Leonard v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - The final decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Judgment shall enter against Leonard and in favor of the Commissioner. Signed by Magistrate Judge Leonard T Strand on 1/28/16. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
DAWN A. LEONARD,
Plaintiff,
No. C14-00130-LTS
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Defendant.
____________________
Plaintiff Dawn A. Leonard seeks judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying her application for Social
Security disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Act). Leonard contends that the administrative record (AR) does
not contain substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision that she was not
disabled during the relevant period. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner’s
decision will be affirmed.
I.
BACKGROUND
Leonard was born in 1967 and has a high school education. AR 220. She has
previously worked as a cleaner and sales attendant. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
determined that she is able to perform those past jobs. Finding 6; AR 22.
Leonard filed her application for DIB on November 18, 2011, alleging a disability
onset date of November 4, 2011. AR 12, 185. She contends that she is disabled due to
a disorder of the back with low back pain; status post breast cancer, in remission; and an
affective disorder.
AR 14.
Leonard’s claims were denied initially and on
reconsideration. AR 83, 90. She then requested a hearing before an ALJ. ALJ Julie
Bruntz conducted a hearing on July 18, 2013. AR 12, 28. On August 19, 2013, the ALJ
issued a decision denying Leonard’s claim. AR 9. Leonard sought review by the Appeals
Council, which denied review on October 3, 2014, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final
decision of the Commissioner. AR 1.
On December 4, 2014, Leonard filed a complaint (Doc. No. 3) in this court
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. On January 21, 2015, with the consent
of the parties (Doc. No. 6), the Honorable Linda R. Reade transferred this case to me
for final disposition and entry of judgment. The parties have now briefed the issues and
the matter is fully submitted.
II.
DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord 20 C.F.R. §
404.1505. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers
either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social
Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined
in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th
Cir. 2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s work activity. If the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
2
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
Commissioner looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work
activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). “An impairment is
not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the
claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at
707; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes
necessary to do most jobs.” Id. § 404.1521(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1)
physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching,
carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding,
carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding
appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with
changes in a routine work setting. Id. § 404.1521(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two
only when the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments would have no more
than a minimal impact on her ability to work.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043
(8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will
consider the medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one
of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is
considered disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d); see Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir.
1998).
Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one
of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) to determine the claimant’s “ability to meet
the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements” of the claimant’s past relevant
3
work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4). “RFC is a medical question
defined wholly in terms of the claimant’s physical ability to perform exertional tasks or,
in other words, what the claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental
limitations.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for
providing evidence the Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant’s
RFC, but the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant’s “complete
medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and
making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the
claimant’s] own medical sources.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). The Commissioner also will
consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. Id.
If a claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not
disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant’s RFC as determined in Step Four will not allow the claimant
to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that
there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s RFC as determined at
Step Four, and his or her age, education, and work experience. See Bladow v. Apfel,
205 F.3d 356, 358-59 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). The Commissioner must show not only that
the claimant’s RFC will allow the claimant to make an adjustment to other work, but also
that the other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Eichelberger
v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the
claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy, then the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. If the
claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will find that
the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). At Step Five, even though the
burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, the burden of persuasion to prove
disability remains on the claimant. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir.
2004).
4
III.
ALJ’S FINDINGS
The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2016.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
November 4, 2011, the alleged onset date.
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Disorder of
the Back with Low Back Pain; Status Post Breast Cancer, in Remission;
and Affective Disorder.
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) in that the claimant can
occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently;
stand or walk for six hours in an 8-hour workday; sit for six hours in an 8hour workday; push and pull, including the operation of hand and foot
controls, is unlimited within the weight limits set forth for lifting and
carrying; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but occasionally climb
ramps and stairs; and frequently balance, but only occasionally stoop,
kneel, crouch and crawl. Additionally, the claimant is limited to simple,
routine tasks.
6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a
cleaner (DOT #323.687-014, Light, SVP-2) and sales attendant (DOT
#299.677-010, Light, SVP-2). This work does not require the performance
of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional
capacity.
7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from November 4, 2011 through the date of this
decision.
AR 14-23.
5
IV.
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD
The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed “if it is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir.
2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .”). “Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis, 353 F.3d at 645. The Eighth Circuit
explains the standard as “something less than the weight of the evidence and [that] allows
for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of
choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits without
being subject to reversal on appeal.” Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir.
1994).
In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision meets this standard, the court
considers “all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the
evidence.” Wester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers
both evidence which supports the Commissioner’s decision and evidence that detracts
from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court must “search
the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner’s] decision and give that
evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support
is substantial.” Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v.
Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply
a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not
“reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ,” Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v.
Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or “review the factual record de novo.” Roe
v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188
(8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court finds it “possible to
6
draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the Commissioner’s findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner’s] denial of
benefits.” Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th
Cir. 2008)). This is true even in cases where the court “might have weighed the evidence
differently.” Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817,
822 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision “merely
because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Baker v.
Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789
(8th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply because
some evidence may support the opposite conclusion.”).
V.
DISCUSSION
Leonard argues the ALJ’s decision is flawed for two reasons:
1.
The ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by work-related
limitations from a treating or examining source.
2.
The ALJ failed to properly evaluate Leonard’s subjective
allegations.
I will address these arguments separately below.
A.
RFC Determination
1.
Applicable Standards
The claimant’s RFC is “what [the claimant] can still do” despite his or her
“physical or mental limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). “The ALJ must determine
a claimant’s RFC based on all of the relevant evidence.” Fredrickson v. Barnhart, 359
F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 2004). This includes “an individual’s own description of [her]
limitations.”
McGeorge v. Barnhart, 321 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting
McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). The claimant’s RFC “is a
medical question,” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001), and must be
7
supported by “some medical evidence.” Dykes v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.
2000) (per curiam). The medical evidence should address the claimant’s “ability to
function in the workplace.” Lewis, 353 F.3d at 646. At step four, the claimant has the
burden to prove his RFC and the ALJ determines the RFC based on all relevant evidence.
See Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ is not required to mechanically list and reject every possible limitation.
McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 615 (8th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, “[a]n ALJ’s failure
to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not considered.”
Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d
383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998)). “[T]he ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert,
whether hired by a claimant or by the government, if inconsistent with the medical record
as a whole.” Bentley v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1995). The RFC must only
include those impairments which are substantially supported by the record as a whole.
Goose v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Forte v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d
892, 897 (8th Cir. 2004).
2.
The ALJ’s Findings
The ALJ found that Leonard had the RFC to perform light work. AR 17. She
included the following limitations:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) in that the claimant can occasionally lift
and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently; stand or walk
for six hours in an 8-hour workday; sit for six hours in an 8-hour workday;
push and pull, including the operation of hand and foot controls, is
unlimited within the weight limits set forth for lifting and carrying; never
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but occasionally climb ramps and stairs;
and frequently balance, but only occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and
crawl. Additionally, the claimant is limited to simple, routine tasks.
8
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of the state
agency’s consultants, Drs. Larrison, Griffin and Ryan, finding that they were consistent
with other substantial medical evidence of record. AR 21-22. The ALJ did not give
great weight to the opinion of Dr. Hayes, finding it to be both conclusory and inconsistent
with his own notes which indicate that Leonard’s physical examinations were normal,
including negative straight leg raises and normal gait, other than tenderness to palpation
of the lumbosacral region of Leonard’s spine, which is relatively minor.
3.
Analysis
I find that some medical evidence, indeed substantial evidence, supports the ALJ’s
residual functional capacity assessment, and her analysis as a whole. The ALJ considered
the entire record, including medical opinions and lay statements, and determined that
Leonard was capable of light work with some non-exertional limitations. AR 16-21. In
addition, I find that the ALJ gave good reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for
the limited weight afforded to Dr. Hayes’ opinion. While an ALJ must normally give
great weight to the opinion of a treating physician, where that opinion is inconsistent
with the physician’s own treatment notes, as well as with most other evidence in the
record, that opinion may be discredited. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir.
2001). I agree with the ALJ that Dr. Hayes’ opinion was inconsistent with his own
notes, and also with the great weight of the other medical evidence, and thus the ALJ
was within his discretion in disregarding it.
Leonard argues, however, that the ALJ was required as a matter of law under
Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2000), to obtain a treating or examining source
medical opinion regarding her ability to perform work-related activities. In Nevland, the
Commissioner made a Step Five determination that a claimant who could not perform
past relevant work could, nonetheless, perform various jobs identified by a VE. Id. at
857. Various non-treating and non-examining physicians reviewed the claimant’s records
9
and gave opinions about the claimant’s RFC, which the ALJ then used in formulating
hypothetical questions to a VE. Id. at 858. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals began
its analysis as follows:
In our circuit it is well settled law that once a claimant demonstrates that he
or she is unable to do past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner to prove, first that the claimant retains the residual functional
capacity to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists in
substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to do.
McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1146–47 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc);
O'Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1983). It is also well
settled law that it is the duty of the ALJ to fully and fairly develop the
record, even when, as in this case, the claimant is represented by counsel.
Warner v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 857. The court then noted that while the record contained many treatment notes,
none of the treating physicians provided opinions concerning the claimant’s RFC. Id. at
858. The court then stated:
In the case at bar, there is no medical evidence about how Nevland's
impairments affect his ability to function now. The ALJ relied on the
opinions of non-treating, non-examining physicians who reviewed the
reports of the treating physicians to form an opinion of Nevland's RFC. In
our opinion, this does not satisfy the ALJ's duty to fully and fairly develop
the record. The opinions of doctors who have not examined the claimant
ordinarily do not constitute substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Jenkins v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir.1999). Likewise, the
testimony of a vocational expert who responds to a hypothetical based on
such evidence is not substantial evidence upon which to base a denial of
benefits. Id. In our opinion, the ALJ should have sought such an opinion
from Nevland's treating physicians or, in the alternative, ordered
consultative examinations, including psychiatric and/or psychological
evaluations to assess Nevland's mental and physical residual functional
capacity. As this Court said in Lund v. Weinberger, 520 F.2d 782, 785
(8th Cir.1975): “An administrative law judge may not draw upon his own
inferences from medical reports. See Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d
1187, 1189 (8th Cir.1974); Willem v. Richardson, 490 F.2d 1247, 1248–
49 n. 3 (8th Cir.1974).”
Id. [emphasis in original].
10
Here, in contrast to Nevland, the ALJ found that Leonard is capable of performing
her past work, both as a cleaner (DOT #323.687-014, Light, SVP-2) and as a sales
attendant (DOT #299.677-010, Light, SVP-2). Finding 6, AR 22.1 Thus, the analysis
ended at Step Four. The Eighth Circuit has consistently held that Nevland applies only in
cases arising at Step Five of the sequential evaluation process. See, e.g., Casey v. Astrue,
503 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2007); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir.
2004). Moreover, this court has held that Nevland “does not compel remand in every
case in which the administrative record lacks a treating doctor’s opinion.” Hattig v.
Colvin, No. C12-4092 MWB, 2013 WL 6511866, at *10 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 12, 2013).
Leonard contends, however, that Nevland should apply at Step Four because it was
premised on the ALJ’s duty to fully and fairly develop the record. Doc. No. 11 at 10.
As explained above, Nevland’s holding applies only at Step Five due to the burden shifting
that occurs at that step. Leonard is correct, however, that an ALJ does have a duty to
develop the record fully and fairly, independent of the claimant’s burden to press her
case. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010). “[A]n ALJ is permitted
to issue a decision without obtaining additional medical evidence so long as other evidence
in the record provides a sufficient basis for the ALJ’s decision.” Anderson v. Shalala,
51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 189 (8th Cir.
1994)). “[R]eversal due to failure to develop the record is only warranted where such
failure is unfair or prejudicial.” Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2001).
Ultimately, it is the claimant’s burden to provide evidence of disability. Medhaug v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2009); Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737
(8th Cir. 2004) (“It is the claimant’s burden to establish her RFC at step four.”).
1
Leonard states: “The ALJ determined that Leonard was unable to perform past relevant work
as a cleaner and a sales attendant.” Doc. No. 11 at 2. This is clearly wrong. The ALJ’s express
finding was: “The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a cleaner…and sales
attendant…” AR 22.
11
Having carefully reviewed the record, I find that the ALJ was not obligated to
obtain additional medical evidence. The existing medical evidence shows, inter alia, that
Leonard had a normal gait (AR 355, 358, 499, 501, 502, 503, 522, 527, 535, 692, 698),
normal motor function (AR 355, 356, 525, 531) and essentially-normal range of motion
of the back (AR 502, 628). This evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s RFC findings. See also Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir.
2002) (“Even though the opinion of a [reviewing] physician alone does not generally
constitute substantial evidence, see [Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2001)],
the ALJ did not rely solely on the opinion of the [reviewing] physician, but also conducted
an independent review of the medical evidence.”). The ALJ was not obligated to obtain
additional medical evidence.
B.
Subjective Allegations
Leonard argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider her subjective allegations
and the third-party statements of family members. She contends the ALJ discredited
those allegations because she incorrectly relied on the fact that Leonard’s allegations as
to back pain are inconsistent with objective medical evidence in the file, the lack of sought
treatment and Leonard’s normal gait and station.
She further contends that if her
subjective allegations had been afforded the proper weight, a finding of disability would
have been mandated.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly analyzed
Leonard’s subjective allegations as to her limitations and pain, as well as the other record
evidence – including the medical evidence – which supports discounting her allegations.
1.
Applicable Standards
“The credibility of a claimant’s subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to
decide, not the courts.” Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, the court must “defer to the ALJ’s determinations regarding the credibility
12
of testimony, so long as they are supported by good reasons and substantial evidence.”
Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801 (8th Cir. 2005). An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective
complaints if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole. Id. “An ALJ who rejects
[subjective] complaints must make an express credibility determination explaining the
reasons for discrediting the complaints.” Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir.
2000). To determine a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must consider:
(1)
the claimant’s daily activities;
(2)
the duration, intensity, and frequency of pain;
(3)
the precipitating and aggravating factors;
(4)
the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and
(5)
any functional restrictions.
Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). “Other relevant factors include
the claimant’s relevant work history, and the absence of objective medical evidence to
support the complaints.” Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Wheeler v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2000)). An ALJ may not discount a
claimant’s subjective complaints solely because they are unsupported by objective
medical evidence. Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 931-32 (8th Cir. 2010).
The ALJ is not required “‘to discuss methodically each Polaski consideration, so
long as he acknowledge[s] and examine[s] those considerations before discounting [the
claimant’s] subjective complaints.’” Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000)). If an ALJ discounts a
claimant’s subjective complaints, he or she is required to “detail the reasons for
discrediting the testimony and set forth the inconsistencies found.” Ford v. Astrue, 518
F.3d 979, 982 (quoting Lewis, 353 F.3d at 647). When an ALJ explicitly discredits the
claimant’s testimony and gives good reason for doing so, the court should normally defer
to the ALJ’s credibility determination. Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir.
2003). It is not the court’s role to re-weigh the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see
13
also Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[I]f, after reviewing the
record, [the Court] find[s] that it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the [Commissioner’s] findings, [the Court]
must affirm the decision of the Commissioner.”) [citations and quotations omitted].
An ALJ may discount corroborating testimony on the same basis used to discredit
the claimant’s testimony. See Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2006); Young
v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000) (ALJ’s failure to give specific reasons for
disregarding testimony of claimant’s husband was inconsequential, as same reasons ALJ
gave to discredit claimant could serve as basis for discrediting husband).
2.
Analysis
The ALJ noted that objective medical evidence did not support Leonard’s
allegations of having severe functional limitations due to back pain. AR 20. She pointed
out that diagnostic imaging only revealed one multilevel facet arthropathy and lumbar
disc bulge. Id. The absence of supporting evidence is a relevant factor in evaluating
her allegations. See Ward v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1986). In addition,
the ALJ observed that Leonard frequently had normal physical examinations and had
negative straight leg raises and normal gait and station. AR 20. The ALJ also observed
that Leonard’s treatment was routine, with no recommendation for surgery and only
outpatient care. Id. Such conservative treatment weighs against her credibility. See
Gowell v. Apfel, 242 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2001). Other evidence shows that Leonard
did not follow through with her home exercise program and did not take Tylenol or
Aleve, as her orthopedist recommended. AR 581, 690. See Guilliams v. Barnhart,
393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 2005) (a failure to follow a recommended course of
treatment weighs against credibility). Accordingly, the ALJ was entitled to find that
her allegations were not entirely credible. The ALJ was similarly entitled to discredit
the third-party statements for the same reasons.
14
In short, the ALJ provided good reasons, supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole, for her assessment of Leonard’s credibility. As such, the court
may not re-weigh the evidence.
VI.
CONCLUSION
After a thorough review of the entire record and in accordance with the standard
of review I must follow, I conclude that the ALJ’s determination that Leonard was not
disabled within the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Accordingly, the final decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Judgment shall enter
against Leonard and in favor of the Commissioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 28th day of January, 2016.
________________________________
LEONARD T. STRAND
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?