Lampman et al v. Ternus et al
Filing
68
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 42 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and denying 51 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. See text of Order. Judgment shall enter accordingly. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 2/6/12. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
AMY LAMPMAN, AMY LUTGEN,
JACKIE THOMPSON SCHAFFNER,
JESSICA SAVITS, KIMBERLY
KURTH, JODI VANDERHEIDEN, and
SUSAN HANAN,
Plaintiffs,
No. C10-3025-MWB
vs.
MARSHA K. TERNUS, DAVID K.
BOYD, LINDA A. NILGES, SCOTT S.
HAND, LEESA A. MCNEIL, KENT V.
WIRTH, ELIZABETH J. BALDWIN,
CARROLL EDMONDSON, HOWARD
THOMAS, and DEBORAH M. DICE,
all in their individual and official
capacities,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING THE
PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Summary Judgment Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.
Property interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
14
17
17
2.
Reorganization exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Many euphemisms have been coined for “(permanent) layoff”,
including “downsizing”, “excess reduction”, “rightsizing”,
“delayering“, “smartsizing”, “redeployment”, “workforce
reduction”, “workforce optimization”, “simplification”, “force
shaping”, “recussion”, and “reduction in force” (also called
1
“RIF”, especially in the government employment sector).
The business of state government is an increasingly difficult one in these times of
economic hardships. This litigation requires me to determine whether plaintiff court
reporters have a federally protected constitutional "due process" property interest in
continued employment with the state? If so, were they laid off or their hours permanently
reduced as part of a legitimate governmental reorganization? If these layoffs were
legitimate does the judicially created doctrine "reorganization exception" strip the plaintiffs
of their federally protected constitutional entitlement to pre termination notice and hearing?
1
Wikipedia, Layoff, available at http:// en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Layoff (last visited
February 6, 2011).
2
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On December 7, 2010, plaintiffs, court reporters who are or were employed by the
State of Iowa, filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they
were terminated or had their hours reduced in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. On December 21, 2010, defendants, the former Chief Justice of
the Iowa Supreme Court, the Iowa State Court Administrator, and the Court
Administrators for each of the eight Iowa judicial districts, filed their Answer to the
Amended Complaint. Defendants filed an Amended Answer on June 28, 2011.
On December 16, 2011, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (docket
no. 42). Defendants make three arguments in their motion. First, defendants contend that
plaintiffs have failed to make out a due process claim because the relevant Iowa statutes
do not create a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment.
Second,
defendants alternatively argue that, assuming arguendo that Iowa law creates a property
interest in plaintiffs’ employment, plaintiffs were not entitled to pre-termination notice and
an opportunity to be heard under the “reorganization exception” to the general rule that
requires due process prior to a public employee’s termination.
Third, defendants
alternatively argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages on
plaintiffs’ due process claims.
On December 30, 2011, plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment on January 3, 2012 (Docket
no. 51). In contrast to defendants’ motion, plaintiffs contend that summary judgment
should be granted in their favor. They argue that they were entitled to due process,
including notice and an opportunity to be heard, prior to employment termination or
3
reduction in hours. Plaintiffs further argue that defendants failed to provide them with
such notice and opportunity to be heard prior to terminating their employment or reducing
their employment hours, violating their right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
On January 9, 2012, plaintiffs filed their resistance to defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. In their resistance, plaintiffs argue the relevant Iowa statutes create
a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment entitling them to due process.
Plaintiffs also contend that the “reorganization exception” is inapplicable here because the
only the Iowa legislature had the authority to extinguish their property interest in their
jobs. Finally, plaintiffs argue defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from
liability for damages on plaintiffs’ Due Process claims because it was clear that the
relevant Iowa statutes gave plaintiffs a property interest in their jobs. In addition, plaintiffs
argue that, even if qualified immunity did apply, qualified immunity would only protect
the defendants in their individual liability and would not bar plaintiffs’ claim for
reinstatement. On January 17, 2012, defendants filed their reply brief in support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs filed their reply brief in support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment on February 3, 2012.
B. Factual Background
I set forth those facts, both undisputed and disputed, sufficient to put in context the
parties’ arguments concerning the cross-motions for summary judgment. Unless otherwise
indicated, the facts recited here are undisputed, at least for purposes of summary judgment.
Additional factual allegations and the extent to which they are or are not disputed or
material will be discussed, if necessary, in my legal analysis.
4
Plaintiffs Amy Lampman, Amy Lutgen, Jackie Thompson Schaffner, Jessica Savits,
Kimberly Kurth, Jodi Vanderheiden, and Susan Hanan were all appointed by a district
associate judge with the approval of a chief judge and a state court administrator and prior
authorization by the Iowa Supreme Court in accordance with Iowa Code §§ 602.602.1402,
and 602.6603(2). There are no jobs for the State of Iowa entitled
“District Associate Court Reporter” or “District Court Reporter.” The pay scale for court
reporters is the same whether they work for a district judge, a district associate judge, or
a juvenile judge. The qualifications for all court reporters is the same.
On April 23, 1990, District Associate Judge John R. Sladek appointed Kurth to
work as a court reporter in Iowa’s Sixth Judicial District. Kurth’s personnel file was
destroyed by a flood in 2008. Following Judge Sladek’s retirement in 1995, his successor,
District Associate Judge Stephen C. Gerrard II, appointed Kurth to continue work as a
court reporter in Iowa’s Sixth Judicial District. In December 2004, District Associate
Judge Sylvia A. Lewis appointed Kurth to continue her work as a court reporter. Kurth
worked full time as a court reporter for the State of Iowa from April 1990 until December
11, 2009.
On September 15, 1992, District Judge Harlan Bainter appointed Hanan to work as
a court reporter in Iowa’s Eighth Judicial District. In 1993, District Associate Judge Gary
R. Noneman appointed Hanan to work as a court reporter in the Eighth Judicial District.
On September 22, 1995, Vanderheiden was hired by the State of Iowa to work as
a roving court reporter in Iowa’s Second Judicial District. On June 13, 1997, District
Associate Judge Frederick Breen appointed Vanderheiden as his court reporter in the
Second Judicial District. On June 13, 2006, Vanderheiden’s appointment was rescinded
by operation of law due to Judge Breen’s retirement. On October 1, 2007, District
5
Associate Judge Susan Larsen Christensen appointed Vanderheiden to work as a court
reporter in Iowa’s Fourth Judicial District. Vanderheiden worked full time as a court
reporter for Judge Christensen.
In September 1997, Associate Juvenile Judge Alan D. Allbee appointed Lutgen to
work as a court reporter in Iowa’s First Judicial District. In September 1999, Associate
Juvenile Judge James McGlynn appointed Lutgen to work as a court reporter in Iowa’s
Second Judicial District.
On September 4, 1998, District Judge Gerald W. Magee appointed Lampman to
work as a court reporter in Iowa’s Second Judicial District.
Judge Magee viewed
Lampman as a hard worker and a dedicated state employee. On October 1, 2008, District
Associate Judge Gregg Rosenbladt appointed Lampman to work as a court reporter in
Iowa’s Second Judicial District. Judge Rosenbladt’s order states in pertinent part: “This
Order is effective immediately and is to continue until terminated by subsequent order or
by operation of law, and the compensation shall be at the rate as provided by law.” Order
and Oath at 1, Plaintiffs’ Am. App. at 107.
On October 29, 1999, District Associate
Judge Kim M. Riley appointed Lampamn to work as a court reporter in Iowa’s Second
Judicial District.
On July 14, 2006, District Associate Judge Kurt J. Stoebe appointed Schaffner to
work as a court reporter for Iowa’s Second Judicial District. Judge Stoebe’s order states
in pertinent part: “This order is effective immediately and is to continue until terminated
by subsequent order or by operation of law, and the compensation shall be at the rate as
provided by law.” Order and Oath at 1, Plaintiffs’ Am. App. at 106.
Defendant Marsha Ternus was, at all times relevant, the Chief Justice of the Iowa
Supreme Court. Defendant David K. Boyd is the Iowa State Court Administrator.
6
Defendant Scott S. Hand is the District Court Administrator for the Second Judicial
District and defendant Kent V. Wirth occupies the same position with the Fourth Judicial
District. Defendant Carroll Edmondson is the District Court Administrator for the Sixth
Judicial District while defendant Deborah M. Dice is the Eighth Judicial District’s Court
Administrator. Hand, Wirth, Edmondson, and Dice were all appointed in accordance with
Iowa Code § 602.1214.
In 2009, Iowa’s judicial branch faced a significant budget deficit going into fiscal
year 2010, which began on July 1, 2009. During the spring of 2009, the Judicial Council
began to discuss the possibility of laying off court reporters to help reduce the budget
deficit. The possibility of laying off justices of the Iowa Supreme Court, judges on the
Iowa Court of Appeals, and Iowa district court judges was “not on the table,” because
such layoffs would have required statutory amendments. No one asked the Iowa Attorney
General’s Office for a legal opinion about whether the judicial branch had the authority to
terminate or permanently reduce the hours of court reporters.
Boyd prepared a layoff plan, with input and advice from the Iowa Judicial Council,
to eliminate positions as part of the judicial branch’s effort to reduce its budget. The
Judicial Council recommended that the Iowa Supreme Court adopt Boyd’s plan. In June
2009, the Iowa Supreme Court adopted and approved Boyd’s layoff plan. Boyd’s plan
eliminated positions across the judicial branch, including law clerks, court reporters
assigned to district associate judges, juvenile technicians, judicial clerks, and other
administrative staff. Under the plan, each judicial district was required to eliminate a
designated number of court reporters. No one ever discussed or suggested that court
reporters affected by the layoffs or permanent reduction in hours might be entitled to some
kind of hearing or due process. It was recommended that the judicial branch cut the full
7
time equivalencies (“FTEs”) of 15.9 court reporters. Court reporters who reported to
Iowa District Court judges were not subject to layoffs. Only court reporters who worked
for Iowa District Associate Court judges were terminated or had their hours permanently
reduced. Boyd offered the following explanation for why court reporters who worked for
Iowa District Associate Court judges were targeted for layoffs:
I would just--I would just simply say that, to avoid—to avoid
as much grief as possible from their district court brethren as
a group, I think the chief judges were leaning towards district
associate positions, even though they knew that then they were
going to have to reassign to get the work done, court reporters
who work for district judges to district associate court, but
they would—they would take less grief if they could zero in on
the district associate judge court reporters because those are
positions that, you know, the statutory language is a little
different on, and they had to approve even providing a court
reporter to a DAJ in the first place, so.
Boyd Dep. at 57-58, Plaintiffs’ Amend. App. at 8. The Judicial Council instructed the
district court administrators that they were “not to inform the judges who will lose a court
reporter until immediately before the layoff process begins.” Judicial Council Minutes,
June 19, 2009, at 3; Plaintiffs’ App. at 111. Chief Justice Ternus does not recall being
“concerned about the process used for laying off the court reporters.” Ternus Dep. at 2526; Plaintiffs’ App. at 72. Boyd, the district court administrators and the chief judges of
each Iowa judicial district implemented the Iowa Supreme Court’s layoff plan. Court
reporters who had their hours permanently reduced were prohibited from doing any work
as free lance court reporters in the State of Iowa.
On June 25, 2009, Scott Hand notified Amy Lampman that she was being laid off
effective July 23, 2009. Hand was acting on the orders of the Iowa Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Ternus, and Boyd when he laid off Lampman. At the time she was terminated,
8
Lampman still worked for Judge Rosenbladt. Judge Rosenbladt viewed Lampman to be
a good court reporter who had never been disciplined or counseled during her
employment. Lampman did not receive a pre-termination notice or hearing. Lampman
and Judge Rosenbladt first found out that Lampman was to be terminated on June 25,
2009. As of that date, Lampman was no longer assigned any duties. It was not Judge
Rosenbladt’s decision to terminate Lampman. He was not allowed any input on whether
Lampman should be terminated. Upon her termination, Lampman had served as a court
reporter with the State of Iowa for approximately 12 years and 6 months.
On June 25, 2009, Kent Wirth notified Jodi Vanderheiden that her hours were being
reduced, from 40 hours per week to 32 hours per week, effective July 10, 2009. On
November 12, 2009, Wirth notified Vanderheiden that her hours were being further
reduced from 32 hours per week to 20 hours per week, effective December 11, 2009.
Wirth was acting on the orders of the Iowa Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ternus, and
Boyd when he reduced Vanderheiden’s hours. Vanderheiden was considered a good
reporter.
Judge Christensen had no say in the decision to permanently reduce
Vanderheiden’s hours. Judge Christensen learned of Vanderheiden’s reduction in hours
at the same time as Vanderheiden. At no time prior to her permanent reduction in hours
was Vanderheiden given a hearing. There were court reporters in the Fourth Judicial
District who had less seniority than Vanderheiden who were neither laid off nor had their
work hours cut. Vanderheiden’s years of service in Iowa’s Second Judicial District were
not considered in calculating her seniority. Vanderheiden had worked in the Second
Judicial District for 11 years before beginning to work in the Fourth Judicial District.
Other judicial districts calculated seniority by total years of service even when the
employee had a break in service. No one in the State Court Administrator’s office
9
provided judicial districts with any guidance about whether seniority should be calculated
by including or not including a court reporter’s breaks in service. On January 3, 2011,
Vanderheiden’s hours were increased to 30 hours per week. She has served as a court
reporter with the State of Iowa for approximately 15 years and 2 months.
Also on June 25, 2009, Deb Dice informed Susan Hanan that she was being laid off
effective July 23, 2009. At the time her employment was terminated, Hanan still worked
for Judge Noneman. Dice was acting on the orders of the Iowa Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Ternus, and Boyd when she laid off Hanan. Judge Noneman considered Hanan
to be an excellent court reporter who was a model employee and team player. Judge
Noneman believes Iowa’s Eighth Judicial District could have used a dozen employees just
like her. Judge Noneman was given no say in the decision to terminate Hanan. He did
not find out about Hanan’s termination until June 25, 2009. Hanan did not receive a pretermination notice or hearing. Hanan served as a court reporter with the State of Iowa for
approximately 16 years and 10 months.
Hanan filed a grievance regarding her
termination, first to Chief Judge James Blomgran and then to State Court Administrator
David Boyd, raising the lack of due process in her termination, among other issues.
Hanan’s grievance was denied, first by Dice and then by Betty Buitenwerf, legal counsel
to the Iowa State Court Administrator.
Over the summer and fall of 2009, the State of Iowa’s budgetary conditions
worsened. This meant the judicial branch had to reduce its fiscal year 2010 budget again
by 7.1 percent, which required another round of layoffs and budget reductions. As a
result, Boyd prepared a layoff plan, with input and advice from the Iowa Judicial Council,
to eliminate positions, or permanently reduce hours in other positions, as part of the
judicial branch’s effort to further reduce its budget. On October 19, 2009, Judge James
10
McGlynn sent an email to Second Judicial District Court Administrator, Scott Hand, in
which he questioned whether court reporters could be summarily discharged under Iowa
law. On October 22, 2009, Judge Timothy Finn sent an email to Hand in which he stated
that Judge McGlynn’s email “raises an important issue which should be addressed
immediately.” Finn email of Oct. 22, 2009, Plaintiffs’ App. at 94. Boyd never saw Judge
Finn’s email. During 2009, no one suggested to Boyd that the court reporters who were
being terminated or having their hours permanently reduced were entitled to due process
prior to termination or having their hours cut.
The Judicial Council recommended that the Iowa Supreme Court adopt Boyd’s
newest plan. In November 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court adopted and approved Boyd’s
latest layoff plan. Boyd’s plan eliminated positions across the judicial branch, including
court attendants, Juvenile Court Services positions and court reporters assigned to district
associate judges. Under the plan, each Iowa judicial district was required to eliminate a
designated number of court reporters. The plan called for the Iowa judicial branch to cut
the FTEs of 19.25 court reporters. Other than seniority, the criteria suggested by Boyd
concerning which court reporters should be laid off was quite subjective.
In addition to the lay offs of court reporters, the plan eliminated support and
administrative positions in the Iowa Supreme Court, the Iowa Court of Appeals, the Clerk
of the Iowa Supreme Court’s office, the State Court Administrator’s Office, and the Iowa
Court Information System. Boyd, the district court administrators, and the chief judges
of each Iowa judicial district implemented the Iowa Supreme Court’s second layoff plan.
On November 12, 2009, Hand notified Amy Lutgen that her hours would be
permanently reduced from 40 hours per week to 26 hours per week, effective December
11, 2009. It was not Judge McGlynn’s decision to reduce Lutgen’s hours. Hand was
11
acting on the orders of the Iowa Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ternus, and Boyd when he
reduced Lutgen’s work hours. Judge McGlynn was in disbelief when he found out about
Lutgen’s reduction in hours. He considered Lutgen to be an excellent court reporter who
could never be replaced by any sort of machine. At no time prior to her permanent
reduction in hours was Lutgen given a hearing. Lutgen and Judge McGlynn first learned
on November 12, 2009, that Lutgen’s hours were to be permanently reduced. There were
court reporters in the Second Judicial District who had less seniority than Lutgen who were
neither laid off nor had their work hours cut.
On February 12, 2010, Lutgen was
reinstated to full-time status. Lutgen has served as a court reporter with the State of Iowa
for approximately 14 years.
On November 12, 2009, Hand also terminated Schaffner’s employment, effective
December 11, 2009. Hand was again acting on the orders of the Iowa Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Ternus, and Boyd when he fired Schafffner. Schaffner worked for Judge
Stroebe the entire time she was an official court reporter. Judge Stoebe considered
Schaffner to be an exemplary employee and a valuable asset to the court system. It was
not Judge Stoebe’s decision to terminate Schaffner. Judge Stoebe and Schaffner found out
she was being fired at the same time. He was not allowed to have any input on whether
Schaffner should be terminated. Schaffner did not receive a pre-termination notice or
hearing. Judge Stoebe was later appointed an Iowa District Court Judge. He hired
Schaffner as his court reporter. She was reappointed on February 7, 2011. Schaffner has
served as a court reporter with the State of Iowa for approximately four and one--half
years.
On November 12, 2009, Hand also terminated Savits’s employment, effective
December 11, 2009. He was again acting on the orders of the Iowa Supreme Court, Chief
12
Justice Ternus, and Boyd when he fired Savits. At the time she was fired, Savits was still
working for Judge Riley. He considered Savits to be a top notch reporter and there was
none better. It was not Judge Riley’s decision to terminate Savits. Judge Riley and Savits
leaned of her firing at the same time. Judge Riley was not permitted any input on Savits’s
firing. Savits did not receive a pre-termination notice or hearing. She served as a court
reporter with the State of Iowa for over 10 years.
On November 12, 2009, Carroll Edmondson notified Kurth that her hours would
be permanently reduced effective December 11, 2009, from full-time to 24 hours a week.
Edmondson was acting on the orders of the Iowa Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ternus,
and Boyd when he reduced Kurth’s hours. Kurth was a good and satisfactory court
reporter who never required any sort of discipline.
At the time her hours were
permanently reduced, Kurth reported to Judge Lewis. Judge Lewis had no say in the
decision to permanently reduce Kurth’s hours. At no time prior to her permanent
reduction in hours was Kurth given a hearing. There were court reporters in the Sixth
Judicial District who had less seniority than Kurth who were neither laid off nor had their
work hours cut.
Kurth has served as a court reporter with the State of Iowa for
approximately 21 years and 8 months.
None of the plaintiffs were terminated or had their hours permanently reduced
because of any alleged inefficiency, insubordination, incompetence, failure to perform
assigned duties, inadequacy in performance of assigned duties, narcotics addiction,
dishonesty, unrehabilitated alcoholism, negligence, conduct which adversely affects the
performance of the individual or of the judicial branch, conduct unbecoming a public
employee, or misconduct. These are the grounds which constitute “cause” under Iowa
Code § 602.1218.
13
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Motions for summary judgment essentially “define disputed facts and issues and . . .
dispose of unmeritorious claims [or defenses].” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 585 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (“One of the principal purposes of the summary
judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. . . .”).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
A fact is material when it “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.’” Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, “the substantive law will identify
which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is
genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58687 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party’
on the question,” Woods, 409 F.3d at 990 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248); see Diesel
Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating
14
genuineness depends on “whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence”).
Procedurally, the moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which
show a lack of a genuine issue,” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323), and demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment according to law. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323 (“[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the
district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set
forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.”). Once the moving party has successfully carried its
burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to go beyond the
pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate “specific facts showing
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Mosley v. City of
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The nonmoving party may not
‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of
specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.’” (quoting Krenik v. County of Le
Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995))).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there
is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’” Ricci v. DeStefano,
–––U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L. Ed. 2d 490
(2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct.
1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097,
15
147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(1986). The nonmovant “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” and
must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S. Ct. 1348,
89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). “‘Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” Ricci,
129 S. Ct. at 2677, quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106
S. Ct. 1348.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in a number of panel decisions that
summary judgment is “disfavored” or should be used “sparingly” in employment
discrimination cases. See id., at 1043 (collecting such cases in an Appendix). The
rationales for this “employment discrimination exception” were that “discrimination cases
often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence. . . .,” E.E.O.C. v. Woodbridge
Corp., 263 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341;
Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999)), and that “intent” is generally
a central issue in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Christopher v. Adam’s
Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Gill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist.
R-6, Festus, Mo., 32 F.3d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1994)); see Simpson v. Des Moines Water
Works, 425 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting summary judgment is disfavored in
employment discrimination cases because they are “‘inherently fact-based.’” (quoting
Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2003))). On the other hand, the
Supreme Court recognized that, even in employment discrimination cases, “‘the ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
16
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
In its en banc decision in Torgerson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly
rejected the notion that summary judgment in employment discrimination cases is
considered under a separate standard, citing Reeves and Celotex. Instead, the court held
as follows:
Because summary judgment is not disfavored and is designed
for “every action,” panel statements to the contrary are
unauthorized and should not be followed. There is no
“discrimination case exception” to the application of summary
judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to determine whether
any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial.
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043.
Therefore, I will apply these standards to the parties’ respective motions for
summary judgment.
B. Due Process
1.
Property interest
In plaintiffs’ due process claim against defendants, plaintiffs allege defendants
violated their right to due process by terminating their employment or permanently
reducing their hours without hearing and notice, and without “just cause,” as required by
Iowa Code §§ 602.6603(7) and 6602.1218. Generally, the threshold inquiry in analyzing
a procedural due process claim is whether plaintiffs have a property or liberty interest
protected by the Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The
United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
17
guarantee applies only to public employees who have a “property interest” in the terms or
conditions of their employment. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (1972); see Gilbert v. Homar, 520
U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997). “‘A person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or
her employment to have a property interest in it.’” Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d
653, 657 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 1994). “Typically, this interest arises from contractual or
statutory limitations on the employer’s ability to terminate an employee.” Winegar, 20
F.3d at 899 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976)). “Whether the employee
had a legitimate claim of entitlement—and thus, a constitutionally protected property
interest—depends on state law and the terms of his employment.” Mulvenon, 643 F.3d at
657 (citing Kozisek v. Cnty. of Seward, Neb., 539 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 2008)); see
Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 (noting that the sufficiency of the claim of a property interest
“must be decided by reference to state law.”). When such a property interest exists, the
employee is entitled to a hearing or some related form of due process before being
deprived of the interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
The sufficiency of the claim of a property interest “must be decided by reference to state
law.” Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344. Plaintiffs assert Iowa Code § 602.6603(7), read in
conjunction with Iowa Code § 602.1218, creates their property interest in their
employment.
Iowa Code § 602.6603(7) provides: “[a] court reporter may be removed for cause
with due process by the judicial officer making the appointment.” Iowa Code § 602.1218
defines “cause” as:
Inefficiency, insubordination, incompetence, failure to perform
assigned duties, inadequacy in performance of assigned duties,
narcotics addiction, dishonesty, unrehabilitated alcoholism,
18
negligence, conduct which adversely affects the performance
of the individual or of the judicial branch, conduct unbecoming
a public employee, misconduct, or any other just and good
cause constitutes cause for removal.
IOWA CODE § 602.1218. Section 602.6603(7) is silent as to whether this is the exclusive
procedure for removing a court reporter. No decision of the Iowa Supreme Court or the
Iowa Court of Appeals has interpreted or construed § 602.6603(7). Likewise, § 602.1218
is entirely silent as to whether budgetary restrictions constitute cause for removal. Again,
neither the Iowa Supreme Court nor the Iowa Court of Appeals has interpreted or
construed § 602.1218. I need not determine whether plaintiffs are correct in their assertion
that § 602.6603(7) creates a property interest in their jobs. Assuming, arguendo, that
plaintiffs have such a property interest, their jobs were eliminated or their hours
permanently reduced as part of a legitimate governmental cost-cutting measure, I will first
decide whether they were entitled to pre-termination hearings under the “reorganization
exception.”
2.
Reorganization exception
Under the “reorganization exception,” federal courts have recognized that “[w]hen
a government eliminates an employee’s position in connection with a ‘legitimate
governmental reorganization’ . . . the employee is not entitled to notice or a hearing.”
Schultz v. Green Cnty. State of Wisc., 645 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); accord
Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 658 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 2011)
(holding that “pre-termination hearings are not required by due process where a bona fide
government reorganization plan bases dismissals on factors unrelated to personal
performance.”); Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Where a
reorganization or other cost-cutting measure results in dismissal of an employee no hearing
19
is due.”); see Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Ct., 397 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting
that “we have recognized a limited ‘reorganization exception’ to due process that
eliminates the need for a hearing where a reorganization or other cost-cutting measure
results in the dismissal of an employee.”); Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 101 (7th
Cir. 1986) (recognizing that “there is an exception to a hearing right when the discharge
is caused by reorganization.”); Day v. City of Providence, 338 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317
(D.R.I. 2004) (“‘Where a reorganization or other cost-cutting measure results in dismissal
of an employee no hearing is due.’”) (quoting Duffy, 892 F.2d at 147); Hartman v. City
of Providence, 636 F. Supp. 1395, 1410 (D.R.I. 1986) (“Numerous federal and state
courts have recognized that an employee who loses his or her job or who is furloughed is
not entitled to a hearing, despite the presence of a “no dismissal except for cause” rule,
when the position is abolished pursuant to a bona fide government reorganization or
kindred cost-cutting measure.); see also Upshaw v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Auth.,
207 Fed. App’x 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) (observing that “[a] number of other jurisdictions
have recognized a general “reorganization exception” to civil service-derived due process
requirements . . .”); Washington Teachers’ Union Local # 6 v. Board of Educ., 109 F.3d
774, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting a property interest in continued employment
may not survive a bona fide reduction in force); Ritz v. Town of East Hartford, 110 F.
Supp. 2d 94, 102 (D. Conn. 2000) (suggesting that “legitimate reorganization” would be
grounds to grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of a procedural
due process violation of employee with protected property interest).
2
2
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not had occasion to recognize the
reorganization exception. The court, however, noted, in dicta, that: “In the ordinary,
(continued...)
20
The rationale behind the reorganization exception, as the First Circuit Court of
Appeals cogently observed last year, is that “[b]ecause such a plan is aimed at positions
of employment rather than at individual employees, a pre-termination hearing would be a
futile exercise.” Rodriguez-Sanchez, 658 F.3d at 130. “‘[S]ince there are no charges
against the employee . . . there would be no occasion for a hearing, and it would be idle
to hold one.’” Whalen, 397 F.3d at 25 (quoting Hartman, 636 F. Supp. at 1411 (quoting
in turn Kusza v. Maximonis, 363 Pa. 479, 70 A.2d 329, 331 (1950) (internal quotation
mark omitted)). However, where a purported governmental reorganization is merely a
pretext for terminating an employee for other, discriminatory reasons, the reorganization
exception is inapplicable. Hartman, 636 F. Supp. at 1416 (“[C]ourts cannot permit the
exception to become a convenient ruse whereby a government agency, simply by affixing
a label, can avoid the necessity for demonstrating ‘cause’ when it wishes to dismiss a
particular employee.”). Thus, the relevant question is whether the Iowa court system
reorganization was a pretext for harming plaintiffs. Here, the summary judgment record
indicates that the Iowa court system was reorganized solely to save costs, not to terminate
or reduce the hours of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argue that the reorganization exception does not apply because the Iowa
Supreme Court lacked authority to create a layoff plan. I disagree. Iowa law places
control of the Iowa judiciary solely with the Iowa Supreme Court. The Iowa Constitution
provides, “[t]he supreme court shall . . . exercise a supervisory and administrative control
2
(...continued)
budgetary lay-off situation, however, individual pre-lay-off hearings are not necessary
given the impracticality of imposing such a requirement.” Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis,
798 F.2d 1168, 1178 (8th Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
21
over all inferior judicial tribunals throughout the state.” IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 4. In
keeping with this constitutional provision, “[t]he supreme court has supervisory and
administrative control over the judicial branch and over all judicial officers and court
employees.” IOWA CODE § 602.1201. The Iowa Supreme Court is also granted authority
to “prescribe procedures for the orderly and efficient supervision and administration of the
judicial branch. These procedures shall be executed by the chief justice.” IOWA CODE
§ 602.1204(1).
In addition, the Iowa Supreme Court has authority over the Iowa
judiciary’s budgeting and funding. IOWA CODE § 602.1301. The Iowa Supreme Court
appoints a State Court Administrator, who “is the principal administrative officer of the
judicial branch, subject to the immediate direction and supervision of the chief justice.”
IOWA CODE §§ 602.1208(1)-(2). Along with other duties, the State Court Administrator
is responsible for “[m]anag[ing] the judicial branch” and “[a]dminister[ing] the funds
appropriated to the judicial branch.” IOWA CODE § 602.1208(2).
The State Court
Administrator is authorized to: “issue directives relating to the management of the judicial
branch. The subject matters of these directives shall include, but need not be limited to,
fiscal procedures . . .” IOWA CODE § 602.1204(2). Thus, I conclude that the Iowa
Supreme Court had authority under Iowa law to create the two reorganization plans.
Defendants terminated plaintiffs’ positions or permanently reduced their hours through a
legitimate governmental reorganization. Nothing in the record suggests that the
reorganization plans were pretextual. Thus, plaintiffs were not entitled to due process.
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III. CONCLUSION
Having found that defendants did not violate plaintiffs’ due process rights as a result
of their execution of a legitimate reorganization of the Iowa court system, defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
is denied. Judgment shall enter accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of February, 2012.
__________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
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