Fraserside IP LLC v. Letyagin et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order denying without prejudice 18 Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Discovery Deadline 11/30/2102. (See Order Text) Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 8/7/2012. (des)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION

FRASERSIDE IP L.L.C., an Iowa
Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

No. C11-3041-MWB

vs.
SERGEJ LETYAGIN, d/b/a
SunPorno.com and www.SunPorno.com
and JOHN DOES 1-100 AND JOHN
DOE COMPANIES 1-100,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS

Defendants.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.
Facts Drawn From Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.
Facts Related Solely To Personal Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . .

3
3
3
4
5

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Rule 12(b)(2) Standards and Personal Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Personal Jurisdiction Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. Federal Long-Arm Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.
Claim arises under federal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.
No state with personal jurisdiction over defendants . . . . . . . 21
3.
Due process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Nearly 75 years ago, H.G. Wells came close to predicting the advent of the Internet
in his collection of essays, World Brain:
There is no practical obstacle whatever now to the creation of
an efficient index to all human knowledge, ideas and
achievements, to the creation, that is, of a complete planetary
memory for all mankind. And not simply an index; the direct
reproduction of the thing itself can be summoned to any
properly prepared spot. A microfilm, coloured where
necessary, occupying an inch or so of space and weighing little
more than a letter, can be duplicated from the records and sent
anywhere, and thrown enlarged upon the screen so that the
student may study it in every detail.
H.G. WELLS, WORLD BRAIN 60 (Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1938). Wells, however, did
not foresee the legal challenges that the advent of the internet would present for courts
considering personal jurisdiction and venue. Such a challenge is before me. Plaintiff, a
producer of adult motion pictures, alleges that defendants, an individual residing in
Gibraltar and a corporation headquartered in the Republic of Seychelles, have willfully
violated plaintiff’s copyright and trademarks by offering plaintiff’s motion pictures on an
internet website they operate. However, the merits of plaintiff’s claims are not presently
before me. Rather, I must resolve, inter alia, whether plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing that defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa, or, alternatively, the
United States, to satisfy due process and permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
them.

2

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On August 17, 2011, plaintiff Fraserside IP L.L.C. (“Fraserside”) filed a complaint
against Sergej Letyagin, doing business as SunPorno.com (“SunPorno”), John Does, and
John Doe Companies, alleging the following causes of action: copyright infringement, in
violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; contributory copyright infringement, in
violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; vicarious copyright infringement, in
violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; inducing copyright infringement, in
violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; false designation of origin, in violation of
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and, dilution of trademark, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
On February 7, 2012, Letyagin and SunPorno filed a Motion to Dismiss. In their
motion, Letyagin and SunPorno contend that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction
in Iowa and the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil procedure
12(b)(2). On February 27, 2012, Fraserside filed a resistance to Letyagin and SunPorno’s
Motion to Dismiss. Fraserside argues that SunPorno’s internet activities establish a
sufficient basis for specific personal jurisdiction under Iowa’s long-arm statute.
Fraserside, alternatively, argues that, even if it did not make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction under Iowa’s long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction exists under the
federal long-arm statute found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Fraserside also
alternatively requests that I delay ruling on defendants’ motion and permit it limited
jurisdictional discovery. After obtaining an extension of time, Letyagin and SunPorno
filed their reply brief on March 16, 2012.

3

B. Factual Background
1.

Facts Drawn From Complaint

On a motion to dismiss, I must assume all facts alleged in the Complaint are true,
and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957). The following factual background is drawn from the Complaint, documents
attached to the Complaint, and public records.

1

Plaintiff Fraserside is a subsidiary of Private Media Group, Inc., a Nevada
Corporation (“Private Media”).

Private Media, Fraserside, and sibling companies,

collectively, are commercially known as “Private.” Private Media is a producer of adult
motion pictures. Its adult films are distributed on a wide range of platforms, including
mobile handsets in 45 countries, digital television in 24 countries, broadband internet, a
1

I note that I may consider public records, those materials that are embraced by the
complaint, and documents attached to the complaint. See Illig v. Union Elec. Co., 652
F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (“In addressing a motion to dismiss,’[t]he court may
consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached
to the pleadings, and matters of public record.’”) (quoting Mills v. City of Grand Forks,
614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010); Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., L.L.C., 543 F.3d
978, 983 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the district court is limited to the materials properly before it
on a motion to dismiss, which may include public records and materials embraced by the
complaint.”); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)
(noting that a court “generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may
consider ‘some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the
complaint,’ as well as materials that are “‘necessarily embraced by the
pleadings.’”)(citations omitted). Materials necessarily embraced by the complaint include
“documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party
questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.” Kushner v. Beverly
Enters., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003)); see Jenisio v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., Ret. Plan,
187 F.3d 970, 972 n.3 (8th Cir. 1999) (“A district court may consider documents on a
motion to dismiss where . . . the plaintiffs’ claims are based solely on the interpretation
of the documents and the parties do not dispute the actual contents of the documents.”).
4

South American cable channel, DVDs, and on demand and subscription based services on
the Internet. Private has produced over 1,000 adult films and holds over 75 United States
copyrights for its works.
Defendant Sergej Letyagin is the owner of defendant SunPorno. He resides in
Gibraltar. SunPorno competes with Fraserside Holdings in the distribution and sale of
adult audio-visual works through the Internet. SunPorno operates the website
www.SunPorno.com.

The website allows users the option of viewing adult films,

downloading adult films, or viewing films in Hi-Definition.

2

One of Fraserside’s

copyrighted works has been viewed over 55,000 times on SunPorno’s website.
2.

Facts Related Solely To Personal Jurisdiction

Defendants have supplied affidavits in support of their request to dismiss the
Complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2). I have extracted the following facts, all uncontroverted, from those
affidavits which relate to defendants’ contacts with the State of Iowa.
Letyagin is a full-time resident of Europe. He has never resided in, or visited,
Iowa. He has never resided in, or visited, the United States. He does not maintain any
2

SunPorno’s website informs users wishing to watch adult films in Hi-Definition the
following:
If you want to watch movies in Hi-Definition quality, you will
need to upgrade your account. You will need to pay for this
account. Please note that an HD upgrade account is totally
separate from SunPorno and services are provided by a thirdparty. If you want to cancel your HD Upgrade membership,
please use support system at http://www.csmemberers.com.
P l ease follow this link for more details
http://www.sunporno.com/premium.php.
SunPorno webpage at 1; Plaintiff’s Ex. P.
5

servers in Iowa, does not advertise there, does not own any real estate in Iowa, and has
never paid taxes in Iowa. He is the Director of Technology for Ideal Consult, Ltd.
(“Ideal”). Ideal is headquartered in the Republic of Seychelles. Letyagin alleges that Ideal
owns and operates the SunPorno website, and that he has never owned or run that
website.

3

Ideal has no employees in Iowa, and has never maintained a server in Iowa. Ideal
has never owned any real state in Iowa and has never paid taxes in Iowa. Ideal has never
had a bank account in Iowa. Neither Ideal nor SunPorno are registered to do business in
Iowa.
SunPorno does not offer any premium memberships. SunPorno has previously
entered into affiliate agreements with other companies that provide adult video
memberships to enter into affiliate agreements with them. None of these other companies
were located in Iowa. Under these affiliate agreements, the affiliated company created
what is known as a “white label site.” In a white label site, the affiliated company puts
SunPorno’s logo on a site which the affiliated company creates, owns, and runs.
Ideal has no control over what ads are displayed on SunPorno.com. Ideal contracts
with an advertising network company called ExoClick. ExoClick is headquartered in
3

Fraserside hotly contests Letyagin’s assertion that he has no ownership interest in
SunPorno. Fraserside points to Skype chats between Letyagin and Jason Tucker,
Fraserside’s Enforcement Officer, in which Letyagin refers to SunPorno as “a small
website like mine”. Skype Chat Log at 1, Plaintiff’s Ex. K. Fraserside also points out
that a WhoIs search, an online database where users can access information regarding
domains, identifies Letyagin as SunPorno’s registrant. Fraserside also contends that, after
this lawsuit was filed, Letyagin transferred his ownership in SunPorno to Ideal, his alter
ego. Letyagin, however, has not sought dismissal on the ground that Fraserside has sued
the wrong party. For the purposes of defendants’ motion, I will assume that Letyagin is,
as alleged in the Complaint, the owner of SunPorno and its parent company, Ideal.
6

Spain. Ideal provides banner advertising space on its website to ExoClick. ExoClick then
selects the advertisements that display when someone goes to the website. The SunPorno
website also has “pop under” ads which appear in a separate browser window beneath the
main browser window. These advertisements are provided by Ero-Advertising.com, a
Netherlands advertising network company. Ideal permits Ero-Advertising to place ads in
the “pop under” spaces on its SunPorno website. Ero-Advertising then sells advertising
to its clients. The SunPorno website has nothing to do with those transactions or with what
ads are displayed. ExoClick and Ero-Advertising gear their ads to the location of the user.
Visitors in France are shown French ads while visitors in Germany are shown German ads.
The advertisements are not for SunPorno but rather for customers of ExoClick and EroAdvertising.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(2) Standards and Personal Jurisdiction
In considering defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), Fraserside’s Complaint “must state
sufficient facts . . . to support a reasonable inference that [each defendant] may be
subjected to jurisdiction in the forum state.” Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 585 (8th
Cir. 2008). “‘Once jurisdiction ha[s] been controverted or denied, [plaintiffs] ha[ve] the
burden of proving such facts.’” Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072
(8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Block Indus. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir.
1974)); see Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. George GMBH & Co., K.G., 646 F.3d 589,
592 (8th Cir. 2011). Fraserside need not, however, establish jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence until an evidentiary hearing is held, or until trial. Dakota
7

Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1991). Where,
as here, “‘the district court does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and
affidavits, . . . the court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of that party.’” Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying
Burrito L.L.C., 647 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2011)(quoting Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d
at 1387); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 793-94 (8th Cir. 2010)( “‘If the District Court
does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and affidavits, then we must look
at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual
conflicts in favor of that party.’”)(quoting Epps v. Stewart Information. Serv. Corp., 327
F.3d 642, 646–47 (8th Cir. 2003)); Romak USA, Inc. v. Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 983-84 (8th
Cir. 2004)(noting that a court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
[plaintiffs] and resolve factual conflicts in its favor.”).

For Fraserside to survive

defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction,
Fraserside “‘need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction,’ and may do so by
affidavits, exhibits, or other evidence.” Romak USA, Inc., 384 F.3d at 983 (quoting Epps,
327 F.3d at 647); accord K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591
(8th Cir. 2011); see Viasystems, Inc., 646 F.3d at 592; Pangaea, Inc., 647 F.3d at 745.
I “may assume jurisdiction over a foreign defendant only to the extent permitted by
the forum state’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.”
Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994); accord K-V
Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592 (“Personal jurisdiction in a diversity case exists ‘only to the
extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state and by the Due Process
Clause.’”)(quoting Dever, 380 F.3d at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Iowa’s
long-arm statute “expands Iowa’s jurisdictional reach to the widest due process parameters
8

4

allowed by the United States Constitution.” Hammond v. Florida Asset Fin. Corp., 695
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2005) (discussing Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.306). “As a result,
the Court is left with the sole issue of whether exercising personal jurisdiction over [the]
nonresident Defendant is consistent with principles of due process.” Brown v. Kerkhoff,
504 F. Supp. 2d 464, 499-500 (S.D. Iowa 2007); see Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids,
Inc. (Bell Paper I), 22 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen a state construes its longarm statute to confer jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the due process
clause . . . the inquiry collapses into the single question of whether exercise of personal
jurisdiction comports with due process.”).
“The Due Process Clause requires ‘minimum contacts’ between the nonresident
defendant and the forum state before the court may exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant.” Coen v. Coen, 509 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)). The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has explained sufficient minimum contacts as follows:
“Sufficient contacts exist when the defendant’s conduct
and connection with the forum state are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and when
4

Iowa’s long-arm statute is actually set forth in two places: Iowa Code § 617.3 and
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.306. Section 617.3 provides for the service of “foreign
corporations or nonresidents contracting or committing torts in Iowa,” Iowa Code § 617.3
(2006), and Rule 1.306 provides for an “[a]lternative method of service” that applies to
“every corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association,” Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.306. Rule 1.306 is the provision that specifically extends Iowa’s
jurisdictional reach to the federal constitutional limits. See Hammond, 695 N.W.2d at 5;
Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1980) (noting that Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.2 (now Rule 1.306), “unlike Iowa’s older ‘long-arm’ statute, section
617.3, . . . expands Iowa’s jurisdictional reach to the widest due process parameters of the
federal constitution”).
9

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.” By defendant’s reasonable
anticipation, we mean “there must be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.” We have set “a five-part
test for measuring minimum contacts: (1) the nature and
quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of
those contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the
contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the parties.”
Factors one through three are primary. With respect to the
third factor, we distinguish between specific jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction.
“‘Specific jurisdiction refers to
jurisdiction over causes of action arising from or related to a
defendant’s actions within the forum state,’ while ‘[g]eneral
jurisdiction . . . refers to the power of a state to adjudicate any
cause of action involving a particular defendant, regardless of
where the cause of action arose.’”
Id. (citations omitted); see K-V Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592; Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food
Movers Int’l, Inc., 667 F.3d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 2010); Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 585-86;
Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2006); Epps v. Stewart Information.
Servis. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 648 (8th Cir. 2003); Guinness Import Co. v. Mark VII
Distributors, Inc., 153 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1998); Aylward v. Fleet Bank, 122 F.3d
616, 618 (8th Cir. 1997); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100,
1102 (8th Cir. 1996).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has further instructed that:
The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral
activity of another party of a third person. Jurisdiction is
proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from
10

actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial
connection with the forum State.
Stanton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 693-94 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
“‘Minimum contacts must exist either at the time the cause of action arose, the time
the suit was filed, or within a reasonable period of time immediately prior to the filing of
the lawsuit.’” Johnson, 444 F.3d at 955-56 (quoting Pecoraro v. Sky Ranch For Boys,
Inc., 340 F.3d 558, 562 (8th Cir. 2003)). If the court determines that a defendant has the
requisite “minimum contacts within the forum state, these contacts may be considered in
light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would
comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320
(1945)); see Luv N. Care Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2006) (“It
remains for us to inquire whether the exercise of jurisdiction would offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. When a plaintiff makes its prima facie case that
the defendant has ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state, the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (citation
and quotation omitted)). These other factors include:
“the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
the controversies,” and the “shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantial social policies.”
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-77 (quoting World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292).

“These considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of

jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be
11

required.” Id. at 477. If, however, a defendant “seeks to defeat jurisdiction” when the
defendant purposefully “directed his activities at forum residents”—i.e., when minimum
contacts are clearly established—the defendant “must present a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Id.
B. Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
Fraserside contends that defendants’ contacts with Iowa are sufficient to establish
5

specific jurisdiction over them. “In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific
jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the
very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’”

Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting

Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)). Thus, “[s]pecific jurisdiction is proper
‘only if the injury giving rise to the lawsuit occurred within or had some connection to the
forum state, meaning that the defendant purposely directed its activities at the forum state
and the claim arose out of or relates to those activities.’” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 795
(quoting Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 586). Fraserside asserts that specific jurisdiction over
5

Fraserside does not contend that defendants’ contacts with Iowa are sufficient to
establish general jurisdiction over them. “A court obtains general jurisdiction ‘against a
defendant who has ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum state, even if the
injuries at issue in the lawsuit did not arise out of the defendant’s activities directed at the
forum.’” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 794 (quoting Dever., 380 F.3d at 1073)(quoting in turn
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984)). “For
an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as at home.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2853–54 (2011); see Viasystems, Inc., 646 F.3d at 592 (quoting Brown, 131 S. Ct.
at 2853-54). Thus, I will confine my analysis to whether specific jurisdiction exists.
12

defendants exists because they have directed tortious conduct at Iowa through the activities
of the SunPorno website.
In Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the “sliding scale” approach established by Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997), to determine if
website contacts provide a basis for specific jurisdiction. Lakin, 348 F.3d at 710 (“We
agree with our sister circuits that the Zippo model is an appropriate approach in cases of
specific jurisdiction—, i.e., ones in which we need only find ‘minimum contacts.’”). The
“sliding scale” approach recognizes that “‘the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of the
commercial activity that the entity conducts over the Internet.’” Id. (quoting Zippo Mfg.
Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124). In Lakin, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that:
“At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant
clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that
involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the
opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply
posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible
to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does
little more than make information available to those who are
interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal
jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive
Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host
computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is
determined by examining the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs
on the Web site.”
Id. at 710–11 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
13

Fraserside relies upon the Calder effects test formulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) and cites the decision in
CYBERsitter, L.L.C. v. People’s Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 958, 968-974 (C.D. Cal.
2011), in which the district court applied the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’s expansive
interpretation of Calder to conclude that it had specific jurisdiction over defendant Chinese
companies. The Calder effects test provides that:
“a defendant’s tortious acts can serve as a source of personal
jurisdiction only where the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the defendant’s acts (1) were intentional, (2) were
uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused
harm, the brunt of which was suffered—and which the
defendant knew was likely to be suffered—[in the forum
state].”
Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796 (quoting Lindgren v. GDT, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (S.D.
Iowa 2004)); see Viasystems, Inc., 646 F.3d at 595 (quoting Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796).
The Calder effects test “allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants whose acts ‘are performed for the very purpose of having their consequences
felt in the forum state.’” Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384,
1390–91 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Brainerd v. Governors of Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d
1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, unlike the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, construes the Calder effects test narrowly. See Johnson,
614 F.3d at 796-97 (“Additionally, even if the effect of Heineman’s alleged statement was
felt in Missouri, we have used the Calder test merely as an additional factor to consider
when evaluating a defendant’s relevant contacts with the forum state. . . We therefore
construe the Calder effects test narrowly, and hold that, absent additional contacts, mere
effects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.”); see also
14

Furminator, Inc. v. Wahba, No. 4:10CV01941, 2011 WL 3847390, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug.
29, 2011) (noting that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals construes the Calder effects test
narrowly); Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., L.L.C.,, ---F. Supp.---, 2011 WL
3702423, at *15 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011) (noting in Johnson, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals expressly clarified its position that it construes the Calder effects test narrowly);
Express Scripts, Inc. v. Care Continuum Alliance, Inc., No. 410CV2235CDP, 2011 WL
2199967, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 7, 2011) (observing that “[t]he Eighth Circuit has
narrowly construed the Calder effects test. . .”). Although I accept as true Fraserside’s
allegations that defendants intentionally infringed Fraserside’s registered copyrights and
trademarks, these allegations, alone, fail to demonstrate that defendants “uniquely or
expressly aimed” their tortious acts at Iowa. Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796. At best, all
Fraserside has established, for jurisdictional purposes, is that defendants intentionally
continued to infringe Fraserside’s copyrights and trademarks even after they were made
aware of them by their continued operation of the SunPorno website. That alone is
insufficient to establish the express-aiming prong of the Calder test. In Calder, the court
reasoned that jurisdiction in California was proper where the publisher of a allegedly
libelous newspaper article had its “largest circulation” in that state. Calder, 465 U.S. at
790. Here, by contrast, Fraserside cannot point to a single user of SunPorno’s website in
Iowa.

6

Although SunPorno’s website is both commercial and interactive, as an Iowa
6

Fraserside argues that SunPorno’s website contains “geographically targeted
advertising.” Fraserside’s Br. at 16. Specifically, Fraserside points to the fact that when
one of its employees, in Iowa, logged onto SunPorno’s website, pop-up advertisements for
www.adultfriendfinders.com and www.sexfinder.com appeared.
These pop-up
advertisements mentioned finding “sexy girls near Northwood” and “Fuck Buddies Near
Northwood”. The flaw in this argument is that www.adultfriendfinders.com and
(continued...)
15

district court noted in a case presenting similar facts, such a website “is arguably no more
directed at Iowa than at Uzbekistan.” Lindgren v. GDT, L.L.C., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1125,
1131 (S.D. Iowa 2004). In Lindgren, the district court concluded that because the website
could be accessed anywhere, including Iowa, “its existence does not demonstrate an intent
to purposefully target Iowa.” Id.; see Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Prods.,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant’s website was “not
directed at customers in the District of Columbia, but instead is available to all customers
throughout the country who have access to the Internet”); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut,
L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 331 (D.S.C. 1999) (“While it is true that anyone, anywhere
could access Centricut’s home page, including someone in South Carolina, it cannot be
inferred from this fact alone that Centricut deliberately directed its efforts toward South

6

(...continued)
www.sexfinder.com are distinct websites from www.SunPorno.com From the limited
record before me, it appears that both of these websites offer on-line adult-oriented social
networking services to individuals. Moreover, there is no allegation that either website
is affiliated with Letyagin or SunPorno. Thus, these advertisements are not for
SunPorno’s services and SunPorno merely provides banner advertising space on its website
for unrelated services and are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See Dynetech
Corp. v. Leonard Fitness, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that
“the fact that the website of a company that sells products in Florida can be reached via
a link on Defendants’ website is too narrow a thread on which to find a meaningful
“contact’ for the purposes of due process.”). As one district court recognized, if it were
otherwise all websites “that feature advertisements may become subject to personal
jurisdiction in any state regardless of whether they have actually directed their own
business activities to the forum.” Zamora Radio, L.L.C. v. Last.fm Ltd., No. 09-20940CIV, 2011 WL 2580401 at *8 (S.D. Fla. June 28, 2011) (dismissing complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction over defendant where website at issue allowed visitors to sign up
for a newsletter, listen to live audio, post comments, and provided banner advertising
space for unrelated products and services).
16

Carolina residents.”). Thus, I conclude that Fraserside has failed to demonstrate that
defendants actions were “‘performed for the very purpose of having their consequences
felt in the forum state.’” Dakota Indus., 946 F.2d at 1390–91 (quoting Brainerd, 873 F.2d
at 1260).
Assuming, arguendo, Fraserside could demonstrate that defendants’ actions were
aimed at Iowa and that the consequences of their actions were felt in Iowa, the Calder
effects test is “merely an additional factor to consider when evaluating a defendant’s
relevant contacts with the forum state.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796–97. I must also
consider the five factors developed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in determining
whether a nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to
exercise personal jurisdiction over it. As discussed above, I must consider: (1) the nature
and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of the contacts with the
forum state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the
forum state in providing its residents a forum; and (5) the convenience of the parties. See
K-V Pharm. Co., 648 F.3d at 592; Wells Dairy, Inc., 667 F.3d at 518 Steinbuch, 518
F.3d at 585-86; Johnson, 444 F.3d at 956. Of these factors, “the first three factors are
of primary importance, and the last two are ‘secondary factors.’” Stanton v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds,
823 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1987)). After considering these five factors, I conclude that
Fraserside has not demonstrated that either defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with
Iowa to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over them. Both defendants have a notable
complete absence of contacts with the State of Iowa. Letyagin is a full-time resident of
Europe. He has never resided in, or visited, Iowa. He does not maintain any servers in
Iowa, does not advertise there, does not own any real estate in Iowa, and has never paid
17

taxes in Iowa. SunPorno is a subsidiary of Ideal. SunPorno has no employees in Iowa,
and has never maintained a server in Iowa. SunPorno has never owned any real-estate in
Iowa and has never paid taxes in Iowa. SunPorno has never had a bank account in Iowa.
Thus, the nature and quality of defendants’ contacts with Iowa; the quantity of defendants’
contacts with Iowa; and, the relation of the cause of action to their contacts, all decidedly
weigh against exercising personal jurisdiction over them. While Iowa has an interest in
providing a local forum in which its resident corporations may litigate claims against nonresidents, Iowa’s “interest in providing its residents with a forum cannot make up for the
absence of minimum contacts.” Digi–Tel Holdings, Inc., v. Proteq Telecomms.(PTE),
Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 525 (8th Cir. 1996). Additionally, the convenience of the parties is,
at best, neutral given Fraserside’s limited presence in Iowa and the unique burdens placed
upon defendants having to defend themselves in a foreign legal system. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (observing that “[t]he unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal
jurisdiction over national borders.”). Thus, after considering all five relevant factors, I
conclude that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over either defendant is
inappropriate under the Iowa long-arm statute and fails to comport with due process.
Accordingly, viewing the circumstances of this case as a whole, Fraserside has failed to
make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over either Letyagin or SunPorno.
C. Federal Long-Arm Statute
Fraserside, alternatively, argues that, even if it did not make a prima facie showing
of personal jurisdiction under Iowa’s long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction exists under
18

7

the federal long-arm statute found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). See United
States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1999)(observing that Rule
4(k)(2) is “a sort of federal long-arm statute.”). Rule 4(k)(2) permits a court to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant that is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
general jurisdiction of any state, as long as the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law
and the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend due process. Oldfield v. Pueblo
De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Consol. Dev. Corp.
v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000)). “Rule 4(k)(2) was adopted to
ensure that federal claims will have a U.S. forum if sufficient national contacts exist.”
Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr., 563 F.3d 1285, 1295 (9th Cir. 2009). Rule 4(k)(2)
closed a loophole that existed prior to 1993. Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1295. As the advisory
committee notes explain:
Under the former rule, a problem was presented when the
defendant was a non-resident of the United States having
contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the
application of United States law and to satisfy federal standards
of forum selection, but having insufficient contact with any
7

Rule 4(k)(2) states:
(2)

Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a
claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons
or filing a waiver of service establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant if:
(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any
state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and
(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United
States Constitution and laws.

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
19

single state to support jurisdiction under state longarm
legislation or meet the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment limitation on state court territorial jurisdiction. In
such cases, the defendant was shielded from the enforcement
of federal law by the fortuity of a favorable limitation on the
power of state courts, which was incorporated into the federal
practice by the former rule. In this respect, the revision
responds to the suggestion of the Supreme Court made in Omni
Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 111,
108 S. Ct. 404, 98 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1987).
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee notes to 1993 amendment. Specifically, Rule
4(k)(2) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (1) the
plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law; (2) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in
any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with
due process. See Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr., 563 F.3d 1285, 1293–94 (9th
Cir. 2009); see also World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. M/V Ya Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 720
(5th Cir. 1996); see also Oldfield, 558 F.3d at 1218-19..

8

I take up each of these

requirements seriatim.
1.

Claim arises under federal law

Fraserside brings six claims, all of which arise under federal law: copyright
infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; contributory copyright
infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; vicarious copyright
infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; inducing copyright
infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 et seq.; false designation of origin,
in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and, dilution of trademark, in violation of 15 U.S.C.
8

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not discussed Rule 4(2)(k). Thus, I look
to decisions from the other federal courts of appeals for direction.
20

§ 1125(c). Since Fraserside has pled copyright and trademark claims, it is uncontested that
those claims satisfy the first requirement of Rule 4(k)(2).
2.

No state with personal jurisdiction over defendants

The second requirement of the Rule 4(k)(2) requires that defendants not be subject
to personal jurisdiction in any state. Rather than requiring the plaintiff to meet the onerous
burden of proving that a defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction, most circuits
have adopted the following approach:
A defendant who wants to preclude the use of Rule 4(k)(2) has
only to name some other state in which the suit could proceed.
Naming a more appropriate state would amount to a consent to
personal jurisdiction there. . . . If, however, the defendant
contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses
to identify any other state where suit is possible, then the
federal court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2). This procedure
makes it unnecessary to traipse through the 50 states, asking
whether each could entertain the suit.
ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais L.L.P., 256 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted); see Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1415 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Holland Am. Line, Inc. v. Wartsila N.A., 485 F.3d 450, 461 (9th Cir. 2007);
Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di
Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 651 (5th Cir. 2004). Because a majority of the federal courts of
appeals have adopted this approach, I presume that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
would also follow it.
Defendants argue that Fraserside names Kansas and Ohio as states where defendants
might be subject to personal jurisdiction. See Defendants’ Reply Br. at 3. Defendants
conclude from this that Rule 4(k)(2) does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over
them. See Touchcom, Inc., 574 F.3d at 1415 (noting that “the purposes of Rule 4(k)(2)
21

are best achieved when the defendant is afforded the opportunity to avoid the application
of the rule when it designates a suitable forum in which the plaintiff could have brought
suit.”). Defendants’ legal sleight of hand fails, however, because defendants, themselves,
do not concede that they are subject to personal jurisdiction in either Kansas or Ohio.
Rather, defendants argue that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in any state.
Given this argument, Rule 4(k)(2)’s second requirement is satisfied here.
3.

Due process

The third prong of Rule 4(k)(2) requires that the exercise of jurisdiction comport
with due process. Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1293–94; M/V Ya Mawlaya, 99 F.3d at 720. The
due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) is nearly identical to the traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis, the only difference lies in that the forum under analysis shifts from
Iowa to the United States as a whole. See Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1295; Oldfield, 558 F.3d
at 1220; Holland Am. Line, Inc., 485 F.3d at 463 (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453
F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006)). The minimum-contacts test for specific jurisdiction has
the following three requirements:
First, the defendant must have contacts related to or giving rise
to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Second, the defendant must,
through those contacts, have purposefully availed itself of
forum benefits. Third, the defendant’s contacts with the forum
must be such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.
Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 851 (11th Cir. 2010); see Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1295
(outlining three factor test for specific jurisdiction which considers whether (1) the
defendants have purposefully directed their activities at residents of the United States; (2)
whether the claim arises out of or relate to the defendants’ activities with the forum; and
(3) whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendants would be fair and
22

reasonable).
Turning to the facts of this case, Fraserside alleges that defendants have the
following contacts with the United States:
!Eighteen percent of SunPorno’s website’s 2,500,000 daily
visitors are from the United States.
!defendants have ongoing contractual relationships with
United States residents.
!defendants’ contacts with the United States are for the
purpose of displaying Fraserside’s adult films.
!SunPorno’s website provides its membership fees in U.S.
dollars.
!SunPorno’s website is controlled by a nameserver in Kansas.
!SunPorno’s website is hosted in Ohio.
Plaintiff’s Br. at 9, 21, and 23. Defendants deny these factual allegations but do not offer
contradictory evidence. While these allegations might support specific jurisdiction over
defendants, Fraserside has not provided me with an adequate evidentiary basis to accept
them.

9

However, Fraserside, alternatively contends that, even if it did not make a prima
9

Fraserside supports these assertions with naked printouts from various third-party
websites, including
IP Trace, www.ip-address.com, and WhoIs,
www.whois.comaintools.com. Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
authentication of evidence. Private web-sites, however, are not self-authenticating.
Martinez v. America’s Wholesale Lender, 446 Fed. App’x 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2011);
Foreword Magazine v. OverDrive, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1144, 2011 WL 5169384, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2011); St. Luke’s Cataract and Laser Institute, P.A. v. Sanderson,
No. 8:06–cv–223–T–MSS, 2006 WL 1320242, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006); Lorraine
(continued...)
23

facie showing of personal jurisdiction, I should delay ruling on defendants’ motion and
permit Fraserside limited jurisdictional discovery.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for liberal discovery. Seattle Times
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (“Liberal discovery is provided for the sole
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes.”).
Courts “have broad discretion in [their] resolution of discovery problems that arise in cases
pending before [them].” In re Multi–Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 653 F.2d 671, 679
(D.C. Cir. 1981). When a plaintiff offers only speculation or conclusory assertions about
contacts with a forum state, a court is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional
discovery. See Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GMBH & Co., 646 F.3d 589,
598 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that “‘[w]hen a plaintiff offers only speculation or conclusory
assertions about contacts with a forum state, a court is within its discretion in denying
jurisdictional discovery.’”) (quoting Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070,
1074 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting in turn Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy
Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003)); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv.
Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 716 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s refusal
9

(...continued)
v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 556 (D. Md. 2007). To authenticate printouts
from a website, the party proffering the evidence must produce “some statement or
affidavit from someone with knowledge [of the website] . . . for example [a] web master
or someone else with personal knowledge would be sufficient.” In re Homestore.com, Inc.
Sec.Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 782 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Here, Fraserside has not offered
any such materials which might meet the requirements for authentication. Even if
Fraserside had properly authenticated the internet printouts, whether the information drawn
from those printouts constitutes inadmissible hearsay remains. Since I have concluded that
website printouts are not properly authenticated, it is unnecessary to decide the hearsay
question at this time.
24

to allow plaintiff to engage in jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff’s request was based
on “conclusory assertions”); McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir. 1983)
(holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery
where plaintiff “offered nothing beyond his bare allegations that the defendants had had
significant contacts with the [forum] state of Maryland” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 259 (M.D.N.C. 1988)
(“[W]here a plaintiff’s claim of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and
based on bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by defendants, the Court
need not permit even limited discovery confined to issues of personal jurisdiction should
it conclude that such discovery will be a fishing expedition.”).
Presumably conclusive information regarding Letyagin’s relationship to SunPorno
and SunPorno’s contacts with the United States are available to Fraserside only through
discovery. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting that “any information regarding Step Two’s intent vis-a-vis its Internet business
and regarding other related contacts is known by Step Two, and can be learned by Toys
only through discovery”). Because Fraserside has proffered facts that, if proven, would
affect my exercise of jurisdiction over defendants, I grant Fraserside’s request for
jurisdictional discovery. To avoid potential disputes over the scope of Fraserside’s
discovery, I note that discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “‘to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment.’” Credit Lyonnais, S.A. v. SGC Int’l, Inc., 160
F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
This maxim applies equally when discovery is directed to personal jurisdiction. See
Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Wyatt v. Kaplan,
25

686 F.2d 276, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1982) (Wisdom, J.). Accordingly, Fraserside’s discovery
may inquire into all areas that are reasonably likely to aid in resolution of the jurisdictional
issue here. Such jurisdictional discovery must be completed on or before November 30,
2012.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously discussed, defendants do not have sufficient “minimum
contacts” with Iowa to permit jurisdiction under Iowa’s long-arm statute. However,
because I grant Fraserside’s request for jurisdictional discovery, I need not determine, at
this time, whether personal jurisdiction exists under the federal long-arm statute found in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction is denied without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 7th day of August, 2012.

__________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

26