Moore v. The John R and Zelda Z Grubb Charitable Foundation et al
Filing
23
ORDER denying 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Magistrate Judge CJ Williams on 11/2/16. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
SHEILA MOORE,
Plaintiff,
No. 16-CV-1021-CJW
vs.
ORDER
HEALTHCARE OF IOWA, INC.,
DEANNA KAHLER, Individually and in
her corporate capacities; McGREGOR
NURSING HOME COMPANY, LC,
d/b/a Great River Care Center,
Defendants.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sheila Moore (Moore) brought suit against defendants alleging a violation
of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) (Count I), and disability discrimination in
violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (Count II).1 Doc. 8. Defendants Healthcare of
Iowa (HI) and Deanna Kahler (Kahler) moved to dismiss the complaint against them on
the ground that Moore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against them. Doc.
11.
Defendant McGregor Nursing Home Company, L.C., d/b/a Great River Care
Center (Great River) is now seeking dismissal of the complaint against it.
resisted the motion to dismiss. Doc. 13.
Moore
On October 13, 2016, the Court heard oral
arguments on the motion. The Court deems the motions to dismiss the complaint fully
submitted. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies defendants HI’s and Kahler’s
Motion to Dismiss.
1
Count I does not name Deanna Kahler as a defendant because individuals are not subject to
liability under the ADA.
II.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Job Offer and Rescission
McGregor Nursing Home Company L.C., an Iowa corporation, owns and operates
the Great River Care Center.
Doc. 8, ¶5.
HI is an Iowa corporation providing
professional management services for Great River.
Id., ¶6. Deanna Kahler is a Great
River and HI managerial or supervisory employee. Id., ¶ 7.
On July 21, 2014, defendants offered Moore a position as a Registered Nurse.
Doc. 8, ¶14. Defendants informed Moore that she was required to undergo a post-offer
medical screening, which was scheduled for July 23, 2014. Id., ¶15. Moore informed
defendants she had a 50 pound lifting restriction due to the surgical removal of a kidney
tumor. Id., ¶16.
On July 25, 2014, Moore took and passed the post-offer medical screening. 2
Doc. 8, ¶ 19.
On July 28, 2014, defendants informed Moore that they were rescinding the job
offer because of Moore’s physical impairment, explaining that they did not have to
accommodate her disability because she was not yet an employee. Doc. 8, ¶¶20-22.
B. EEOC Complaint and Proceedings
On July 30, 2014, Moore sent a discrimination complaint to the EEOC. Doc.
13-2, at 5 (Exhibit A). 3
The complaint references Kahler, by name, as the
2
To be sure, defendants deny this allegation.
3
The document reflects that the EEOC received it on August 13, 2014.
2
“administrator” who informed Moore that Great River was rescinding the offer. Moore
provided the “name and address of the nursing home” as “Great River Care Center
(managed by Healthcare of Iowa).”
On August 18, 2014, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC sent Moore a letter
attaching a Charge of Discrimination form, identifying Great River as the respondent.
Doc. 13-2, at 6-8 (Exhibits B & C).
This Charge of Discrimination form bore the
Charge Number with the last five digits 05982. Moore signed the charge document on
August 25, 2014.
Doc. 13-2, at 9 (Exhibit D).
The respondent in the Charge of
Discrimination is identified as “Great River Care Center” with a “Street Address” of
“Healthcare of Iowa, 1400 W. Main, Mcgregor [sic], IA 52157.” Id. In the section
of the form for “The Particulars,” neither Healthcare of Iowa nor Kahler are referenced
by name or position.
This charge was cross-filed with the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission.
On August 18, 2014, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC sent a Notice of
Charge of Discrimination (Charge No. 05982) to the Chief Executive Officer, “GREAT
RIVER CARE CENTER, Healthcare of Iowa, 1400 W. Main, Mcgregor [sic], IA
52157.” Doc. 13-2, at 10 (Exhibit E).
On August 19, 2014, the Milwaukee Area Office of the EEOC sent a Notice of
Charge of Discrimination (Charge No. 01246) to “GREAT RIVER CARE CENTER,
Attn: Human Resource Manager, 1400 W Main Street, Mcgregor [sic], IA 52157.”
Doc. 13-2, at 11 (Exhibit F).
On August 26, 2014, the Milwaukee Area Office of the EEOC sent Moore a letter
with an attached Charge of Discrimination form, identifying the respondent as Great
River Care Center.
Doc. 13-2, at 12-13 (Exhibits G & H).
The Charge of
Discrimination Form bore the Charge Number with the last five digits 01246. Moore
signed the charge document on September 3, 2014. Doc. 13-2, at 14 (Exhibit I). The
3
respondent in the Charge of Discrimination is identified as “Great River Care Center”
with a “Street Address” of “1400 W. Main Street, Mcgregor [sic], IA 52157.” Id. In
the section of the form for “The Particulars,” neither Healthcare of Iowa nor Kahler are
referenced by name. It does, however, indicate that an “administrator” rescinded the
job offer.
On September 3, 2014, the charge filed in the Chicago Office of the EEOC
(Charge No. 05982) was transferred to the Milwaukee Office. Doc. 13-2, at 17 (Exhibit
L).
On February 2, 2016, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue in relation to
Charge No. 01246. Doc. 13-2, at 38 (Exhibit W). The EEOC sent Great River a copy
of the Notice of Right to Sue.
On June 2, 2016, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission issued a Letter of Right to
Sue in relation to Charge No. 05982. Doc. 13-2, at 39 (Exhibit X). The Commission
sent Great River a copy of the notice.
C. Federal Court Proceedings
On May 27, 2016, Moore filed a one-count complaint in this Court against “The
John R. and Zelda Z. Grubb Charitable Foundation, d/b/a Great River Care Center, and
Healthcare of Iowa,” in which Moore alleged she was discriminated against by defendants
based on her disability. Doc. 2.
On June 15, 2016, Moore filed an amended complaint against the same defendants
named in her original complaint, plus Kahler, and broke out her discrimination claim into
two counts; the first alleging a violation of the ADA, and the second, a violation of the
Iowa Civil Rights Act. Doc. 4.
On July 8, 2016, Moore filed a Second Amended Complaint. This complaint
was, in all respects, identical to her first amended complaint except that it substitutes
4
McGregor Nursing Home Company, L.C., as a defendant in the place of The John R.
and Zelda Z. Grubb Charitable Foundation. Doc. 8.
On July 20, 2016, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. Doc. 11.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants HI and Kahler move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the
ground that Moore did not properly exhaust her administrative remedies against them.
Doc. 11, at 2. Specifically, defendants alleged that they were not named in any of the
EEOC filings as a respondent, and consequently, did not have notice or an opportunity
to conciliate through the administrative process. It is well established in the Eighth
Circuit that failure to exhaust an administrative remedy is an affirmative defense.
See
Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation Ctr., 481 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2007).
The
burden is on defendants HI and Kahler to prove that Moore failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies.
See, e.g., Slingland v. Donahoe, 542 F. App’x 189, 191 (3rd
Cir. 2013) (noting that burden of proving failure to exhaust administrative remedies falls
on defendants bringing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)); Latson v. Holder,
82 F. Supp. 3d 377, 386 (D. D.C. 2015) (same).
Defendants bring their motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This is the proper rule for the Court to apply to a claim that Moore
has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds is inappropriate because Court held “that filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court,
but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and
equitable tolling.”); Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 450-51 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing
5
Zipes and noting that exhausting administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional
requirement).
Before turning to whether defendants carried their burden of proving that Moore
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, it is first appropriate to address the standard
of review pertaining to a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because, in this
context, the Court is limited in the scope of pleadings and documents it may consider.
A. Legal Standard
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not require
“detailed factual allegations.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Accordingly, Rule 8 “marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Iqbal, 556 at 678.
A complaint that
relies on “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement,” “labels and
conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557.
“When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 51 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). It must also “grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of
the nonmoving party.” United States v. Any & All Station Transmission Equip., 207
F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000). To survive a motion to dismiss, then, the complaint
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when
6
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While plausibility is not
equivalent to probability, it is something “more than the sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. “The question . . . is not whether [the plaintiff] might at
some later stage be able to prove [a claim]; the question is whether [the plaintiff] has
adequately asserted facts (as contrasted with naked legal conclusions) to support his
claims.” Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1129 (8th Cir. 2012). In assessing
whether a complaint states a plausible claim, the court “considers only the materials that
are ‘necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint.’”
Whitney, 700 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4
(8th Cir. 2003)). See also Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931
n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that in considering a motion to dismiss, the court may rely
on the face of the complaint and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is
unquestioned). However, “[t]he court has complete discretion to determine whether or
not to accept any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.” 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE § 1366, at 491 (2d ed.1990); Casazza v. Kiser, 313 F.3d 414, 417–18
(8th Cir. 2002).
A court must also assess “plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim as a
whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation,” Zolteck Corp. v. Structural
Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010), “draw[ing] on [its own] judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B. Moore’s Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Filing an administrative complaint and obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC are prerequisites to any private action under Title I of the ADA.
§ 12117(a) (incorporating § 2000e-5).
See 42 U.S.C.
Exhausting administrative remedies in this
7
fashion furthers the goal of providing the EEOC an opportunity to seek voluntary
compliance and conciliation before a law suit is filed.
See, e.g., Williams v. Little Rock
Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is central to Title VII’s statutory scheme because it provides the EEOC the first
opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of
obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts.”) (citing Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180–81 (1989)); Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d
448, 450 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that the aim of the filing requirement is to give notice
to the employer and encourage the employer’s voluntary compliance with Title VII).
“The proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the plaintiff a green light
to bring h[is] employment-discrimination claim, along with allegations that are ‘like or
reasonably related’ to that claim, in federal court.”
Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72
F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996). Generally speaking, a claimant who fails to name a
party in the administrative charge generally may not sue that party under Title VII.
Omission of a party’s name from an EEOC charge, however, does not automatically
preclude suit against that party because it may frustrate the remedial goals of employment
discrimination statutes.
Id.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have
recognized two exceptions to the requirement that plaintiffs explicitly name defendants in
EEOC charges. The first occurs where there is sufficient identity of interest between
the unnamed defendant and the party named in the administrative charge.
778 F.2d at 451.
Greenwood,
The second occurs when “the unnamed party has been afforded
adequate notice of the EEOC charge and the opportunity to participate in any proceedings
held before the EEOC.” Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., No. CIV.LR–C–94–435, 1994
WL 651928 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 14, 1994) (citing Greenwood, 778 F.2d at 451). These
two exceptions overlap to a degree because there is a presumption of adequate notice and
the opportunity to participate in EEOC proceedings for an unnamed party under the
8
identity of interest doctrine.
See Kizer v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 816 F. Supp.
548, 551 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (citing Greenwood, 778 F.2d at 451) (“[T]he named
respondent and the unnamed party may share sufficient identity of interest to satisfy Title
VII’s intention that each defendant shall have adequate notice and opportunity to
conciliate.”).
The identity of interest exception applies where the interests of a named party are
so similar to those of the unnamed party’s interest that, for purpose of obtaining voluntary
conciliation and compliance, it is unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC
proceeding. “Generally, the Court looks at the following factors to determine when two
entities will be treated as one for purposes of administrative exhaustion: ‘(1) the similarity
of interest between the named and unnamed party; (2) whether the unnamed party’s
identity could have been ascertained by the plaintiff at the time of the EEOC filing; (3)
whether the unnamed party received adequate notice of the charges; (4) whether the
unnamed party had adequate opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings; and
(5) whether exclusion from the EEOC proceedings actually work a prejudice on the
unnamed party.’” Schoenfeld v. U.S. Resort Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-4368-CV-C-NKL,
2007 WL 2363500, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2007) (quoting Gordon v. MCG Health,
Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (S.D. Ga. 2003)), and citing also Virgo v. Riviera
Beach Associates, Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1994). Other courts have
considered similar factors.
See Romero v. Union Pacific Railroad, 615 F.2d 1303, 1312
(10th Cir. 1980) (identifying the following factors: (1) whether the role of the unnamed
party could through reasonable effort by the complainant be ascertained at the time of the
filing of the EEOC complaint; (2) whether the interests of the named are so similar as
the unnamed party’s interest that for the purposes of obtaining voluntary consolation and
compliance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC
proceedings; (3) whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual
9
prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party; and (4) whether the unnamed party has
in some way represented to the complainant that the relationship with the complainant is
to be through the named party.).
With these general principles in mind, and applying the factors identified above,
the Court will consider separately whether the Great River had an identity of interest in
HI and Kahler such that “notice to one was notice to the other.”
Sedlacek v. Hach, 752
F.2d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1985).
1.
Identity of Interest Between HI and Great River
Moore argues that she exhausted her remedies as to HI, both on the ADA claim
and the Iowa Civil Right claim, because HI shares an identity of interest with Great River
such that notification to Great River of the EEOC charge was equivalent to notification
to HI. Moore’s Second Amended Complaint describes HI as an Iowa corporation that
“provides professional management services for the Great River Care Center.” Doc.
8, ¶6. An identity of interest between entities may exist even though one is not wholly
owned or a subsidiary of another entity. For example, in Hile v. Jimmy Johns Highway
55, Golden Valley, 899 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Minn. 2012), the court found that “a
franchisor and its franchisees have an identity of interest in defending discrimination
claims based on the franchisees’ conduct, particularly when that conduct purportedly was
undertaken due to the franchisor’s unlawful policies.” 899 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (emphasis
in original). The Hile Court noted, however, that there was “no evidence in the record
that the Franchises lacked notice” of the discrimination charge, and the court found it
“particularly unlikely that neither the EEOC nor Jimmy John’s would have contacted the
Franchises while investigating” the discrimination claim. Id. In Sedlacek, the court
found an identity of interests existed between two entities when (1) the entities conceded
10
at oral argument that they were a “single employer” for jurisdictional purposes; and (2)
had common management and ownership. 752 F.2d at 336.
In this case, HI has not conceded that it is a common employer with the Great
River. HI claims it did not receive notice of a discrimination claim against it. The
only reference to HI in the Charge of Discrimination (No. 05982) is in the address line.
Doc. 13-2, at 8. HI asserts that the street address given in that box is for Great River,
not HI, and Moore does not dispute that. There is nothing in the “particulars” portion
of the charge referencing HI. Id. The right to sue letter makes no reference to HI,
and shows only Great River receiving a copy.
Doc. 13-2, at 39. The ADA Charge of
Discrimination (No. 01246), does not mention HI at all. Doc. 13-2, at 14. Again, the
right to sue letter was provided only to Great River. Doc. 13-2, at 38.
There is no information before the Court from the face of the complaint or
supporting EEOC documents that establishes that HI and Great River lack common
management or ownership. Although it is not clear exactly what business relationship
exists between the entities, the Court must accept as true Moore’s allegation that HI
provides professional management services for Great River.
It appears reasonable,
given that relationship, that HI knew or should have known that Moore was making a
discrimination claim against it.
Sedlacek, 752 F.2d at 336 (holding that notice
requirement is satisfied “if a party ‘sought to be included as a defendant knew or should
have known that his conduct might be the subject of inquiry at issue.”). Although HI
argues it was not given an opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings, there is
nothing in the Second Amended Complaint or supporting documents that indicates the
extent to which HI was or was not involved in the conciliation process. Finally, based
on the record before the Court in this motion to dismiss, it cannot determine whether HI
was actually prejudiced by not being explicitly named in the EEOC charge.
11
Defendants argue that Moore’s “Second Amended Complaint does not allege that
a ‘substantial identity’ exists between McGregor Nursing Home Company L.C. and
Healthcare of Iowa.” Doc. 41, at 8. As noted, however, a claim that Moore failed to
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. Moore had no obligation to
plead in anticipation of an affirmative defense.
A complaint may, nevertheless, be
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense appears on its face.
See Nash v. Lappin, 172 Fed. App’x 702, 703 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal
because “[w]hile the exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense that a defendant
must plead and prove, . . . it is clear from the dates of the alleged incidents that Nash
could not have administratively exhausted all of his claims when he filed the lawsuit”).
Thus, the burden is on defendants HI and Kahler, as the moving parties, to establish that
a sufficient basis exists to dismiss suit against them based on facts alleged on the face of
the complaint and any documents the Court may consider in addition to the complaint.
The Court cannot, here, definitively conclude from the face of the complaint that
defendants have established their affirmative defense. When the Court must rely on
other facts to determine whether there is an identity of interest, then the better vehicle
for addressing this affirmative defense is in a motion for summary judgment and not a
motion to dismiss. As one court noted, “whether there exists an identity of interest is a
fact question ill-suited to resolution” pursuant to a motion to dismiss.
Hile, 899 F.
Supp. 2d at 849.
Accordingly, at this stage of the litigation, the Court does not find that the
complaint and supporting documents establishes that HI lacked an identity of interest with
Great River such that the Court should dismiss HI from the law suit. HI may bring a
motion for summary judgment at a later time if it believes it can show additional facts
establishing a lack of identity of interest with Great River such that notice to Great River
did not effectively give notice to HI.
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2.
Identity of Interest Between Kahler and Great River
Plaintiff Moore’s Second Amended Complaint identifies Kahler as a “managerial
or supervisory employee” of “Great River Care Center and Healthcare of Iowa.” Doc.
8, ¶7. A manager or supervisor may, in some cases, have an identity of interest with
an employer. In Greenwood, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the failure to name a
university’s chancellor and athletic director in the EEOC complaint filed by an assistant
basketball coach was not fatal to plaintiff’s Title VII claim.
Greenwood, 778 F.2d at
451. The court found an identity of interest between the university and the unnamed
defendants.
Id.
The court also noted that the unnamed parties “had notice of the
proceedings against them and were represented by counsel from the beginning.” Id.
The court also noted that individuals “were aware of the possibility of conciliation at an
early date.”
778 F.2d at 450-51.
Finally, the Greenwood Court concluded that
dismissal of the claims against the unnamed parties would result in a frustration of the
purposes of Title VII. Id.
A court reached a similar conclusion in Kizer, which also involved an age
discrimination claim against a university and a dean and chairperson of a professor’s
department.
In Kizer, the defendants “concede[d] an identity of interest exist[ed]
between themselves and the University.” Kizer, 816 F. Supp. at 551. The Kizer court
also noted that, even though they were not named in the EEOC charge, the individual
defendants “were on notice of the charges . . . because they had been interviewed as part
of the EEOC investigation.” Id. Similarly, in Lenius v. Deere & Co., No. 12-20063,
2014 WL 2891029, at *22 (N.D. Iowa Jun.25, 2014), this Court held there was a
sufficient identity of interest where the individual defendants were managers of the
company, “[a]ll three had actual knowledge that [the plaintiff] filed a claim with the
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EEOC,” and “[a]ll three were named in the narrative portion of [the plaintiff’s] EEOC
charge.” In contrast, in Stefanovic v. University of Tennessee, 935 F. Supp. 950, 95354 (E.D. Tenn. 1996), the court found that individual officials did not, in their individual
capacities, have an identity of interest with the University for whom they worked.
In this case, Kahler was referenced only by description of her position as an
administrator, and only in the Charge of Discrimination (No. 01246) that led to the right
to sue under ADA. It is unclear why the EEOC omitted that reference in the other
Charge of Discrimination (No. 05982) when both were based on the same complaint.
“Because persons filing charges with the EEOC typically lack legal training, those
charges must be interpreted with the utmost liberality in order not to frustrate the remedial
purposes of Title VII.”
Iowa 2003).
Soto v. John Morrell & Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1170 (N.D.
There is nothing in the complaint or supporting documents indicating
whether Kahler was or was not interviewed by the EEOC as part of the investigation.
Kahler argues that she did not receive actual notice that Moore was alleging she
discriminated against her, and that she was not given an opportunity to participate in
conciliation efforts.
Yet, that assertion is not supported by facts contained in the
complaint or supporting documentation. It is clear that Great River identified Kahler as
the administrator involved in rescinding Moore’s offer of employment. Doc. 13-2, at
21-25, 30-31.
There is nothing in the Complaint or supporting documents that show that Great
River did not direct Kahler’s conduct, or to negate the allegation that Kahler, as a
supervisor, was acting on behalf of Great River. The Court cannot conclude based on
the limited documents it may consider in the context of a motion to dismiss that Kahler
did not know, or have reason to know, that Moore was claiming Kahler discriminated
against her. Finally, there is nothing in this limited record showing that Kahler was
actually prejudiced by the fact that she was not identified by name in the Charge of
14
Discrimination as a party responsible for discriminating against Moore. Again, Kahler
may bring a motion for summary judgment at a later time if there are facts outside of the
complaint and supporting documents showing that, as the Administrator at Great River,
she was unaware of the claim she discriminated against Moore and was deprived of the
opportunity to participate in any attempt at conciliation.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court recognizes that neither HI nor Kahler were named in either
Charge of Discrimination as the party responsible for discriminating against Moore.
Based on the limited documents the Court may consider in relation to a motion to dismiss,
however, and accepting as true the allegations Moore makes regarding the connection
between Great River and HI and Kahler, the Court cannot find that defendants have
established their affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court has sought to avoid frustrating the goals of the ADA
and Iowa Civil Rights Act by dismissing defendants from a lawsuit based on the exactness
of language in charges of discrimination drafted by EEOC employees. Therefore, the
Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 11).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of November, 2016.
__________________________________
C.J. Williams
United States Magistrate Judge
Northern District of Iowa
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