Zhou v. International Business Machines Corporation et al
Filing
42
ORDER denying 41 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order (See Order Text). Signed by Judge Leonard T Strand on 3/11/2016. (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
SHAUNPEN ZHOU,
Plaintiff,
No. C15-1027-LTS
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MACHINES CORPORATION, et al.,
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND RESTRAINIG ORDER
vs.
Defendants.
____________________
This case is before me on plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 41) for preliminary
injunction and restraining order.
For the reasons set forth below, I find that the
requested relief is unavailable at this time because the motion is based on facts and claims
that are beyond the scope of plaintiff’s complaint. As such, the motion must be denied.1
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shaunpen Zhou filed this action on August 17, 2015. See Doc. No. 1.
His complaint names two defendants: (1) International Business Machines Corporation
(IBM) and (2) Artech Information Systems, LLC (Artech). In general terms, Zhou
contends that he is employed by Artech and has been placed by Artech as a temporary
employee at IBM since March 18, 2013. Zhou alleges that during his placement at IBM,
he has been treated adversely as compared to other employees due to his age. Among
other things, he contends that he has been discriminated against with regard to such
matters as compensation, working conditions and IBM’s refusal to hire him as a direct
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Plaintiff did not request expedited relief in the manner set forth in this court’s local rules. See
N.D. Ia. L.R. 7(j). Nonetheless, I have elected to rule on the motion immediately to prevent
the waste of time and money that would result from having the parties fully brief and argue a
motion that, based on the current state of the pleadings, has no chance of success.
employee. He also contends that IBM and Artech have paid him for fewer hours than
he actually worked. Counts One and Three of his complaint assert discrimination claims
against IBM under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Doc.
No. 1 at 30-33.
Count Three asserts ADEA discrimination claims against both
defendants, while Count Four asserts claims against both defendants under the ADEA
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) based on Zhou’s contention that he has not
been paid for all hours worked. Id. at 32-33. The complaint includes the following
requests for relief:
1. A judgment declaring that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff
in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) and § 215;
2.
A money judgment representing compensatory damages, including
unpaid wages, unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid night-shift premium,
and all other sums of money;
3.
A money judgment representing liquidated damages for Defendants'
willful violations of the ADEA and FLSA;
4.
A money judgment representing compensatory damages for physical
and emotional distress pursuant to Defendants' willful violations of the
ADEA and FLSA;
5.
An Order directing Defendant IBM hire Plaintiff as a regular
employee for a position of Senior Subject Matter Expert or equivalent. For
purpose of determining IBM employee's wage rate and benefits, all of the
years Plaintiff had been working for IBM as a temporary employee shall be
counted as his regular IBM employee time;
6.
Award Plaintiff the costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b) and 216(b); and
7.
Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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Id. at 34. With the possible exception of the requested “Order directing Defendant IBM
hire Plaintiff as a regular employee,” none of these items of requested relief are of an
injunctive nature.
Both defendants have filed answers (Doc. Nos. 9, 14) in which they deny liability
and assert various affirmative defenses. Trial is scheduled to begin February 27, 2017.
II.
ZHOU’S MOTION
Zhou filed his present motion on March 10, 2016. He contends that IBM and
Artech effectively terminated his employment on February 22, 2016, as a retaliatory
measure soon after Zhou served his initial disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a). Doc. No. 41-1 at 1-2. Specifically, he alleges that he served his initial
disclosures on Friday, February 19, 2016, and was advised by Artech the following
Monday that IBM requested his removal from all IBM accounts.
Because Zhou’s
employment with Artech was devoted entirely to serving IBM, Zhou contends that IBM’s
decision to remove him from all IBM accounts has rendered him unemployed, thus
terminating his sole source of income. Zhou alleges that he has no adequate remedy at
law and argues that a restraining order and temporary injunction are necessary to preserve
the status quo while this case proceeds.
III.
A.
ANALYSIS
Preliminary Injunction Standards
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
When evaluating whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a district court
should consider four factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that
granting the injunction will inflict on other parties; (3) the probability that
the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.
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Roudachevski v. All–American Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2011)
(citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
banc)).
In this circuit, these are often referred to as the “Dataphase” factors.
In
applying these factors, the court must keep in mind that a preliminary injunction is “an
extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). And, of course, the party seeking injunctive relief
bears the burden of proving that it is appropriate. Roudachevski, 648 F.3d at 705.
In this case, a threshold question exists as to whether it is even appropriate to
consider the Dataphase factors. This is because the retaliation claim Zhou raises in his
motion – and the preliminary injunctive relief he now seeks – differ from the claims
described and the relief requested in his complaint. As noted above, Zhou’s complaint
raises various age discrimination and wage-and-hour claims.
He demands money
damages and an order directing IBM to hire him as a direct employee. Doc. No. 1 at
35. Now, however, Zhou seeks relief based on recent, allegedly-retaliatory action and
seeks the restoration of his position as an Artech employee working on IBM accounts.
Doc. No. 41 at 1.
Zhou has not amended his complaint, nor has he sought leave to do so. Thus, no
claim based on any adverse retaliatory action is currently awaiting trial. Even if I accept
Zhou’s current allegations as true, I must first consider whether it is appropriate for a
plaintiff to seek a preliminary injunction that is not based on conduct alleged or claims
asserted in the complaint.
B.
The Relationship Requirement
Zhou is not the first plaintiff to seek injunctive relief based on adverse actions
allegedly taken in retaliation for the underlying lawsuit. In Devose v. Herrington, 42
F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), a state prison inmate filed a Section 1983 action
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alleging that he was being deprived of adequate medical treatment. Id. at 471. While
that case was pending, he sought an injunction to bar prison officials from taking actions
that, he claimed, constituted retaliation for his filing of the lawsuit.
Id. In affirming
the district court’s denial of the requested injunction, the Eighth Circuit stated:
Faced with a motion that raised issues entirely different
presented in Devose's complaint, the district court concluded
had failed to allege circumstances that entitled him to a
injunction, and denied his motion without a hearing. Devose
we affirm.
from those
that Devose
preliminary
appeals and
A court issues a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit to preserve the status
quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule
on the lawsuit's merits. . . . Thus, a party moving for a preliminary
injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury
claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint. . . .
It is self-evident that Devose's motion for temporary relief has nothing to
do with preserving the district court's decision-making power over the
merits of Devose's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. To the contrary, Devose's
motion is based on new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely different
from the claim raised and the relief requested in his inadequate medical
treatment lawsuit. Although these new assertions might support additional
claims against the same prison officials, they cannot provide the basis for a
preliminary injunction in this lawsuit.
Id. [citations omitted]; accord Owens v. Severin, 293 Fed. Appx. 425, 425 (8th Cir.
2008) (unpublished); Hale v. Wood, 89 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 1996) (table). Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
A preliminary injunction is always appropriate to grant intermediate relief
of the same character as that which may be granted finally. A district court
should not issue an injunction when the injunction in question is not of the
same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in
the suit. Here, the suit is one for damages on a claim of fraud. In his
injunction [plaintiff] sought equitable relief regarding a First Amendment
issue, but that relief was not of the same character that could be granted
finally, and dealt with a matter that was wholly outside of the issues in the
suit. The district court did not err in denying the motion for an injunction.
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Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Florida, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing De Beers
Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).
The relationship requirement is necessary because the purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to impose a provisional remedy that will remain in place until the issues can
be decided on their merits at trial. This is precisely why one of the Dataphase factors
explores the probability that the movant will ultimately succeed on the merits.
A
preliminary injunction that bears no relationship to the claims and events alleged in the
complaint would be unworkable, as the issues giving rise to that injunction will not be
addressed, let alone resolved, at trial. Thus, this court has held that the “first step” for
a party seeking a preliminary injunction is “the establishment of a relationship between
the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.”
Olham v. Chandler-Halford, 877 F. Supp. 1340, 1346 (N.D. Iowa 1995); see also Redd
v. Lutgen, No. C11–3046–MWB, 2013 WL 5757864, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 23, 2013).
Based on the current state of the pleadings, Zhou has failed the “first step” of the
preliminary injunction analysis.
His request for an injunction is based on both (a)
alleged facts that are outside the scope of his complaint and (b) a legal theory (retaliation)
that is not currently part of this case. The preliminary injunction and restraining order
he seeks would bear no relationship to the relief requested in his complaint. As such, I
find that it is unnecessary to evaluate the Dataphase factors.
At this time, Zhou’s
motion is not legally viable.
Of course, in making this finding I take no position as to the merits of Zhou’s
current allegations. It is certainly possible that the defendants have taken improper,
adverse action against him in retaliation for his prosecution of this lawsuit. It is also
possible that no such retaliation has occurred.
Either way, a request for a preliminary
injunction is not, at this time at least, the appropriate procedural mechanism to address
Zhou’s allegations. Zhou may seek leave to amend his complaint in order to add new
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claims and allegations based on recent events. If such a motion is made, and granted,
then Zhou will be free to renew his request for a preliminary injunction and restraining
order.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff Shaunpen Zhou’s motion (Doc. No. 41)
for preliminary injunction and restraining order is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 11th day of March, 2016.
________________________________
LEONARD T. STRAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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