Yates v. Fayram

Filing 26

ORDER denying 1 Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application filed by Duane Yates. A certificate of appealability is denied. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 9/29/15. (ksy)(copy w/NEF to Pet)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

DUANE YATES,
Petitioner,

No. C14-0134-LRR

vs.
JOHN FAYRAM,

ORDER

Respondent.

This matter appears before the court on the petitioner’s application for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket no. 1). On December 29, 2014, the
petitioner submitted his application for a writ of habeas corpus. On January 28, 2015, the
court directed the respondent to address the petitioner’s claims (docket no. 4). On March
13, 2015, the respondent complied with the court’s order by filing an answer (docket no.
10). On the same date, the court established a briefing schedule (docket no. 11). On
March 16, 2015, the respondent filed the disciplinary record, which included confidential
information, and the state court record (docket nos. 12 & 25). On June 22, 2015, the
petitioner filed a brief (docket no. 20). On September 10, 2015, the respondent filed a
response brief (docket no. 24). The court now turns to consider the petitioner’s application
for a writ of habeas corpus.
With respect to whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted, 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(2) provides:
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a
claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows
that—
(A) the claim relies on—

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;
or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of
due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Due to the limits set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the court
concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d

915, 921 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing constraints on district court’s discretion to hold an
evidentiary hearing); Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 700 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing
standard for conducting an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)); Kinder v.
Bowersox, 272 F.3d 532, 542 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding it was proper for district court not
to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioner did not meet the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)); Parker v. Kemna, 260 F.3d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 2001) (same);
Hatcher v. Hopkins, 256 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); cf. Johnston v. Luebbers,
288 F.3d 1048, 1058-60 (8th Cir. 2002) (assuming that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) did not bar
the district court from granting an evidentiary hearing and denying the petitioner an
evidentiary hearing because such a hearing would not assist in the resolution of his claim).
It is clear that “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Nonetheless, “due process
requires procedural protections before a prison inmate can be deprived of a protected
liberty interest in good time credits.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 (1985)
(citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-58).

2

Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of
good time credits, . . . [an] inmate must receive: (1) advance
written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity,
when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals,
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67); see also Dible v. Scholl, 506
F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2007) (making clear that a prisoner must receive advance
written notice of a charge, an opportunity to call witnesses and present a defense and a
written statement of the evidence relied upon by the fact finder and the reasons for the
disciplinary action).

Further, due process requires that a prison disciplinary board

establish its factual findings by using “some evidence” as the standard of proof. Hill, 472
U.S. at 454; see also Ragan v. Lynch, 113 F.3d 875, 876 (8th Cir. 1997) (making clear
that a disciplinary decision must be supported by some evidence in the record); Goff v.
Dailey, 991 F.2d 1437, 1440-42 (8th Cir. 1993) (same). “‘This standard is met if ‘there
was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be
deduced . . . .’” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (quoting United States ex rel. Vajtauer v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)).
Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.
Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence
in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.
Id. at 455-56. “Thus, courts are to give deference to prison officials and should intercede
in prison discipline cases only when the sanctions are wholly unsupported by the record.”
Gomez v. Graves, 323 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2003).
With respect to the merits of the petitioner’s claims, the court deems it appropriate
to deny the application for a writ of habeas corpus for the reasons stated in the response
brief that the respondent filed. The response brief adequately sets forth the law that is
3

applicable to the petitioner’s claims. Specifically, the respondent correctly concluded that
the petitioner failed to adequately present his claims to the state courts as he is required to
do if he seeks habeas corpus relief, the petitioner cannot raise procedurally defaulted
claims and/or the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he received due process
during his disciplinary proceedings.
Moreover, after thoroughly reviewing the record, the court finds that relief is not
available under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).1 In his postconviction relief action, the petitioner argued that: (1) the notice was improper or
untimely, (2) the statement of the evidence relied upon or the reasons for the decision was
inadequate (3) and the decision was improper. More specifically, the petitioner asserted
that the length of the investigation and the amount of time he spent in lockup after a
corrections officer discovered him having oral sex with another inmate violates his due

1

The court only addresses the petitioner’s discipline for sexual misconduct because
the petitioner’s other discipline did not involve the loss of earned time. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (finding that a writ of habeas corpus is the only
federal remedy available if a plaintiff is challenging the validity of his conviction or the
duration of his incarceration and seeking a determination that he is entitled to immediate
or speedier release); Deloria v. Lightenberg, 400 F. App’x 117, 118 (8th Cir. 2010)
(same). Moreover, the record indicates that an adequate and independent basis bars review
of the petitioner’s other discipline under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Stated differently, the court
is precluded from considering the petitioner’s other discipline because the courts of Iowa
already determined that the 90-day statute of limitation contained in Iowa Code section
822.3 barred the petitioner from obtaining post-conviction relief. See Cagle v. Norris, 474
F.3d 1090, 1098 (8th Cir. 2007) (determining that review of procedurally barred claim is
limited); Bailey v. Mapes, 358 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that district
court correctly found that petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted and barred unless
he could show “cause” and “actual prejudice” for the procedural default”); Reagan v.
Norris, 279 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a district court is precluded
from considering any issue that a state court has already resolved on an independent and
adequate state-law basis, including a state court determination that a claim has been lost
because of default); Murray v. Hvass, 269 F.3d 896, 898-99 (8th Cir. 2001) (same);
Owsley v. Bowersox, 234 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Burr v. Snider, 234
F.3d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (same).
4

process and equal protection rights, the disciplinary process violated his liberty interests
and a non-neutral ALJ found him guilty. The Iowa courts’ analysis of the petitioner’s
claims is not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and
the evidence was sufficient for the ALJ to find the petitioner guilty. In light of the record,
it cannot be said that the petitioner’s disciplinary proceedings failed to satisfy the
procedural requirements prescribed in Wolff.

Indeed, the record indicates that the

petitioner received: (1) written notice on June 3, 2013, (2) a full and fair hearing and (3)
written findings on June 11, 2013. Moreover, because the petitioner admitted that he
engaged in consensual oral sex with another inmate and a corrections officer observed the
petitioner while he was engaged in consensual oral sex with another inmate, there is more
than “some evidence” in the record to support the determination that the ALJ made. See
Espinoza v. Peterson, 283 F.3d 949, 952-53 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding “some evidence”
standard met); Mason v. Sargent, 898 F.2d 679, 680 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). In sum, the
court concludes that: (1) the Iowa courts’ adjudication of the petitioner’s claims neither
resulted in a decision contrary to clearly established federal law nor involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; and (2) the Iowa courts’ rulings
did not result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the introduced evidence.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Accordingly, the

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be denied.
In a habeas proceeding before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to
review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d
518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability
may only issue if a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
5

constitutional right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029,
154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir.
2000); Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d
565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997); Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues
must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently,
or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing Flieger v. Delo,
16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating
standard).
Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds.
“‘[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a
federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying
constitutional claim, “the [petitioner must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the
petitioner failed to make the requisite “substantial showing” with respect to the claims that
he raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Because there is no
debatable question as to the resolution of this case, an appeal is not warranted.
Accordingly, the court shall not grant a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253.

6

If the petitioner desires further review of his claims, he may request issuance of the
certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
accordance with Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 520-22.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application (docket no. 1) is denied.
2) A certificate of appealability is denied.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2015.

7