently held that violating a company policy is a legitimate, non-discriminatory
rationale for terminating an employee.” Id.

18

c.

Application

Parker has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to
terminate Coker. Parker offers evidence that the company terminated Coker’s employment
because he violated the retaliation provision of either the Anti-Harassment Policy or the
Anti-Retaliation Policy when, by his own admission, he left a voicemail for R.Y. that
threatened to tell her husband about her lying and cheating unless she went to Point “to
correct what [she] did” and “fix” the situation involving J.M. Coker Voicemail to R.Y.,
Parker App’x at 181. Because the burden is one of production, not persuasion, and
involves no credibility assessment, see Twymon, 462 F.3d at 935, Coker’s arguments that
he did not violate the cited policies are more appropriately analyzed under the pretext stage
of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Therefore, the court finds that Parker has met its
burden, which is not onerous, of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Coker’s termination. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1047.
2.

Pretext

“[A] plaintiff may prove pretext by ‘adducing enough admissible evidence to raise
genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of [the defendant’s] motive.’” Gibson v. Am. Greetings
Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 854 (8th Cir. 2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Anderson
v. Durham D & M, L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 521 (8th Cir. 2010)). “To demonstrate pretext,
the employee must show that the employer’s proffered reason is ‘unworthy of credence.’”
Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., No. 13-2160, __ F.3d __, __, 2014 WL 3361160, at *5,
(8th Cir. July 10, 2014) (quoting Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir.
2006)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
“[a] plaintiff may show pretext, among other ways, by
showing that an employer (1) failed to follow its own policies,
(2) treated similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner,
or (3) shifted its explanation of the employment decision.”
Lake, 596 F.3d at 874. “We have observed that there are ‘at
least two routes’ for demonstrating a material question of fact
19

as to pretext.” Anderson, 606 F.3d at 521 (citing Wallace v.
DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1120 (8th Cir. 2006)).
“First, a plaintiff may succeed indirectly by showing the
proffered explanation has no basis in fact. Second, a plaintiff
can directly persuade the court that a prohibited reason more
likely motivated the employer.” Id. [(quoting Wallace, 442
F.3d at 1120) (internal quotation marks omitted)].
Gibson, 670 F.3d at 854.
a.

Was there a basis in fact for the proffered explanation?

Coker asserts that Parker “has failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for Coker’s termination.” Brief in Support of the Resistance at 12. Coker argues
that Parker acknowledged that he did not violate one of the policies initially cited by Parker
for his termination, the Workplace Violence Policy, and that there was no allegation of
harassment under the Anti-Harassment Policy. Coker further argues that he could not have
violated the Anti-Retaliation Policy because it “has an exception providing that employee
conduct in reaction to a claim of harassment which included false or misleading
information is not prohibited.” Id. at 13.
Parker argues that Coker cannot demonstrate that its proffered explanation for
Coker’s termination has no basis in fact. Parker asserts that its management investigated
the voicemail Coker left for R.Y. and determined that Coker violated company policy
when he threatened to tell R.Y.’s husband about her lying and cheating if she did not fix
the situation involving J.M. Furthermore, Parker asserts that Coker acknowledged that
his voicemail was threatening and that he knew he could not retaliate against an employee
who brought a sexual harassment complaint.
In this case, the member of Parker management responsible for investigating R.Y.’s
complaint of sexual harassment, Point, believed her claim that J.M. sexually harassed her.
Point stated that he could tell “[R.Y.] was very concerned” when she made her complaint.
Point Deposition, Parker App’x at 254. Point’s testimony further indicates that after

20

investigating R.Y.’s complaint by speaking with her, J.M. and other employees, he
believed her claim that J.M. had grabbed her butt. Furthermore, there is no indication that
the allegations Coker raised about R.Y. during his conversation with Point following
J.M.’s termination convinced Point, or any of Parker’s management, that R.Y.’s complaint
was false.
Likewise, Parker honestly believed that Coker, against Parker’s policies, retaliated
against R.Y. for filing a sexual harassment complaint. The e-mail discussed during
Seltrecht’s deposition, which was circulated to Parker management, stated that Coker
called R.Y. after he was warned by Point that Parker did not tolerate retaliation against
employees who reported sexual harassment.6 Furthermore, Odean, with Seltrecht, Point
and another manager in the room, informed Coker that he was being terminated for
retaliating against R.Y. for reporting sexual harassment.
The evidence in the record is not clear on which policy Parker based its decision to
terminate Coker’s employment. Seltrecht testified that she “went by the Anti-Harassment
Policy’s [retaliation] provision because . . . [R.Y.] made a claim for sexual harassment,
and [Coker] left her a threatening message that said retract it or else.”

Seltrecht

Deposition, Coker App’x at 93. That provision states that “[n]o employee will be
retaliated against for bringing such conduct to Parker’s attention or for participating in any
investigation of such conduct.”

2011 Employee Handbook, Parker App’x at 167.

Immediately following such provision in the Anti-Harassment Policy is a penalty provision
that states that “[a]ny manager, supervisor or team member who engages in such

6

Coker disputes that prior to him leaving the voicemail that Point warned him that
Parker did not tolerate retaliation against employees who reported sexual harassment.
Nonetheless, the content of the e-mail, that is, that Point warned Coker not to retaliate,
formed a basis for Parker’s decision to terminate Coker and, therefore, is evidence of
whether there is a basis in fact for Parker’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for terminating Coker’s employment.
21

objectionable conduct is subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination.”
Id. As discussed in footnote 4, it is unclear whether this penalty provision refers to
retaliatory conduct, sexual harassment or discriminatory conduct. The Anti-Retaliation
Policy, which was the policy violation that Odean and Point relied on, may have been the
more appropriate policy under which to terminate Coker’s employment, but the evidence
in the record indicates that Parker believed that Coker violated its general prohibition of
retaliation.

Moreover, Seltrecht confirmed that “[i]f conduct was violative of the

[retaliation provision of the Anti-Harassment Policy], it would be a violation of . . . the
Anti-Retaliation Policy.” Seltrecht Deposition, Parker App’x at 304.
Parker’s proffered reason for terminating Coker, that is, that he retaliated against
R.Y. for filing a sexual harassment complaint, “need not, in the end, be correct if [Parker]
honestly believed the asserted grounds at the time of [Coker’s] termination.” Twymon,
462 F.3d at 935. While it is unclear whether Parker relied on the retaliation provision
within the Anti-Harassment Policy or the Anti-Retaliation Policy, the evidence in the
record clearly indicates that Parker management honestly believed that Coker violated a
company policy by retaliating against an employee that reported sexual harassment.
b.

Did a prohibited reason more likely motivate the employer?
I.

Parties’ arguments

Coker argues that “[e]ven if [Parker] can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for Coker’s termination, Coker can establish that [Parker]’s reason was merely
pretext for discrimination.” Brief in Support of the Resistance at 14 (emphasis omitted).
Coker argues that a prohibited reason more likely motivated Parker to terminate his
employment for the following reasons: (1) similarly situated co-workers were treated more
favorably by Parker; (2) Parker shifted its explanation for terminating Coker; and (3)
Parker’s conduct close in time to Coker’s termination, including J.M.’s termination,
Coker’s discussion with Odean about the segregation of black workers at Parker and the

22

mention of Coker’s race in the e-mail sent from Seltrecht to Emig, indicated that Coker’s
race or national origin were the reason for his termination. Id. at 14-17.
Parker argues that Coker cannot demonstrate that a prohibited reason more likely
led to the decision to terminate his employment for the following reasons: (1) Parker’s
history of supporting Coker throughout his employment; (2) Coker’s complaints about the
radio station, safety vests, cell phone use and black employees not working together do not
suggest a racial animus, are not actionable and are petty slights or minor annoyances that
Title VII does not cover; (3) Coker has not demonstrated that similarly situated employees
were treated more favorably; (4) Coker cannot prove pretext based on how J.M. was
treated; (5) Parker has not shifted its explanation for Coker’s termination; and (6) the email sent from Seltrecht to Emig that mentions Coker’s race only shows that Seltrecht
made “an HR risk analysis concerning protected classes before proceeding with Coker’s
termination.” Reply at 5. Accordingly, Parker asserts that Coker’s claim should be
dismissed because “Coker cannot show that [Parker]’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason is pretext.” Brief in Support of Motion at 15.
ii.

Applicable law and application
(1)

Comparators

“At the pretext stage, ‘the test for determining whether employees are similarly
situated to a plaintiff is a rigorous one.’” Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948,
956 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir.
2005)). The plaintiff must establish that he and other employees outside of his protected
class are “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Id. (quoting Rodgers, 417 F.3d at
853) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he individuals used for comparison must
have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged
in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Id. (quoting
Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original) (internal

23

quotation marks omitted). “[T]o be probative evidence of pretext, the misconduct of more
leniently disciplined employees must be of comparable seriousness.”

Id.

(quoting

Rodgers, 417 F.3d at 853) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Coker claims that two employees outside of his protected class, that is, R.Y. and
D.P., engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating circumstances. Seltrecht
confirmed that R.Y. admitted to the following conduct: playing “you show me yours, I’ll
show you mine” with a male employee, being flirtatious, shaking baby powder down the
pants of a male employee and having other inappropriate conversations while at work.
Seltrecht Deposition, Coker App’x at 102-05. D.P. was accused of attempting to follow
R.Y. into the restroom. Point Deposition, Coker App’x at 66.
In this case, the record reveals that neither R.Y. nor D.P. is an employee that is
similarly situated to Coker. To be similarly situated to Coker, an employee would have
to also have retaliated against a co-worker for reporting sexual harassment, or other,
comparably serious misconduct. While R.Y.’s and D.P.’s behavior certainly constituted
harassment, these employees neither engaged in the same conduct as Coker nor violated
Parker’s policies against retaliation. The evidence in the record does not identify that
R.Y., D.P. or any other employee violated Parker’s anti-retaliation policies, let alone that
an employee who violated the policies was not terminated. Moreover, Seltrecht confirmed
that, in her ten years at Parker, “there has never been a reported violation of [the AntiRetaliation Policy].” Seltrecht Deposition, Parker App’x at 305. See Twymon, 462 F.3d
at 936 (finding that plaintiff failed to identify valid comparators because he could not
identify any admissible evidence regarding employer’s treatment of employees who
violated the same policy and, accordingly, holding that the plaintiff could not prove the
defendant’s proffered reason for terminating the employee was pretextual); Wheeler v.
Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that employer was not
required to treat two behaviors, both considered sexual horseplay, as substantially similar

24

because they involved objectively different conduct), abrogated on other grounds by
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1031.
Moreover, Coker’s disciplinary history is a “mitigating or distinguishing
circumstance[],” Bone, 686 F.3d at 956, that prevents R.Y. and D.P. from being similarly
situated to him. The evidence in the record does not indicate that either R.Y. or D.P. had
a similar disciplinary history as Coker.7 After the sexual harassment claim was filed
against him in 2008, Coker was warned that he was “in a very serious and critical position
relative to [his] continued employment at Parker.”

Decision-Making Time Off

Notification, Parker App’x at 180. Odean confirmed that the sexual harassment complaint
filed against Coker played a role in the decision to terminate Coker. Odean Deposition,
Parker App’x at 286. As such, Coker’s disciplinary record further prevents a finding that
R.Y. and D.P. were similarly situated employees that received disparate treatment.
Furthermore, even if R.Y. and D.P’s conduct was considered to be of “comparable
seriousness,” Bone, 686 F.3d at 956, to Coker’s, Coker has not presented sufficient
evidence to show that people outside of his protected class were treated differently than
himself. Like R.Y. and D.P., Coker violated the sexual harassment policy in 2008. Also
like R.Y. and D.P., Coker was given a second chance. Thus, Coker’s suggestion that
Parker treated employees of different races and national origins differently for the same
conduct is inaccurate. Rather, Parker treated different conduct differently, as discussed
above.
(2)

Shifting explanation

“A change in an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing an
employee is probative of pretext only if the discrepancy is ‘substantial.’” Id. at 957
(quoting Twiggs v. Selig, 679 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2012)). “Where employers ‘gave

7

While R.Y. admitted to committing comparably serious misconduct, no one filed
a formal complaint against her and she was not disciplined for committing such conduct.
25

two completely different explanations for their decisions to terminate their employees,’
such a substantial change is established.” Twiggs, 679 F.3d at 994 (quoting EEOC v.
Trans State Airlines, Inc., 462 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 2006)). “However, where the
employer ‘has not wavered from its one explanation for terminating’ the employee, there
is no substantial change.” Id. (quoting Trans State Airlines, Inc., 462 F.3d at 995).
There is no evidence in the record that Parker substantially shifted its explanation
for Coker’s termination. While the evidence is unclear under which policy Coker was
terminated, each of Parker’s explanations for Coker’s termination revolve around the
retaliatory voicemail that he left R.Y. The e-mail discussed in Seltrecht’s deposition and
Odean’s statement when Coker was terminated demonstrate that the management of Parker
terminated Coker because they honestly believed that Coker left R.Y. a retaliatory
voicemail, in violation of Parker’s policies, after she reported sexual harassment.
Moreover, Seltrecht confirmed that any conduct that violated the provision against
retaliation in the Anti-Harassment Policy would also violate the Anti-Retaliation Policy.
The fact that Seltrecht also relied on the Workplace Violence Policy, even if incorrect, also
resulted from Coker’s voicemail that he left for R.Y. Because Parker’s explanation for
its decision to terminate Coker always focused on the same conduct, that is, Coker leaving
R.Y. a threatening voicemail after she reported sexual harassment, Coker cannot establish
that Parker “gave two completely different explanations” for its decision to terminate
Coker or that there was a “substantial change” in Parker’s explanations. Twiggs, 679
F.3d at 994.
(3)

Other evidence of discrimination

Coker’s other evidence of discrimination does not demonstrate that a prohibited
reason more likely led to Parker’s decision to terminate him. First, Coker cannot rely on
Parker’s recent termination of J.M., a black employee, to demonstrate pretext. The
evidence in the record demonstrates that Parker ended J.M.’s temporary contract because

26

he was accused of, and admitted to, inappropriate behavior while at work. Moreover,
there is no evidence in the record that an employee ever filed a formal complaint that
alleged another employee sexually touched someone like J.M. did when he credibly
grabbed R.Y.’s butt. The record indicates that Parker’s decision to terminate J.M.’s
temporary employment contract was based solely on the independent finding that J.M.
sexually harassed an employee by grabbing her butt.
Coker also alleges that he can show that Parker terminated his employment because
of his race or national origin because Parker discriminated against him after he complained
about the following: (1) the radio station not being rotated properly8; (2) Parker’s cell
phone policy not being applied equally to all employees; (3) Parker not requiring all
employees to wear safety vests in the dock area of Parker’s plant; and (4) Parker not
scheduling black employees to work together.
Parker has presented legitimate reasons why the company made these decisions and
“federal courts do not serve as ‘super personnel departments,’ sitting in judgment of an
employer’s business decisions absent evidence of discrimination.” Anderson, 606 F.3d at
522 (quoting Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Coker was caught using his cell phone during work hours even though the
Employee Handbook explicitly states that “[c]ell phones may only be used during breaks
and lunch periods.” Employee Handbook, Parker App’x at 168. Coker was required to
wear his safety vest because he worked in an area where Parker requires all employees to
wear a vest. Furthermore, during Coker’s conversation with Odean, in which Coker
complained about black employees not working together, Odean told Coker that he and
Calvin, a black employee, were not scheduled to work together “[b]ecause you’re always
8

Coker’s complaint about the radio station is a non-issue. Coker acknowledged that
the radio station was not played in a discriminatory way and that his complaint about how
the radio station was played did not have to do with race. Coker Deposition, Parker App’x
at 91-93, 140-41.
27

talking together, and I don’t know how much production you get done if you’re in the
exact same cell working together.” Odean Deposition, Parker App’x at 270. Coker also
confirmed that Parker had the right to “figure out what works the best at Parker as far as
who works in what cell.” Coker Deposition, Parker App’x at 148. Because there is no
evidence in the record that Parker discriminated on the basis of race or national origin with
respect to any of Coker’s complaints, these complaints do not support Coker’s contention
that Parker’s reason for terminating him was pretext and that the real reason for his
termination was because of his race or national origin.
Neither does the e-mail Seltrecht sent to Emig prior to Coker’s termination
demonstrate that a prohibited reason more likely led to Parker’s decision to terminate
Coker. At her deposition, Seltrecht stated that the e-mail discussed Coker’s race because
Parker’s legal department wants employee demographics when making personnel
decisions. The evidence in the record does not show that Coker’s race or national origin
were discussed in any derogatory or distasteful manner, and it does not indicate that
Coker’s status as a minority played any role in the decision to end his employment. It is
permissible for a legal team to request the race of an employee to determine if an employee
is in a protected class so that it can properly evaluate the potential risk of litigation
associated with terminating an employee belonging to a protected class.
Finally, the evidence in the record demonstrates that Parker had a strong history of
supporting Coker throughout his employment. Coker received positive and negative
reviews; received counselings and warnings for quality-related errors, attendance, wasting
time, leaving the work area, having nonproductive conversations, not maintaining a
consistent productivity level and striking a water fountain while operating a forklift; had
a sexual harassment complaint filed against him; and violated the Workplace Violence
Policy. Yet, Parker repeatedly allowed Coker to maintain his employment. Odean, who
was directly involved in Coker’s termination, had a good relationship with Coker inside

28

and outside of work. Coker felt comfortable enough to talk with Odean about his marital
problems and Odean had previously allowed Coker to take an extra week off of work to
visit his family in Africa. Parker’s history of supporting Coker, despite many instances
of unacceptable performance, and his relationship with Odean provide further evidence that
Parker’s decision to end Coker’s employment was not motivated by Coker’s race or
national origin.
Coker’s claim fails at step three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis because he has
not produced “sufficient admissible evidence from which a rational factfinder could find
that [Parker]’s proffered reason was false or not the real reason for its action, and that
intentional discrimination was the real reason.” Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d
851, 857-58 (8th Cir. 1998). Here, “the evidence . . . is so one-sided that it does not
present a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Torgerson, 643 F.3d
at 1052. Accordingly, the court grants Parker’s motion with respect to Coker’s Title VII
claim.
B. ICRA Claim
The ICRA, like Title VII, makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any
employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against . . . any employee because
of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin,
religion, or disability of such . . . employee.” Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a).
The Eighth Circuit has found that if the plaintiff has failed to present any separate
arguments under the ICRA, then the federal courts may address the plaintiff’s state civil
rights claims together with his or her Title VII claims. Hannoon v. Fawn Eng’g Corp.,
324 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Iowa State Fairgrounds Sec. v. Iowa Civil
Rights Comm’n, 322 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1982)). This is because the Iowa Supreme
Court has found that “[t]he ICRA was modeled after Title VII, and therefore [it has]
consistently employed federal analysis when interpreting the ICRA.” Estate of Harris v.

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Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 677-78 (Iowa 2004) (citing Pecenka v. Fareway
Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Iowa 2003)); see also Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d
872, 873 (Iowa 1999).
With these principles in mind, the court finds that Coker has not presented any
separate arguments under the ICRA and, therefore, the court addresses Coker’s state claim
in the same manner as his Title VII claim. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above,
the court grants Parker’s motion with respect to Coker’s ICRA claim.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Parker Hannifin Corporation’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (docket no. 13) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment in favor of Parker Hannifin Corporation and against Muctaru Coker and to
CLOSE THIS CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2014.

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