Yancey v. Dietsch et al
Filing
28
ORDER granting 24 Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Randy Caspers, Tracy Dietsch: The Clerk's office is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Clerk's office is directed to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 9/16/14. (ksy)(Copy w/NEF to Plf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
NATHANIEL LAMICE YANCEY,
Plaintiff,
No. C13-0106-LRR
vs.
TRACY DIETSCH and RANDY
CASPERS,
ORDER
Defendants.
____________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court pursuant to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (docket no. 24). The defendants filed such motion on July 28, 2014. The
plaintiff filed a “resistance” (docket no. 25) on August 7, 2014. The defendants did not
file a reply.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
687 F.3d 947, 948-49 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Thus, “the substantive law will identify
which facts are material.” Schilf, 687 F.3d at 949 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)
(internal quotation mark omitted). “To establish a genuine issue of material fact, [a party]
may not ‘merely point to self-serving allegations, but must substantiate allegations with
sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in [his or her] favor.’” Argenyi
v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davidson & Assocs. v.
Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005)). Typically, the moving party must support its
motion by using “the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of
the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”, to show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact before the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Since a “‘party’s own testimony is often self-serving,’” all “particular factual allegations
[must be] scrutinized for ‘independent documentary evidence’” to be considered legally
competent. Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 446 (citations omitted).
The court must view all “the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and giv[e] the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Crawford
v. Van Buren Cnty., Ark., 678 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Lewis v. Heartland
Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010)). However, “[w]hen opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007). In order to deny a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence must
be ‘such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Reed v.
City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248.
Procedurally, “[a] movant for summary judgment . . . must identify those portions
of the record which . . . demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). If the moving party has
done so, then the nonmoving party “must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that
set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Torgerson,
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643 F.3d at 1042). “Speculation and conjecture are insufficient . . . .” Id. at 794 (citing
Bloom v. Metro Heart Grp. of St. Louis, Inc., 440 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2006)). If
the record, viewed as a whole, “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 792. (citing Torgerson, 643
F.3d at 1042). Throughout the summary judgment stage, “the court’s function is not to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter itself, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Schilf, 687 F.3d at 949 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview of Civil Rights Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally
protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978).
However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides no substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). “[O]ne cannot go into court and claim
a ‘violation of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983’ — for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 by itself does not protect
anyone against anything.” Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides a remedy for violations of all “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws [of the United States].” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright, 510
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U.S. at 271 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 “merely provides a ‘method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.’”); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (“Constitution and laws” means 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides remedies for
violations of rights created by federal statute, as well as those created by the
Constitution.). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the
alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. The Plaintiff’s Failure to Respond
A proper resistance and supporting documents were due on August 21, 2014. See
LR 56.b. To date, the plaintiff has not properly resisted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment by furnishing evidence, citations or other reasons for denying it. Id.;
see also Settlemire v. Watson, 877 F.2d 13, 14 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (any party
proceeding pro se is expected to be familiar with and follow procedural rules). Although
he could have requested an extension of the filing deadline, the plaintiff did not do so, and,
consequently, it is appropriate to consider the merits of the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. LR 56.c (“If no timely resistance to a motion for summary judgment
is filed, the motion may be granted without prior notice from the court. . . .”). Because
he never submitted a proper resistance, the plaintiff did not expressly admit, deny or
qualify each of the facts set forth in the statement of undisputed material facts that the
defendants submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment. See LR 56.b.2.
The plaintiff’s failure to file any response to the defendants’ statement of undisputed
material facts constitutes an admission of each of these facts. See LR 56.b.; accord Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Given the plaintiff’s admission of the facts included in the defendants’
statement of undisputed material facts and the plaintiff’s failure to come forward with any
evidence, it is clear that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with
respect to the plaintiff’s failure to protect from harm claim.
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And, despite the plaintiff’s failure to take appropriate action, the court reviewed the
law that is applicable to the plaintiff’s claims, the facts that the plaintiff asserts in his
complaint, the additional facts that the plaintiff included in his motions and resistance and
the statement of undisputed material facts which are deemed admitted by the plaintiff. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(4) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or
fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the
court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion, . . . grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including facts considered
undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it . . . or . . . issue any other appropriate
order.”); see also Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 992 F.2d 804,
807 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a court must still determine that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if the nonmoving party did not oppose the
moving party’s contentions). Based on such review, the court finds that the record, even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails to establish a genuine issue
of material fact with regard to whether the defendants violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
C. The Defendants’ Contentions Regarding the
Failure to Protect from Harm Claim1
The defendants argue that no constitutional violation occurred because there is no
evidence that shows they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s
safety. In support of such argument, the defendants point out the following: (1) since
2006, the plaintiff has been incarcerated at several facilities within the Iowa Department
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Although the defendants contend that the plaintiff failed to comply with the
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) or exhaust the administrative remedies available to
him, nothing prevents a review of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that a constitutional
violation occurred as a result of the defendants’ actions. See Jones v. Norris, 310 F.3d
610, 612 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding exhaustion requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) not
met and dismissing case under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)).
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of Corrections, including but not limited to the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility and the
Newton Correctional Facility; (2) the plaintiff spent time at the Iowa Medical and
Classification Center prior to arriving at the Anamosa State Penitentiary on October 9,
2012; (3) the plaintiff was placed at the Anamosa State Penitentiary because he had a
tentative discharge date of 2054, a mandatory sentence that required him to be confined
until 2020 and a custody score of 12; (4) the plaintiff was placed in general population and
did not complain to staff about his safety or identify any enemies from October 9, 2012 to
January 14, 2013; (5) on January 15, 2013, the plaintiff generally advised Dietsch that he
wanted to be transferred to another prison because he had been affiliated with a gang and
was having issues with inmates; (6) the plaintiff was unwilling to tell Dietsch the names
of individuals who were causing him problems; (7) the plaintiff made clear that he did not
want to be placed in protective custody; (8) in response, Dietsch documented the plaintiff’s
visit, sent an email to various prison officials, including Caspers, spoke with the plaintiff’s
counselor and started an investigation; (9) on January 17, 2013, the plaintiff complained
to Dietsch that he was having problems with a black inmate named “Peter” and needed to
be transferred; (10) the plaintiff stated that Peter was a friend of Dock and a gang member,
that Peter approached him on the yard and challenged him about testifying against Dock
in federal court and that Peter had other inmates approach him about testifying against
Dock; (11) the plaintiff did not identify the other individuals that approached him and
stated that he did not want or need to be placed in protective custody; (12) after meeting
with the plaintiff, Dietsch wrote an incident report that was submitted to the prison security
office for further investigation and she emailed the incident report to Caspers, the deputy
warden and the plaintiff’s counselor; (13) on January 23, 2013, Caspers informed Dietsch
that an investigation revealed that the plaintiff was not affiliated with a gang, no evidence
suggested the plaintiff was in danger and it appeared the plaintiff was attempting to
manipulate a transfer to another prison; (14) Caspers also informed Dietsch that, although
the plaintiff talked to federal officials about Dock, he did not testify against him and the
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information he provided was not helpful or usable; (15) on January 31, 2013, the plaintiff
and another inmate, Blanco, were involved in a fight; (16) as a result of fighting, the
plaintiff received thirty days of disciplinary detention; (17) on March 7, 2013, the plaintiff
asked to be moved out of administrative segregation; (18) in response, the warden told the
plaintiff that the review committee had concerns about his release to general population and
those concerns were being reviewed; (19) the plaintiff told those individuals who were
reviewing his classification that he did not want to be in protective custody, and Blanco
and the plaintiff assured their counselors that there would not be any additional problems;
(20) the review committee returned the plaintiff to general population on March 12, 2013;
(21) the plaintiff never complained about his safety from March 12, 2013 to May 8, 2013,
that is, the date that he was assaulted by Griffin; (22) the plaintiff spent time in general
population without being assaulted from March 12, 2013 to May 8, 2013; (23) the plaintiff
never told any prison official that he was having problems with Griffin; (24) the plaintiff
and Griffin remained in general population without incident for substantial periods of time
between October 12, 2012 and May 8, 2013; (25) an investigation did not reveal why
Griffin assaulted the plaintiff; (26) the plaintiff was placed in investigative segregation
from May 8, 2013 to May 22, 2013 and, pursuant to his request, remained in voluntary
protective custody from May 22, 2013 until his transfer; and (27) on July 23, 2013, the
plaintiff transferred to another facility.
Although it is true that prisoners have a right to be free from violence at the hands
of other prisoners, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); see also Latimore
v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff’s “Eighth Amendment
right . . . ‘to be protected from harm by fellow inmates’” is “well established in the law”
(quoting Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 501 (8th Cir. 1990))), not “every injury
suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability
for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety”, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also
Andrews v. Siegel, 929 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that “some violence
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in prisons may be unavoidable due to the character of the prisoners” (quoting Martin v.
White, 742 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather,
to establish an “unconstitutional failure to protect from harm [claim], [the plaintiff] must
show (1) an ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ deprivation, meaning that he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) that the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm.” Schoelch
v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834); accord Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 601-02 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing
Pagels v. Morrison, 335 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2003) and Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d
1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Blades v. Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801, 803-04 (8th Cir.
2002) (discussing what must be established to succeed on a constitutional failure to protect
claim); Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the first
requirement is intended to “ensure[] that the deprivation is sufficiently serious to amount
to a deprivation of constitutional dimension” and the second requirement is intended to
“ensure[] that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the
[Constitution]’” (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991))).
Given the undisputed material facts, it cannot be said that any “act or omission [by
the named defendants resulted] in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)). The plaintiff fails to establish that the defendants were “‘aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed].’”
Schoelch, 625 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see also Holden v. Hirner,
663 F.3d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that a showing of deliberate indifference
“mandat[es] the prisoner prove the official both knew of and disregarded ‘an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety’” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)); Pagels, 335 F.3d at 740
(providing that a prison guard’s negligence is not enough to establish reckless
indifference); Jackson, 140 F.3d at 1152 (pointing out that the matter of deliberate
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indifference must be determined with regard to the relevant prison official’s knowledge at
“the time in question, not with hindsight’s perfect vision” and that “‘threats between
inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual
knowledge of a substantial risk of harm’” (quoting Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th
Cir. 1996))); Andrews, 929 F.2d at 1330 (stating that a plaintiff “‘must show the
defendant[] [was] deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights, either because [the
defendant] actually intended to deprive him of some right, or because [the defendant] acted
with reckless disregard of his right to be free from violent attacks by fellow inmates’”
(quoting Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1984))).
The record indicates that: (1) nearly five months passed between the date that the
plaintiff generally complained about his safety and the date that Griffin assaulted him, (2)
the plaintiff always maintained that he should remain in general population, even after
fighting with another inmate, (3) the plaintiff never identified anyone who made a specific
threat against him and (4) the defendants and others took appropriate actions in response
to the plaintiff’s statements even though they lacked sufficient detail. Moreover, the
plaintiff admits that he did not tell the defendants that an inmate posed a substantial risk
of harm to him because he did not know who might assault him and insists that the
defendants should have placed him in non-voluntary protective custody despite his
assurances to them that he could be in general population. Consequently, the plaintiff
offers insufficient facts to support the conclusion that the defendants or any other prison
official acted in a deliberately indifferent manner. See Prater, 89 F.3d at 541-42 (finding
that a prisoner failed to show that a prison official “actually knew of the risk” to the
prisoner when the prisoner told the official that he received threats from his roommate
because, in part, after reporting the threats, the prisoner and his roommate told the official
that there would be no trouble and the two “were incarcerated together for a substantial
period of time without incident”); Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892, 895 (8th Cir.
1994) (determining that defendants did not act with deliberate indifference by refusing to
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place inmate in protective custody based on his general fear for his safety); cf. Spruce v.
Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (clarifying that a jury may infer that an official
must have known of the risk if there is evidence of very obvious and blatant circumstances
indicating a risk to an inmate). Thus, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
D. The Defendants’ Other Argument
Having concluded that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because the record fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether
the defendants violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it is unnecessary to review the
defendants’ remaining contention that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Nonetheless,
qualified immunity shields “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law”, Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), and the record does not establish
that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the defendants’ conduct was
unlawful in the situation that they confronted, see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199
(2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). This is especially so
because the undisputed evidence indicates that no one, including the plaintiff, believed he
faced a substantial risk of serious harm or that the defendants subjectively acted, or failed
to act, with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. See Berry v. Sherman, 365
F.3d 631, 634-35 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that officials were entitled to qualified
immunity because they investigated information they received and had no notice of an
attack); Pagels, 335 F.3d at 740-42 (deciding that district court improperly denied officer
qualified immunity because officer did not have actual knowledge of a credible threat of
serious harm to inmate and he responded in an objectively reasonable way); Tucker v.
Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that record did not support the
conclusion that an officer was deliberately indifferent to a risk to an inmate).
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E. Summary
The court afforded the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, but the
record fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the
defendants failed to protect the plaintiff from harm or whether the defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity. Given the undisputed material facts, it is appropriate to enter
judgment in favor of the defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
(1) The defendants’ motion for summary judgment (docket no. 24) is granted.
(2) The clerk’s office is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
(3) The clerk’s office is directed to close this case.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2014.
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