Lampman et al v. Ternus et al
Filing
35
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 26 Motion to Certify Questions to the Iowa Supreme Court. See text of order. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 10/11/11. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
AMY LAMPMAN, AMY LUTGEN,
JACKIE THOMPSON SCHAFFNER,
JESSICA SAVITS, KIMBERLY
KURTH, JODI VANDERHEIDEN, and
SUSAN HANAN,
Plaintiffs,
No. C10-3025-MWB
vs.
MARSHA K. TERNUS, DAVID K.
BOYD, LINDA A. NILGES, SCOTT S.
HAND, LEESA A. MCNEIL, KENT V.
WIRTH, ELIZABETH J. BALDWIN,
CARROLL EDMONDSON, HOWARD
THOMAS, and DEBORAH M. DICE,
all in their individual and official
capacities,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE
IOWA SUPREME COURT
Defendants.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Authorization and Standards for Certification of Questions . . . . . . . . .
B. Certification Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.
Whether legal issue is unsettled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.
Availability of legal resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
3
6
6
9
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Court’s familiarity with state law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Time demands on comparative court dockets . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Frequency legal issue is likely to reoccur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Age of litigation and prejudice from certification . . . . . . . . 11
Whether there is a split in authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
This litigation raises unresolved questions of Iowa law. Specifically, who has
authority to discharge or permanently reduce the work hours of court reporters working
in the Iowa District Courts, and whether such actions, when taken as part of a reduction
in force caused by state budgetary constraints, constitutes “good cause” under Iowa law
for the employment actions. Neither of these first impression questions of Iowa law is
presently before me for resolution. Instead, defendants’ Motion to Certify Questions to
the Iowa Supreme Court requires me to determine whether these issues should be resolved
by myself, or the Iowa Supreme Court.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On December 7, 2010, plaintiffs, court reporters who are or were employed by the
State of Iowa, filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they
were terminated or had their hours reduced in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. On June 30, 2011, defendants, the former Chief Justice of the
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Iowa Supreme Court, the Iowa State Court Administrator, and the Court Administrators
for each of the eight Iowa judicial districts, filed their Motion to Certify Questions (docket
no. 26). Defendants request certification of the following questions to the Iowa Supreme
Court:
Does Iowa Code § 602.6603(7) apply when someone other
than a judicial officer removes a court reporter or reduces the
hours a court reporter works for reasons such as budgetary
reasons?
If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative,
does laying off court reporters or reducing court reporters’
hours for budgetary reasons constitute “other just and good
cause” under Iowa Code § 602.1218?
Defendants’ Mot. at 2. Defendants assert that I should grant their motion because the
questions they seek to certify are unresolved and the Iowa Supreme Court should be
permitted to decide such questions of first impression concerning Iowa law. Plaintiffs
resisted the motion on July 22, 2011. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Iowa courts have
not addressed the issues raised here, but argue the statutes in question are unambiguous
and I do not need the assistance of the Iowa Supreme Court in interpreting them.
Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion on July 29, 2011.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Authorization and Standards for Certification of Questions
Both Iowa law and this court’s Local Rules permit me, on the motion of a party or
sua sponte, to certify a question of state law to the Iowa Supreme Court. Iowa’s
certification statute provides:
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The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it
by the supreme court of the United States, a court of appeals
of the United States, a United States district court or the
highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of
another state, when requested by the certifying court, if there
are involved in a proceeding before it questions of law of this
state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in
the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying
court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the
appellate courts of this state.
IOWA CODE § 684A.1. Local Rule 83 of the Northern District of Iowa provides:
When a question of state law may be determinative of
a cause pending in this court and it appears there may be no
controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts of
the state, any party may file a motion to certify the question to
the highest appellate court of the state. The court may, on such
motion or on its own motion, certify the question to the
appropriate state court.
N.D. IA. L.R. 83.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that:
Certification procedure . . . allows a federal court faced with
a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the
State’s highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and
increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997); see Lehman Bros. v.
Shein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (by certifying a question of state law, the federal court
may save “time, energy and resources and hel[p] build a cooperative judicial federalism”).
Thus, “[t]aking advantage of certification made available by a State may ‘greatly
simplif[y]’ an ultimate adjudication in federal court.” Arizonans for Official English, 520
U.S. at 76 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976)).
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Whether a federal district court should certify a question of state law to the state’s
highest court is a matter “committed to the discretion of the district court.” Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 881-82 (8th Cir. 1996); Schein, 416 U.S. at 391
(“[Certification’s] use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.”);
see Babinski v. American Family Ins. Group, 569 F.3d 349,
353 (8th Cir. 2009)
(“‘Whether a federal court should certify a question to a state court is a matter of
discretion.’”) (quoting Johnson v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1991));
see also Anderson v. Hess Corp., 649 F.3d 891, 891 (8th Cir. 2011); Jung v. General
Cas. Co., 651 F.3d 796, 796 (8th Cir. 2011); Packett v. Stenberg, 969 F.2d 721, 726 (8th
Cir. 1992).
I previously articulated the following factors to be considered in determining
whether to certify a question to a state’s highest court:
(1) the extent to which the legal issue under consideration has
been left unsettled by the state courts; (2) the availability of
legal resources which would aid the court in coming to a
conclusion on the legal issue; (3) the court’s familiarity with
the pertinent state law; (4) the time demands on the court’s
docket and the docket of the state supreme court; (5) the
frequency that the legal issue in question is likely to recur; and
(6) the age of the current litigation and the possible prejudice
to the litigants which may result from certification.
Leiberkneckt v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 300, 310 (N.D. Iowa 1997);
accord Erickson-Puttmann v. Gill, 212 F. Supp.2d 960, 975 n. 6 (N.D. Iowa 2002); see
Olympus Alum. Prod. v. Kehm Enters., Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 1295, 1309 n.10 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (citing Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 & n. 5
(N.D. Iowa 1994)). In Leiberkneckt, I also considered a seventh factor; “whether there
is any split of authority among those jurisdictions that have considered the issues presented
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in similar or analogous circumstances.” Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 311. I will address
each of these factors seriatim.
B. Certification Analysis
1.
Whether legal issue is unsettled
The initial certification factor considers whether the issue is “unsettled” by state
courts.
See Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 310; see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F.
Supp.2d at 975 n.6; Olympus Alum. Prod., 930 F. Supp. at 1309 n.10. Here, there is no
dispute between the parties that the issues are unsettled. Rather, the parties dispute the
complexity of the legal questions, and which court should be called upon to answer them.
Plaintiffs allege defendants terminated their employment or permanently reduced
their hours, as court reporters. Plaintiffs assert these employment actions violated their
right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants contend
plaintiffs’ due process rights were not violated because the employment actions taken
against them were on orders of the Iowa Supreme Court as a result of severe budget
deficits.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process guarantee applies only to public employees who have a “property interest” in the
terms or conditions of their employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972); see Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997). “‘A person must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her employment to have a property interest in it.’”
Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winegar v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 1994). “Typically, this
interest arises from contractual or statutory limitations on the employer’s ability to
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terminate an employee.” Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
344 (1976)). “Whether the employee had a legitimate claim of entitlement—and thus, a
constitutionally protected property interest—depends on state law and the terms of his
employment.” Mulvenon, 643 F.3d at 657 (citing Kozisek v. Cnty. of Seward, Neb., 539
F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 2008)); see Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 (noting that the sufficiency
of the claim of a property interest “must be decided by reference to state law.”). When
such a property interest exists, the employee is entitled to a hearing or some related form
of due process before being deprived of the interest.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). The sufficiency of the claim of a property interest
“must be decided by reference to state law.” Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344. Plaintiffs assert
Iowa Code § 602.6603(7), read in conjunction with Iowa Code § 602.1218, creates their
property interest.
Iowa Code § 602.6603(7) provides: “[a] court reporter may be removed for cause
with due process by the judicial officer making the appointment.” Iowa Code § 602.1218
defines “cause” as:
Inefficiency, insubordination, incompetence, failure to perform
assigned duties, inadequacy in performance of assigned duties,
narcotics addiction, dishonesty, unrehabilitated alcoholism,
negligence, conduct which adversely affects the performance
of the individual or of the judicial branch, conduct unbecoming
a public employee, misconduct, or any other just and good
cause constitutes cause for removal.
IOWA CODE § 602.1218. Section 602.6603(7) is silent as to whether this is the exclusive
procedure for removing a court reporter. No decision of the Iowa Supreme Court or the
Iowa Court of Appeals has interpreted or construed § 602.6603(7). Likewise, § 602.1218
is entirely silent as to whether budgetary restrictions constitute cause for removal. Again,
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neither the Iowa Supreme Court nor the Iowa Court of Appeals has interpreted or
construed § 602.1218.
Iowa law places control of the Iowa judiciary solely with the Iowa Supreme Court.
The Iowa Constitution provides, “[t]he supreme court shall . . . exercise a supervisory and
administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals throughout the state.” IOWA
CONST. art. 5, § 4. In keeping with this constitutional provision, “[t]he supreme court has
supervisory and administrative control over the judicial branch and over all judicial officers
and court employees.” IOWA CODE § 602.1201. The Iowa Supreme Court is also granted
authority to “prescribe procedures for the orderly and efficient supervision and
administration of the judicial branch. These procedures shall be executed by the chief
justice.” IOWA CODE § 602.1204(1). In addition, the Iowa Supreme Court has authority
over the Iowa judiciary’s budgeting and funding. IOWA CODE § 602.1301. The Iowa
Supreme Court appoints a State Court Administrator. IOWA CODE § 602.1208(1). The
State Court Administrator “is the principal administrative officer of the judicial branch,
subject to the immediate direction and supervision of the chief justice.” IOWA CODE
§ 602.1208(2). Along with other duties, the State Court Administrator is responsible for
“[m]anag[ing] the judicial branch” and “[a]dminister[ing] the funds appropriated to the
judicial branch.” IOWA CODE § 602.1208(2). The State Court Administrator is authorized
to: “issue directives relating to the management of the judicial branch. The subject matters
of these directives shall include, but need not be limited to, fiscal procedures . . .” IOWA
CODE § 602.1204(2). The Iowa Supreme Court has not addressed whether these
constitutional and statutory provisions provide the Iowa Supreme Court and State Court
Administrator with plenary authority to develop and carry out the layoffs of court
personnel, including court reporters, as a result of budgetary constraints.
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Given the absence of controlling authority here, I conclude that this factor weighs
in favor of certification.
2.
Availability of legal resources
The second factor considers the availability of legal resources which would aid the
court in coming to a conclusion on the legal issue. See Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 310;
see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F. Supp.2d at 975 n.6; Olympus Alum. Prod., 930 F.
Supp. at 1309 n.10. Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment arise from “legitimate claim[s] of entitlement . . . defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. My familiarity with procedural due process claims arising from
Iowa state law, gained from having handled numerous such claims in the past, would aid
me in resolving the issues here. See, e.g, Dorr v. Weber, 741 F. Supp.2d 993, 1009
(N.D. Iowa 2010); Dibble v. Scholl, 410 F. Supp.2d 807, 817 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Williams
v. Manternach, 192 F. Supp.2d 980, 985 (N.D. Iowa 2002); Busch v. City of Anthon, 173
F. Supp.2d 876, 886 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Kish v. Iowa Cent. Cmty. College, 142 F.
Supp.2d 1084, 1095 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury Cnty., 119
F. Supp.2d 900, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 104 F. Supp.2d
1130, 1049 (N.D. Iowa 2000), aff’d, 308 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2002); Randall v. Buena
Vista Cnty. Hosp., 75 F. Supp.2d 946, 953 (N.D. Iowa 1999); Hill v. Hamiton Cnty.
Public Hosp., 71 F. Supp.2d 936, 946 (N.D. Iowa 1999). I conclude that this factor
weighs against certification.
3.
Court’s familiarity with state law
The third factor concerns my familiarity with pertinent state law. See Leiberkneckt,
980 F. Supp. at 310; see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F. Supp.2d at 975 n.6; Olympus
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Alum. Prod., 930 F. Supp. at 1309 n.10. Sitting in diversity, I am frequently called upon
to consider, construe, and apply Iowa law. In addition, as discussed above, I have been
called upon many times to consider Iowa state law as that law relates to procedural due
process claims. See, e.g, Dorr, 741 F. Supp.2d at 1009; Dibble, 410 F. Supp.2d at 817;
Williams, 192 F. Supp.2d at 985; Busch, 173 F. Supp.2d at 886; Kish, 142 F. Supp.2d at
1095; Salcido ex rel. Gilliland, 119 F. Supp.2d at 910; Mercer, 104 F. Supp.2d at 1049;
Randall, 75 F. Supp.2d at 953; Hill, 71 F. Supp.2d at 946. Thus, this factor weighs
against certification.
4.
Time demands on comparative court dockets
The fourth factor addresses the relative docket load of the courts. See Leiberkneckt,
980 F. Supp. at 310; see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F. Supp.2d at 975 n.6; Olympus
Alum. Prod., 930 F. Supp. at 1309 n.10. I recognize that both myself and the Iowa
Supreme Court are pressed for time to consider the cases before us. I further recognize
that requests to respond to certified questions should not be made lightly.
Here,
certification not only shifts time demands from me to the Iowa Supreme Court, but has the
possibility of creating an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of
the criminal justice system in general. This is because the Iowa Supreme Court would be
called upon to rule on a case involving its former Chief Justice as well as the current State
Court Administrator. My declining to certify the questions here avoids even the remotest
scintilla of an appearance of impropriety.
I conclude this factor weighs against
certification.
5.
Frequency legal issue is likely to reoccur
The fifth factor concerns the frequency that the legal issue in question is likely to
reoccur. See Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 310; see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F.
10
Supp.2d at 975 n.6; Olympus Alum. Prod., 930 F. Supp. at 1309 n.10. Defendants point
out that given ongoing state budgetary problems, the Iowa judicial branch may need to
implement another round of personnel layoffs or reduction in hours, including court
reporters. Defendants argue litigation resulting from such personnel actions would raise
the same unanswered questions. However, my resolution of these issues here makes the
reoccurrence of litigation over such issues unnecessary and unlikely to reoccur. I conclude
this factor also weighs against certification.
6.
Age of litigation and prejudice from certification
The sixth factor concerns the age of the current litigation and the possible prejudice
to the litigants which may result from certification. See Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 311;
see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F. Supp.2d at 975 n.6; Olympus Alum. Prod., 930 F.
Supp. at 1309 n.10. This case has been pending for more than a year and is set for trial
next spring. It has been my experience that certification stalls litigation for well over a
year and as much as two years. Thus, certification would undoubtedly require continuing
the trial for a significant period of time. The parties would be prejudiced by such a
substantial delay in the adjudication of their case. I conclude that this factor weighs
heavily against certification.
7.
Whether there is a split in authority
Finally, the seventh factor requires me to consider “whether there is any split of
authority among those jurisdictions that have considered the issues presented in similar or
analogous circumstances.” Leiberkneckt, 980 F. Supp. at 311. The parties have not cited,
and I have not found, any other jurisdictions which considered a similar issue in an
analogous statute. I conclude this factor is neutral.
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III. CONCLUSION
Having considered the authorizations to do so under both this district’s local rules
and an Iowa authorizing statute, and the various pertinent factors regarding the propriety
of certification, I deny defendants’ Motion to Certify Questions to the Iowa Supreme
Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 11th day of October, 2011.
__________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
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