Celia v. Kane et al

Filing 16

ORDER Accepting 15 Report and Recommendation On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment. I direct the Clerk of Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against plaintiff Celia accordingly. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 04/21/2014. Order/NEF mailed to plaintiff. (src)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
ROBERT ANTHONY CELIA,
No. C 13-3018-MWB
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE KANE, RYAN MOORE, and
STEVE ZDRAZIL,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS

___________________________
In this case, plaintiff Robert Anthony Celia, an inmate at the Fort Dodge
Correctional Facility (FDCF) asserts a “failure to protect” claim against the defendants,
officers or counselors at the FDCF, for failure to protect him from threats of harm from
other inmates that he identified only as members of a prison gang. After a period in
protective custody, during which Celia had repeatedly requested a transfer to another
facility, Celia requested that he be returned to general population. He was returned to
general population, but just a few days later, he was attacked by a member of the prison
gang, but from a different unit. During that assault, Celia sustained a cut requiring nine
stitches. Celia was then placed back in protective custody. He seeks cosmetic surgery
for scar removal and compensation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This case is before me on United States Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand’s
March 20, 2014, Report And Recommendation On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss
(docket no. 15). In his Report And Recommendation, Judge Strand considered the
defendants’ January 7, 2014, Motion To Dismiss (docket no. 11), to which Celia had
filed no resistance. Judge Strand concluded that the defendants had attached to their

Motion and had relied upon an affidavit and other documents, had anticipated that their
Motion To Dismiss would be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and had
adequately alerted Celia that consideration of their Motion as a motion for summary
judgment would probably occur. Therefore, Judge Strand concluded that there was no
need to provide further notice that he would treat the Motion as a motion for summary
judgment or to provide Celia with any additional opportunity to provide the court with
relevant evidence before Judge Strand reviewed the record under the summary judgment
standard.
In performing that review, Judge Strand concluded that Celia had neither
responded to nor requested any extension of time to respond to the defendants’ Motion
and that the deadline to do so had expired nearly two months earlier. Consequently, he
concluded that the defendants’ Motion could be granted without further notice, citing
Local Rules 7 and 56(c).

Furthermore, Judge Strand considered the record, and

concluded that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Celia’s
claim. He concluded that Celia had not fully exhausted administrative remedies for the
“failure to protect” claim that he had asserted against the defendants, as required by 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before commencing this action. Turning to the merits, anyway,
Judge Strand concluded that Celia had failed to plead or point to facts sufficient to support
his claim that the defendants or any other prison official acted in a deliberately indifferent
manner to his request for protection from fellow inmates. Because Judge Strand had
rejected Celia’s claim on the merits, Judge Strand found it unnecessary to address the
defendants’ claim of qualified immunity, as an alternate ground for judgment in their
favor. Nevertheless, he observed that the record did not establish that it would have been
clear to a reasonable officer that the defendants’ conduct was unlawful in the situation
that they confronted. Consequently, Judge Strand recommended that the defendants’

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Motion be granted and that summary judgment be entered in favor of the defendants and
against Celia.
The applicable statute provides for de novo review by the district judge of a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, when objections are made, as follows:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); see FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) (stating identical requirements);
N.D. IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive matters to a magistrate judge
but not articulating any standards to review the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation). Thus, “[a]ny party that desires plenary consideration by the Article
III judge of any issue need only ask.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985).
In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required “to give any more
consideration to the magistrate’s report than the court considers appropriate.” Thomas,
474 U.S. at 150; see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991) (stating that
§ 636(b)(1) “provide[s] for de novo review only when a party objected to the magistrate’s
findings or recommendations” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ewing, 632 F.3d 412,
415 (8th Cir. 2011) (“By failing to file objections, Ewing waived his right to de novo
review [of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on a suppression motion] by
the district court.”). Indeed, Thomas suggests that no review at all is required. Id. (“We
are therefore not persuaded that [§ 636(b)(1)] requires some lesser review by the district
court when no objections are filed.”). Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has indicated that, at a minimum, a district court should review the portions of a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which no objections have been made
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under a “clearly erroneous” standard of review. See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793,
795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that, when no objections are filed and the time for filing
objections has expired, “[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings
of the magistrate judge for clear error”); Taylor v. Farrier, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir.
1990) (noting that the advisory committee’s note to FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) indicates “when
no timely objection is filed the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record”). Review for clear error, even when no objection has been
made, is also consistent with “retention by the district court of substantial control over
the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate.” Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d
803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has explained precisely what “clear error” review means in this context,
in other contexts, the Supreme Court has stated that the “foremost” principle under this
standard of review “is that ‘[a] finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948)).
I find no clear error in Judge Strand’s recommendation. Grinder, 73 F.3d at 795
(noting that, when no objections are filed and the time for filing objections has expired,
“[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge
for clear error”); Taylor, 910 F.2d at 520 (noting that the advisory committee’s note to
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) indicates “when no timely objection is filed the court need only
satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record”). Notwithstanding the
lack of any resistance to the defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, and after properly
concluding that the Motion could be considered under summary judgment standards
without further notice to Celia, Judge Strand considered the merits of the defendants’
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assertions that Celia had not exhausted administrative remedies, that he had not identified
sufficient evidence to generate a question of fact on his “failure to protect” claim, and
that the record did not generate a question on the defendants’ “qualified immunity” to
Celia’s claim. I find no clear error in Judge Strand’s recommended disposition of any
of these issues. Consequently, I accept Judge Strand’s recommendation to grant the
defendants’ January 7, 2014, Motion To Dismiss (docket no. 11), treated as a motion for
summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006) (“A judge of the court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.”).
THEREFORE,
1.

I accept Judge Strand’s March 20, 2014, Report And Recommendation On

Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (docket no. 15);
2.

I grant the defendants’ January 7, 2014, Motion To Dismiss (docket no.

11), treated as a motion for summary judgment; and
3.

I direct the Clerk of Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the

defendants and against plaintiff Celia accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 21st day of April, 2014.

______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

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