Schaetzel v. Mercy Health Services-Iowa, Corp et al

Filing 49

ORDER granting 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Mercy and against Plaintiff, and terminate all outstanding motions. The Final Pretrial Conference is canceled and the trial date is vacated. Signed by Judge Linda R Reade on 6/26/2018 (copy w/NEF ePlt). (skm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM PAUL SCHAETZEL,
Plaintiff,

No. 17-CV-1007-LRR

vs.

ORDER

MERCY HEALTH SERVICES-IOWA,
CORP. and MERCY MEDICAL
CENTER-DUBUQUE,
Defendants.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

III.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

V.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A.
B.

VI.

The Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Overview of the Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A.

B.

C.

Count I: Defamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1
Parties’ arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.
Applicable law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.
Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
a.
Libel per se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
b.
Libel per quod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Count II: Breach of Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.
Parties’ arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.
Applicable law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.
Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Count III: Interference with Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.
Parties’ arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.
3.
VII.

Applicable law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Defendant Mercy Health Services-Iowa,

Corporation’s1 (“Mercy”) “Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Motion”) (docket no. 42).
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 28, 2017, Plaintiff William Paul Schaetzel filed a Complaint (docket no.
1) against Defendants Mercy and Does 1-10 (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting the
following claims: (1) defamation of character; (2) breach of contract; (3) injurious
interference with contract; and (4) invasion of privacy. See Complaint at 3-6. On June
1, 2017, Mercy filed an Answer (docket no. 3) denying liability. On June 6, 2018,
Schaetzel voluntarily dismissed Does 1-10 and Count IV of the Complaint. See June 6,
2018 Order (docket no. 48) at 1. On May 3, 2018, Mercy filed the Motion. On May 22,
2018, Schaetzel filed a Resistance (docket no. 46). On May 24, 2018, Mercy filed a Reply
(docket no. 47). No party has requested oral argument and the court finds that oral
argument is unnecessary. The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The court has diversity jurisdiction over the claims because complete diversity exists
between the parties and Schaetzel alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is
between . . . citizens of different States.”).

Although listed as distinct defendants, the parties agree that Mercy Health
Services-Iowa, Corporation is doing business as Mercy Medical Center-Dubuque. See
Complaint ¶ 4; Motion at 1. Neither party has moved to amend the caption to correct this
discrepancy.
1

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IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show’” an absence of a genuine dispute as
to a material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (quotation omitted). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its
resolution affects the outcome of the case.” Amini v. City of Minneapolis, 643 F.3d 1068,
1074 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252
(1986)). “The movant ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion,’ and must identify ‘those portions of [the record] . . . which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Torgerson, 643
F.3d at 1042 (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)). Once the movant has done so, “the nonmovant must respond by submitting
evidentiary materials that set out ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts “in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
586 (2009)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial,” and summary judgment
is appropriate. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “The nonmovant ‘must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts’ . . . .” Torgerson, 643
F.3d at 1042 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586). Instead, “[t]o survive a motion for
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must ‘substantiate his allegations with sufficient

3

probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor based on more than mere
speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’” Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d
782, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Putman v. Unity
Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2003)). Mere “self-serving allegations and
denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Anuforo v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 614 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2010).
V. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and
affording him all reasonable inferences, the uncontested material facts are as follows:
A. The Parties
Schaetzel is a resident of Douglas County, Kansas. Complaint ¶ 2. Mercy is an
Iowa corporation doing business as Mercy Medical Center-Dubuque in Dubuque County,
Iowa. Id. ¶ 4.
B. Overview of the Dispute
On April 17, 2015, the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County (“Iowa District
Court”) awarded Schaetzel temporary guardianship of his father-in-law, Harold Lindstrom.
Id. ¶ 12. On that same date, Lindstrom was admitted to Mercy for treatment. Id. ¶ 14.
On April 26, 2015, Schaetzel visited Lindstrom at Mercy. Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts (docket no. 42-2) ¶ 6. During this visit he “used a ballpoint pen to
puncture the air valve” of Lindstrom’s feeding bottle. Appendix in Support of Motion
(docket no. 42-3) at 18; see also Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 6. The attending nurse
notified the nursing supervisor, Riley Miller, of what Schaetzel had done. Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 7.
Schaetzel admitted to Nurse Miller that he had punctured the air valve and stated
that he would not interfere further with hospital medical equipment. Id. ¶ 8. Nurse Miller
subsequently documented both that Schaetzel had punctured Lindstrom’s air valve and the

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conversation between himself and Schaetzel in Lindstrom’s medical records. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
The statement reads in its entirety:
Nursing staff phoned House Supervisor to speak to [Schaetzel]
regarding [his] interruption and manipulation of the patient’s
tube feeding. When I approached [Schaetzel] two young
women were scratching his head as if [he] were a dog and he
was kicking his legs and giggling. I introduced myself and
asked [Schaetzel] if he was interrupting the administration of
the tube feeding. He readily admitted with a smile that he,
“was a physician,” that he, “is a type-a personality,” that he
“wanted it to go faster,” that he, “thought it wasn’t going fast
enough,” that he, “did think there was a vacuum within the
bottle and so he punctured it and then all of the fluid started to
. . . come out.” I asked [Schaetzel] if he understood that was
not acceptable. He said, “Yes, I shouldn’t have done that.”
I asked [Schaetzel] if he intended to do that if he understood
that was not acceptable. He said, “Yes, I shouldn’t have done
that.” I asked [Schaetzel] if he intended to do that again. He
said, “No, I won’t.” I asked [him] if he knew what to do in
the future should he have any questions about the tube feeding
infusion or think something ought to be done differently with
the infusion. He said, “I suppose I could call the nurse, but
. . . ok, I’ll call the nurse in the future.” [Schaetzel] then
asked if we could please increase the rate of the tube feeding
so that [Lindstrom] could get more tube feeding, “because he’s
been malnourished for so long.” I explained that we do want
to prevent the risk of aspiration[,] pneumonia, and suffocation
and drowning by way of tube feeding, to which [Schaetzel]
responded, “Yes, yes, yes, I understand all of that; after all,
I am a physician.” I thanked [Schaetzel] for his time and
parted.
Appendix in Support of Motion at 41.
On April 28, 2015, Schaetzel contacted Mercy’s pharmacy and spoke with an
employee, Dr. Kate Kurt, regarding “the accuracy of the pumped feedings being
administered to” Lindstrom. Complaint ¶¶ 30-31. Schaetzel asked to be transferred to
the dietary department. Id. ¶ 31. Schaetzel contends that Dr. Kurt offered to contact the
5

dietary department herself, but never did so. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
On May 1, 2015, a hearing was held in the Iowa District Court to determine
whether Lindstrom continued to require a guardian. Appendix in Support of Motion at 42.
On May 4, 2015, the Iowa District Court determined “that the temporary guardianship
[was] in contravention of [Lindstrom’s] wishes” and concluded that the temporary
guardianship was no longer necessary. Id. at 43. Accordingly, the Iowa District Court
granted a motion to terminate the temporary guardianship and removed Schaetzel from his
position as temporary guardian. Id. at 43-44.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Complaint contains three remaining claims. In Count I, Schaetzel alleges that
Nurse Miller “falsely documented [a] conversation and [Schaetzel’s] actions in the medical
record” which “defamed [him] and cast him in a false light.” Complaint ¶¶ 24-25. In
Count II, Schaetzel contends that Dr. Kurt breached an oral contract made with Schaetzel
wherein Dr. Kurt agreed to contact the dietary department regarding Lindstrom’s feedings.
Id. ¶¶ 31-33, 36. In Count III, Schaetzel asserts a claim of injurious interference with
contract. Id. ¶¶ 39-44. The court shall address each claim in turn.
A. Count I: Defamation
Schaetzel alleges that Nurse Miller “falsely documented [a] conversation and
[Schaetzel’s] actions in the medical record” which “defamed [him] and cast him in a false
light.”2 Id. ¶¶ 24-25. He asserts that, as a result, his “personal and professional
reputation . . . was severely damaged.” Id. ¶ 25. Schaetzel further asserts that he was
“questioned about his manipulation of the feeding solution” at the May 1, 2015 hearing on

Although Schaetzel includes the term “false light” within his defamation claim in
Count I, he does not assert that including this term is intended to constitute a distinct
claim. See generally Complaint. Nor does Schaetzel argue in his Resistance that he is
raising a separate “false light” claim. See Resistance at 2. Therefore, the court shall
address Count I exclusively as a defamation claim.
2

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the temporary guardianship, after which the Iowa District Court terminated the temporary
guardianship. Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
1.

Parties’ arguments

Mercy contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Schaetzel’s defamation
claim. Mercy argues that the statement does not constitute defamation per se and that,
therefore, “Schaetzel must prove [that] he sustained actual damages.” Brief in Support of
Motion (docket no. 42-1) at 1-3. Mercy asserts that Schaetzel is unable to establish that
he suffered any reputational harm due to Nurse Miller’s note and, thus, his claim fails as
a matter of law. Id. at 3. Schaetzel contends that the statements contained in Nurse
Miller’s note constitute defamation per se and, therefore, injury is presumed. See
Resistance at 2.
2.

Applicable law

“Defamation includes the twin torts of libel and slander. Libel involves written
statements, while slander involves oral statements.” Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436,
444 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Iowa 2004) overruled
on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)). “Iowa
courts recognize two types of libel: ‘libel per se and libel per quod.’” Doe v. Hagar, 765
F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier, Inc., 585 N.W.2d
217, 222 (Iowa 1998)). “Statements that have ‘a natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff
to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the
benefit of public confidence or social intercourse’ are defamatory as a matter of law and
can give rise to a claim for libel per se.” Id. at 860-61 (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542
N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

“Statements qualifying as libel per se have been

described in four general categories: ‘imputation of (1) certain indictable crimes, (2)
loathsome disease, (3) incompetence in occupation, and (4) unchastity.’” Home Show
Tours, Inc. v. Quad City Virtual, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 924, 941 (S.D. Iowa 2011)

7

(quoting Barreca v. Nickolas, 683 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 2004)). “In statements that are
libelous per se, falsity, malice, and injury are presumed and proof of these elements is not
necessary.” Doe, 765 F.3d at 861 (quoting Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d at 175).
“On the other hand, ‘[a] statement is libelous per quod if it is necessary to refer to
facts or circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish the defamation.’” Sykes
v. Hengel, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1072 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
Johnson, 542 N.W.2d at 510). To establish a prima facie case of libel per quod, “the
plaintiff must show the defendant ‘(1) published a statement that (2) was defamatory (3)
of and concerning the plaintiff, and (4) resulted in injury to the plaintiff.’” Kiesau, 686
N.W.2d at 175 (quoting Johnson, 542 N.W.2d at 510). “[A] plaintiff must prove that
[the] defamatory statements were false, made with malice, and caused damage.”
Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Iowa 1996). “The truth of the statement
is an absolute defense.” Id.; see also King v. Sioux City Radiological Grp., P.C., 985 F.
Supp. 869, 878 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (stating that “the truth of the libelous statements remains
as an absolute defense to liability for those statements even if the statements constitute libel
per se” (citations omitted)).
3.

Application

Schaetzel does not specify which particular statements in the note are allegedly
defamatory. See generally Complaint. In the Complaint, Schaetzel highlights questioning
regarding “his manipulation of the feeding solution, and the events as recorded . . . by
[Nurse] Miller” during the May 1, 2015 hearing before the Iowa District Court. Id. ¶ 27.
In the Resistance, Schaetzel points specifically to the statement that “when [Nurse Miller]
approached [Schaetzel] two young women were scratching his head as if [he] were a dog
and he was kicking his legs and giggling.” Resistance at 2. Therefore, the court shall
address each of these statements in turn.

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a.

Libel per se

The court finds that Nurse Miller’s statements about his conversation with Schaetzel
regarding Schaetzel’s admitted manipulation of the feeding bottle do not constitute libel per
se. The statements include Schaetzel’s admission that he “did think there was a vacuum
within the bottle and so he punctured it.”

Appendix in Support of Motion at 41.

However, these statements do not have “a natural tendency to . . . expose [Schaetzel] to
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule” as is required to establish libel per se. Johnson, 542
N.W.2d at 510 (quoting Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 N.W. 365, 367 (Iowa 1905)). The
statements simply recount Schaetzel’s admission that he punctured the feeding bottle and
his explanation for so doing. Additional context would be necessary to impute any
defamatory meaning to these statements. Compare Suntken v. Den Ouden, 548 N.W.2d
164, 166-67 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (finding derogatory comments written on the face of
three checks stating “child support,” “unemployment ex-wife,” “breast implants” and
“psycho” were not libel per se), and Galloway v. Zuckert, 447 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that the statements “that [the defendant] was not able to do
business with [the plaintiff] ‘on a handshake’ or that he did ‘an about-face,’” were not libel
per se because they were “not synonymous with calling the [plaintiff] a liar nor do they
impute dishonesty to any great degree”), with McFarland v. McFarland, 684 F. Supp. 2d
1073, 1087 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (concluding that “an email communication [sent] to over
300 households” which accused the plaintiff “of being physically abusive” was libel per
se), and Spencer v. Spencer, 479 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1991) (“It is libel per se to make
published statements accusing a person of being a liar, a cheater, or thief.”), and Vinson
v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 115-16 (Iowa 1984) (accusing plaintiff
of falsifying time cards is libel per se). The statements alone do not “attack . . . the
integrity and moral character of” Schaetzel. Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 116. Therefore, the
court shall address the statements as libel per quod.

9

As to Nurse Miller’s statement that “two young women were scratching
[Schaetzel’s] head as if [he] were a dog and he was kicking his legs and giggling,” the
court finds that this statement does not constitute libel per se. Appendix in Support of
Motion at 41. Even assuming, as Schaetzel contends, that these words “were intentionally
chosen to ridicule [him],” that is insufficient to render statements libel per se. Resistance
at 2. The statement does not have “a natural tendency to . . . expose [Schaetzel] to public
hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” Johnson, 542 N.W.2d at 510 (quoting Prewitt, 103 N.W.
at 367). That Schaetzel may personally have considered the statement to be embarrassing
is insufficient to render it libel per se.

See, e.g., Suntken, 548 N.W.2d at 169

(“Statements which are merely annoying or embarrassing . . . are not defamatory.”)
(Habhab, J., specially concurring) (emphasis and quotation omitted). Further, Schaetzel’s
Resistance demonstrates that additional context is necessary to impute any defamatory
connotation to this statement. See Bierman, 826 N.W.2d at 444 (“[A] statement would be
deemed libel per quod where the words in themselves were not considered sufficiently
harmful to the plaintiff without further context.”). Therefore, the court shall address both
statements as a libel per quod claim.
b.

Libel per quod

As stated above, libel per quod requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant
made defamatory statements that “resulted in injury to the plaintiff.” Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d
at 175 (quoting Johnson, 542 N.W.2d at 510). The court finds that Schaetzel has failed
to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was injured by Nurse Miller’s
allegedly defamatory statements. In the Complaint, Schaetzel contends that, as a result of
the allegedly defamatory statements, his “personal and professional reputation . . . was
severely damaged.” Complaint ¶ 25. However, as noted by Mercy, Schaetzel admits that
he is not aware of any Mercy employee who actually read the note and no person has ever
told him that they read the note. See Appendix in Support of Motion at 23. Rather,

10

Schaetzel simply relies on his unsubstantiated belief that his sisters-in-law may have read
the statement. See id. at 24-45. Schaetzel cannot point to any “transmission of [the]
derogatory statements.” See Kiseau, 686 N.W.2d at 175. Further, any dissemination of
the statement solely by Schaetzel cannot constitute defamation. See Appendix in Support
of Motion at 28 (stating that Schaetzel told his wife about the contents of the statement);
see also Thomas v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1413, 1442 (N.D. Iowa
1994) (“Where there is no communication to the general public, but instead the statements
are made only to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff disseminates the statements, there is no
defamation.”).
Schaetzel points the court to no evidence establishing a cognizable injury that would
permit a finding in his favor. See Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d at 175 (“In cases of libel per quod,
‘a plaintiff must ordinarily prove some sort of cognizable injury, such as injury to
reputation.’” (quoting Johnson, 542 N.W.2d at 513)). Schaetzel has presented no evidence
save his own self-serving statements that his reputation was denigrated as a result of the
allegedly defamatory statements. See id. (“Defamation is an impairment of a relational
interest; it denigrates the opinion which others in the community have of the plaintiff and
invades the plaintiff’s interest in his reputation and good name.” (quoting Schlegel, 585
N.W.2d at 221)). Nor does Schaetzel point to any impairment in his relational interests.
Without any substantiating evidence, Schaetzel’s claim cannot survive summary judgment.
Accordingly, the court shall grant the Motion as to Count I.
B. Count II: Breach of Contract
Schaetzel contends that Dr. Kurt breached an oral contract made with Schaetzel
wherein Dr. Kurt agreed to contact the dietary department regarding Lindstrom’s feedings.
Complaint ¶¶ 31-33.
1.

Parties’ arguments

Mercy contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract

11

claim because it pertains to a “contract[] to which [Schaetzel]—as an individual—was not
a party.”3 Brief in Support of Motion at 4. Mercy asserts that any claim under this
contract is “personal to Lindstrom’s estate, [and] any action based upon [it] would need
to be brought by a representative of the estate.” Id. at 5. Mercy argues that, because
Schaetzel was not a party to the contract and brought this action in his individual capacity,
he “lacks capacity to bring forth” this claim. Id. Schaetzel contends that when he entered
into the contract he “was not acting as [Lindstrom’s] guardian but rather as an interested
party as a relative . . . who cares for their loved one.” Resistance at 2. Therefore,
Schaetzel asserts that he is the proper party to bring this claim.
2.

Applicable law

“[T]he federal court is bound by state law in determining the capacity of an
individual to sue in a representative capacity.” Mann v. De Moss, 323 F. Supp. 1126,
1127 (S.D. Iowa 1971). Thus, the law of the state of Iowa governs the determination of
whether Schaetzel has the capacity to bring an action for breach of the alleged contract
under Count II. “A party must have the capacity to sue in order to commence and
maintain a lawsuit.” Estate of Dyer v. Krug, 533 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Iowa 1995). The
“test for standing is that ‘the complaining party have a specific, personal, and legal interest
in the litigation, and be injuriously affected.’” Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa
1992) (quoting Hawkeye Bancorporation v. Iowa Coll. Aid Comm’n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801
(Iowa 1985)).
3.

Application

Schaetzel does not dispute that he “brings this suit as an individual and not as the
authorized representative of . . . Lindstrom’s estate.” Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 4;
Mercy does not dispute that the phone call between Schaetzel and Dr. Kurt
constituted an oral contract. While the court is dubious that this conversation can be
construed as an oral contract, it shall assume an oral contract existed since the issue is
undisputed.
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Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts (docket no. 45) ¶ 4. He does, however,
contend that “[t]he agreement for the breach of contract claim” at issue in Count II “was
between [himself] and Dr. Kurt.” Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 18.
Schaetzel states that Lindstrom “was to be the beneficiary of [the] verbal contract.” Id.
Schaetzel’s contention is undermined by his own sworn statements. Schaetzel stated
that he and Dr. Kurt were parties to the contract, but subsequently clarified that when he
referred to himself he “mean[t] in [his] capacity as the guardian of [his] father-in-law.”
Appendix in Support of Motion at 31. Schaetzel has presented no evidence, save his own
self-serving statements, to establish that he entered into the contract in his individual
capacity rather than in his capacity as guardian for Lindstrom. Since Schaetzel does not
bring this claim on Lindstrom’s behalf, it fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the court shall grant the Motion as to Count II.
C. Count III: Interference with Contract
Schaetzel asserts a claim of injurious interference with contract. Complaint ¶¶ 3844.

Schaetzel contends that the court order appointing him temporary guardian of

Lindstrom constituted a contract between himself and the Iowa District Court.4 See
Resistance at 3. He further asserts that Mercy interfered with this contract by allegedly
communicating ex parte with the Iowa District Court, causing the Iowa District Court to
deny his request to transfer Lindstrom to a different hospital. Complaint ¶¶ 41-43.
1.

Parties’ arguments

Mercy contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because “[t]he
type of distress Schaetzel seeks damages for does not constitute severe emotional

Mercy does not challenge Schaetzel’s claim that the guardianship order constitutes
a contract. Although the court doubts that the Iowa District Court’s guardianship order
constituted a contract between the Iowa District Court and Schaetzel, it shall not address
the issue because it is not raised by the parties.
4

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distress.”5 Brief in Support of Motion at 5 (quotations omitted). Schaetzel contends that
he was harmed by the events alleged in Count III in that they “weighed heavily on [his]
heart.” Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 27 (alteration in original); see also Resistance to
Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 27.
2.

Applicable law

Under Iowa law, “[i]f the defendant induces or otherwise causes [a] third person not
to perform the contract, the defendant is liable to the other person (plaintiff) for damages
from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.” RTL Distrib., Inc. v. Double
S Batteries, Inc., 545 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 766 (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or
otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to
perform the contract.”). The elements of a claim of intentional interference with a contract
are:
(1) plaintiff had a contract with a third-party; (2) defendant
knew of the contract; (3) defendant intentionally and
improperly interfered with the contract; (4) the interference
caused the third-party not to perform, or made performance
more burdensome or expensive; and (5) damage to the plaintiff
resulted.

Mercy also contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because
Schaetzel “lacks the capacity to bring suit” since the contract upon which the claim is
based “was between Schaetzel—as Lindstrom’s agent—and Mercy.” Brief in Support of
Motion 3-4. However, Mercy’s representation as to the contract’s parties is belied by the
record. See Appendix at 32 (“The contract that I had with the court in guardianship of the
ward.”); see also Resistance at 3 (stating that the “contract referred to [in Count III]
involves the appointment by the [Iowa] District Court of temporary guardianship”).
Because Schaetzel alleges that the contract was between himself and the Iowa District
Court, Mercy’s argument does not provide a basis to grant the motion.
5

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Green v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 713 N.W.2d 234, 243 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Gibson
v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 399 (Iowa 2001)). “Iowa law permits the
award of damages for emotional distress in an action for intentional interference with
contract.” In re Knickerbocker, 827 F.2d 281, 291 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Peterson v.
First Nat’l Bank of Iowa, 392 N.W.2d 158, 167 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (distinguishing
between “a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress” and “tort theories under
which damages could be awarded for emotional distress”).
3.

Application

Assuming, without deciding, that the Iowa District Court’s guardianship order
constituted a contract between the Iowa District Court and Schaetzel, the court finds that
Schaetzel has failed to present evidence that he suffered damage as a result of Mercy’s
alleged interference. Schaetzel does not point to any evidence supporting his assertion of
emotional distress. Rather, Schaetzel admits that “the full extent of [his] emotional distress
as a consequence of the events alleged in Count III,” and thus the full extent of his alleged
damages, “is that [the events] ‘weighed heavily on [his] heart.’” Statement of Undisputed
Facts ¶ 27 (second alteration in original); see also Resistance to Statement of Undisputed
Facts ¶ 27.
Although emotional distress damages are permissible, the court finds that
Schaetzel’s assertion that the alleged interference weighed heavily on his heart is
insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of damages for
emotional distress. Compare In re Knickerbocker, 827 F.2d at 291 (concluding that the
plaintiff’s “general testimony regarding strain on the entire family [was], without more,
insufficient to support an award of damages for emotional distress”) with Nesler v. Fisher
& Co., 452 N.W.2d 191, 199-200 (Iowa 1990) (concluding that “[t]here was sufficient
evidence . . . from which a jury could conclude that [the plaintiff] suffered severe
emotional distress from the interference” with the contract where the “evidence showed

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that [the plaintiff] experienced marital difficulties, depression, and that he attempted
suicide”). Since Schaetzel cannot establish that he suffered damages as a result of the
alleged interference, his claim fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the court shall grant the Motion as to Count III.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED:
(1)

Mercy’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 42) is GRANTED;

(2)

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Mercy and
against Plaintiff William Paul Schaetzel; and

(3)

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate all outstanding motions.

The Final Pretrial Conference is CANCELED and the trial date is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 26th day of June, 2018.

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