Williamson v. United States of America
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (CR05-3023-MWB) denying 1 Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255). This matter is dismissed in its entirety. No certificate of appealability will issue for any claim or contention in this case. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 6/28/2011. (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
JASON NATHANIEL WILLIAMSON,
Petitioner,
No. C 10-3017-MWB
(No. CR 05-3023-MWB)
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING
PETITIONER’S SECTION 2255
MOTION
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. The Petitioner’s Criminal Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. The Petitioner’s §2255 Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Standards For Relief Pursuant To § 2255 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.
Applicable standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.
Failure to advise regarding challenge to state charge . . . . . . 10
C. Certificate Of Appealability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before me on petitioner Jason Nathaniel Williamson’s Motion To
Vacate Sentence (Civ. docket no. 1), filed by counsel on April 19, 2010, and on
Williamson’s Motion For Evidentiary Hearing (Civ. docket no. 6) filed on July 6, 2010.
Williamson claims that the attorney who represented him at the trial level provided him
with ineffective assistance of counsel. The respondent denies that Williamson is entitled
to any relief on his claims.
A. The Petitioner’s Criminal Proceedings
On August 23, 2005, Williamson was charged by a two-count Indictment (Crim.
docket no. 1). Count one of the Indictment charged Williamson with bank robbery and
count two of the Indictment charged him with money laundering. See Crim. docket no.
1. On September 1, 2005, Williamson appeared, with counsel, for his Arraignment and
Initial Appearance before United States Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey and entered a
plea of not guilty to both counts. See Crim. docket no. 7. On November 9, 2005, by
counsel, Williamson filed a Notice Of Intent To Plead Guilty (Crim. docket no. 16).
Williamson appeared, with counsel, before Judge Jarvey, on April 3, 2006, to enter his
plea of guilty to both counts of the Indictment. See Crim. docket no. 41. On April 3,
2006, Judge Jarvey filed his Report and Recommendation (Crim. docket no. 39),
recommending that I accept Williamson’s guilty plea.
I filed an Order Accepting
Magistrate Judge’s Report And Recommendation Regarding Defendant’s Guilty Plea
(Crim. docket no. 44) on April 18, 2006.
Williamson appeared, with counsel, before me on June 30, 2006, for a sentencing
hearing. See Crim. docket no. 54. I found that Williamson had a total offense level of 31
with a criminal history category of VI, for an advisory United States Sentencing Guideline
2
range of imprisonment of 188 to 235 months. See Sent. Trans. at 23. I determined that
a sentence of 235 months, at the top of the guideline range, on each count, to run
concurrently, was a reasonable sentence taking into consideration the § 3553(a) factors.
See Sent. Trans. at 25.
Williamson, by counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal (Crim. docket no. 56), to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, on July 6, 2006. On appeal,
Williamson’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw and filed an Anders brief arguing that
the sentence at the top of the guideline range was unreasonable because I gave undue
weight to a robbery victim’s testimony as compared to Williamson’s mental illness and
sentenced Williamson beyond what was minimally sufficient. See Crim. docket no. 76.
On November 14, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
entered an Opinion (Crim. docket no. 76). The court affirmed my sentencing decision,
concluding that I had properly considered only relevant factors, including the offense
circumstances and Williamson’s extensive criminal history, as well as his serious mental
illness and that the sentences were not unreasonable. See Crim. docket no. 76.
B. The Petitioner’s §2255 Motion
On April 19, 2010, Williamson, by counsel, filed this Motion To Vacate Sentence
(Civ. docket no. 1) (“Motion”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. On July 6, 2010, by
counsel, Williamson filed a Brief In Support Of Motion To Vacate Sentence (Civ. docket
no. 5) and a Motion For Evidentiary Hearing (Civ. docket no. 6). The respondent filed
a Resistance To Movant’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (Civ. docket no. 9), on October
12, 2010. On December 15, 2010, Williamson, by counsel, filed an Unresisted Motion
To Supplement Record (Civ. docket no. 14). By Order (Civ. docket no. 16), I granted
Williamson’s Unresisted Motion To Supplement Record. Williamson, by counsel, filed
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a Reply To Government’s Resistance (Civ. docket no. 17) on December 17, 2010.
Williamson, by counsel, filed a Motion To Supplement The Record (Civ. docket no. 18)
on December 17, 2010. On January 25, 2011, by Order (Civ. docket no. 21), I granted
Williamson’s Motion To Supplement The Record.
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
“A district court does not err in dismissing a movant’s section 2255 motion without
a hearing if (1) the movant’s ‘allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle’ the movant
to relief, or ‘(2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted
by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.’” Buster
v. United States, 447 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sanders v. United States,
341 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir. 2003), with citation and quotation marks omitted); see 28
U.S.C. § 2255. In this case, I conclude that no evidentiary hearing is required on any
issue, because the record conclusively shows that Williamson’s allegations, if accepted as
true, would not entitle him to relief because he cannot demonstrate either that he was
prejudiced nor that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient.
Claims are procedurally defaulted if not raised at trial or on direct appeal. See
Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Section 2255 relief is not
available to correct errors which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, absent
a showing of cause and prejudice, or a showing that the alleged errors were fundamental
defects resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.” (internal citations omitted)); accord
Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (“In order to obtain collateral
review of a procedurally defaulted issue, [a § 2255 movant] must show ‘either cause and
actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent.’” (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622, with
citations omitted)). However, the “cause and prejudice” that must be shown to resuscitate
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a procedurally defaulted claim may include “ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Becht
v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 2005). Where necessary and possible, I
have construed otherwise potentially defaulted claims as claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and have assumed, without deciding, that Williamson can show “cause and
prejudice” to overcome defaulted claims, inter alia, as the result of “ineffective assistance”
of trial counsel. Therefore, I will pass on to the merits of Williamson’s claims for § 2255
relief.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standards For Relief Pursuant To § 2255
Turning to the legal analysis of Williamson’s claims, in light of the evidence in the
record, I note, first, that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides as follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground [1] that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
[2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or [4] is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255; Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 a defendant in federal custody may seek post conviction relief on the
ground that his sentence was imposed in the absence of jurisdiction or in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d
777, 781 (8th Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the petitioner must demonstrate
5
a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”). Thus, a motion pursuant
to § 2255 “is ‘intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal
habeas corpus.’” United States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974)); accord Auman v. United States, 67
F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson).
A claim that has been unsuccessfully raised on direct appeal may not be relitigated
on a motion to vacate. Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1992).
Section 2255 relief is not available to correct errors
which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal,
absent a showing of cause and prejudice, United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71
L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982), or a showing that the alleged errors
were fundamental defects resulting in a complete miscarriage
of justice. See United States v. Smith, 843 F.2d 1148, 1149
(8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); accord Johnson
v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (“In order to obtain collateral review
of a procedurally defaulted issue, [a § 2255 movant] must show ‘either cause and actual
prejudice, or that he is actually innocent.’”) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 622 (1998), with citations omitted).
The “cause and prejudice” that must be shown to resuscitate a procedurally
defaulted claim may include “ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Becht v. United
States, 403 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 2005). Otherwise, “[t]he Supreme Court recognized
in Bousley that ‘a claim that “is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to
counsel” may constitute cause for a procedural default.’” United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d
993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622, with emphasis added, in turn
quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). “Actual prejudice” requires a showing that
6
the alleged error “‘worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Johnson, 278 F.3d at 844 (quoting United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1981), and explaining, further, that the movant must
show that there is a substantial likelihood that, absent the error, a jury would have
acquitted him of the charged offense). To establish “actual innocence,” as an alternative
way to resuscitate a procedurally defaulted claim, “‘petitioner must demonstrate that, in
light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him.’” Id. (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623). “‘This is a strict standard;
generally, a petitioner cannot show actual innocence where the evidence is sufficient to
support a [conviction on the charged offense].’” Id. (quoting McNeal v. United States, 249
F.3d 747, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2001)).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals will review the district court’s decision on a
§ 2255 motion de novo, regardless of whether the district court’s decision grants or denies
the requested relief. Compare United States v. Hilliard, 392 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir.
2004) (“We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny relief on a petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo.”) (citing United States v. White, 341 F.3d
673, 677 (8th Cir. 2003)); with United States v. Hernandez, 436 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir.
2006) (“‘We review de novo the district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion.’”)
(quoting Never Misses A Shot v. United States, 413 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2005)).
However, “[a]ny underlying fact-findings are reviewed for clear error.’” Hernandez, 436
F.3d at 855 (quoting United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 2005)). With
these standards in mind, I turn to analysis of Williamson’s claims for § 2255 relief.
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B. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
1.
Applicable standards
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. Thus, a criminal defendant is
constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct
appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d
777, 780 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Steele v United States, 518 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir.
2008).
By the same token, “ineffective assistance of counsel” could result in the
imposition of a sentence in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 2255; Bear Stops, 339 F.3d at 781 (“To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the
petitioner must demonstrate a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United
States.”). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly recognized that a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in a § 2255 proceeding, rather than on
direct appeal, because it often involves facts outside of the original record. See United
States v. Hughes, 330 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003) (“When claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel are asserted on direct appeal, we ordinarily defer them to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings.”). Thus, whether or not Williamson is entitled to relief on
his § 2255 motion turns on whether or not he can satisfy the standards applicable to his
“ineffective assistance” claims.
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “‘The applicable law here
is well-established: post-conviction relief will not be granted on a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel unless the petitioner can show not only that counsel’s
performance was deficient but also that such deficient performance prejudiced his
defense.’” United States v. Ledezma-Rodriguez, 423 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 2005)
8
(quoting Saunders v. United States, 236 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2001), in turn citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 877
(8th Cir. 2005) (“To prove that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of
the Sixth Amendment, [the movant] must satisfy the two prong test outlined in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984),” which requires
the movant to “show that his counsel’s performance was deficient” and that he was
“prejudice[d]”).
The “deficient performance” prong requires the movant to “show that his ‘counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir.
2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). That showing can be made by demonstrating
that counsel’s performance “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). There
are two substantial impediments to making such a showing, however. First, “‘[s]trategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable.’” Rice, 449 F.3d at 897 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
Second, “[t]here is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); Davis,
423 F.3d at 877 (“To satisfy this prong [the movant] must overcome the strong
presumption that his counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.”). “[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most
deferential one.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). If the movant fails
to show deficient performance by counsel, the court need proceed no further in its analysis
of an “ineffective assistance” claim. United States v. Walker, 324 F.3d 1032, 1040 (8th
Cir. 2003).
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Even if counsel’s performance was “deficient,” the movant must also establish
“prejudice” to overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance. LedezmaRodriguez, 423 F.3d at 836; Davis, 423 F.3d at 877. To satisfy this “prejudice” prong,
the movant must show “‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different . . . [,] a
reasonable probability [meaning] a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’” Rice, 449 F.3d at 897 (again quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); Davis, 423
F.3d at 877 (same). Thus, “‘[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Pfau v. Ault, 409 F.3d
933, 939 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). “There must be a
substantial likelihood of a different result.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 792. “Where the
conviction was entered on the basis of a guilty plea, the second part of the test is slightly
modified. In the guilty plea context, the convicted defendant must demonstrate that “there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Matthews v. United States, 114 F.3d 112, 114
(8th Cir. 1997) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Although the two
prongs of the “ineffective assistance” analysis are described as sequential, courts “do
not . . . need to address the performance prong if petitioner does not affirmatively prove
prejudice.” Boysiewick v. Schriro, 179 F.3d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Pryor v.
Norris, 103 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 1997)).
2.
Failure to advise regarding challenge to state charge
Williamson argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to advise Williamson to seek state criminal counsel to challenge a prior state
court conviction for domestic abuse assault that provided the basis for determining that
Williamson was a career offender pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines
10
(“U.S.S.G.”) §4B1.1(a) because the state court conviction was erroneously classified as
an aggravated misdemeanor. (Motion at 9). Williamson alleges that, at some point prior
to sentencing, he told his trial counsel that the domestic abuse assault charge should have
been only a misdemeanor. (Motion at 9). Williamson argues that no other prior criminal
charges would have qualified as a prior crime of violence for purposes of determining that
he was a career offender and, therefore, if his trial counsel had advised him to reopen his
prior state conviction, he “could have avoided the career offender designation.” (Motion
9-10).
Respondent asserts, first, that Williamson’s Motion is untimely. (Resistance at 5).
Respondent argues that when a state offense that has served as a predicate offense for a
career offender designation is subsequently vacated, the one year statute of limitations for
filing a §2255 is extended for an extra year, running from the date of the movant’s notice
of the vacated sentence pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005);
however, respondent argues, Williamson, has not used the due diligence to obtain the
vacation of his underlying state conviction that is required to gain the benefit of the
extended statute of limitations. (Resistance at 5).
Further, the respondent claims that Williamson would have been designated as a
career offender regardless of the domestic assault conviction because Williamson would
still have been 18 years old at the time of the instant offense; the instant offense was a
felony involving violence; and Williamson still had two other prior felony convictions
involving violence or controlled substances. (Resistance at 6-7). Respondent asserts that
because Williamson would correctly have been classified as a career offender regardless
of the mistaken classification of the domestic assault conviction, Williamson fails to show
how he was prejudiced by the alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
(Resistance at 8-9).
11
Williamson received a sentencing enhancement in accordance with the provisions
found in U.S.S.G. §4B1.1. (PSIR at para. 51). Section 4B1.1 of the Guidelines provides:
(a) A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen
years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant
has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.
U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(a)(2006). The record demonstrates that Williamson was at least 18 years
old at the time he committed the bank robbery and engaged in money laundering as
charged in the instant offense. It is undisputed that bank robbery is a felony that is a crime
of violence. It is also undisputed that Williamson was convicted of Possession With Intent
To Manufacture Methamphetamine on June 1, 1999, in Boone County, Iowa, and was
sentenced to 10 years. (PSIR at para. 65). If Williamson had one other prior conviction
that was a felony conviction of “either a crime of violence” or a qualifying “controlled
substance offense,” his status as a career offender would have been unchanged and his
sentence would have remained the same, regardless of the status of his domestic assault
conviction as a misdemeanor or felony.
The record shows that Williamson was convicted of eluding on February 12, 2004,
in Boone County, Iowa, and was sentenced to 2 years in prison. (PSIR para. 70). Iowa
Code § 321.279 provides three criminal classifications for a charge of eluding. Iowa Code
§ 321.279. One classification is a serious misdemeanor, which would only have been
punishable by up to one year imprisonment. See Iowa Code § 903.1(b). In order to have
been sentenced to 2 years in prison, Williamson would have had to have been convicted
of eluding pursuant to either Iowa Code § 321.279(2) or § 321.279(3). Both of these
sections of the Iowa Code relating to the offense of eluding have been separately
12
determined to be “crimes of violence,” for purposes of application of the career offender
provisions of the Guidelines, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
See United States v. Clay, 622 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Malloy, 614
F.3d 852 (8th Cir 2010). The statutory and guideline provisions analyzed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Clay and Malloy, were substantively identical to the controlling
provisions at the time of Williamson’s sentencing in 2006.
In Malloy, the court
distinguished its prior holding in United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a Minnesota conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle was not
a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender guideline enhancement), by
discussing at length the differences between the Iowa eluding offense pursuant to Iowa
Code § 321.279(3) and the Minnesota “fleeing” offense. Malloy, 614 F.3d at 864-65.
Indeed, very recently, for many of the same reasons the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the charge of eluding in Iowa was a crime of violence, the Supreme Court
held that the offense of “vehicle flight” pursuant to Indiana’s statutes, is a violent felony
for purposes of ACCA. Sykes v. United States, 2011 WL 2224437 (June 9, 2011) (risk
of violence is inherent to vehicle flight).
It would not have been unreasonable for Williamson’s trial counsel, as Williamson
states she did, to have predicted, based on the state of the law at the time, that his prior
conviction for eluding would have been considered a qualifying crime of violence for
purposes of the career offender guidelines. The “deficient performance” prong requires
the movant to “show that his ‘counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” United
States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
That showing can be made by demonstrating that counsel’s performance “‘fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003)
13
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
On this record, Williamson is unable to
demonstrate that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
While I could rest my decision in this case on Williamson’s inability to demonstrate
that his trial counsel performed deficiently, it is also clear that Williamson has not shown
that he was prejudiced. Since I have determined that Williamson would have been
classified as a career offender regardless of the subsequent reclassification of his prior state
conviction for domestic assault, Williamson would have received the exact same sentence.
“‘It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Pfau v. Ault, 409 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). “There must be a substantial likelihood of a
different result.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 792.
Williamson cannot demonstrate either that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance or that he was prejudiced. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel fails. There is no need, in this case, to address the issue of whether Williamson
used due diligence in attacking his prior state conviction.
C. Certificate Of Appealability
Denial of Williamson’s § 2255 Motion raises the question of whether or not he
should be issued a certificate of appealability for his claims therein. The requirement of
a certificate of appealability is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), which provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the
court of appeals from—
***
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
14
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); accord FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). To obtain a certificate of
appealability on claims for § 2255 relief, a defendant must make “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir.
2000); Mills v. Norris, 187 F.3d 881, 882 n.1 (8th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Hopkins, 151
F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1998);
Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998). “A
substantial showing is a showing that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court
could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox, 133
F.3d at 569. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Miller-El that
“‘[w]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. Ct. at 338 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
I find that Williamson has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right on his § 2255 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, there
is no showing that reasonable jurists would find my assessment of Williamson’s claims
debatable or wrong, Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338; Cox, 133 F.3d at 569, or that any court
would resolve those issues differently. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569. Therefore, Williamson
does not make the requisite showing to satisfy § 2253(c) on his claims for relief, and no
certificate of appealability will issue in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R.
App. P. 22(b).
15
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon the foregoing, Williamson’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civ. docket
no. 1), is denied in its entirety. This matter is dismissed in its entirety. No certificate
of appealability will issue for any claim or contention in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2011.
__________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
16
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