Heller v. Regional Environmental Improvement Commission of Iowa County et al

Filing 52

ORDER granting in part 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. Hellers FMLA claim is dismissed. The remainder of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as moot. This case is remanded to the Iowa District Court for Iowa County. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Linda R Reade on 09/10/2018. (jjh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

RICHARD HELLER,
Plaintiff,

No. 17-CV-93-LRR

vs.
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION OF
IOWA COUNTY et al.,

ORDER

Defendants.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION. .............................................................................1

II.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY...................................................2

III.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.....................................................2

IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD....................................................3

V.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND..................................................4
A.
B.

VI.

ANALYSIS........................................................................................7
A.

B.
VII.

Parties.....................................................................................4
Overview of the Dispute...............................................................4

FMLA Claim.............................................................................7
1.
Parties’ arguments............................................................7
2.
Applicable law..................................................................9
3.
Application......................................................................9
Heller’s State Law Claims...........................................................12

CONCLUSION.................................................................................12
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Defendants Regional Environmental Improvement

Commission (“REIC”), Iowa County, Iowa (“the County”) and John Gahring’s

(collectively, “Defendants”) “Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Motion”) (docket no.
34).
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 14, 2017, Heller filed a “Petition at Law and Jury Demand” (“Petition”)
(docket no. 6) in the Iowa District Court for Iowa County. In the Petition, Heller alleges
the following claims against Defendants: (1) wrongful discharge and retaliation; (2)
violation of the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act; (3) defamation; (4) tortious
interference with contract; (5) infliction of severe emotional distress; (6) interference with
rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”); and (7) breach of contract. See
Petition at 3-11. On August 10, 2017, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal (docket no.
2), bringing the case before the court. On August 17, 2017, Defendants filed an Answer
(docket no. 8).
On July 6, 2018, Defendants filed the Motion. On August 3, 2018, Heller filed a
Resistance (docket no. 41). On August 13, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply (docket no.
48). On August 20, 2018, Heller filed a Surreply (docket no. 51). No party has requested
oral argument, and the court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. The matter is fully
submitted and ready for decision.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The court has federal-question jurisdiction over Heller’s FMLA claim because it
arises under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Heller’s remaining state
law claims because these claims are so related to the federal claim that they “form part of
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a).

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IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show’” an absence of a genuine dispute as
to a material fact. Hilde v. City of Eveleth, 777 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). “A
dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.”
Massey-Diez v. Univ. of Iowa Cmty. Med. Servs., Inc., 826 F.3d 1149, 1157 (8th Cir.
2016) (quoting Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 647 F.3d 833, 837-38 (8th
Cir. 2011)). “The movant ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion,’ and must identify ‘those portions of [the record] . . . which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Torgerson, 643
F.3d at 1042 (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)). Once the movant has done so, “the nonmovant must respond by submitting
evidentiary materials that set out ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts “in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
586 (2009)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial,” and summary judgment
is appropriate. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “The nonmovant ‘must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts’ . . . .” Torgerson,
643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586). Instead, “[t]o survive a motion

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for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must substantiate [its] allegations with
sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [its] favor based on more
than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Williams v. Mannis, 889 F.3d 926, 931
(8th Cir. 2018) (third alteration in original) (quoting Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training,
LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 2011)). Mere “self-serving allegations and denials are
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Anuforo v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 614 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2010). “Evidence, not contentions, avoids summary
judgment.” Reasonover v. St. Louis Cty., Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 578 (8th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2003)).
V. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
affording him all reasonable inferences, the uncontested material facts are as follows.
A. Parties
Heller is a resident of Iowa County, Iowa. Petition ¶ 1. REIC is an organization
organized under Iowa Code Chapter 28E. Id. ¶ 2. Iowa County is a unit of government
organized under the laws of the State of Iowa. Id. ¶ 3. At all times relevant, Gahring was
a resident of Iowa County, Iowa. Id. ¶ 4.
B. Overview of the Dispute
On March 1, 1990, Heller began working for REIC as its Environmental Director
and for the County as the County Sanitarian. See Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
in Support of Motion (“SUMF”) (docket no. 34-1) ¶ 1. Heller received employee
handbooks from both REIC and the County. Id. ¶ 4.
On July 18, 2016, Heller requested FMLA leave from July 19, 2016 to August 1,
2016. Id. ¶¶ 69, 75. Heller requested FMLA leave because he “had the shakes,” could
not sleep and had “loss of memory.” Id. ¶ 71; Appendix in Support of Motion (docket no.
34-2) at 25.

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On July 19, 2016, the County sent Heller an FMLA certification form and an
explanatory letter.

SUMF ¶ 72; Appendix in Support of Motion at 149-53.

The

certification form pertained to the “amount of leave needed.” Appendix in Support of
Motion at 152. The form enumerated several types of leave that were available, including
a continuous period of leave, part-time leave and intermittent leave.

Id.

The

accompanying letter stated in pertinent part:
You must provide sufficient medical certification to the
Auditor’s Office within [fifteen] calendar days from the date
of this letter. Enclosed is a form that must be completed by
your health care provider. Failure to provide this certification
will result in denial of FMLA leave and this absence will be
counted in accordance with our attendance policy. Upon
receipt of your certification, you will be required to use all
sources of paid leave concurrently with your FMLA leave,
with the exception of [forty] hours of vacation.
Your health benefits will be maintained for up to [twelve]
weeks during your leave under the same conditions as if you
continued to work. You must continue to pay your portion of
your health insurance premiums that you normally pay during
your leave. . . . Additionally, if your leave extends for more
than [twelve] weeks, you will become responsible for payment
of the entire health insurance premium to maintain coverage.
Id. at 149.
On July 26, 2016, Heller returned the certification form to the County. SUMF
¶ 73.

On the form, Heller’s medical provider indicated that Heller would “be

incapacitated for a single continuous period of time due to [his] medical condition.”
Appendix in Support of Motion at 152. On July 27, 2016, the County sent Heller a
designation notice stating that it had received the medical certification and that it had
determined that his absence qualified as FMLA leave. SUMF ¶ 73; Appendix in Support
of Motion at 154. On August 2, 2016, REIC sent Heller an FMLA certification form and

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accompanying letter.1 SUMF ¶ 74; Appendix in Support of Motion at 157-61. Heller
returned the REIC certification form and, again, Heller’s medical provider indicated that
Heller would “be incapacitated for a single continuous period of time due to [his] medical
condition.” Appendix in Support of Resistance (docket no. 44) at 3.
On August 1, 2016, Heller provided REIC and the County with a note from his
medical provider extending his medical leave through September 1, 2016. Appendix in
Support of Motion at 156. On August 31, 2016, Heller provided REIC and the County
with a note from his medical provider extending his medical leave through September 30,
2016. Id. at 162.
On September 20, 2016, Heller’s attorney sent an email to counsel for REIC and
the County. SUMF ¶ 80. Heller’s attorney stated that “[her] calculations reveal that
[Heller’s] [twelve] weeks of FMLA [leave] conclude on October 11, 2016” and that
“[a]fter that time, he intends to return to work.” Appendix in Support of Motion at 164.
On September 21, 2016, REIC and the County’s attorney responded that, according to
their calculations, “it appears that [Heller’s FMLA leave] will expire mid-day October 10”
and therefore, “REIC and the County would expect [Heller] to return to work on October
11 if he is able to.” Id. at 163. On September 27, 2016, Heller provided REIC and the
County with a note from his medical provider extending his medical leave through October
11, 2016. SUMF ¶ 81; Appendix in Support of Motion at 165.
On October 11, 2016, after his FMLA leave had expired, Heller provided REIC and
the County with a note from his medical provider extending his medical leave through
November 16, 2016. SUMF ¶ 82; Appendix in Support of Motion at 166. On the same
date, counsel for REIC and the County emailed Heller’s attorney inquiring whether Heller
1

The REIC letter is nearly identical to the County letter. Compare Appendix in
Support of Motion at 149 (County letter), with id. at 157 (REIC letter). Similarly, the
REIC certification form is nearly identical to the County certification form. Compare id.
at 152 (County certification form) with id. at 160 (REIC certification form).
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desired “to use vacation leave until he [was] able to get the medical release to return to
work.” Appendix in Support of Motion at 168. On October 12, 2016, Heller’s attorney
responded to counsel for REIC and the County, and advised that Heller intended to use his
accrued vacation time to continue on paid medical leave. SUMF ¶ 84; Appendix in
Support of Motion at 168.
On November 7, 2016, Heller exhausted all of his paid vacation and sick leave.
SUMF ¶ 85; Apendix in Support of Motion at 170. On November 18, 2016, Heller
provided REIC and the County with a note from his medical provider extending his
medical leave through December 16, 2016. SUMF ¶ 87; Appendix in Support of Motion
at 171. On December 16, 2016, Heller provided REIC and the County with a note from
his medical provider extending his medical leave through mid-February 2017. SUMF
¶ 88; Appendix in Support of Motion at 172. On February 24, 2017, Heller provided
REIC and the County with a note from his medical provider extending his medical leave
through approximately May 24, 2017. SUMF ¶ 89; Appendix in Support of Motion at
173. For reasons not relevant to the ultimate disposition of this case, Heller’s employment
with REIC was terminated on March 8, 2017, and his employment with the County was
terminated on March 30, 2017. SUMF ¶¶ 101-02; Appendix in Support of Motion at 19196.2
VI. ANALYSIS
A. FMLA Claim
1.

Parties’ arguments

Defendants argue that summary judgment on the FMLA claim is appropriate
because Heller “cannot prove that he was deprived of any rights [that] he was entitled to
2

In “Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts” (“Response
to Defendants’ SUMF”) (docket no. 41-1), Heller “admits these were the reasons stated
for his termination” but “denies the allegations.” Response to Defendants’ SUMF at
¶¶ 101-02.
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under the FMLA.” Brief in Support of Motion (docket no. 34-3) at 35. Defendants assert
that Heller “cannot establish his [FMLA] interference claim because he received all the
FMLA benefits he was entitled to from both REIC and [the] County.” Id. at 38.
Defendants maintain that, “[i]f an employee receives all of the leave he or she is entitled
to, there is no prejudice established and the [FMLA] interference claim fails.” Id.
Defendants argue that “it is undisputed that [Heller] received the full twelve weeks of leave
[that] he was entitled to,” and, in fact, Heller “received over thirty-three . . . weeks of
leave, far more than he was entitled to under the FMLA.” Id. at 39. Defendants conclude
that they are entitled to summary judgment on Heller’s FM LA claim.
Heller responds that he was prejudiced by Defendants’ failure to provide him with
required “notices regarding his entitlement to FMLA [leave].” Resistance at 18. Heller
maintains that “Defendants’ failure to provide such notices prevented [him] from properly
exercising his leave.” Id. Heller claims that with proper notice he “could have structured
his leave on a part-time basis or intermittently.” Id. Heller further claims that “[t]his type
of structured leave would have prolonged and/or prevented the complete exhaustion of
[his] sick and vacation pay, meaning he would not have been required to take as much (or
any) unpaid leave.” Id. Heller contends that he “can demonstrate the prejudice element
of his FMLA interference claim by showing that, had he received the notice Defendants
were obligated to give, he would have been able to make an informed decision about
structuring leave and would have structured it a different way.” Id.
In response, Defendants admit:
that REIC did not provide a designation notice after [Heller]
returned the [FMLA certification] forms. However, the REIC
cover letter to the certification forms explained to [Heller] his
rights and responsibilities for FMLA leave. Furthermore,
Defendants’ labor and human resources legal counsel kept in
constant contact with [Heller’s] attorney to explain the
accounting of FMLA leave and they agreed when the leave
expired. In addition, [Heller] was fully advised of his FMLA
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rights in the Iowa County Employee Handbook.
Reply at 13 (citations omitted). Defendants further argue that the certification forms that
REIC and the County provided to Heller “gave [Heller’s] health care provider the option
of authorizing [Heller] for intermittent leave and none of the forms [Heller] supplied from
his health care provider authorized this type of leave, nor did any of the medical provider’s
notices authorizing extension of his FMLA leave allow this option.”

Id. at 14.

Defendants conclude that Heller “received all benefits he was entitled to under the FMLA
and suffered no prejudice even if any technical violations occurred.” Id.
2.

Applicable law

“The FMLA entitles an employee to twelve weeks of leave from work during any
twelve-month period if the employee meets certain statutory requirements.” Pulczinski v.
Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)). “[29 U.S.C. §] 2615(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to ‘interfere
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise’ rights provided under the
FMLA.” Id. Interference includes refusing to authorize FMLA leave, discouraging an
employee from using FMLA leave and manipulation by an employer to avoid
responsibilities under the FMLA. See Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1050
(8th Cir. 2006). In order “[t]o succeed on a claim of FMLA interference, an employee
must show [he] was eligible for FMLA leave, the employer knew [he] needed FMLA
leave, and the employer denied [him] an FMLA benefit to which [he] was entitled.” Smith
v. AS Am., Inc., 829 F.3d 616, 621 (8th Cir. 2016). “Even if successful on this front, a
claim for interference will fail unless the employee also shows that the employer’s
interference prejudiced the employee as the result of a real, remediable impairment of [his]
rights under the FMLA.” Massey-Diez, 826 F.3d at 1158.
3.

Application

Heller argues that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on his FMLA

9

claim because Defendants interfered with his rights under the FMLA. See generally
Petition ¶¶ 59-68. Specifically, Heller alleges that “REIC and [the] County misle[d]
and/or failed to properly inform [him] of his rights under the FMLA, including . . .
designation of the amount of time used for FMLA [leave], the basis for his [twelve] week
calculation, whether he was permitted to use his leave intermittently, and what
substitutions were required for paid leave.” Id. ¶ 66. Heller also argues that Defendants’
interference prejudiced him because, “had he received the notice Defendants were
obligated to give, he would have been able to make an informed decision about structuring
leave and would have structured it a different way.” Resistance at 18.
Heller’s argument fails for three reasons. First, Heller received the full twelve
weeks of FMLA leave that he was entitled to receive. See Quinn v. St. Louis Cty., 653
F.3d 745, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that summary judgment was appropriate on the
plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim because plaintiff “received the full twelve weeks of
FMLA leave to which she was entitled”); Stallings, 447 F.3d at 1051 (finding that the
plaintiff did not have an FMLA interference claim because he was granted every request
for FMLA leave, and therefore, failed to establish that the defendant “denied him a benefit
to which he was entitled”). Moreover, Heller received an additional twenty-one weeks of
paid and unpaid medical leave, for a total of thirty-three weeks of medical leave. Second,
the parties agreed that Heller’s twelve weeks of FMLA leave began on July 19, 2016, and
ended on October 11, 2016. See SUMF ¶¶ 69, 73, 80, 84; Appendix in Support of
Motion at 147, 154, 163-64, 168. Third, both REIC and the County provided Heller with
FMLA certification forms and accompanying letters setting forth Heller’s FMLA rights.
See Appendix in Support of Motion at 149-53, 157-61.

The court notes that the

certification forms provided for continuous, intermittent and part-time leave. See id. at
152, 160. Although the forms provided these three options, Heller’s medical provider
indicated on the forms that Heller would “be incapacitated for a single continuous period

10

of time due to [his] medical condition.” Id. at 152; Appendix in Support of Resistance at
3. There is no indication from the record that Heller’s medical provider believed Heller’s
FMLA leave could have been structured for intermittent leave or part-time leave. See
Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 578 (“Evidence, not contentions, avoids summary judgment.”)
(quoting Mayer, 318 F.3d at 809)). Moreover, given his medical provider’s orders, even
if REIC had properly designated Heller’s FMLA leave, Heller offers no evidence to
support his allegation that he could have worked intermittently or part-time. See Anuforo,
614 F.3d at 807 (providing that “self-serving allegations and denials are insufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact”).
The court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Defendants did
not interfere with Heller’s FMLA rights. Further, Heller was not prejudiced by REIC’s
failure to properly designate his FMLA leave because he received his full twelve weeks
of FMLA leave. See Hasenwinkel v. Mosaic, 809 F.3d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding
that “summary judgment was proper because [the plaintiff] exhausted her FMLA benefits,”
as the defendant “allowed her to take twelve weeks of FMLA leave,” and therefore, the
plaintiff was not “denied any entitlement under the statute”); Quinn, 653 F.3d 745, 753-54
(8th Cir. 2011) (finding that summary judgment was appropriate on the plaintiff’s FMLA
interference claim because plaintiff “received the full twelve weeks of FMLA leave to
which she was entitled”); Stallings, 447 F.3d at 1051 (finding that the plaintiff did not
have an FMLA interference claim because he was granted every request for FMLA leave,
and therefore, failed to establish that the defendant “denied him a benefit to which he was
entitled”); Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that
summary judgment was appropriate because “the undisputed evidence show[ed] [the
plaintiff] actually received her requested FMLA leave,” and therefore, she “suffered no
prejudice”). Accordingly, the court shall grant Defendants summary judgment as to
Heller’s FMLA claim.

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B. Heller’s State Law Claims
Because the court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on Heller’s FM LA
claim and shall dismiss the claim, Heller has no remaining federal claims. Upon review,
the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“[A] district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction.”); Streambend Props. II, LLC v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC,
781 F.3d 1003, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2015) (“When a district court dismisses federal claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, the balance of interests usually will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” (quoting In re
Canadian Imp. Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2006))); Lindsey v. Dillard’s,
Inc., 306 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Upon dismissal of the federal claim, the district
court did not err in remanding the supplemental claims to the state court”). Accordingly,
the remaining state law claims in this case are remanded to the Iowa District Court for
Iowa County.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no.
34) is GRANTED IN PART and Heller’s FMLA claim is DISMISSED. The remainder
of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.3 This case is
REMANDED to the Iowa District Court for Iowa County. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to CLOSE THIS CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

3

The court takes no position as to the potential merits of the remainder of the
Motion for Summary Judgment. The court shall leave this matter for the Iowa District
Court to consider in the first instance on remand.
12

DATED this 10th day of September, 2018.

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