Cole et al v. Trinity Health Corporation et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Trinity Health Corporation. Judgment shall enter accordingly. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 1/21/2014. (des)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
BONNIE COLE and LYLE COLE,
individually and as next friends of P.C., a
minor,
No. C12-3075-MWB
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................................. 2 
A. 
Factual Background ............................................................... 2 
B. 
Procedural Background ........................................................... 5 

II. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 6 
A. 
Summary Judgment Standards ................................................... 6 
B. 
COBRA Notice And Civil Penalty ............................................... 9 

III. 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 15 

The continuation of health insurance coverage is an important concern to
employees facing the loss of employment.

Congress recognized this in the

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (“COBRA”), by amending

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) to require that covered
group health plans “provide . . . that each qualified beneficiary who would lose
coverage . . . as a result of a qualifying event is entitled . . . to elect . . . continuation
coverage under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1161(a). Termination of employment is a
“qualifying event” for purposes of this COBRA requirement.
1163(2).

See 29 U.S.C. §

Plaintiffs allege that Bonnie Cole’s former employer, defendant Trinity

Health Corporation (“Trinity Health”), failed to give them timely notice of their right
to elect continued health insurance as required by 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4). Trinity
Health does not dispute that it did not provide plaintiffs with timely notice of their
COBRA rights. Trinity Health, however, claims that a statutory penalty for its notice
violation is inappropriate because plaintiffs’ alleged damages are of considerably less
value than the free health care insurance coverage they received over an extended
period as a result.

This issue, and others, is presented by Trinity Health’s motion for

summary judgment.
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

I set out only those facts, disputed and undisputed, sufficient to put in context the
parties’ arguments concerning the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
resistance to it. At least for the purposes of summary judgment, the facts recited here
are undisputed. I will discuss additional factual allegations, and the extent to which
they are or are not disputed or material, if necessary, in my legal analysis.
Plaintiff Bonnie Cole was previously employed by Mercy Medical Center. She
began working at Mercy Medical Center in 2007.
employee of defendant Trinity Health in July 2010.

Bonnie transitioned to be an
Trinity Health provides its

employees and their families with benefits, including participation in an employer2

sponsored group health plan (“the Plan”). Only current employees and their spouses or
dependents are eligible to participate in the Plan. Bonnie enrolled in the Plan with Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (“Blue Cross”), with an effective date of July 11, 2010.
Plaintiff Lyle Cole is Bonnie’s husband and plaintiff P.C. is Bonnie and Lyle’s minor
son (collectively, “the Coles”). Lyle and P.C. were also enrolled in the Plan, with the
same effective date, as beneficiaries. Lyle and P.C. were eligible for enrollment in the
Plan because Bonnie was a participant.
Bonnie went on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, beginning in December 2010. Bonnie’s FMLA
leave expired on March 2, 2011 and she transitioned to short-term disability leave at
that time. Bonnie’s short-term disability leave expired on June 8, 2011. She received a
letter dated May 27, 2011, alerting her to the expiration of her short-term disability
benefits on June 8, 2011.

At this point, Bonnie applied for long-term disability

benefits. From July 6, 2011, to October 2011, Bonnie received long-term disability
benefits from UNUM, Trinity Health’s long-term disability benefits provider, under a
“reservation of rights.”

On October 11, 2011, UNUM denied Bonnie long-term

disability benefits, and notified Bonnie of its decision on that date. UNUM decided that
it would not request repayment from Bonnie of the long-term disability benefits it paid
her under the reservation of rights. On October 18, 2011, Bonnie called Trinity Health
and asked what her termination date would be. Trinity Health told Bonnie that they
would confirm the termination of her long-term disability claim with UNUM and check
with their human resources department.
Bonnie subsequently received a “2012 Benefit Confirmation Statement” dated
January 1, 2012. Lyle received a letter dated March 13, 2012, from Blue Cross which
stated, in part, that: “You have successfully completed your Blue Cross Blue Shield of

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Michigan health plan requirements. You are eligible to remain in the enhanced benefit
level.” Blue Cross Letter at 1; Plaintiffs’ App. Ex. 6 at 1.
Bonnie’s termination date should have been June 8, 2011, the last date on which
she was qualified for disability benefits and considered an employee.

At the time

Bonnie was denied long-term disability benefits in October 2011, an error was made
and Bonnie’s termination was not processed. In late April 2012, it was discovered that
Bonnie had not been terminated in the Trinity Health system. On April 27, 2012,
Trinity Health entered Bonnie’s termination in its system, effective June 8, 2011.
Trinity Health also terminated the Coles’ benefits effective January 1, 2012. Trinity
Health notified Blue Cross of this termination.
Although the Trinity Health system indicated a “COBRA Term Sent Date” of
May 8, 2012, a COBRA notice was not sent on May 8, 2012, when Bonnie’s
termination was processed. On June 1, 2012, Lyle visited his doctor and was notified
that the Coles no longer had health insurance. In response, Bonnie contacted Blue
Cross for clarification. On June 8, 2012, Bonnie received a letter from Blue Cross that
the Coles’ health care coverage had ended on January 1, 2012. This letter was the first
notice the Coles received that their health insurance coverage was cancelled.
When Trinity Health became aware of the Coles’ benefits situation, in order to
assist the Coles in switching to Lyle’s employer’s plan, Trinity Health provided Bonnie
with a letter dated June 19, 2012, in which Trinity Health explained that Bonnie had not
been given notice of the termination of her health coverage prior to June 8, 2012.
The Coles were able to join a Humana insurance health care plan offered through
Lyle’s employer, Menards, Inc., with an effective date of June 1, 2012. By the time
Bonnie’s benefits termination had been communicated to Blue Cross in May 2012, the
Coles had received benefits covered by Blue Cross through April 2012. Blue Cross did
not deny any claims submitted by the Coles based on the termination of coverage until
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May 1, 2012. Blue Cross has not sought a refund from any medical provider for any of
the Coles’ claims covered by Blue Cross between January 1, 2012 and April 30, 2012.
The Coles had $1307 in medical claims denied by Blue Cross beginning on May 1,
2012.
At the time Bonnie’s short-term disability benefits expired in June 2011, her
employee portion of her family’s health insurance premiums was $135.12 per two-week
pay period. Trinity Health’s portion of the Coles’ health insurance premiums was
$405.37 per two-week pay period. The last date of the pay period for which Bonnie
paid the employee contribution for her health insurance was June 11, 2011.

This

premium was deducted from the last paycheck Bonnie received from Trinity Health on
June 16, 2011.

B.

Procedural Background

On October 16, 2012, the Coles filed a Complaint alleging the following two
causes of action against Trinity Health: (1) that Trinity Health violated ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., by failing to notify them of their COBRA right to continuing
health care coverage, 29 U.S.C. § 1166 et seq.; and (2) improper rescission of health
care benefits, in violation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(“ACA”), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12.1 Trinity Health moves for summary judgment on
four grounds. First, Trinity Health argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
the Coles’ ACA claim because there is no private cause of action for statutory damages
based on a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12. Second, Trinity Health argues that it is
Blue Cross, the Plan’s group health insurance provider, was also originally
named as a defendant. The Coles have dismissed their claims against Blue Cross.
1

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entitled to summary judgment on the Coles’ ACA claim because no rescission of the
Coles’ health care coverage occurred. Third, Trinity Health contends that statutory
penalties for its COBRA violation may only be assessed to a single participant, here
Bonnie. Thus, Trinity Health seeks summary judgment in its favor on Lyle and P.S.’s
claims for statutory damages under § 1166(a)(4). Finally, Trinity Health argues that it
is entitled to summary judgment on the Coles’ claims for statutory damages under both
ERISA and the ACA because any alleged damages suffered by the Coles are not
significant when compared to the free health care benefit they received as a result of its
delay in processing Bonnie’s termination.
The Coles filed a timely response to Trinity Health’s motion for summary
judgment in which they acknowledge that summary judgment is appropriate on their
ACA claim because no rescission occurred here.2 The Coles, however, argue that
summary judgment is inappropriate on their ERISA claim.

Trinity Health in turn has

filed a timely brief in reply.
II.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Summary Judgment Standards

Motions for summary judgment essentially “define disputed facts and issues
and . . . dispose of unmeritorious claims [or defenses].”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 585 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (“One of the principal purposes
of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
2

Because the Coles concede that summary judgment against them on their ACA
claim is appropriate, Trinity Health’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to the
Coles’ ACA claim.

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or defenses. . . .”). Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added);
see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Summary
judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
A fact is material when it “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.’” Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, “the substantive
law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of
material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953
F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party’ on the question,” Woods, 409 F.3d at 990 (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248); see Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418
F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating genuineness depends on “whether a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party based on the evidence”).
Procedurally, the moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record
which show a lack of a genuine issue,” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323), and demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment according to law. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.”). Once the moving party
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has successfully carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an
affirmative burden to go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or
otherwise, designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir.
2005) (“The nonmoving party may not ‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but must
demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue
for trial.’” (quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995))).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’” Ricci v.
DeStefano, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L.
Ed. 2d 490 (2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal
quotations omitted).
“Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000),
quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The
nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” and must
come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S. Ct.
1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). “‘Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677, quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

8

Summary judgment is particularly appropriate when only questions of law are
involved, rather than factual issues that may or may not be subject to genuine dispute.
See, e.g., Cremona v. R.S. Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2006).
Consequently, I turn to consider the parties’ arguments for and against summary
judgment.

B.

COBRA Notice And Civil Penalty

The Coles seek statutory damages for Trinity Health’s failure to timely notify
them of their COBRA rights to continuing health care coverage.

COBRA permits

employees to continue their health insurance coverage at the group rate after
termination of employment.3 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161(a), 1163. COBRA requires an
administrator to give each participant a notice of certain health insurance coverage
rights upon a “qualifying event,” such as the termination of the participant's
employment. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a). COBRA specifies that “the employer . . . must
notify the [group health plan] administrator . . . within 30 days” of the employee's
termination, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166(a)(2), and then the administrator must notify the
employee of his or her rights to continuing coverage within 14 days. 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1162(a)(4), (c). ERISA, in turn, provides that a plan administrator who fails to meet
the COBRA notice requirements “may in the court's discretion be personally liable to
such participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $[110] a day from the date of

COBRA states that “each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under
the plan as a result of a qualifying event is entitled, under the plan, to elect, within the
election period, continuation coverage under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1161(a).
3

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such failure or refusal. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).4 “‘The purpose of this statutory
penalty is to provide plan administrators with an incentive to comply with the
requirements of ERISA and to punish noncompliance.’” In re Interstate Bakeries
Corp., 704 F.3d 528, 534 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Starr v. Metro Sys., Inc., 461 F.3d
1036, 1040 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “In exercising its discretion to impose
statutory damages, a court primarily should consider ‘the prejudice to the plaintiff and
the nature of the plan administrator's conduct.’” Id. (quoting Starr, 461 F.3d at 1040)
(quoting in turn Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 948 (8th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Trinity Health bears the burden of demonstrating that timely notice was given.
See Chesnut v. Montgomery, 307 F.3d 698, 702 (8th Cir. 2002).

Trinity Health

concedes that it did not send the Coles any COBRA notification immediately following
Bonnie’s termination. Trinity Health argues that a civil penalty here is unwarranted
because the Coles received approximately eleven months of free health insurance
coverage and the value of this free coverage far exceeds the $1307 in medical claims
incurred by the Coles before they could obtain medical coverage through Lyle’s
employer’s group plan.5

To support its position, Trinity Health points to the Eighth

The maximum amount of the civil monetary penalty in § 1132(c)(1) has been
increased from $100 to $110 per day. See 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-1; In re Interstate
Bakeries Corp., 704 F.3d 528, 534 n.6 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Kwan v. Andalex
Group, L.L.C., 737 F.3d 834, 848 n.8 (2nd Cir. 2013).
4

5

The Coles are not entitled to actual damages. The only damages that they could
recover are based on the $1307 in unreimbursed medical bills they incurred in May
2011. However, “[t]o be eligible to collect the [unreimbursed medical bills], the
plaintiff would need to pay the COBRA premium payments.” Rinaldo v. Grand Union
Co., No. CV–89–3850, 1995 WL 116418, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1995) (citing 29
(Footnote continued . . .
10

Circuit Court of Appeals’s In re Interstate Bakeries decision from last year. The Coles
counter that the facts here are “dramatically different” than those in Interstate Bakeries.
Accordingly, a close review of that decision is necessary.
In Interstate Bakeries, the employer terminated an employee on September 11,
2006. The employer, however, did not provide the employee with a COBRA notice, so
he did not elect to continue his health insurance coverage. In re Interstate Bakeries
Corp., 704 F.3d at 532. However, due to a “clerical oversight,” the employer did not
cancel the employee’s health insurance coverage. As a result, the employee received
approximately two years' worth of health insurance coverage for free. Id. When the
employer discovered this, it retroactively cancelled his coverage to his termination date.
Id. Then, the employer’s third-party claims administrator attempted to “claw back” or
recover benefits it had paid to health care providers on the employee’s behalf. Id. The
employee’s health care providers, in turn, sought reimbursement from the employee.
Id. at 533. The employee responded by filing an administrative claim in the employer’s
bankruptcy case, contending that the employer violated COBRA by not providing him
with notice of his right to elect the continuation of his health insurance benefits at the
time of his termination. Id. The employer then retroactively reinstated the employee’s
coverage from the date of termination to February 1, 2009, when the employee became

U.S.C. § 1162(2)(C)). “Where, as here, [the] plaintiff is in a better position not having
exercised [her] rights under COBRA, there can be no actual damages.” Id.; see
Soliman v. Shark Inc., No. 00 Civ. 9049, 2004 WL 1672458, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 27,
2004).

11

Medicare-eligible.6 Id.

This left a six-month coverage gap between August 2008,

when the employee’s coverage was terminated, and February 2009, when the
employee’s coverage was retroactively reinstated. Id.
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the employer on the
employee’s claim for civil penalties for failure to provide COBRA notice. Id. The
bankruptcy court reasoned that “‘the prejudice [the employee] experienced [from the
cancellation of coverage] was insignificant compared to the benefit he received from
two years of uninterrupted free health care.’” Id. The bankruptcy court also found that
the employer did not act in bad faith and that a civil penalty was unnecessary to
promote compliance with ERISA. Id. The employee appealed the bankruptcy court’s
decision to the district court, which affirmed. Id. The employee then appealed to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which also affirmed. Id. at 537. The court initially
concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in weighing the employee’s benefit of
receiving free medical coverage for an extended period against his claimed damages
from the employer’s failure to provide COBRA notice. Id. at 534.

The court further

concluded that the lack of “physical impact” on the employee resulting from the lack of
COBRA notice weighed against COBRA penalties.

Id. at 536.

The court also

observed:
Whatever the general purposes of COBRA may be,
however, § 1132(c)(1) does not mandate a penalty in every
case where a gap in health care coverage occurs, but rather
it expressly reserves discretion to the court. We decline to

6

“The obligation to provide continuing health care coverage under COBRA ends
on the date that the covered individual becomes eligible for Medicare benefits.” In re
Interstate Bakeries Corp., 704 F.3d at 533 n.5 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(ii)).

12

impose a non-statutory requirement that mandates a penalty
in every such case.
Id. at 537. Finally, the court noted that the employer acted in good faith in both its
claw back efforts and retroactive termination of the employee's health insurance
because both actions occurred before the employer learned it had failed to provide the
employee with a timely COBRA notice. Id. at 537.
The Coles, like the Interstate Bakeries’ employee, received free health insurance
coverage for a substantial period. Because the Coles were able to obtain health care
coverage through Lyle’s employer beginning on June 1, 2012, the Coles were without
coverage for only one month. The purpose of the civil enforcement provisions of
COBRA is, above all, to put plaintiffs in the same position they would have been in but
for the violation. See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 159 F.Supp.2d 1032,
1041 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Burgess v. Adams Tool & Engineering, Inc., 908 F. Supp.
473, 478 (W.D. Mich. 1995); DiSabatino v. DiSabatino Bros., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 810,
814 (D. Del. 1995); Van Hoove v. Mid-America Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., 841 F. Supp.
1523, 1536 (D. Kan. 1993); Phillips v. Riverside, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 403, 411 (E.D.
Ark.1992). Here, because the Coles’ benefit of receiving extended free health care
coverage far outweighs their claimed damages from the lack of COBRA notice, the
Coles are already in a better position than they would have been in but for the COBRA
notice violation. Thus, I find that imposing a civil penalty against Trinity Health would
not serve the purposes of COBRA.
Moreover, like the Interstate Bakeries’ employer, I find that Trinity Health acted
in good faith. “A finding of bad faith typically requires a ‘willful failure on [the plan
administrator's] part to send the notice.’” In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 704 F.3d at
537 (quoting Starr, 461 F.3d at 1040). While I recognize that timely COBRA notice
was not sent to the Coles, if Trinity Health intended to act in bad faith, free health care
13

coverage would not have been extended to the Coles.

Trinity Health’s good faith

further weighs against imposing a civil penalty here.
The Coles argue that summary judgment is inappropriate because they faced
uncertainty regarding the availability of health insurance for a period and that they
postponed medical services during that time. The Coles, however, point to no evidence
in the summary judgment record as to what the medical care would have been or how
they were physically harmed as a result of the delay in treatment. In rejecting a near
identical argument in Interstate Bakeries, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals observed:
[A]lthough [plaintiff] avers that he postponed medical care,
he offers no specific evidence as to what that medical care
would have been or how the postponement resulted in a
“physical impact” on him. In the absence of any evidence
that Deckard's postponement of medical care during his nocoverage period presented an increased risk such as the
spouse in Fadalla faced, we cannot say that the bankruptcy
court weighed the prejudice against him incorrectly with
regard to his evidence of damages.
In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 704 F.3d at 536 (citation omitted).

Discovery is

completed and the Coles are expected to lay out all their proof in opposition to Trinity
Health’s motion. The Coles have failed to demonstrate that they postponed necessary
medical care as a result of the COBRA notice violation and how that postponement
resulted in harm to them. Thus, I conclude that the Coles’ general allegations and
speculative inferences are insufficient to deny Trinity Health’s motion for summary
judgment.
For the reasons discussed above, I decline to impose a civil penalty on Trinity
Health for not providing the Coles with timely notice of their COBRA rights. Trinity
Health acted in good faith. Moreover, the Coles were not harmed or prejudiced by
Trinity Health’s tardy notice of their COBRA rights. Rather, the Coles were provided
continued medical coverage for approximately eleven months after Bonnie’s
14

termination. Under these circumstances, imposing a civil penalty against Trinity Health
would not serve the purposes of COBRA. Therefore, I find that the Coles are not
entitled to any civil penalties for Trinity Health’s tardy COBRA notification and Trinity
Health’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
III.

CONCLUSION

As discussed above, the Coles concede that Trinity Health did not improperly
rescind their health care benefits. I also find that civil penalties for Trinity Health’s
tardy COBRA notification are unwarranted. Therefore, Trinity Health’s motion for
summary judgment is granted. Judgment shall enter accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 21st day of January, 2014.

______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

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