Chacon v. United States of America
Filing
9
ORDER denying 2 MOTION to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (2255)(Criminal Case No. 10cr3031-LRR) filed by Nery Saud Chacon. A certificate ofappealability is denied. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 2/8/13. (ksy)(copy w/NEF to Plf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
NERY SAND CHACON,
Movant,
No. 10-cr-03031-LRR (Criminal)
No. 12-cv-03031-LRR (Civil)
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
ORDER
____________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A.
B.
IV.
ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A.
B.
C.
V.
Standards Applicable to Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 . . . . . 3
Standards Applicable to Sixth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Request for Evidentiary Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Movant’s Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Certificate of Appealability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Nery Sand Chacon’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person In Federal Custody (civil docket no.
2). Nery Chacon (“the movant”) filed such motion on May 10, 2012. The court, among
other things, directed the parties to brief the claims that the movant included in his motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (civil docket no. 3). On July 12, 2012, the government filed
a resistance (civil docket no. 7). When resisting, the government relied in part on defense
counsel’s affidavit (civil docket no. 5), which the court had previously ordered her to file.
Although the movant responded to defense counsel’s affidavit (civil docket no. 6), he did
not file a reply brief. The court now turns to consider the movant’s claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2010, the grand jury returned an indictment against the movant
(criminal docket no. 2). It charged him with illegal re-entry after having been previously
deported due to conviction of an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and
(b)(2). On September 29, 2010, the movant filed a notice of his intent to plead guilty
(criminal docket no. 17), and, on October 6, 2010, he pleaded guilty (criminal docket nos.
21 & 22). On October 21, 2010, the court accepted his guilty plea (criminal docket no.
24).
After probation prepared and released a final pre-sentence investigation report
(criminal docket no. 28), the court held a sentencing hearing. On April 5, 2011, the court
sentenced the movant to 46 months imprisonment, imposed a three-year term of supervised
release and ordered him to pay a $100 special assessment (criminal docket no. 38).
The movant sought appellate relief (criminal docket no. 40). On appeal, the sole
issue was whether the sentence imposed was greater than necessary to achieve the goals
of sentencing. United States v. Chacon, 428 Fed. Appx. 660 (8th Cir. 2011). On
September 14, 2011, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
district court. Id. Mandate issued on October 5, 2011 (criminal docket no. 55).
2
In his motion, the movant claims that his counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to
object to the scoring of his criminal history as set forth in the pre-sentence investigation
report; (2) failing to object to the 16-level enhancement under USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(A); and
(3) permitting him to sign a plea agreement wherein he agreed to the 16-level enhancement
(civil docket no. 2). Nowhere in the movant’s motion does he identify the offense that he
claims was improperly scored for purposes of his criminal history and used to enhance his
sentence under the advisory guidelines; however, counsel identified it as the 1991
conviction for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (criminal docket no. 28, ¶¶ 22,
36). The government resists all of movant’s claims (civil docket no. 7). The court now
turns to consider the movant’s claims.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standards Applicable to Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court to
move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. To obtain relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner must establish: (1) the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
Although it appears to be broad, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not provide a remedy for
“all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178, 185, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is intended
to redress only “fundamental defect[s] which inherently [result] in a complete miscarriage
of justice” and “omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”
3
Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996)
(“Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and
for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct
appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.”) (citing
Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987)). A collateral challenge
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not interchangeable or substitutable for a direct appeal. See
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982)
(making clear a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will not be allowed to do service for
an appeal). Consequently, “[a]n error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not
necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In addition, movants ordinarily are precluded from asserting claims they failed to
raise on direct appeal. See McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001).
“A [movant] who has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review
may raise the claim in a [28 U.S.C. §] 2255 proceeding only by demonstrating cause for
the default and prejudice or actual innocence.” Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 622, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)); see also Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003) (“[T]he general
rule [is] that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review
unless the [movant] shows cause and prejudice.”). “‘[C]ause’ under the cause and
prejudice test must be something external to the [movant], something that cannot be fairly
attributed to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (emphasis in original). If a movant fails to show cause, a court need
not consider whether actual prejudice exists. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 501, 111
S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). Actual innocence under the actual innocence test
4
“means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24;
see also McNeal, 249 F.3d at 749 (“[A movant] must show factual innocence, not simply
legal insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction.”).1
B. Standards Applicable to Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part
that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his [or her] defen[s]e.” U.S. Const., amend. VI. Furthermore,
there is a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-95, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963).
The Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is clearly established.
See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In
Strickland, the Supreme Court explained that a violation of that right has two components:
First, [a movant] must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the [movant] by the Sixth Amendment. Second, [a
movant] must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were
so serious as to deprive the [movant] of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed.
2d 389 (2000) (reasserting Strickland standard). Thus, Strickland requires a showing of
1
The procedural default rule applies to a conviction obtained through trial or
through the entry of a guilty plea. See United States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th
Cir. 1998); Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1997); Matthews v.
United States, 114 F.3d 112, 113 (8th Cir. 1997); Thomas v. United States, 112 F.3d 365,
366 (8th Cir. 1997); Reid v. United States, 976 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1992).
5
both deficient performance and prejudice. However, “a court deciding an ineffective
assistance claim [need not] address both components of the inquiry if the [movant] makes
an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on grounds of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course
should be followed.” Id.; see also Apfel, 97 F.3d at 1076 (“[A court] need not address the
reasonableness of the attorney’s behavior if the movant cannot prove prejudice.”).
To establish unreasonably deficient performance, a movant “must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688. The “reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct [must be reviewed]
on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 690.
There is a strong presumption of competence and reasonable professional judgment. Id.;
see also United States v. Taylor, 258 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2001) (operating on the
“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)); Sanders v. Trickey, 875
F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1989) (broad latitude to make strategic and tactical choices
regarding the appropriate action to take or refrain from taking is afforded when acting in
a representative capacity) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In sum, the court must
“determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were
outside the range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
To establish prejudice, “[i]t is not enough for [a movant] to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Rather, a movant
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. In other
words, “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent those errors,
6
the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. In
answering that question, the court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the
judge or jury.” Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Request for Evidentiary Hearing
A district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Oldham, 787 F.2d 454,
457 (8th Cir. 1986). In exercising that discretion, the district court must determine
whether the alleged facts, if true, entitle the movant to relief. See Payne v. United States,
78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). “Accordingly, [a district court may summarily dismiss
a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without an evidentiary hearing] if (1) the . . .
allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations
cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently
incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Engelen v. United States, 68
F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Delgado v. United States,
162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary
where allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief or allegations cannot be accepted as
true because they are contradicted by the record or lack factual evidence and rely on
conclusive statements); United States v. Hester, 489 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1973) (stating
that no evidentiary hearing is necessary where the files and records of the case demonstrate
that relief is unavailable or where the motion is based on a question of law). Stated
differently, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing where “the files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255; see also Standing Bear v. United States, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam).
7
The court finds that it is able to resolve the movant’s claims from the record. See
Rogers v. United States, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding “[a]ll of the information
that the court needed to make its decision with regard to [the movant’s] claims was
included in the record . . . .” and, therefore, the court “was not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing”) (citing Rule Governing Section 2255 Proceedings 8(a) and United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980)). The
evidence of record conclusively demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to the relief
sought. Specifically, the record indicates that the movant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are without merit and that no violation of either the movant’s constitutional
rights or federal law occurred. As such, the court finds that there is no need for an
evidentiary hearing.
B. The Movant’s Arguments
With respect to the merits of the movant’s claims, the court deems it appropriate to
deny the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for the reasons that are stated in the
government’s resistance because it adequately applied the law to the facts in the case. The
government correctly asserted that counsel provided professionally competent assistance
to the movant and did not make objectively unreasonable choices regarding the appropriate
action to take or refrain from taking that prejudiced the movant’s defense, particularly with
respect to the change of plea and sentencing.
Moreover, the court thoroughly reviewed the record and finds that the denial of the
movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion comports with the Constitution, results in no
“miscarriage of justice” and is consistent with the “rudimentary demands of fair
procedure.” Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; see also Apfel, 97 F.3d at 1076 (making clear that a
movant must establish a constitutional violation that, if uncorrected, would result in a
complete miscarriage of justice). The court concludes that the conduct of counsel fell
8
within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, and
any deficiencies in counsel’s performance did not prejudice the movant’s defense, id. at
692-94. The criminal history scoring and the sixteen-level enhancement under USSG
§2L1.2(b)(1)(A) were not the result of any error by counsel, but rather were based on the
movant’s own admissions, first to law enforcement and then to probation during his
interview. On or about July 14, 2010, the movant admitted to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement that he reentered the United States on or about April 13, 2005, and swore to
the same under penalty of perjury (civil docket no.7-1, p. 2 questions 7 and 8). He
reaffirmed this fact during his interview with the probation officer, who then indicated:
“[t]he defendant corroborated his illegal status and advised he illegally reentered the
United States on or about April 13, 2005” (criminal docket no. 28, ¶16). Having admitted
this fact, there was nothing counsel could do to challenge the scoring of the criminal
history and the sixteen-level enhancement under the applicable law. Further, the court
notes there was no plea agreement in this case. Because his claims are without merit, the
movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied.
C. Certificate of Appealability
In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding before a district judge, the final order is subject
to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is
held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d
518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability
may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.
9
Ed. 2d 931 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000);
Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565,
569 (8th Cir. 1997); Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues
must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently,
or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing Flieger v. Delo,
16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating
standard).
Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds.
“‘[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the [movant] must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a
federal habeas petition
is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim,
“the [movant must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the movant
failed to make the requisite “substantial showing” with respect to the claims that he raised
in his motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Because he does not present a question
of substance for appellate review, there is no reason to grant a certificate of appealability.
Accordingly, a certificate of appealability shall be denied. If he desires further review of
10
his motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the
movant may request issuance of the certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 520-22.
V. CONCLUSION
The court finds all of the movant’s assertions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to be without
merit. Accordingly, the movant’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docket no. 2) is DENIED. Lastly, the court does not believe that
appellate review of the movant’s claims is warranted, and, therefore, a certificate of
appealability is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2013.
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?