Dyke v. Hormel Foods Corporation et al SET SCHEDULING REPORT DDL FOR 30 DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF THE ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS IS FILED-SEE ORDER AT [16].
Filing
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ORDER denying 7 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge John A Jarvey on 1/13/2012. (Cavanagh, Maura)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
LUCAS DYKE, Individually, and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
No. 3:11-cv-03029-JAJ
vs.
HORMEL FOODS CORPORATION and
PETER VONRUDEN, Individually,
ORDER
Defendants.
____________________
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the Iowa District Court in and for Kossuth County
on April 28, 2011. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit contains one count, alleging a violation of the Iowa
Wage Payment Law (“IWPCL”). Defendants removed plaintiffs lawsuit to this court on
June 1, 2011. This matter now comes before the court pursuant to defendants’ June 24,
2011 motion to dismiss [dkt. 7]. Plaintiffs resisted defendants’ motion on July 21, 2011
[dkt. 11], to which defendants replied on August 5, 2011 [dkt. 14]. Plaintiff’s filed
supplemental authority in support of their resistance on September 22, 2011 [dkt. 18].
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Defendants move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiffs’ lawsuit
with prejudice, arguing that plaintiffs’ petition fails to meet the pleading standards
articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal. Alternatively, defendants argue
that plaintiffs’ lawsuit should be dismissed because it is preempted by Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185.
Plaintiffs argue that their lawsuit should not be dismissed as their lawsuit adequately
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and plainly alleged that he and other meat processors routinely worked in excess of 40
hours per week by performing necessary work before and after their scheduled shift
without proper overtime pay. Plaintiffs further allege that defendants subjected plaintiffs
and other similarly situated employees to a common policy or practice of failing to pay an
overtime premium for all time worked in excess of 40 hours in given workweeks.
Plaintiffs argue that their claim is not preempted by the LMRA as interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) in place is not necessary to resolve their claim.
In reply, defendants reply that plaintiffs’ donning and doffing claims do require
interpretation and application of the CBA, as 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) specifically excludes time
“changing clothes” from compensable “hours worked,” if such time is excluded “by
custom or practice or under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement.”
III. MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint present “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The court may
only consider matters within the pleadings. Moble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., L.L.C.,
543 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2008). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the claim “may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). The complaint must also
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir.
2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)); Ritchie v. St. Louis
Jewish Light, 630 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Northstar Indus., Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 576 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2009)). While not a “probability requirement,”
the “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on
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the merits is more than a ‘sheer possibility.’” Id. To adequately state a claim, the plaintiff
must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Zutz v. Nelson,
601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 347, 591 F.3d 624, 629-30 (8th Cir. 2010)). “Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing
5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed.
2004)).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
When analyzing the adequacy of a complaint's allegations under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must accept as true all of the complaint's factual allegations and view them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
508 n.1 (2002); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“when ruling on a
defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint” (citations omitted)). “The issue is not whether plaintiffs will
ultimately prevail, but rather whether they are entitled to offer evidence in support of their
claims.” United States v. Aceto Agr. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir.
1989) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds,
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (quotation marks omitted)).
Further, “the complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to
determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.” Braden, 588 F.3d at 594
(citations omitted). “Ultimately, evaluation of a complaint upon a motion to dismiss ‘is
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.’” Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
Plaintiff’s lawsuit alleges:
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•
Plaintiffs are individuals who were employed by Defendants as food/meat
processors or other similarly titled positions during the statutory period.
Plaintiffs all shared similar job titles, pay plans, job descriptions, job duties,
uniforms and hours of work amongst other things.
•
Defendants managed Plaintiffs’ work, including the amount of time they
worked and how their time was recorded. Defendants dictated, controlled
and ratified the wage and hour policies and practices challenged in this
action.
•
Plaintiffs were classified by Defendants as non-exempt under Iowa state
wage and hour laws and paid an hourly rate. Upon information and belief,
Plaintiffs’ hourly rate ranged between $11.65 and $13.45 per hour.
•
Defendants required, suffered and permitted Plaintiffs to regularly work
more than 40 hours per workweek without proper overtime compensation.
Plaintiffs routinely worked unpaid time by working before the start of their
scheduled shifts, and working after the end of their scheduled shifts.
•
Defendants required, suffered and permitted Plaintiffs to regularly work
without proper straight time compensation in violation of the minimum age
requirements of Iowa law. Iowa Code § 91D.1(b).
•
Defendants failed to accurately record all time worked by their employees.
Rather, Defendants willfully required, suffered and permitted their
employees to perform tasks and work additional straight time, and overtime,
while off-the-clock.
•
Defendants knew and were aware at all times that their employees routinely
worked more than their scheduled time and/or more than 40 hours per
workweek. Nonetheless, Defendants typically paid Plaintiffs only for their
scheduled time and not all their actual time worked, including straight time
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and overtime.
•
Defendants’ practices violated the provisions of the Iowa Wage Payment
Statute, Iowa Code §§ 91A, et seq. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful
practice, the Defendants benefitted from reduced labor and payroll costs.
•
Plaintiffs were all subject to Defendants’ uniform policies and practices and
were victims of Defendants’ schemes to deprive them of straight time and
overtime compensation. As a result of Defendants’ improper and willful
failure to pay Plaintiffs in accordance with the requirements of the Iowa
Wage Payment Statute, Plaintiffs suffered lost wages and other damages.
See Dkt. 1-1, p. 2-3, ¶¶ 7-15.
While plaintiffs’ lawsuit fails to specifically include “donning” and “doffing” in
their complaint, it does allege that defendants required, suffered and permitted plaintiffs
to regularly work more than 40 hours per workweek without paying overtime
compensation, as required by the IWPCL. Plaintiffs further allege that the “work” at issue
occurred before the start of and after the end of the shift. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit has pleaded
sufficient facts which, if accepted as true, have stated a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. The factual allegations rise above the speculative level and demonstrate that
success on the merits is more than a mere possibility. Defendants’ motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.
B. Preemption
Section 301 of the LMRA states: “Suits for violations of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
Section 301 of the LMRA “expresses a congressional policy that federal labor law
should govern § 301 disputes.” Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc., 875
5
F.2d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir. 1989). “It is a mandate to the federal courts to establish a
federal common law to govern disputes arising out of labor contracts.” Id. (citations
omitted). Thus, if an action alleges a violation of a term of a labor contract, “federal labor
law preempts any local law purporting to define the meaning or delineate the scope of a
labor contract provision.” Id. at 1342. “This assures uniformity of interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements and promotes harmonious and consistent resolution of
labor contract disputes.” Id. (citations omitted). The preemptive effect of § 301 is not
limited to actions alleging violations of labor contracts, however. Section 301 preempts
all actions “where resolution of the action requires interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement.” Id. As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit
in Vacca, however, the preemptive effect of § 301 is not all encompassing.
This does not mean that all actions commenced by an employer
by an employee covered under a labor contract must be
brought under § 301. Such an employee may assert a state law
claim against his employer if resolution of that claim does not
require interpretation fo the terms of the union contract. If
resolution of the claim, however, is “substantially dependent”
on the terms of the union contract, or if evaluation fo the state
law claim is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the
terms of the labor contract,” it is preempted by § 301. The
complete factual background of the case must be examined
against all elements of the state law claim, including defenses,
to determine whether the terms of the union contract “come
into play.”
Id. at 1342 (internal citations omitted). As explained by the Supreme Court in AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211-213 (1985):
Of course, not every dispute concerning employment, or
tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the
federal labor law. Section 301 on its face says nothing about
the substance of what private parties may agree to in a labor
contract. Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, in
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adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of
private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any
inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule of law would
delegate to unions and unionized employers the power to
exempt themselves from whatever state labor standards they
disfavored. Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what
is illegal under state law. In extending the preemptive effect
of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be
inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to
preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights
and obligations, independent of a labor contract.
Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist
independently of private agreements, and that as a result can
be waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are
preempted by those agreements.
The focus must be, therefore, whether the state law cause of action, as applied in
the current case:
[C]onfers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or
employees independent of any right established by contract,
or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably
intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract. If the state tort law purports to define the meaning
of the contractual relationship, that law is preempted.
Id. at 213.
A two-step analysis has been endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in determining whether plaintiffs’ IWPCL claim is preempted by
section 301.
In applying the section 301 preemption doctrine, we begin with
“the claim itself,” see Trustees of the Twin City Bricklayers
Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450
F.3d 324, 331 (8th Cir. 2006), and apply a two-step approach
in order to determine if the claim is sufficiently “independent”
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to survive section 301 preemption, see Bogan, 500 F.3d at
832. First, a “state-law claim is preempted if it is ‘based on’
[a] . . . provision of the CBA[,]” meaning that “[t]he CBA
provision at issue” actually sets forth the right upon which the
claim is based. Id. Second, section 301 preemption applies
where a state-law claim “is ‘dependent upon an analysis’ of the
relevant CBA,” meaning that the plaintiff’s state-law claim
requires interpretation of a provision of the CBA. Id.
Williams v. National Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009). “[T]he crucial
inquiry is whether ‘resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a
[CBA].’” Miner v. Local 373, 513 F.3d 854, 865 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lingle v. Norge
Div. Of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. at 399, 405-06 (1988)).
With respect to the first step of the two-step analysis, Plaintiffs’ claim under the
IWPCL seeks the recovery of unpaid wages under the IWPCL. The IWPCL is designed
to facilitate the collection of wages owed to employees. Jeanes v. Allied Life Ins. Co.,
300 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2002). See also Kartheiser v. American Nat. Can Co., 271 F.3d
1135, 1136 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of the statute is uncomplicated and direct: ‘to
facilitate collection of wages by employees.’”) (quoting Educational Tech., Ltd. v.
Meinhard, 2001 WL 488088 *8 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001). Plaintiffs’ claim is not premised
on a right provided by the CBA. To the contrary, plaintiffs claim that is that defendants’
violated the IWPCL by failing to pay plaintiffs for all hours worked. Thus, the dispositive
inquiry becomes that under the second step of the analysis, i.e., whether plaintiffs’ IWPCL
claim requires either the interpretation or construction of the CBA, or merely reference to
the CBA.
In support of its preemption argument, defendant notes that the CBA governs
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights and responsibilities with respect to hours worked, wages,
and overtime, and mandates binding arbitration to resolve disputes over its meaning and
application, and argues that plaintiffs’ IWPCL claim is preempted by the LMRA because
it is founded on substantive rights under the CBA, depends on an interpretation and
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application of the CBA’s terms, and requires resolution through the bargained-for remedial
mechanism. Defendant specifically cites Article V, “Hours of Work and Overtime,” in
the CBA, i.e.:
5.2 One and one-half (1 ½) times the regular rate of pay shall
be paid for all hours worked in excess of forth (40) hours in
any one week and in excess of eight (8) in one day.
5.3 . . . [O]ne and one-half (1 ½) times the hourly rate [shall
be] paid for all hours worked on Saturday, except that those
employees who are normally required to work on Saturday
shall be paid one and one-half (1 ½) times their hourly rate
when required to work their designated day in lieu of
Saturday.
5.4 Two (2) times the hourly rate shall be paid for all hours
worked on Sunday, except that those employees who are
normally required to work on Sunday shall be paid two (2)
times their hourly rate when required to work their designated
day in lieu of Sunday.
5.5 Double the regular rate of pay shall be paid for all hours
worked on holidays by employees, except employees who are
normally scheduled to work on holidays shall be paid two (2)
times their hourly rate when required to work the day
designated as their day in lieu of the holiday.
Further, Appendix A of the CBA sets forth a wage schedule by position/category,
Article XIV establishes annual wage rate and cost of living increases, and Article X
establishes a mandatory “Grievance Procedure” to be followed in the event of dispute
involving the substantive terms of the CBA.
The court finds that the CBA provisions cited by defendants only become relevant
in the event damages must be computed. Reference to the CBA for this limited purposes
does not support preemption. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124-25 (1994) (holding
there was no preemption under section 301 since the wage rate provision in the CBA only
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had to be referenced to calculate damages). See also Trustees, 450 F.3d at 330 (“An
otherwise independent claim will not be preempted if the CBA need only be consulted
during its adjudication.”).
Further, the court would not properly consult the CBA in order to resolve the
plaintiffs’ IWPCL claim. Rather, the court would compare the facts as developed with the
requirements of the IWPCL to determine whether the state statute had been violated. Such
a claim is not preempted by section 301. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S.
246, 266 (1994) (holding that strictly factual questions about an employer’s conduct do not
require interpretation of a term of a CBA). Section 301 does not grant parties to a CBA
license to contract for what is illegal under state law. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211-12.
In conclusion, plaintiffs’ IWPCL claim is based on Iowa law and the defendants’
conduct. It is not based on the CBA. Plaintiffs’ IWPCL claim does not depend upon an
interpretation or construction of the CBA.
Thus, plaintiffs’ IWPCL claim is not
preempted.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED THAT defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.
Dated this 13th day of January, 2012.
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