Aguilera v. Wright County, Iowa et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 7 Motion to Dismiss (See Order Text). Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 1/6/2014. (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
JOSE ANGEL AGUILERA,
No. C 13-3034-MWB
Plaintiff,
vs.
WRIGHT COUNTY, IOWA; LEE E.
POPPEN; JEFFREY TEKIPPE; VICTOR
MURILLO; WILLIAM BASLER; JACK
SEWARD; ERIC SIMONSON; and
SCOTT D. BROWN
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING STATE
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS
Defendants.
___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 3
A.
Factual Background ............................................................... 3
B.
Procedural Background ........................................................... 7
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 20
A.
Standards For Dismissal For Failure To State A Claim .................. 20
B.
Federal Constitutional Claims .................................................. 23
1.
Count “37”: Brady and Giglio violations by the
1996 State Defendants ................................................... 24
a.
Arguments of the parties ....................................... 24
b.
Analysis ............................................................ 26
2.
Counts 1, 5, and 9: The § 1983 claims against
individual State Defendants ............................................ 33
a.
Arguments of the parties ....................................... 34
b.
Analysis ............................................................ 35
3.
Count 27: The § 1983 claim against Brown ........................ 36
a.
Arguments of the parties ....................................... 36
b.
Analysis ............................................................ 37
4.
Summary ................................................................... 37
C.
D.
E.
III.
Section 1983 Conspiracy Claims ............................................... 38
1.
Arguments of the parties ................................................ 38
2.
Analysis .................................................................... 38
Remaining State Tort Claims ................................................... 39
1.
Arguments of the parties ................................................ 40
2.
Analysis .................................................................... 41
The “Obstruction Of Justice” Claims ........................................ 47
1.
Arguments of the parties ................................................ 47
2.
Analysis .................................................................... 47
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 48
I
n 1996, plaintiff Jose Angel Aguilera was convicted of the second-degree
murder of Jesus “Jesse” Garcia. Aguilera v. State, 807 N.W.2d 249, 250
(Iowa 2011). Fourteen years later, on Aguilera’s second application for post-conviction
relief, the Iowa Supreme Court granted Aguilera relief from his conviction, on the basis
of a Brady violation.1
Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that Aguilera
was denied due process when the prosecution failed to turn over an Iowa Division of
Criminal Investigation (DCI) file, which contained several witness statements, prior to
1
A Brady violation is a due process violation that occurs when the state fails to
turn over exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2
Aguilera’s initial trial, and that the suppressed, favorable statements in the DCI file had
a reasonable probability of impacting the outcome of the trial. Id. at 250 & 259. The
state opted to retry Aguilera on a second-degree murder charge for the death of Garcia,
but, on March 12, 2012, Aguilera entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to
involuntary manslaughter and to be sentenced to time served. Aguilera continues in
custody facing deportation.
Aguilera now asserts federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and state-law tort claims against state investigators and county prosecutors involved in
his initial prosecution in 1996 and against a state investigator and county and state
prosecutors involved in his re-prosecution in 2012. The state defendants have moved to
dismiss the claims against them for failure to state claims upon which relief can be
granted.2 Aguilera concedes that his state-law tort claims for malicious prosecution and
false arrest and imprisonment against the state defendants must be dismissed, because
the State has not waived sovereign immunity as to those claims, but he contests
dismissal of his § 1983 claims and state-law tort claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and loss of consortium against these defendants.
I.
A.
INTRODUCTION
Factual Background
The parties agree to the moving defendants’ summary of the factual background
to this case in the moving defendants’ brief in support of their Motion To Dismiss
(docket no. 7-1). That summary is, in turn, based almost entirely on the Iowa Supreme
2
The county and the county prosecutors have not moved to dismiss Aguilera’s
claims, but instead filed an Answer (docket no. 15) on October 14, 2013.
3
Court’s decision in Aguilera v. State, 807 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 2011), on Aguilera’s
second application for post-conviction relief, and subsequent court orders on Aguilera’s
re-prosecution. The parties do not dispute my consideration of such court decisions and
orders on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.3 Therefore, I will rely directly on those court decisions and
orders, rather than the moving defendants’ statement of facts, as well as pertinent
allegations in Aguilera’s Amended Complaint (docket no. 5), which must be taken as
true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.4
Jesus “Jesse” Garcia died on August 18, 1996, from a gunshot wound that he
sustained while he was attending a party at the home of Salvador Guido.
Victor
Murillo, William Basler, and Jack Seward, who were Special Agents with the Iowa
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), investigated Garcia’s death. As a result of
their investigation, Aguilera was prosecuted on a charge of first-degree murder for the
death of Garcia in the Iowa District Court for Wright County by Wright County
Attorney Lee E. Poppen and Assistant Wright County Attorney Jeffrey TeKippe.
The evidence at trial showed the following:
On August 18, 1996, Aguilera attended a party that
was hosted by Salvador Guido. The victim, Jesus “Jesse”
Garcia, also attended, though neither had been invited.
Garcia had recently moved in with Aguilera’s wife, Zeidy.
3
As explained in more detail, below, considering such documents outside of the
pleadings does not require conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for
summary judgment. See, e.g., Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d
928, 931 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2012).
4
See, e.g., Freitas v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 703 F.3d 436, 438 (8th
Cir. 2013).
4
Guido and Lorenzo Lopez, who was also at the house that
night, were the only “eyewitnesses” who testified at trial. At
trial, each testified that Aguilera approached Garcia while
Garcia was sitting in his Blazer. The two exchanged words
and taunts, and Garcia exited the car. At that point, Aguilera
pulled out a gun and shot Garcia in the chest. Although both
Guido and Lopez acknowledged Garcia and Aguilera
struggled over the weapon at some point, there was
disagreement as to how far apart the two were when the gun
went off. Guido placed the two six feet apart when the shot
was fired and testified they only struggled after the shot was
fired. Lopez indicated the two had struggled over the gun
before or at the same time as the shot was fired. At trial,
witnesses testified that Aguilera was afraid that Garcia, who
had just moved in with Aguilera’s wife, would attempt to
kidnap Aguilera’s daughter. According to their testimony,
Aguilera appeared nervous and mentioned that men might be
coming to harm him or take his daughter and that he needed
the gun that was ultimately used to shoot Garcia for his own
personal protection. Aguilera attempted to portray the
shooting as either an accident, self-defense, or as a
voluntary manslaughter killing, whereas the State sought a
first-degree murder conviction.
Aguilera, 807 N.W.2d at 250-51 (footnote omitted) (decision on Aguilera’s second
application for post-conviction relief). Aguilera’s defense was partially successful, in
that he was convicted only of a lesser-included offense:
In December 1996, a jury found Aguilera guilty of
second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed sentence
in January 1997. The conviction and sentence were affirmed
by the court of appeals in 1998.
Aguilera, 807 N.W.2d at 251.
Aguilera’s first application for post-conviction relief, challenging jury
instructions, was dismissed in 2000, and his appeal of that dismissal was dismissed for
want of prosecution. Id. at 250. Then,
5
[i]n 2005, Aguilera filed a second application for
postconviction relief, which was amended in 2007. . . . It
was based on an alleged Brady violation and various other
issues that were not appealed. The application alleged that
the State failed to turn over a DCI file containing interviews
with various people. The file was turned over on October 2,
2006. Two of the individuals whose interviews were
included in the file testified at trial (Guido and Lopez) and
four did not (Ramae Shuver, Zeidy Aguilera, Roberto
Reyes, and Graciela Lucio).
Aguilera, 807 N.W.2d at 251 (footnotes omitted).
In its decision on Aguilera’s second application for post-conviction relief, the
Iowa Supreme Court analyzed in detail the statements of the witnesses in the DCI file;
the inconsistencies between some of the witnesses’ statements to police, their pre-trial
deposition testimony, and their trial testimony; and the inconsistencies among the
witnesses concerning where purported eyewitnesses Guido and Lopez were at the time
of the shooting. See id. at 253-59. Based on this analysis, the Iowa Supreme Court
concluded that “there is a reasonable probability that had these statements been turned
over to the defense, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The DCI file
and statements were material.”
Id. at 259.
Furthermore, “[b]ecause [the court]
determine[d] that the suppressed, favorable statements which were not turned over by
the State had a reasonable probability of impacting the outcome of the trial, [the court]
f[ou]nd a Brady violation occurred in this case and Aguilera’s due process rights were
violated.” Id. It then reversed the lower courts’ decisions, and remanded for a new
trial. Id. (reversing the decisions of the district court and the Iowa Court of Appeals,
which had held that, while some of the statements were not disclosed, others were, and
that, while favorable to Aguilera, the undisclosed statements were not material to
Aguilera’s guilt).
6
Nowhere in its decision on Aguilera’s second application for post-conviction
relief did the Iowa Supreme Court determine who, specifically, was responsible for
failure to turn over the DCI file to Aguilera’s defense counsel.
On January 11, 2012, the Iowa District Court for Wright County set Aguilera’s
new trial for March 27, 2012. See State Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, Exhibit B
(docket no. 7-3) (order setting new trial). Eric Simonson, Assistant Wright County
Attorney and later County Attorney, and Scott D. Brown, an Iowa Assistant Attorney
General (IAAG), represented the State in the 2012 new trial proceedings, and Aguilera
alleges that DCI Special Agent Jack Seward was again involved in the case. On March
12, 2012, pursuant to a plea agreement, Aguilera pleaded guilty to involuntary
manslaughter, a class D felony, in the death of Garcia, and was sentenced to 5 years
with credit for time served in connection with the offense. Id., Exhibit C (docket no.
73-4) (Judgment and Sentence). Aguilera alleges, and the moving defendants do not
dispute, that he continues in custody facing deportation. Amended Complaint (docket
no. 5), ¶ 207.
B.
Procedural Background
On July 3, 2013, Aguilera filed his Complaint (docket no. 2) initiating this
action, and, on July 10, 2013, he filed his Amended Complaint (docket no. 3). In his
Amended Complaint, Aguilera named Wright County, Poppen, TeKippe, Murillo,
Basler, Seward, Simonson, and Brown as defendants. He identified TeKippe, Poppen,
Murillo, Basler, and Seward collectively as the “1996 Defendants.” Aguilera identified
Wright County, Simonson, Brown, and Seward collectively as the “2012 Defendants.”
I will further subdivide the defendants into the “1996 State Defendants” (Murillo,
Basler, and Seward) and the “1996 County Defendants” (Wright County, Poppen, and
TeKippe), and the “2012 State Defendants” (Brown and Seward) and the “2012 County
7
Defendants” (Wright County and Simonson).
Where appropriate, I will refer to
Murillo, Basler, Seward, and Brown collectively as the “State Defendants,” and I will
refer to Wright County, Poppen, TeKippe, and Simonson collectively as the “County
Defendants.”
Aguilera’s claims against the 1996 Defendants rest principally on his allegation
that the “1996 defendants purposefully withheld the several statements from the defense
obstructing the fact-finding process.” Amended Complaint, ¶ 23. His claims against
the 2012 Defendants rest principally on the following allegations:
31.
The 2012 defendants persisted in threatening to use
the fraudulent statements of Guido and Lopez at trial.
32.
The 2012 defendants obtained more exculpatory
evidence during the new investigation.
33.
The 2012 defendants moved the court to keep
Aguilera from presenting a defense based on the
fraudulent statements and prior misconduct of the
1996 defendants.
34.
The 2012 defendants made false reports to the court
that DCI reports had been sent to Aguilera.
35.
The 2012 defendants violated ethical standards of a
prosecuting attorney by pursuing a charge not
supported by probable cause absent the fraudulent
statements.
Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 31-35.
Aguilera asserts 38 causes of action, two of which are identified as “Count 37.”
On September 9, 2013, however, the State Defendants filed their Motion To Dismiss
(docket no. 7), seeking dismissal of all claims against them on various grounds. On
October 8, 2013, Aguilera filed his Response (docket no. 14), conceding that his
8
Counts 2, 6, 10,5 3, 7, 11, and 28—in which he alleges “malicious prosecution” and
“false arrest and imprisonment” claims against State Defendants—should be dismissed
without prejudice, but disputing dismissal of his other claims against the State
Defendants. On October 15, 2013, the State Defendants filed a Reply (docket no. 16),
in further support of their Motion To Dismiss.
Although not all of Aguilera’s 38 causes of action are still in dispute, the chart
below identifies all of his claims, with bold indicating claims against State Defendants,
and shading indicating claims that Aguilera agrees should be dismissed. I will quote, in
the margin, only the factual allegations supporting claims in dispute on the State
Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss.
5
Aguilar identifies “Count 20” as a “malicious prosecution” claim against a
State Defendant that he concedes must be dismissed, but his reference to “Count 20” is
clearly a typographical error. Count 20 is neither a “malicious prosecution” claim nor
a claim against a State Defendant that is at issue in the State Defendants’ Motion To
Dismiss. Rather, it is apparent that the claim that Aguilera intended to concede should
be dismissed is Count 10, the “malicious prosecution” claim against Basler, a State
Defendant.
9
COUNT DEFENDANT
1
Murillo (DCI)
2
Murillo (DCI)
3
Murillo (DCI)
4
Murillo (DCI)
CAUSE OF ACTION
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
ALLEGATIONS
Creating
false
testimony
and
concealing information6
Instigation of prosecution without
Malicious prosecution
probable cause and with malice
False arrest and
Previously alleged misconduct caused
imprisonment
Aguilera’s unlawful detention
Previously alleged conduct was
outrageous and was intended to or was
Intentional infliction
in reckless disregard of whether it
of emotional distress
would cause emotional distress to
Aguilera7
6
The factual allegations of misconduct supporting the § 1983 claims in Counts 1,
5, 9, 13, and 17, which are essentially identical for each 1996 Defendant, are the
following (using the paragraph numbers from Count 1):
38.
During the course of the investigation, [the named
defendant] knew that he lacked sufficient facts to
support a reasonable and honest belief that Aguilera
was guilty of first degree murder of Garcia.
39.
[The named defendant] coerced and coached
witnesses to lie in order to manufacture the case
against Aguilera. He also knew that other 1996
defendants did so.
40.
[The named defendant] concealed how
witnesses’ false testimony was obtained.
41.
[The named defendant] also participated in the
concealment of information to prevent Aguilera from
defending himself against the first degree murder
charge.
these
7
The factual allegations of misconduct supporting the “intentional infliction of
emotional distress” claims in Counts 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20, which are essentially
identical for each 1996 Defendant, are the following (using the paragraph numbers
from Count 4):
(Footnote continued . . .
10
COUNT DEFENDANT
5
Basler (DCI)
6
Basler (DCI)
7
Basler (DCI)
8
Basler (DCI)
9
Seward (DCI)
10
Seward (DCI)
11
Seward (DCI)
12
Seward (DCI)
13
14
15
TeKippe
(ACA)
TeKippe
(ACA)
TeKippe
(ACA)
CAUSE OF ACTION
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
Malicious prosecution
False arrest and
imprisonment
Intentional infliction
of emotional distress
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
Malicious prosecution
False arrest and
imprisonment
Intentional infliction
of emotional distress
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
ALLEGATIONS
Malicious prosecution
See Count 2
False arrest and
imprisonment
See Count 3
See Count 1
See Count 2
See Count 3
See Count 4
See Count 1
See Count 2
See Count 3
See Count 4
See Count 1
56.
Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
57.
[The named defendant’s] misconduct in the arrest and
prosecution of Aguilera without probable cause; the
fabrication of evidence against him; the concealment
of that fabrication; and the concealment of other
material, exculpatory evidence was so outrageous and
extreme as to go beyond all bounds of decency.
48.
[The named defendant] intended to cause emotional
distress to Aguilera or acted in reckless disregard of
the probability of causing emotional distress to him.
11
COUNT DEFENDANT
TeKippe
16
(ACA)
17
Poppen (CA)
18
Poppen (CA)
19
Poppen (CA)
20
Poppen (CA)
21
1996
Defendants
CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional infliction of
emotional distress
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
Malicious prosecution
False arrest and
imprisonment
Intentional infliction of
emotional distress
§ 1983 Conspiracy
ALLEGATIONS
See Count 4
See Count 1
See Count 2
See Count 3
See Count 4
Conspiring to convict Aguilera and
fabricating and concealing evidence in
furtherance of the conspiracy8
8
More specifically, the factual allegations of misconduct supporting the Ҥ 1983
conspiracy” claim in Count 21 are the following:
163. Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
164. The 1996 defendants . . . conspired with each other
and perhaps others to arrest, prosecute, convict and
imprison Aguilera for the first degree murder of Jesus
Garcia when they lacked sufficient facts to support a
reasonable and honest belief that Aguilera was guilty.
165. In furtherance of their conspiracy, the 1996
defendants and each of them fabricated evidence
against Aguilera; concealed this fabrication; and also
concealed other material, exculpatory evidence in
order to convict an innocent man for a crime he did
not commit.
12
COUNT DEFENDANT
CAUSE OF ACTION
22
Wright County
§ 1983—1996 Policy
or custom
23
Wright County
1996 Indemnity
24
Simonson
(ACA)
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
ALLEGATIONS
Poppen was a final policy maker for the
County and the County is responsible for
his misconduct in promulgating a policy
and custom of unconstitutional treatment
and discrimination against Mexicans,
and the County failed to train or
supervise its personnel
Wright County has a statutory obligation
to indemnify TeKippe and Poppen for
claims against them and has agreed to
indemnify them for punitive damages
Creating false testimony and concealing
information9
9
The factual allegations of misconduct supporting the § 1983 claims in Counts
24 and 27, are essentially identical for the two 2012 Defendants against whom these
claims are brought. I will set them out here, because Count 27, against State Defendant
Brown, is at issue on the State Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss. The pertinent
allegations are the following (using the paragraph numbers from Count 24):
180. During the course of the investigation, [the named
defendant] knew that he lacked sufficient facts to
support a reasonable and honest belief that Aguilera
was guilty of second degree murder of Garcia.
181. Simonson continued the use of fraudulent evidence of
the 1996 prosecution of Aguilera to induce Aguilera
to enter the March 12, 2012 plea agreement. [N.B.:
No comparable allegation for Brown.]
182. [Simonson presented a Trial Information with
Minutes of Testimony against Aguilera to the court]
[Brown persisted with the prosecution of Aguilera
with a Trial Information with Minutes of Testimony],
implying facts were provable and witnesses were
available when he knew they were not, to induce the
(Footnote continued . . .
13
COUNT DEFENDANT
CAUSE OF ACTION
25
Simonson
(ACA)
False arrest and
imprisonment
26
Simonson
Intentional infliction of
emotional distress
Brown
(IAAG)
Brown
(IAAG)
Brown
(IAAG)
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
False arrest and
imprisonment
Intentional infliction
of emotional distress
27
28
29
ALLEGATIONS
Previously alleged misconduct caused
Aguilera’s unlawful detention from
January 2011 until March 2012 and
thereafter
Previously
alleged
conduct
was
outrageous and was intended to or was
in reckless disregard of whether it would
cause emotional distress to Aguilera10
See Count 24
See Count 25
See Count 26
Court to sign the Trial Information. [Italicized
language only in Count 24 against Simonson.]
10
The factual allegations of misconduct supporting the “intentional infliction of
emotional distress” claims in Count 26, against a County Defendant, and Count 29,
against a State Defendant, are essentially identical. Because Count 29 is at issue here, I
will repeat the supporting allegations for these two claims. They are the following
(using the paragraph numbers from Count 26):
191. Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
192. [The named defendant’s] act of proceeding against
Aguilera for the murder of Garcia without probable
cause knowing the minutes of testimony were not
provable was so outrageous and extreme as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency.
193. [The named defendant] intended to cause emotional
distress to Aguilera or acted in reckless disregard of
the probability of causing emotional distress to him.
14
COUNT DEFENDANT
2012
30
Defendants
31
Wright County
32
Wright County
33
1996
Defendants
CAUSE OF ACTION
ALLEGATIONS
Conspiring to reconvict Aguilera and
2012 Conspiracy
to continue his imprisonment11
Simonson was a final policy maker for
the County and the County is responsible
for his misconduct in promulgating a
§ 1983—2012 Policy
policy and custom of unconstitutional
or custom
treatment and discrimination against
Mexicans, and the County failed to train
or supervise its personnel
Wright County has a statutory obligation
to indemnify Simonson and Brown for
2012 Indemnity
claims against them and has agreed to
indemnify them for punitive damages
There is an ongoing conspiracy to
Conspiracy to commit
cause Aguilera to be unlawfully
malicious prosecution
prosecuted12
11
More specifically, the factual allegations of misconduct supporting the “2012
conspiracy” claim in Count 30 are the following:
214. Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
215. The 2012 defendants . . . conspired with each other
and perhaps others to continue Aguilera’s wrongful
imprisonment and reconvict him of the murder of
Garcia when they lacked sufficient facts to support a
reasonable and honest belief that Aguilera was guilty.
216. In furtherance of their conspiracy, these 2012
defendants and each of them intimidated Aguilera to
obtain Aguilera’s plea and conviction on March 12,
2012 of Involuntary Manslaughter.
12
More specifically, the factual allegations of misconduct supporting the
“conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution” claim in Count 33 are the following:
(Footnote continued . . .
15
COUNT DEFENDANT
All
Defendants
34
CAUSE OF ACTION
ALLEGATIONS
The
governmental
defendants
conspired to defraud the plaintiff by
depriving his Fifth Amendment rights
of due process of law to a fair trial
and his Sixth Amendment rights to
Conspiracy to commit confront
witnesses,
to
have
fraud
compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation, and the County is
liable for the actions of the individual
County Defendants.13
231. Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
232. Malicious prosecution occurs when a person causes or
attempts to cause another to be indicted or prosecuted
for any public offense, having no reasonable grounds
for believing that the person committed the offense.
233. Through their joint efforts defendants caused plaintiff
to be prosecuted. Defendants had no reasonable
grounds for believing that plaintiff unlawfully and
willfully committed murder by willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation killing Garcia with the use of
a firearm.
234. This is an ongoing conspiracy, played through justice
system from at least 9/23/96 to present.
235. 1996 Defendants conspired to maliciously prosecute
plaintiff in Wright County Criminal No. 6492-0896
on 9/23/96, before and after, through the actions of
all 1996 Defendants.
13
More specifically, the key factual allegations supporting the “conspiracy to
commit fraud” claim in Count 34 are the following:
(Footnote continued . . .
16
244. All defendants knew the purpose of the conspiracy.
245. All defendants agreed through their acts, omissions,
strategies, and concealments to defame plaintiff and
obstruct his defense in the aforementioned criminal
and civil cases, to cheat plaintiff out of his legal
rights, and that damaged his reputation and caused
him to be convicted for crimes he did not commit, or
impeded their reversal.
246. The governmental defendants conspired to defraud the
plaintiff by depriving his 5th Amendment rights of
due process of law to a fair trial and his 6th
Amendment rights to confront witnesses, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation.
247. Wright County is liable through the County
Attorney’s office, who elicited false statements in
1996, conspiring with DCI.
248. Wright County is liable through the County
Attorney’s office, making it a crime to call witnesses
using fabricated stories by witnesses as basis.
Usurped 6th Amendment right.
249. Wright County is liable by County Attorney’s actions
in prosecuting plaintiff.
250. Wright County is liable through prosecution for 1st
Degree Murder in 1996 and 2nd Degree Murder in
2012. Prosecutors knew the allegations by witnesses
had no merit and the charges were the result of
conspiracies between prosecutors and investigators
and others; to scapegoat plaintiff using deceptive
evidence, perjury by witnesses and subornation of
perjury by prosecutors. The attorneys usurped the
(Footnote continued . . .
17
COUNT DEFENDANT
35
All
Defendants
36
All
Defendants
CAUSE OF ACTION
ALLEGATIONS
Withholding witness statements and/or
Obstruction of
making unsupported motions to
defense and
prevent Aguilera’s defense, hindering
prosecution
the original trial and the new trial and
Aguilera’s immigration rights14
Agreeing to obstruct Aguilera’s
Conspiracy to commit
defense and prosecution by using false
obstruction
evidence or tampering with evidence15
existing law to deny plaintiff’s 5th, and 6th
Amendment rights. They deceived the jury that
resulted in plaintiff being convicted.
14
More specifically, the key factual allegations supporting the “obstruction of
defense and prosecution” claim in Count 35 are the following:
253. The 1996 defendants and 2012 defendants withheld
witness statements and/or made unsupported motions
to prevent a defense from being argued by Aguilera.
254. The obstruction hindered the original criminal case as
well as the retrial of the criminal case and Aguilera’s
current immigration rights.
15
More specifically, the key factual allegations supporting the “conspiracy to
commit obstruction” claim in Count 36 are the following:
255. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 254
above as if fully set forth herein.
256. All defendants knew the purpose of the conspiracy
and all have agreed through their acts, omissions,
concealments, and false statements and evidence to
effectuate the purpose.
257. Defendants are liable for conspiring to obstruct
defense and prosecution by the culmination of using
false evidence or tampering with evidence.
18
COUNT DEFENDANT
CAUSE OF ACTION
37
1996
Defendants
Loss of consortium
“37”
1996
Defendants
and Wright
County
Withholding evidence
(Brady and Giglio
Violations)
ALLEGATIONS
The previously alleged conduct caused
Aguilera to lose the services,
companionship, and society of his
child for 16 years16
Hiding exculpatory evidence motivated
by prejudice against Aguilera because
of his race and liability of the County
based on policy, practice, or custom17
Unfortunately, the press of other work, including matters requiring expedited
disposition and a trial in a civil rights case, prevented my more timely attention to the
16
More specifically, the factual allegations supporting the “loss of consortium”
claim in Count 37 are the following:
258. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 257
above as if fully set forth herein.
259. Aguilera is the parent of [child’s name], a minor child
at the time of his incarceration, who was in good
health before the acts complained of herein.
260. On August 18, 1996, the 1996 Defendants caused the
separation of plaintiff’s bond to the child by their
acts, omissions, concealments, and false statements
and evidence to effectuate the purpose of wrongfully
convicting Aguilera.
261. Aguilera has been permanently deprived of the
services, companionship and society of the child for
16 years.
17
The factual allegations supporting Count “37” are too lengthy to repeat here.
Suffice it to say that they include all of the allegations supporting the Brady and Giglio
violations against the 1996 Defendants in their individual capacities.
19
present motion. Also, although both parties requested oral arguments on the State
Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, my crowded schedule does not allow me to
accommodate the parties’ request for oral arguments on the present motion without
causing further undue delay of the proceedings. I find the parties’ written submissions
fully address the issues raised. Therefore, I have resolved the pending motion on the
parties’ written submissions.
II.
A.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Standards For Dismissal For Failure
To State A Claim
The State Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against them pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes a pre-answer motion
to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained,
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a
motion to dismiss, accepting as true all factual allegations in
the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. See Palmer v. Ill. Farmers Ins.
Co., 666 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 2012); see also
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2012); accord Freitas
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 703 F.3d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter,
20
686 F.3d at 850); Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating
the same standards).
Courts consider “plausibility” under this Twom-bal standard18 by “‘draw[ing] on
[their own] judicial experience and common sense.’” Whitney, 700 F.3d at 1128
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Also, courts must “‘review the plausibility of the
plaintiff’s claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation.’” Id.
(quoting Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir.
2010)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has refused, at the pleading stage, “to
incorporate some general and formal level of evidentiary proof into the ‘plausibility’
requirement of Iqbal and Twombly.” Id. Nevertheless, the question “is not whether
[the pleader] might at some later stage be able to prove [facts alleged]; the question is
whether [it] has adequately asserted facts (as contrasted with naked legal conclusions) to
support [its] claims.” Id. at 1129. Thus,
[w]hile this court must “accept as true all facts pleaded by
the non-moving party and grant all reasonable inferences
from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party,”
United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission
Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000), “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal,
18
The “Twom-bal” standard is my nickname for the “plausibility” pleading
standard established in the United States Supreme Court’s twin decisions on pleading
requirements, and standards for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
claims in federal court. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
21
556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting [Bell Atl. Corp.
v.] Twombly, 550 U.S. [544,] 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955
[(2007)]).
Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012); Whitney, 700 F.3d
at 1128 (stating the same standards).
In assessing “plausibility,” as required under the Twom-bal standard, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that courts “consider[ ] only the materials that
are ‘necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint,’”
Whitney, 700 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697
n.4 (8th Cir. 2003)), and “‘materials that are part of the public record or do not
contradict the complaint.’” Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928,
931 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079
(8th Cir. 1999), and citing Illig v. Union Elec. Co., 652 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir.
2011)). A more complete list of the matters outside of the pleadings that the court may
consider, without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion
for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 12(d), includes “‘matters incorporated by
reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the
complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned.’” Miller, 688 F.3d at 931 n.3 (quoting
5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)).
Various federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have expressly recognized that, in
addition to dismissal for factual implausibility, the Twom-bal standard still permits
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of a claim that lacks a cognizable legal theory. See,
e.g., Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013); Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 469 (3d Cir. 2013) (a claim may be dismissed if it is based on an
“indisputably meritless legal theory”); Commonwealth Property Advocates, L.L.C. v.
22
Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“Dismissal is appropriate if the law simply affords no relief.”); see also Philadelphia
Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 732 F.3d 645, 649 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing
that a claim must plead sufficient facts under a “viable legal theory”).
I will apply these standards to Aguilera’s federal constitutional, § 1983
conspiracy, remaining state tort, and obstruction of justice claims against the State
Defendants, in turn.
B.
Federal Constitutional Claims
The State Defendants first seek dismissal of all counts alleging constitutional
violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.19 They specifically identify the claims at issue
19
The State Defendants phrase this part of their Motion as seeking dismissal of
“all counts alleging section 1983 violations.” As I have observed more than once,
“[o]ne cannot go into court and claim a ‘violation of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983’—for [42
U.S.C.] § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything.” Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). Section 1983 was designed
to provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights,” Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978), but it provides no substantive rights.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393–
94 (1989); Chapman, 441 U.S. 617. To put it another way, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides a remedy for violations of all “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws [of the United States].” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright,
510 U.S. at 271 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 “merely provides a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.”); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393–94 (same); Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U .S. 1, 4 (1980) (“Constitution and laws” means 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides remedies for violations of rights created by federal statute, as well as those
created by the Constitution.). To state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation of that right
was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
(Footnote continued . . .
23
in this part of their Motion To Dismiss as Count “37” (Brady and Giglio violations by
the 1996 Defendants); Counts 1, 5, and 9 (the § 1983 claims against the 1996 State
Defendants in their individual capacities); and Count 27 (the § 1983 claim against
Brown in his individual capacity).
1.
Count “37”:
Defendants
a.
Brady and Giglio violations by the 1996 State
Arguments of the parties
The State Defendants argue that, to plead Count “37” adequately, Aguilera’s
Amended Complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to demonstrate a
plausible claim (1) that there was bad faith on the part of the 1996 State Defendants in
the failure to disclose evidence, and (2) that the conduct of the 1996 State Defendants
caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. They argue that the Amended Complaint
does neither.
More specifically, they argue that the Amended Complaint fails to
connect the 1996 State Defendants to the alleged Brady violation, where the DCI file
for which the State Defendants were responsible contained the relevant, exculpatory
information.
They argue that, even if that file was improperly withheld by the
42, 48 (1988). See generally Kimbrough v. Fort Dodge Correctional Facility, No.
C13–3005–MWB, 2013 WL 4670277, *3 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 30, 2013); Schon v.
Schumacher, No. C13–4049–MWB, 2013 WL 3479417, *3 (N.D. Iowa July 11,
2013).
I note that even the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has sometimes made the
same mistake, explaining, for example, that “[t]he conduct of counsel, either retained
or appointed, in representing clients, does not constitute action under color of state law
for purposes of a section 1983 violation.” Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.
1990) (emphasis added). While I do not expect pro se prisoners to grasp the distinction
between “violating § 1983” and asserting a constitutional violation “pursuant to
§ 1983,” if even appellate judges sometimes fail to do so, I expect rather more from
attorneys for the state or the federal government.
24
prosecution in the case, that misconduct does not implicate the 1996 State Defendants,
who had properly performed their functions in creating the file.
The State Defendants also argue that the Amended Complaint makes only
conclusory, speculative claims that there were “government agreements with witnesses”
that were not disclosed. They argue that the speculative, conclusory nature of these
statements, standing alone, requires dismissal of Count “37,” but they also argue that
no plausible basis is alleged to show that the 1996 State Defendants, all DCI
investigators, knew or should have known about such agreements or that they had any
role in deciding whether or not such agreements should be disclosed.
The State
Defendants also argue that allegations of “bad faith” are wholly insufficient, because
they are conclusory.
Finally, the State Defendants argue that they enjoy qualified
immunity to the claim in Count “37,” where three courts came to different conclusions
about whether there had even been a Brady violation, demonstrating that reasonable
officers would not have known that their conduct constituted a constitutional violation.
In response, Aguilera argues that his conviction was overturned because
someone hid and withheld valuable information from him. He argues that, while the
person or persons responsible were not specifically sought out in the process that led to
his new trial, the person or persons responsible could have been any of the 1996
Defendants, including the prosecuting attorneys or the DCI officers. He argues that it
is now a jury’s duty to determine who was responsible for his wrongful conviction and
16 unnecessary years in prison. He distinguishes the Iqbal decision, which established
the “plausibility” pleading standard, on the ground that he has named as defendants
persons who were directly involved in the creation and control of the DCI file, not just
the Iowa Attorney General and the head of the DCI. He argues that the Iowa Supreme
Court concluded that “the prosecution” engaged in “obstruction” in his case, and that
“the prosecution” includes the DCI agents.
25
He argues that, in the circumstances
alleged in his Amended Complaint and found by the Iowa Supreme Court, bad faith and
misconduct are implied in “obstruction.”
Moreover, he argues, his Amended
Complaint specifically alleges that the “1996 Defendants hid, refused, and/or failed to
identify or produce for Plaintiff or his counsel any of the several police reports or other
evidence. . . .” Amended Complaint, ¶ 267. Aguilera disputes the applicability of
qualified immunity, because the violation of his constitutional rights at issue—not
turning over the DCI file—is clearly established, and that a reasonable person would
have known that hiding that file would violate his rights, particularly when the trial
court ordered the prosecution to disclose the file in his criminal case.
In reply, the State Defendants argue that the pleading of Count “37” is wholly
insufficient, because the question of liability for the Brady violation was in no way
before the Iowa Supreme Court on Aguilera’s second application for post-conviction
relief. They also reiterate that the face of Aguilera’s Amended Complaint provides no
factual basis for bad faith or causation sufficient to demonstrate that the 1996 State
Defendants committed the constitutional violation. The State Defendants also argue
that Aguilera has asserted other purported, but highly speculative, constitutional
violations.
b.
Analysis
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
The constitutional right implicated by [alleged
suppression of exculpatory evidence] is explained in Brady
v. Maryland: “the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215 (1963). The Supreme Court stated in California v.
Trombetta, with respect to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: “We have long interpreted this
26
standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be
afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense. To safeguard that right, the Court has developed
what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally
guaranteed access to evidence.” 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104
S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).
The right Brady describes definitely applies to
prosecutors and imposes upon them an absolute disclosure
duty. But, Brady’s protections also extend to actions of other
law enforcement officers such as investigating officers.
However, an investigating officer’s failure to preserve
evidence potentially useful to the accused or their failure to
disclose such evidence does not constitute a denial of due
process in the absence of bad faith. Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368
F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir.2004). “[T]he recovery of § 1983
damages requires proof that a law enforcement officer other
than the prosecutor intended to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.” Id. Consequently, to be viable, [a defendant’s]
claim must allege bad faith to implicate a clearly established
right under Brady.
White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 813-14 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Burton v. St. Louis
Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 731 F.3d 784, 792 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting White, 519 F.3d at
814, for the standards to state a claim of a Brady violation against investigators); United
States v. Abfalter, 340 F.3d 646, 655 (8th Cir. 2003) (“‘To prove a Brady violation
[against a prosecutor], a defendant must show that the prosecution suppressed the
evidence, the evidence was favorable to the accused, and the evidence was material to
the issue of guilt or punishment.’” (quoting United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 577
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 885 (1995)). A Brady claim is “meritless,” if the
plaintiff can make no showing that the suppressed evidence would be favorable to him.
Abfalter, 340 F.3d at 646.
The State Defendants make much of Aguilera’s supposed failure to allege facts
that make it “plausible” that any of them were responsible for the suppression of the
27
DCI file, where they simply prepared the file. As noted above, the Rule 12(b)(6)
standard does not “incorporate some general and formal level of evidentiary proof into
the ‘plausibility’ requirement of Iqbal and Twombly,” Whitney, 700 F.3d at 1128,
which is precisely what the State Defendants are attempting to do. Furthermore, while
the “plausibility” standard does not ask “whether [the pleader] might at some later
stage be able to prove [facts alleged],” but only “whether [the pleader] has adequately
asserted facts (as contrasted with naked legal conclusions) to support [the pleader’s]
claims,” id. at 1129, courts considering “plausibility” under this Twom-bal standard
must “‘draw on [their own] judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. at 1128
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). My “judicial experience and common sense” inform
me that DCI agents have varying degrees of responsibility in different cases in
preparing the discovery file and deciding what will be disclosed to a criminal
defendant. It is not merely “possible,” but “plausible,” from the allegations here of a
Brady violation for failure to disclose the DCI file, that the 1996 State Defendants, all
DCI agents who were involved in the investigation of the case, were, indeed,
responsible for a decision not to include parts of the DCI file in the disclosures to
Aguilera’s trial counsel.
This is a case in which only the 1996 Defendants could
possibly know who was responsible for the decision not to disclose the DCI file.
Aguilera’s claim is sufficiently “plausible” that he should be allowed to obtain
discovery on the question of who actually did suppress the DCI file.
As to the part of the claim in Count “37” alleging a Brady violation based on
failure to disclose the DCI file, the State Defendants also argue that the allegations of
“bad faith” are wholly insufficient, because they are conclusory. It is true that, to
prove a Brady violation against the 1996 State Defendants, all of whom were
investigators, Aguilera must prove “bad faith” of the investigators. White, 519 F.3d at
814. It is also true that the Amended Complaint does not expressly allege, even in a
28
conclusory manner, that the 1996 State Defendants acted with “bad faith.” On the
other hand, it does expressly allege that the 1996 Defendants withheld the DCI file in
order to “obstruct his defense,” “to cheat [him] out of his legal rights,” “to prevent a
defense from being argued by Aguilera,” and that their conduct “constituted an
intentional violation of Aguilera’s [rights].”
See Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 245, 253,
275. These allegations identify the essence of the “bad faith” that must be shown to
establish a Brady claim against investigators. See, e.g., Burton, 731 F.3d at 796 (the
plaintiff failed to show “bad faith, because he failed to show that the investigator
“purposefully ignored contrary evidence, recklessly or intentionally withheld evidence,
or faced pressure to unduly strengthen the case against [the plaintiff]). Aguilera has
alleged more than merely negligent destruction of evidence. See United States v. Bugh,
701 F.3d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2012).
Even after imposition of the “Twom-bal” “plausibility” pleading standard, Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure still provides that “[m]alice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 9(b). Furthermore, to the extent that facts making such a mental state
“plausible” must be pleaded, once again, my “judicial experience and common sense,”
see Whitney, 700 F.3d at 1128, inform me that DCI agents have varying degrees of
responsibility in different cases in preparing the discovery file and deciding what will
be disclosed to a criminal defendant, and that it is at least “plausible” that, where the
DCI file plainly did exist, but was not disclosed, despite an order of the trial court,
until 2006, long after Aguilera’s prosecution, it was not disclosed for the purpose of a
bad faith interference with Aguilera’s defense.
Similarly, in White, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found sufficient
allegations to meet the “bad faith” standards, albeit on summary judgment, based on
the following:
29
Treating the facts as alleged to be true, a reasonable juror
could find Richard deprived White of a fair trial in bad faith
by deliberately steering the investigation to benefit his love
interest, Tina. Richard deliberately withheld from
prosecutors the full extent of his relationship with Tina and
failed to preserve the alleged victim’s diary which did not
corroborate the molestation allegations. Failing to preserve
the diary deprived White of his right to a fair trial, in part,
because he could not testify about the diary without waiving
his right not to testify. Whether Richard’s failure to disclose
the full extent of his relationship with Tina and preserve the
diary were done in bad faith are disputed factual questions
inappropriate for summary judgment.
White, 519 F.3d at 814. Here, treating Aguilera’s factual allegations as true, he has
alleged that the investigators failed to disclose the DCI file containing contradictory
witness statements to prevent consideration by the defense and the jury of alternative
descriptions of Garcia’s death. These allegations are enough to plausibly suggest “bad
faith” of the investigators. Dismissal of Count “37” is not warranted on the basis of a
failure to plead bad faith “plausibly.”
Finally, the State Defendants argue that they enjoy qualified immunity to the
claim in Count “37” concerning failure to disclose the DCI file, where three courts
came to different conclusions about whether there had even been a Brady violation.
The State Defendants argue that this split among the courts demonstrates that
reasonable officers would not have known that their conduct constituted a constitutional
violation. I do not agree.
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in White, that court has held
that “‘the absence of a factually similar case does not guarantee government officials
the shield of qualified immunity. . . . The key inquiry in deciding whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” White, 519 F.3d at 814 (quoting Moran
30
v. Clark, 359 F.3d 1058, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2004), with internal citations and
quotations omitted). In White, the court held “that no reasonable police officer in
Richard’s shoes could have believed that he could deliberately misrepresent the nature
and length of his relationship with Tina, or that he could deliberately fail to preserve a
child victim’s diary containing potentially exculpatory information.” Id. Likewise,
here, taking Aguilera’s allegations as true, no reasonable investigator in the shoes of the
1996 State Defendants could have believed that he could deliberately withhold witness
statements that were contradictory about the circumstances of an alleged murder and,
specifically, statements impeaching testimony by purported eyewitnesses that they even
saw the murder. The differences of opinion among the Iowa courts on whether or not
there had been a Brady violation involved after-the-fact consideration of whether the
information withheld actually would have had an impact on Aguilera’s trial. Qualified
immunity is not based on such hindsight, after completion of a trial on the merits.
Seymour v. City of Des Moines, 519 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 2008) (in assessing
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the officers’ actions “are not to be
viewed through the lens of judicial hindsight”).
Qualified immunity does not bar
Aguilera’s claim in Count “37” concerning failure to disclose the DCI file, at least not
at the pleading stage.
On the other hand, I agree with the State Defendants that the Amended
Complaint makes only conclusory, speculative claims that there were “government
agreements with witnesses” that were not disclosed. See Amended Complaint, ¶ 267.20
20
The paragraph of the Amended Complaint in which this challenged allegation
appears is the following:
(Footnote continued . . .
31
Unlike the DCI file, which was not disclosed, but plainly did exist, I find nothing in the
Amended Complaint but speculation to suggest that such “government agreements with
witnesses” ever existed.
The existence of “agreements with witnesses” is not a
“plausible” leap from any factual allegations that Aguilera has made. Thus, the State
Defendants are entitled to dismissal of that part of Count “37” alleging that the State
Defendants “hid, refused, and/or failed to identify or produce for Aguilera or his
counsel any other evidence of government agreements with witnesses known to them in
violation of Aguilera’s constitutional rights to due process and to prevent Aguilera from
defending himself against the false charge that he murdered Garcia,” Amended
Complaint, ¶ 267, for failure to plead a factual basis that would make such a claim
“plausible.”
267. Before, during, and after Aguilera’s 1996 trial for
Garcia’s murder, 1996 Defendants hid, refused,
and/or failed to identify or produce for Plaintiff or his
counsel any of the several (now known, and possibly
even more yet unknown and undisclosed) police
reports or other evidence relating to the existence or
viability of alternative causes of Garcia’s death and
inconsistencies in witness statements and hid, refused,
and/or failed to identify or produce for Aguilera or
his counsel any other evidence of government
agreements with witnesses known to them in violation
of Aguilera’s constitutional rights to due process and
to prevent Aguilera from defending himself against
the false charge that he murdered Garcia.
Amended Complaint, ¶ 267 (emphasis added).
32
The State Defendants are only entitled to dismissal of that part of Count “37”
alleging that the State Defendants hid “government agreements with witnesses,”
Amended Complaint, ¶ 267, for failure to plead a factual basis that would make such a
claim “plausible,” but they are not entitled to dismissal of that part of Count “37”
based on failure to disclose the DCI file.
2.
Counts 1, 5, and 9: The § 1983 claims against individual State
Defendants
As noted above, in footnote 6, the factual allegations that support each of these
claims, which are essentially identical for each 1996 Defendant, are the following
(using the paragraph numbers from Count 1):
38.
During the course of the investigation, [the named
defendant] knew that he lacked sufficient facts to
support a reasonable and honest belief that Aguilera
was guilty of first degree murder of Garcia.
39.
[The named defendant] coerced and coached
witnesses to lie in order to manufacture the case
against Aguilera. He also knew that other 1996
defendants did so.
40.
[The named defendant] concealed how
witnesses’ false testimony was obtained.
41.
[The named defendant] also participated in the
concealment of information to prevent Aguilera from
defending himself against the first degree murder
charge.
these
Amended Complaint, Counts 1, 5, and 9. This misconduct gives rise to the following
specific claims of constitutional violations (using the paragraph numbers from Count 1):
42.
[The named defendant’s] misconduct subjected
Aguilera to an unreasonable arrest and incarceration
in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.
33
43.
[The named defendant’s] misconduct deprived
Aguilera of his liberty without the due process of law
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Amended Complaint, Counts 1, 5, and 9.
a.
Arguments of the parties
The State Defendants assert that the crux of these claims is unwarranted
prosecution, but when an allegedly wrongful prosecution results in a conviction, the
United States Supreme Court has held that such claims must be dismissed without
prejudice, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that his or her conviction has already
been invalidated, citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
The State
Defendants argue that Aguilera’s conviction has not been invalidated, because, although
he was granted a new trial, he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in relation to
the same killing for which he had been initially arrested and tried. They argue that a
successful § 1983 claim would necessarily invalidate his conviction for involuntary
manslaughter, as well. Because his conviction has not been invalidated, they argue,
Aguilera has stated no “plausible” § 1983 claims against them.
Aguilera counters that his conviction for second-degree murder was overturned
by the Iowa Supreme Court. When the county attorney chose to re-file the charges
against him, Aguilera contends that, to avoid the anguish of another trial, and in light
of his justifiable distrust of the system, he finally agreed to plead guilty to a lesserincluded offense of involuntary manslaughter and to be sentenced to 5 years with credit
for the time served, which greatly exceeded the 16-year sentence that he had already
wrongfully served. He argues that the State Defendants have not shown that Iowa
would be so harsh as to consider a defendant who pleaded to a lesser offense on retrial
as not having invalidated his original conviction. He argues that § 1983 claims and a
34
few limited state torts are his only way to seek compensation for all the time that he
served on a wrongful second-degree murder conviction.
b.
Analysis
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained,
[In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)], the Court
held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment ... a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at
486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. This holding has been referred to
as the “favorable termination” requirement. See id. at 499 n.
4, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (Souter, J., concurring); Sheldon v.
Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir.1996). We have
recognized that this type of § 1983 plaintiff must show a
favorable termination by state or federal authorities even
when he is no longer incarcerated. See Entzi v. Redmann,
485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007).
Marlowe v. Fabian, 676 F.3d 743, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2012).
To put it slightly
differently, § 1983 claims are barred by Heck when such claims necessarily imply the
invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction or sentence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
The Iowa Supreme Court clearly reversed Aguilera’s conviction and sentence for
second-degree murder when it granted relief on his second application for postconviction relief. What is less clear is whether Aguilera’s subsequent agreement to
plead guilty to a lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, with a maximum
sentence far less than he had already served on his wrongful conviction for seconddegree murder, in light of the Brady violation, raises the Heck v. Humphrey bar to his
present § 1983 claims for damages. The parties have cited, and I have found, no
controlling decisions (indeed, I found very few relevant decisions) on the question of
35
whether a conviction on a lesser-included offense on a new trial, after obtaining postconviction relief, bars a § 1983 claim. It seems to me that Aguilera’s § 1983 claims do
not implicate the concerns with collateral attacks on a prior conviction that the Heck v.
Humphrey “favorable termination” rule was intended to address.
Certainly, I am
unwilling to conclude on a motion to dismiss, in the absence of controlling precedent,
that Aguilera’s § 1983 claims are barred. That question is better addressed on a motion
for summary judgment that permits a consideration of the full facts and relevant case
law to determine whether or not Aguilera has satisfied the “favorable termination rule”
and whether his § 1983 claims do, in fact, necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence.
The part of the State Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss seeking dismissal of
Counts 1, 5, and 9, on the ground that they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, is denied.
3.
Count 27: The § 1983 claim against Brown
a.
Arguments of the parties
The State Defendants also seek dismissal of Count 27, in which Aguilera asserts
a § 1983 claim against IAAG Brown in his individual capacity. The State Defendants
argue that, where Aguilera’s involuntary manslaughter conviction in 2012 has not been
invalidated, Aguilera’s claims that Brown knew he did not have probable cause to
persist in the prosecution, that Brown knew that the prosecution was based on unprovable facts, and that Brown used fraudulent evidence all necessarily imply the
invalidity of Aguilera’s involuntary manslaughter plea, so that they are barred by Heck
v. Humphrey.
They also argue that Brown enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983
liability, because Aguilera’s claims against him all arise from Brown’s exercise of
prosecutorial functions.
Aguilera counters that Brown’s involvement in the case in 2012, at the time that
Aguilera pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter, was still investigatory, so that, at
36
most, he would be entitled to qualified immunity. He argues, further, that, because he
has alleged that Brown acted in bad faith, Brown is not entitled to qualified immunity.
In reply, the State Defendants reiterate their assertion that Brown was allegedly
only involved in trial preparation and that, therefore, he acted only in a prosecutorial
role, for which he is entitled to absolute immunity. Indeed, they point out that there
are only vague references to Brown acting in an “investigatory” role as part of the 2012
prosecution and that such conclusory allegations cannot overcome absolute
prosecutorial immunity.
b.
Analysis
Aguilera’s 2012 conviction for involuntary manslaughter plainly has not been
invalidated.
Aguilera has not pleaded, nor could he plausibly plead, that he has
obtained a “favorable termination” of that prosecution. See Marlowe, 676 F.3d at 74647. Thus, Heck v. Humphrey does bar this claim against Brown. For this reason, I
need not address whether or not Aguilera’s Amended Complaint adequately pleads that
Brown acted in an “investigatory” role, which would determine the extent of his
immunity—whether absolute or qualified—nor need I determine whether Aguilera has
adequately pleaded facts that might overcome qualified immunity.
The State Defendants are entitled to dismissal of Count 27 for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
4.
Summary
Upon the foregoing, as to Aguilera’s federal constitutional claims against the
State Defendants, the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted as to that part of
Count “37” alleging that the State Defendants hid “government agreements with
witnesses,” Amended Complaint, ¶ 267, for failure to plead a factual basis that would
make such a claim “plausible,” but denied as to that part of Count “37” based on
37
failure to disclose the DCI file; denied as to Counts 1, 5, and 9; and granted as to
Count 27, because that claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
C.
Section 1983 Conspiracy Claims
The State Defendants also seek dismissal of the “§ 1983 conspiracy” claims in
Count 21 (against the 1996 State Defendants) and Count 30 (against 2012 State
Defendant Brown). Aguilera contests dismissal of these claims.
1.
Arguments of the parties
The State Defendants argue that, because the § 1983 claims fail to state claims of
constitutional violations upon which relief can be granted, the claims alleging
“conspiracy” to commit such constitutional violations also fail to state claims upon
which relief can be granted. Aguilera counters that he has stated § 1983 claims of
constitutional violations, so the companion “§ 1983 conspiracy” claims should not be
dismissed.
2.
Analysis
I agree with Aguilera that his “§ 1983 conspiracy” claim against the 1996 State
Defendants in Count 21 should not be dismissed, except to the extent that claim could
be construed to allege a conspiracy to hide “government agreements with witnesses” (as
in Count “37”),21 because I did not dismiss the underlying § 1983 claims against the
individual 1996 State Defendants except to that extent. On the other hand, I agree with
the State Defendants that the “§ 1983 conspiracy” claim against 2012 State Defendant
21
It is not clear to me that Count 21 alleges any conspiracy to hide government
agreements with witnesses. See, supra, note 8 (setting out the scope of the agreements
of the alleged § 1983 conspiracy against the 1996 State Defendants).
38
Brown in Count 30 must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, because it alleges a conspiracy based on the same conduct at issue in Count
27,22 which I dismissed. See Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1176, 1183 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“Absent a constitutional violation, ‘there is no actionable conspiracy claim.’” (quoting
Cook v. Tadros, 312 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 2002)); Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953,
957 (8th Cir. 1999) (to prevail on conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove
actual deprivation of a constitutional right).
Thus, the State Defendants are entitled to partial dismissal of Count 21 and to
dismissal of Count 30 in its entirety.
D.
Remaining State Tort Claims
As noted above, Aguilera concedes that his state-law tort claims for “malicious
prosecution” and “false arrest and imprisonment” against the State Defendants—in
Counts 2, 6, 10, 3, 7, 11, and 28—must be dismissed, because the State has not waived
sovereign immunity as to those claims, but he contests dismissal of his state-law tort
claims for “intentional infliction of emotional distress” and “loss of consortium”
against the State Defendants—in Counts 4, 8, 12, 29, and 37. The State Defendants
contend that they are entitled to dismissal not only of the “intentional infliction of
emotional distress” and “loss of consortium” claims identified by Aguilera, but also of
the “conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution” claim in Count 33 and the “fraud and
conspiracy to commit fraud” claim in Count 34.
22
See, supra, note 9 (setting out the allegations supporting Count 27); and
compare, supra, note 11 (setting out the allegations supporting Count 30).
39
1.
Arguments of the parties
The State Defendants argue that the remaining state tort claims are not subject to
the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), IOWA CODE CH. 669, because the State has
expressly retained sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, [or] deceit,” and
the gravamen of the remaining state tort claims is such alleged misconduct. The State
Defendants also argue that this court lacks supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over
the state torts, because any waiver of sovereign immunity would only be for suits
brought in Iowa state courts. Even to the extent that such claims might be subject to
the ITCA, the State Defendants argue that Aguilera has not exhausted state
administrative remedies on those claims, so that this court does not possess subject
matter jurisdiction over them.
Aguilera argues that his claims of “intentional infliction of emotional distress”
are not excepted from the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 669.14, citing
Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 213-14 (Iowa 1996). He also argues that these
claims, and his “loss of consortium” claim, stand on their own and do not arise out of
any barred tort claim.
Next, Aguilera argues that this court has subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims, because they arise out of the same case or controversy as
his federal claims. He argues that administrative exhaustion is not required by the
authority on which the State Defendants rely, and attempting to exhaust these claims
would be futile.
In reply, the State Defendants argue that, where there has been no waiver of
sovereign immunity, there can be no supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims in
federal court.
40
2.
Analysis
The Iowa Supreme Court recently explained that “[t]he ITCA waives sovereign
immunity for tort claims against the State with certain exceptions.” Minor v. State, 819
N.W.2d 383, 405 (Iowa 2012) (citing IOWA CODE § 669.4). “[I]t ‘recognizes and
provides a remedy for a cause of action already existing which would have otherwise
been without remedy because of common law immunity.’” Id. (quoting Engstrom v.
State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Iowa 1990)).
Specifically, as to exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity,
Section 669.14(4), commonly referred to as the
intentional tort exception, provides that the State’s waiver of
sovereign immunity from tort claims does not apply to
“[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights.” Iowa Code § 669.14(4).
We construe this exception narrowly. Walker v. State, 801
N.W.2d 548, 567 (Iowa 2011). Further, because the
legislature intended the ITCA to have the same effect as the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), we give great weight to
relevant federal decisions interpreting the FTCA. Feltes [v.
State], 385 N.W.2d [544,] 547 [(Iowa 1986)].
We have interpreted this section as a list of “excluded
claims in terms of the type of wrong inflicted.” Greene v.
Friend of Ct., Polk Cnty., 406 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa
1987); accord Hawkeye By-Prods., Inc. v. State, 419
N.W.2d 410, 411 (Iowa 1988). Therefore, where the basis
of the plaintiff’s claim is the functional equivalent of a cause
of action listed in section 669.14(4), the government official
is immune. Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 584
(Iowa 2003); JBP Acquisitions, LP v. U.S. ex rel. F.D.I.C.,
224 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2000) (“‘It is the substance
of the claim and not the language used in stating it which
controls’ whether the claim is barred by an FTCA
exception.” (citation omitted)). There must be more than
“[a] mere conceivable similarity” in order to establish “the
nexus of functional equivalency” between the claimed tort
and the type of wrong listed under section 669.14(4).
Trobaugh, 668 N.W.2d at 585. Consequently, a defendant
may successfully assert section 669.14(4) as a defense even
though the tort complained of is not itself listed in section
669.14(4).
Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 406 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
The court in Minor then explained the limitations on its holding in Dickerson v.
Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa 1996), on which Aguilera relies:
Although we held in Dickerson that state employees
are not entitled to an exception to the waiver of sovereign
immunity under section 669.14 when the plaintiff asserts a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, we
nonetheless noted the defendants did not argue the
exceptions listed in section 669.14(4) included intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 547 N.W.2d at 213–14.
Here, Grabe argues the alleged conduct underlying Minor’s
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
tortious interference with the parent-child relationship, if
true, would amount to conduct listed in section 669.14(4),
specifically misrepresentation and deceit. Therefore, we
need to determine whether the basis of Minor and D.A.’s
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
tortious interference with the parent-child relationship is the
functional equivalent of misrepresentation or deceit.
Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 406-07. Thus, the question here is whether Aguilera’s claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium are the “functional
equivalent[s]” of claims excepted from the waiver of sovereign immunity in
§ 669.14(4). Id.
The “intentional infliction of emotional distress” claims against the State
Defendants in Counts 4, 8, and 12 are premised on the following allegations (using the
paragraph numbers from Count 4):
56.
Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
42
57.
[The named defendant’s] misconduct in the arrest and
prosecution of Aguilera without probable cause; the
fabrication of evidence against him; the concealment
of that fabrication; and the concealment of other
material, exculpatory evidence was so outrageous and
extreme as to go beyond all bounds of decency.
58.
[The named defendant] intended to cause emotional
distress to Aguilera or acted in reckless disregard of
the probability of causing emotional distress to him.
The “intentional infliction of emotional distress” claim against State Defendant Brown
in Count 29 is premised on the following allegations:
209. Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
210. Defendant Brown’s act of proceeding against
Aguilera for the murder of Garcia without probable
cause knowing the minutes of testimony were not
provable was so outrageous and extreme as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency.
211. Defendant Brown intended to cause emotional distress
to Aguilera or acted in reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress to him.
It is plain that the conduct alleged to be “outrageous” in these “intentional
infliction of emotional distress” claims is precisely the kind of conduct listed in
§ 669.14(4) that would give rise to an excepted claim. See Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 407.
Specifically, “arrest and prosecution without probable cause” is the gravamen of
excepted “false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, [and] abuse of
process” claims.
See, e.g., Kraft v. Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984)
(defining the elements of “false imprisonment” as “(1) detention or restraint against
one’s will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint”); Children v. Burton, 331
N.W.2d 673, 678 (Iowa 1983) (“false arrest” is arrest without probable cause and is
one way to commit the tort of “false imprisonment”); Whalen v. Connelly, 621 N.W.2d
43
681, 687-88 (Iowa 2000) (stating the elements of “malicious prosecution” as follows:
“(1) a previous prosecution; (2) investigation of that prosecution by the defendant;
(3) termination of that prosecution by acquittal or discharge of the plaintiff; (4) want of
probable cause; (5) malice on the part of the defendant for bringing the prosecution;
and (6) damage to the plaintiff”); Fuller v. Local Union No. 106 of United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners, 567 N.W.2d 419, 421–22 (Iowa 1997) (stating the elements of
“abuse of process” as the following: “(1) the use of a legal process; (2) its use in an
improper or unauthorized manner; and (3) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of
the abuse”).
Also, “concealment” and “fabrication,” which are also alleged as
“outrageous” conduct here, are also the gravamen of excepted “deceit” claims. See,
e.g., Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 407 (a claim involving intentional concealment or
providing misleading or false information is the functional equivalent of an excepted
“deceit” claim).
Indeed, Aguilera does not clarify how it is that his “intentional
infliction of emotional distress” claims would “stand on their own,” in the absence of
the allegations of “outrageous” conduct that plainly also give rise to excepted tort
claims.
The same is true of Count 33, the “conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution”
claim. The pertinent allegations are the following:
231. Plaintiff reasserts [all previous paragraphs] as though
fully set forth herein.
232. Malicious prosecution occurs when a person causes or
attempts to cause another to be indicted or prosecuted
for any public offense, having no reasonable grounds
for believing that the person committed the offense.
233. Through their joint efforts defendants caused plaintiff
to be prosecuted. Defendants had no reasonable
grounds for believing that plaintiff unlawfully and
willfully committed murder by willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation killing Garcia with the use of
a firearm.
44
234. This is an ongoing conspiracy, played through justice
system from at least 9/23/96 to present.
235. 1996 Defendants conspired to maliciously prosecute
plaintiff in Wright County Criminal No. 6492-0896
on 9/23/96, before and after, through the actions of
all 1996 Defendants.
This claim simply alleges “conspiracy” to commit a “malicious prosecution,” but
claims based on “malicious prosecution” are expressly excepted from the waiver of
sovereign immunity in the ITCA. See IOWA CODE § 669.14(14).
The factual allegations supporting the “loss of consortium” claim in Count 37
are the following:
258. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 257
above as if fully set forth herein.
259. Aguilera is the parent of [child’s name], a minor child
at the time of his incarceration, who was in good
health before the acts complained of herein.
260. On August 18, 1996, the 1996 Defendants caused the
separation of plaintiff’s bond to the child by their
acts, omissions, concealments, and false statements
and evidence to effectuate the purpose of wrongfully
convicting Aguilera.
261. Aguilera has been permanently deprived of the
services, companionship and society of the child for
16 years.
Again, it is plain that the gravamen of this claim is the same conduct that allegedly
gives rise to the “intentional infliction of emotional distress” claims and, consequently,
that it is also conduct that is the gravamen of excepted “false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, [and] abuse of process” claims and “deceit” claims. See
IOWA CODE § 669.14(4). Again, Aguilera does not clarify how it is that his “loss of
45
consortium” claim would “stand on its own,” in the absence of the allegations of
conduct that plainly also gives rise to excepted tort claims.
Finally, as to Count 34, alleging a state tort “fraud” claim, the pertinent
allegations against the State Defendants are the following:
244. All defendants know the purpose of the conspiracy.
245. All defendants agreed through their acts, omissions,
strategies, and concealments to defame plaintiff and
obstruct his defense in the aforementioned criminal
and civil cases, to cheat plaintiff out of his legal
rights, and that damaged his reputation and caused
him to be convicted for crimes he did not commit, or
impeded their reversal.
246. The governmental defendants conspired to defraud
the plaintiff by depriving his 5th Amendment rights of
due process of law to a fair trial and his 6th
Amendment rights to confront witnesses, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation.
Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 244-46 (emphasis added). Again, it is plain that the gravamen
of this claim is also the gravamen of excepted “false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, [and] abuse of process” claims, “deceit” claims, and
“defamation” claims. See IOWA CODE § 669.14(4). Indeed, Aguilera does not appear
to offer any argument that this “fraud” claim would “stand on its own,” in the absence
of the allegations of conduct that plainly also give rise to excepted tort claims.
Because there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity for these state tort
claims, in the ITCA or elsewhere, these claims fail to state claims upon which this
court can grant relief or, indeed, claims over which this court has subject matter
jurisdiction. They will be dismissed.
46
E.
The “Obstruction Of Justice” Claims
Count 35 alleges “obstruction of defense and prosecution” and Count 36 alleges
“conspiracy to commit obstruction” against the State Defendants. The State Defendants
seek dismissal of these counts for failure to state claims upon which relief can be
granted, and Aguilera opposes such dismissal.
1.
Arguments of the parties
The State Defendants assert that the “obstruction of justice” claims are ostensibly
premised on IOWA CODE § 719.3, which defines a criminal violation.
The State
Defendants argue that they know of no similar private cause of action, except for the
§ 1983 and state tort claims already addressed, above.
Aguilera argues that these
claims can be construed as extensions of his § 1983 causes of action and, consequently,
should be allowed to stand.
He cites no authority in support of that proposition,
however.
2.
Analysis
Because I find the parties’ briefing wholly inadequate on the question of whether
IOWA CODE § 719.3 might impliedly create a private cause of action for “obstruction of
justice,” see, e.g., Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 288-289 (Iowa 1995); Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see also Wilcox v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 458 N.W.2d
870, 872 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (suggesting that the existence of a criminal penalty
under a state statute may support a plaintiff’s position that a private cause of action
exists), I decline to consider this issue on a motion to dismiss. To put it another way, I
cannot say that such a private cause of action is either implausible in light of the facts
alleged or legally implausible, on its face. Therefore, the State Defendants are not
entitled to dismissal of Counts 35 and 36 for failure to state claims upon which relief
can be granted.
47
III.
CONCLUSION
Upon the foregoing, the State Defendants’ September 9, 2013, Motion To
Dismiss (docket no. 7) is granted in part and denied in part. I will set out the
disposition of the claims in numerical order:
1.
The Motion is denied as to Count 1;
2.
The Motion is granted as to Counts 2, 3, and 4;
3.
The Motion is denied as to Count 5;
4.
The Motion is granted as to Counts 6, 7, and 8;
5.
The Motion is denied as to Count 9;
6.
The Motion is granted as to Counts 10, 11, and 12;
7.
The Motion is granted as to that part of Count 21 to the extent that claim
could be construed to allege a conspiracy to hide “government agreements with
witnesses” (as in Count “37”), but otherwise denied as to Count 21;
8.
The Motion is granted as to Counts 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, and 34;
9.
The Motion is denied as to Counts 35 and 36;
10.
The Motion is granted as to Count 37; and
11.
The Motion is granted as to that part of Count “37” alleging that the
State Defendants hid “government agreements with witnesses,” but denied as to that
part of Count “37” based on failure to disclose the DCI file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of January, 2014.
______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
48
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?