Aguilera v. Wright County, Iowa et al
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. The County Defendants' 8/4/14, Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all of plaintiff Aguilera's claims against them. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 10/6/14. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
JOSE ANGEL AGUILERA,
No. C 13-3034-MWB
Plaintiff,
vs.
WRIGHT COUNTY, IOWA; LEE E.
POPPEN; JEFFREY TEKIPPE;
VICTOR MURILLO; WILLIAM
BASLER; JACK SEWARD; ERIC
SIMONSON; and SCOTT D. BROWN
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING COUNTY
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants.
___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 3
A.
Factual Background ............................................................... 3
B.
Procedural Background ........................................................... 5
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 8
A.
Standards For Summary Judgment ............................................. 8
B.
Absolute Judicial Immunity .................................................... 10
1.
Arguments of the parties ................................................ 10
2.
Analysis .................................................................... 11
C.
Other Grounds For Summary Judgment ..................................... 15
1.
Arguments of the parties. ............................................... 15
2.
Analysis .................................................................... 16
III.
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 19
A
s I explained, in somewhat more detail, in my January 6, 2014,
Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding State Defendants’ Motion To
Dismiss (docket no. 19), published at Aguilera v. Wright Cnty., Iowa, 990 F. Supp. 2d
926 (N.D. Iowa 2014), this unhappy case has been brought by a state prisoner, plaintiff
Jose Angel Aguilera, after the Iowa Supreme Court set aside Aguilera’s 1996 conviction
for the second-degree murder of Jesus “Jesse” Garcia, on the basis of a Brady violation,1
but not until Aguilera had already served 14 years in prison. The state opted to retry
Aguilera for second-degree murder, but, on March 12, 2012, Aguilera entered into a plea
agreement to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter and to be sentenced to time served.
Aguilera continues in custody facing deportation. Aguilera asserts federal constitutional
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law tort claims against state investigators
and county prosecutors involved in his initial prosecution in 1996 and against a state
investigator and county and state prosecutors involved in his re-prosecution in 2012.2
This action is now before me on the County Defendants’ August 4, 2014, Joint Motion
For Summary Judgment (docket no. 24), asserting absolute prosecutorial immunity and
other bars to Aguilera’s claims against them.
1
A Brady violation is a due process violation that occurs when the state fails to
turn over exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2
As in my prior ruling, in his Amended Complaint (docket no. 5), which remains
the current pleading, Aguilera identified defendants TeKippe, Poppen, Murillo, Basler,
and Seward collectively as the “1996 Defendants,” and defendants Wright County,
Simonson, Brown, and Seward collectively as the “2012 Defendants.” I will further
subdivide the defendants into the “1996 State Defendants” (Murillo, Basler, and Seward)
and the “1996 County Defendants” (Wright County, Poppen, and TeKippe), and the
“2012 State Defendants” (Brown and Seward) and the “2012 County Defendants”
(Wright County and Simonson). Where appropriate, I will refer to Murillo, Basler,
Seward, and Brown collectively as the “State Defendants,” and I will refer to Wright
County, Poppen, TeKippe, and Simonson collectively as the “County Defendants.”
2
I.
A.
INTRODUCTION
Factual Background
I set out an extensive statement of the factual and procedural background to this
case in my prior ruling, including a description of the circumstances of the underlying
shooting of Jesse Garcia. Aguilera, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 930-37. Here, I find that a rather
more circumscribed statement of facts—disputed and undisputed—than the parties have
offered is sufficient to put in context the parties’ arguments concerning the County
Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment. In the present context, the focus is on what
the County Defendants did in the course of prosecuting and re-prosecuting Aguilera.
Agents with the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), who are identified
as State Defendants, investigated Garcia’s death. As a result of their investigation,
Aguilera was prosecuted on a charge of first-degree murder for the death of Garcia in the
Iowa District Court for Wright County by Wright County Attorney Lee E. Poppen and
Assistant Wright County Attorney Jeffrey TeKippe, both identified as County
Defendants. TeKippe filed the Complaint charging Aguilera with first-degree murder,
and Poppen later filed a Trial Information charging Aguilera with first-degree murder.
By letter dated September 30, 1996, Poppen informed Aguilera’s trial counsel that
the Wright County Attorney’s Office would “voluntarily provide [trial counsel] with the
reports of local law enforcement agencies, any lab testing results and the written
statements provided by any witnesses,” but that Poppen “w[ould] not provide the DCI
investigative report without a specific court order directing [him] to do so.” Aguilera
contends that Poppen implemented the policy reflected in this letter in his
“administrative” role, but the County Defendants contend that nothing in the portions of
the record that Aguilera cites indicates that Poppen was acting in an “administrative”
role.
On November 6, 1996, Aguilera’s trial counsel moved the district court for
3
“production of evidence as requested within a time to be fixed by the Court.” The district
court orally granted that request, then, later, at Aguilera’s trial counsel’s request, entered
a written ruling on December 17, 1996, memorializing that the request was granted.
In its opinion granting Aguilera’s second petition for post-conviction relief, the
Iowa Supreme Court found that the State never turned over the DCI file, which that court
held violated Brady, but that court nowhere determined who, specifically, was
responsible for failure to turn over the file. See Aguilera v. State, 807 N.W.2d 249, 25159 (Iowa 2011). The Iowa Supreme Court also determined that the file was not turned
over until October 2, 2006. Id. at 251. While admitting that the Iowa Supreme Court
found otherwise, Poppen contends that he disclosed the DCI reports to Aguilera’s trial
counsel after the district court orally stated that it would require production of the file,
which Aguilera denies. Aguilera contends that his trial counsel did not receive the DCI
file and that the DCI file is not in the state Public Defender’s case file for his 1996
prosecution. Poppen and TeKippe prosecuted Aguilera at his 1996 trial. Aguilera admits
that Poppen’s and TeKippe’s continued involvement in the case during post-trial,
appellate, and post-conviction stages of the case were in performance of their
prosecutorial functions as advocates for the State.
After the Iowa Supreme Court granted Aguilera’s second petition for postconviction relief, Eric Simonson, who was an Assistant Wright County Attorney and then
the Wright County Attorney, referred the case to the Iowa Attorney General’s Office for
possible re-prosecution. Another DCI agent re-investigated the matter by gathering the
files from the prior investigation. The County Defendants assert, and Aguilera admits,
that Simonson filed the March 7, 2012, Substitute Trial Information and Supplemental
Minutes of Testimony initiating Aguilera’s re-prosecution on a charge of second-degree
murder. Aguilera contends that Simonson acted as a “complaining witness” by signing
the Minutes of Testimony in 2012—and, indeed, that he did so knowing that there was
4
no probable cause for a second-degree murder charge, because there was no
determination of the whereabouts of several witnesses in the 1996 trial or if those
witnesses would testify as they did in 1996. The County Defendants deny that the record
supports Aguilera’s assertion that Simonson acted as a “complaining witness,” because
Simonson simply signed the document, but did not attest to the truth of its contents.
Aguilera admits that Simonson engaged in traditional prosecutorial functions throughout
Aguilera’s re-prosecution.
Aguilera eventually chose to plead guilty to involuntary
manslaughter to avoid a retrial.
B.
Procedural Background
In his Amended Complaint, Aguilera asserts the following claims against the
County Defendants:3
COUNT DEFENDANT
TeKippe
13
(ACA)
TeKippe
14
(ACA)
TeKippe
15
(ACA)
CAUSE OF ACTION
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
Malicious prosecution
False arrest and
imprisonment
16
TeKippe
(ACA)
Intentional infliction of
emotional distress
17
Poppen (CA)
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
18
Poppen (CA)
Malicious prosecution
19
Poppen (CA)
False arrest and
imprisonment
3
ALLEGATIONS
Creating false testimony and concealing
information
Instigation of prosecution without
probable cause and with malice
Previously alleged misconduct caused
Aguilera’s unlawful detention
Previously
alleged
conduct
was
outrageous and was intended to or was in
reckless disregard of whether it would
cause emotional distress to Aguilera
Creating false testimony and concealing
information
Instigation of prosecution without
probable cause and with malice
Previously alleged misconduct caused
Aguilera’s unlawful detention
The factual allegations underlying these claims are identified in notes to a
comparable table in my prior ruling. See Aguilera, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 933-36.
5
COUNT DEFENDANT
CAUSE OF ACTION
20
Poppen (CA)
Intentional infliction of
emotional distress
21
1996
Defendants
§ 1983 Conspiracy
22
Wright County
§ 1983—1996 Policy
or custom
23
Wright County
1996 Indemnity
24
Simonson
(ACA)
§ 1983 (Individual
capacity)
25
Simonson
(ACA)
False arrest and
imprisonment
26
Simonson
(ACA)
Intentional infliction of
emotional distress
30
2012
Defendants
§ 1983 Conspiracy
31
Wright County
§ 1983—2012 Policy
or custom
32
Wright County
2012 Indemnity
6
ALLEGATIONS
Previously
alleged
conduct
was
outrageous and was intended to or was in
reckless disregard of whether it would
cause emotional distress to Aguilera
Conspiring to convict Aguilera and
fabricating and concealing evidence in
furtherance of the conspiracy
Poppen was a final policy maker for the
County and the County is responsible for
his misconduct in promulgating a policy
and custom of unconstitutional treatment
and discrimination against Mexicans, and
the County failed to train or supervise its
personnel
Wright County has a statutory obligation
to indemnify TeKippe and Poppen for
claims against them and has agreed to
indemnify them for punitive damages
Creating false testimony and concealing
information
Previously alleged misconduct caused
Aguilera’s unlawful detention from
January 2011 until March 2012 and
thereafter
Previously
alleged
conduct
was
outrageous and was intended to or was in
reckless disregard of whether it would
cause emotional distress to Aguilera
Conspiring to reconvict Aguilera and to
continue his imprisonment
Simonson was a final policy maker for the
County and the County is responsible for
his misconduct in promulgating a policy
and custom of unconstitutional treatment
and discrimination against Mexicans, and
the County failed to train or supervise its
personnel
Wright County has a statutory obligation
to indemnify Simonson and Brown for
COUNT DEFENDANT
CAUSE OF ACTION
33
1996
Defendants
Conspiracy to commit
malicious prosecution
34
All Defendants
Conspiracy to commit
fraud
35
All Defendants
Obstruction of defense
and prosecution
36
All Defendants
Conspiracy to commit
obstruction
37
1996
Defendants
Loss of consortium
“37”
1996
Defendants
and Wright
County
Withholding evidence
(Brady and Giglio
Violations)
ALLEGATIONS
claims against them and has agreed to
indemnify them for punitive damages
There is an ongoing conspiracy to cause
Aguilera to be unlawfully prosecuted
The defendants conspired to defraud the
plaintiff by depriving him of his Fifth
Amendment rights of due process of law
to a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment
rights to confront witnesses, to have
compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation,
and the County is liable for the actions of
the individual County Defendants
Withholding witness statements and/or
making unsupported motions to prevent
Aguilera’s defense, hindering the original
trial and the new trial and Aguilera’s
immigration rights
Agreeing to obstruct Aguilera’s defense
and prosecution by using false evidence
or tampering with evidence
The previously alleged conduct caused
Aguilera
to
lose
the
services,
companionship, and society of his child
for 16 years
Hiding exculpatory evidence motivated
by prejudice against Aguilera because of
his race and liability of the County based
on policy, practice, or custom
In a Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 24), filed August 4, 2014, the
County Defendants seek summary judgment on all of the claims against them, primarily
on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity, but also on other grounds. Aguilera
filed his Resistance (docket no. 27), on September 5, 2014, and the County Defendants
7
filed their Reply To Plaintiff’s Statement Of Additional Facts (docket no. 29), on
September 12, 2014.
I find that the issues raised in the County Defendants’ Motion For Summary
Judgment are appropriate for disposition without oral arguments. Furthermore, my
crowded schedule has not permitted the timely scheduling of oral arguments. Therefore,
I will deem the County Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment fully submitted on
the parties’ written submissions.
II.
A.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Standards For Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); see
generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, “[t]he movant
‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’
and must identify ‘those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d
1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In response,
“[t]he nonmovant ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts,’ and must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)).
8
When the parties have met their burden, the district judge’s task is as follows:
“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’” Ricci v.
DeStefano, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L. Ed.
2d 490 (2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380,
127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal
quotations omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000), quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). . . . . “‘Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677, quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43.
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Ryan v. Capital Contractors, Inc., 679
F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2012). However, summary judgment is particularly appropriate
when only questions of law are involved, rather than factual issues that may or may not
be subject to genuine dispute. See, e.g., Cremona v. R.S. Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d
617, 620 (8th Cir. 2006).
I will apply these standards here.
9
B.
1.
Absolute Judicial Immunity
Arguments of the parties
The principal argument that the County Defendants assert for summary judgment
in their favor on all, or nearly all, of Aguilera’s claims against them, both federal
constitutional claims and state law tort claims, is that the individual County Defendants
have absolute prosecutorial immunity to those claims. They argue that the record shows
beyond dispute that the individual County Defendants, both prosecutors, engaged only in
acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process against Aguilera
and that probable cause for Aguilera’s prosecution existed at every stage of their
involvement. Those two things being true, the County Defendants argue that case law
demonstrates that suit against the individual prosecutors for every kind of wrongdoing
alleged is barred by absolute immunity. The County Defendants also contend that
Aguilera’s challenges to the individual prosecutors’ motives and their compliance with
their ethical obligations does not defeat the prosecutors’ absolute immunity.
Furthermore, the County Defendants argue that the absolute immunity of the individual
County Defendants extends to Wright County.
In his resistance, Aguilera argues, first, that the United States Supreme Court’s
assumptions about the availability and the use of remedies other than civil liability for
wrongdoing of prosecutors were wrong, so that there is no need for common-law
immunity, and that such immunity “flies in the face” of the authorization of § 1983
claims. At a more concrete level, Aguilera argues that Poppen was, in fact, acting in his
“administrative” role when he established a policy of not providing investigative files to
criminal defendants without a court order and that such a policy violated the constitutional
obligations of prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence set out in Brady. He also
argues that Simonson acted as a “complaining witness” when he signed the Supplemental
10
Minutes of Testimony for his 2012 retrial, which Aguilera argues strips Simonson of
absolute immunity and provides him with, at most, qualified immunity.
2.
Analysis
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has succinctly explained,
“Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suits for damages
arising out of their official duties in initiating and pursuing
criminal prosecutions.” Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203,
1208 (8th Cir.1987) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). The defense may
be unavailable when a prosecutor performs functions outside
his role as an advocate. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993)
(explaining that when a prosecutor acts as an administrator or
“performs the investigative functions normally performed by
a detective or police officer,” the prosecutor is not entitled to
absolute immunity). Absolute immunity, however, covers
actions taken to initiate a prosecution, “even if those actions
are patently improper.” Williams, 827 F.2d at 1208.
Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838, 842-43 (8th Cir. 2013); accord Winslow v. Smith,
696 F.3d 716, 739 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Schenk v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th
Cir. 2006)). Thus, “‘[t]he question of whether absolute or qualified immunity applies
depends on whether the prosecutor’s acts were prosecutorial, investigatory or
administrative in nature.’” Winslow, 696 F.3d at 739 (quoting Schenk, 461 F.3d at
1046). Determining whether absolute prosecutorial immunity or only qualified immunity
is appropriate turns on “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor
who performed it.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269 (quotation marks omitted); Schenk, 461
F.3d at 1046. Also, “[absolute] [i]mmunity is not defeated by allegations of malice,
vindictiveness, or self-interest.” Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 580
(8th Cir. 2006) (citing Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated
on other grounds, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991)).
11
The Iowa Supreme Court has applied essentially identical principles of absolute
prosecutorial immunity to state-law claims. See, e.g., Burr v. City of Cedar Rapids, 286
N.W.2d 393, 394-96 (Iowa 1979); see also White v. Moulder, 30 F.3d 80, 83 (8th Cir.
1994) (“Iowa follows the [federal] functional approach to prosecutorial immunity” to
state-law tort claims); Braun v. Best, No. C97–1003, 1998 WL 887270, *3 (N.D. Iowa
March 26, 1998) (Melloy, J.) (so holding). Doing so is particularly appropriate where,
as here, the same conduct of the prosecutors is alleged to be the basis of Aguilera’s
federal constitutional claims brought pursuant to § 1983 and his state-law tort claims.
Moreover, the absolute immunity of the individual prosecutors also requires immunity of
Wright County. Id. at 396.
Here, Aguilera has not generated any genuine issues of material fact that individual
County Defendants Poppen and TeKippe had any involvement in Aguilera’s 1996
prosecution prior to the filing of the criminal complaints or that, if they did, that their
actions were unconstitutional.
Aguilera contends that individual County Defendant
Simonson acted as a “complaining witness” when he signed the Substituted Minutes Of
Testimony. Aguilera’s bald assertion to that effect is insufficient to generate a genuine
issue of material fact as to Simonson’s status or the nature of his conduct, however.
There can be no dispute that there is no oath or affirmation by Simonson in the Substituted
Trial Information or the Substituted Minutes of Testimony attesting to the truth of the
information therein comparable to an oath or affirmation attesting to the truth of facts in
an application for a search warrant. See County Defendants’ Appendix at 105-119; see
also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 509 (1997) (distinguishing between supporting an
application for an arrest warrant with an oath or affirmation of probable cause and merely
signing an unsworn statement of criminal charges, finding that the latter enjoys absolute
immunity); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between
vouching for the truth of affidavits presented to a judicial officer to obtain a search
12
warrant, which enjoys only qualified immunity, and merely presenting the testimony of
others, which enjoys absolute immunity).
Nor does Aguilera assert that individual
County Defendant Simonson acted unconstitutionally when he referred Aguilera’s case
to the Iowa Attorney General’s Office for determination of whether to retry Aguilera.
Once the charging documents were filed, Poppen, TeKippe, and Simonson were protected
by absolute immunity, and all of the claims against them arise from such charging or
post-charging conduct. Winslow, 696 F.3d at 739.
More specifically still, in Saterdalen, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly recognized that absolute prosecutorial immunity bars claims, like Aguilera’s,
that a criminal prosecution was instituted without probable cause:
Saterdalen contends that Spencer is not immune from
suit because no probable cause existed to support the warrant
for his arrest. Even if that were true, Spencer is nonetheless
entitled to absolute immunity because his acts in reviewing
and approving the complaint against Saterdalen were taken to
initiate the criminal prosecution. See Schenk v. Chavis, 461
F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir.2006) (“The acts of preparing,
signing, and filing a criminal complaint constitute
prosecutorial functions, as they are advocacy on behalf of the
government.”) (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129,
118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997)); see also Buckley,
509 U.S. at 274 n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (“The reason that we
grant [absolute immunity] for the latter function (malicious
prosecution) is that we have found a common-law tradition of
immunity for a prosecutor's decision to bring an indictment,
whether he has probable cause or not.” (parenthetical in
original)).
Saterdalen, 725 F.3d at 842-43 (footnote omitted) (noting that the prosecutor had not
vouched for a statement of probable cause in an arrest warrant simply by signing it).
13
Similarly, Aguilera’s claim that the County Defendants knowingly presented false,
misleading, or perjured testimony, or even that they withheld or suppressed exculpatory
evidence, are also barred by absolute immunity. See Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 580 (citing
Myers, 810 F.2d at 1446). Contrary to Aguilera’s assertion that the individual County
Defendants should be subjected to damages for the Brady violation found by the Iowa
Supreme Court, or the purpose of § 1983 is undermined, it is clear that a prosecutor has
absolute immunity from a damages claim under § 1983 for a Brady violation.
Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 580 (“Even if Goldman knowingly presented false, misleading,
or perjured testimony, or even if he withheld or suppressed exculpatory evidence, he is
absolutely immune from suit.”); Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“When acting in [an prosecutorial role], the prosecutor has absolute immunity from
Brady damage claims under § 1983.” (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431
n.34 (1976))).4
4
I find this case very disturbing. Were I writing on a clean slate, I would only
extend absolute immunity in circumstances where a Brady violation by a prosecutor was
both harmless and unintentional—that is, negligent or grossly negligent. On policy
grounds, however, I would find absolute immunity inapplicable where a prosecutor’s
conduct was intentional and so egregious that a court was compelled to reverse the
defendant’s conviction and order a new trial. There should be consequences for such
conduct, including both disciplinary action and civil liability. I recognize, however, that
the law is well settled that a Brady violation is protected by absolute immunity. I also
recognize that, in this case, there are genuine issues of material fact as to who,
specifically, failed to disclose the DCI file to Aguilera after the trial court ordered the
prosecution to do so and whether that failure was intentional. Aguilera argues that the
prosecutors have never been disciplined for the Brady violation found by the Iowa
Supreme Court, and the record does not show whether or not they have been. Thus, it
appears that, even if the egregious Brady violation in this case was by the prosecutors
and was intentional, the prosecutors have, at least thus far, escaped either liability or
censure.
14
Finally, “a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a civil conspiracy charge when
his alleged participation in the conspiracy consists of otherwise immune acts.” Id. at 580
(citing Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), and
Myers, 810 F.2d at 1446).
Thus, the County Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor on Aguilera’s “conspiracy” claims.
Again, because the individual County Defendants enjoy absolute immunity for the
claims against them, Wright County also enjoys such immunity to those claims. Burr,
286 N.W.2d at 396. Consequently, the County Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on all of Aguilera’s claims on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity.
C.
1.
Other Grounds For Summary
Judgment
Arguments of the parties.
In addition or in the alternative to their arguments based on absolute immunity,
the County Defendants contend that Aguilera’s “direct” claims against Wright County
fail, because respondeat superior liability is not available under state or federal law and
he has not demonstrated any factual basis for “Monell liability” for federal constitutional
claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The County Defendants also argue that
Aguilera has no viable Fifth Amendment due process claim, because the Fifth
Amendment is inapplicable against the states and, moreover, because adequate state law
remedies “scotch” Aguilera’s procedural due process claim as a matter of law. They
also argue that Aguilera’s substantive due process claim, if he is, indeed, attempting to
assert one, is actually governed by the Fourth Amendment; that his equal protection claim
fails as a matter of law, because reflections of generic societal racial animus are not
proper bases for such a claim; and that Aguilera cannot relitigate dismissal of claims
against the 2012 County Defendants, having lost on that issue on the State Defendants’
15
Motion To Dismiss, because he has not obtained a favorable outcome of his 2012 reprosecution.
Aguilera asserts that his “direct” claims against Wright County are viable, because
Wright County is obligated by IOWA CODE § 670.8 to indemnify county officers, such as
Poppen, TeKippe, and Simonson, for any tort claims or § 1983 claims. He also argues
that Wright County can be subjected to “Monell liability,” because of Poppen’s
unconstitutional policy of refusing to provide investigative files to criminal defendants
without a court order. Aguilera also argues that his due process claims against the County
Defendants are valid, because he has adequately pleaded loss of a liberty interest and
violation of that interest as a result of the County Defendants’ failure to turn over
exculpatory evidence. He argues that he has a viable substantive due process claim,
because the conduct of the County Defendants “shocks the conscience” and interfered
with his right to liberty. He does, however, concede that his equal protection claim is
“hampered,” which I take to mean foreclosed, by Eighth Circuit precedent cited by the
County Defendants. He also concedes that his lack of a “favorable outcome” for his
claims based on the 2012 re-prosecution bars those claims, although he appears to argue
that this should not be so, because a person, like him, who is not completely exonerated
has no other method to seek compensation for an unwarranted prosecution.
2.
Analysis
Each of these issues can be addressed quite briefly.
First, the County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Aguilera’s
“equal protection” claim, in light of Aguilera’s concession that Eighth Circuit precedent
precludes such a claim. See Jefferson v. City of Omaha Police Dep’t, 335 F.3d 804, 807
(8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “generic evidence that 44% of people arrested in his county
are black although black people represent only 11% of the population” was insufficient
to support an “equal protection” claim; what was required was evidence “that the law he
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was cited under was not enforced with the same vigor against persons of a different
race”).
Similarly, Aguilera concedes that his claims against County Defendant
Simonson, arising from the 2012 re-prosecution, are barred, because Aguilera has not
pleaded, nor could he plausibly plead, that he has obtained a “favorable termination” of
that prosecution. See Marlowe v. Fabian, 676 F.3d 743, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2012). Thus,
the County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
Next, even assuming—notwithstanding my very serious doubts on the issue—that
IOWA CODE § 670.8 could authorize a private cause of action against Wright County, the
language of the statute makes plain that there can be no basis for liability of a county if
there is no basis for liability of an individual county official. This is so, because § 670.8
provides only that a county must “indemnify the officers and employees against any tort
claim or demand.” IOWA CODE § 670.8 (emphasis added). Thus, the County Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on any direct claims against Wright County based on
§ 670.8.
Nor does respondeat superior or “Monell liability” provide a basis for any direct
claim against Wright County. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed both issues
succinctly, as follows:
Although the Supreme Court has “held that a municipality is
a ‘person’ that can be liable under § 1983,” it is well
established “that a municipality cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs
a tortfeasor.” Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minn., 486
F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir.2007) (citing Monell [v. Department
of Social Servs. of New York], 436 U.S. [658,] 690–91, 98
S.Ct. 2018 [(1978)]). Section 1983 liability for a
constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if the
violation resulted from (1) an “official municipal policy,”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; (2) an unofficial
“custom,” id. at 690–91, 98 S.Ct. 2018; or (3) a deliberately
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indifferent failure to train or supervise, see City of Canton,
Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103
L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013).
Aguilera has failed to generate any genuine issue of material fact, see Torgerson,
643 F.3d at 1042 (explaining the non-movant’s burden on summary judgment), that there
is any such “official municipal policy,” unofficial “custom,” or “deliberately indifferent
failure to train or supervise” by Wright County that resulted in his injuries. Atkinson,
709 F.3d at 1214. Aguilera cites Poppen’s policy of not providing DCI files unless
required to do so by a court order, whether or not those files contain Brady material, as
a policy on which Wright County’s liability can hang. This policy indisputably did not
result in any injury to Aguilera, however, because a court order was issued compelling
production of the DCI file. As a matter of law, any injury to Aguilera resulted from the
failure of the County Defendants (or someone else) to produce the DCI file and the Brady
material that it contained, notwithstanding a court order to produce the file, not from
Poppen’s policy of requiring a court order before producing the file.
Finally, Aguilera has no viable “substantive due process” claim against Wright
County (or any other County Defendant), assuming that he is attempting to assert such a
claim.
Aguilera is not wrong that a claim of violation of Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process requires proof that “a defendant’s conduct ‘shocks the conscience
or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ or ‘offends judicial
notions of fairness,’ or is ‘offensive to human dignity,’ or is taken with ‘deliberate
indifference’ to protected rights.” Anderson v. Larson, 327 F.3d 762, 769 (quoting
Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998)). Where his substantive due
process claim fails is, instead, that the basis for his “substantive due process” claim is
the same conduct that he alleges underlies his other claims, and he has cited no authority
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for the proposition that absolute immunity for claims based on such conduct does not
extend to a substantive due process claim. See Winslow, 696 F.3d at 739 (holding that,
even though the plaintiff had a viable substantive due process claim, one defendant
prosecutor had absolute immunity to that claim). Thus, the County Defendants are also
entitled to summary judgment on Aguilera’s substantive due process claim.
III.
CONCLUSION
Aguilera’s claims against the County Defendants fail, as a matter of law, either
because the individual County Defendants and Wright County are entitled to absolute
immunity from those claims, or because the claims are otherwise fatally flawed. That
being so, the County Defendants’ August 4, 2014, Motion For Summary Judgment
(docket no. 24) is granted as to all of plaintiff Aguilera’s claims against them.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2014.
______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
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