Foster v. Anderson et al
Filing
16
ORDER granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Judgment shall enter against the plaintiff. Signed by Judge Leonard T Strand on 2/29/2016. (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
AZZEL MICKEY LEE FOSTER,
Plaintiff,
No. C14-3043-LTS
vs.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
DR. ARNOLD ANDERSON and
BRADLEY KINTE,
Defendants.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Azzel Mickey Lee Foster, previously committed to the care and custody
of the Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC), commenced this lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on July 22, 2014, by filing a pro se motion (Doc. No. 1) for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. After the motion was granted, his pro se complaint (Doc.
No. 3) was filed on October 31, 2014.
On the same date, attorney Hannah Vellinga was appointed to represent Foster.
She filed an appearance (Doc. No. 4) and an amended complaint (Doc. No. 5) on
December 15, 2015.
The amended complaint names two defendants, Dr. Arnold
Andersen and Bradley Kintigh,1 and asserts that while Foster was in DOC custody, the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need and provided
inadequate medical care. Foster seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as
attorney fees and other relief.
1
The case caption for this matter reflects the spellings of the defendants’ last names as they
appeared in plaintiff’s filings. Based on defendants’ own filings, however, both spellings are
incorrect. While the caption has not been changed, I will use the correct spellings in this order.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment (Doc. No. 14). Foster has
not filed a timely resistance. No party has requested oral argument and, in any event, I
find that oral argument is not necessary. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 7(c). The motion is fully
submitted and ready for decision.
II.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
I find the facts set forth below to be undisputed for purposes of defendants’ motion
for summary judgment:2
The Parties. During the events that gave rise to this action, Foster was an inmate
at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility (FDCF) in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Foster has since
been released and is no longer in the care and custody of the DOC.
Dr. Arnold
Andersen is a psychiatrist for the DOC. Bradley Kintigh is a correctional officer at the
FDCF.
Relevant Events. Foster began serving a two-year sentence on January 23, 2014.
During this sentence, Foster spent time at the FDCF from March 4, 2014, until October
22, 2014.
On May 30, 2014, Foster was taken to health services on two separate
occasions for complaints of dizziness, headaches and blurred vision. The complaint
alleges, among other things, that Kintigh “almost banged [Foster’s] knee on the entrance
of the doorway” while transporting Foster to health services. During both visits, Foster
was attended to by nurse staff.
The FDCF maintains written grievance procedures through which inmates may
seek the resolution of complaints and issues. On May 30, 2014, Foster submitted a
grievance concerning “poor medical treatment and poor assistance to someone in need of
The majority of these facts are deemed undisputed by operation of Local Rule 56(b), which
provides that “[t]he failure to respond, with appropriate citations to the appendix, to an individual
statement of material fact constitutes an admission of that fact.” N.D. Ia. L.R. 56(b). As
Foster failed to file a response to the motion, all material facts set forth by defendants are deemed
to have been admitted.
2
2
emergency.” Grievance Officer Dawn Fulton responded to the grievance in writing.
While the grievance procedures include an appeals process, Foster did not appeal the
initial response.
Thus, he did not exhaust all available administrative procedures.
Additionally, the medical care provided to Foster by nurse staff and Dr. Andersen was
timely and met all medical standards.
III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims
asserted in a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when
“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A material fact is one that “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus,
“the substantive law will identify which facts are material.”
Id.
Facts that are
“critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or
unnecessary” are not.
Id.
An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel
v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the question,” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Evidence that only provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,”
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly
probative,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact
genuine.
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As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting
the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
The party
moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show
a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond
the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d
910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and
material as it relates to the substantive law.
If a party fails to make a sufficient showing
of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the
burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587-88.
Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, “because we view the facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or
attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo &
Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, “the court's function is to determine
whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine.”
F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996).
IV.
ANALYSIS
4
Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90
The amended complaint alleges that defendants denied adequate medical care and
were deliberately indifferent to Foster’s serious medical need. In moving for summary
judgment, defendants argue (a) that they did not violate Foster’s Eighth Amendment
rights, (b) that his claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (c) that they are entitled
to qualified immunity and (d) that the claims against Kintigh are barred by 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e).
A.
Foster’s Failure to Respond to the Motion
As noted above, Foster failed – despite being represented by counsel – to resist
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Nor did Foster request an extension of the
resistance deadline or take any other action concerning the motion. Foster’s resistance
deadline expired over five months ago, meaning Foster had ample opportunity to respond.
Ignoring the motion was poor practice.3
Because no response has been filed, defendants' motion may be granted without
further notice. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 7(f) (“If no timely resistance to a motion is filed, the
motion may be granted without notice.”); N.D. Ia. L.R. 56(c) (“If no timely resistance
to a motion for summary judgment is filed, the motion may be granted without prior
notice from the court....”). Nonetheless, I must consider the merits of the motion to
determine whether defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Maxwell v.
Linn County Correctional Center, 310 Fed. Appx. 49, 49-50 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing
Johnson v. Boyd-Richardson Co., 650 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding a court has
the “duty to inquire into the merits of [a summary judgment] motion and to grant or deny
it, as the case may be, in accordance with law and the relevant facts” when a party fails
3
If Foster’s counsel evaluated the motion and concluded that no good faith basis existed to resist
the requested relief, some notice to the court would have been appreciated. See N.D. Ia. L.R.
7(f), 56(c).
5
to comply with local rules deadlines); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a party fails to properly
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact
as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of
the motion, ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—
including facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to relief ... or ...
issue any other appropriate order”). As such, I will address the merits of defendants’
arguments.
B.
Foster’s Deliberate Indifference Claim
1.
Applicable Standards
Deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 828 (1994). To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, an inmate must show
“that (1) the inmate suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) the prison
official knew of the need yet deliberately disregarded it.”
Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d
905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)).
Under the first requirement, an objectively serious medical need is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a
layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Camberos v.
Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349,
351 (8th Cir. 1991)).
Under the second requirement, an official is deliberately indifferent “if he or she
actually knows of the substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably to it.” Young v.
Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007). “Although the level of blameworthiness must
rise above negligence, a plaintiff does not have to show that the prison officials acted ‘for
the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm w[ould] result.’”
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Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
835). Similarly, a claimant’s “mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise
to the level of constitutional violation.”
Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995)).
The claim that an officer deliberately disregarded a risk is evaluated “in light of the
information he possessed at the time, the practical limitations of his position and
alternative courses of action that would have been apparent to an official in that position.”
Letterman, 789 F.3d at 862 (quoting Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir.
2000)).
2.
Analysis
a.
Did Foster have an objectively serious medical need?
In all claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the inmate must
exhibit a serious medical need that (a) had “been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment” or (b) was “so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Camberos, 73 F.3d at 176. As there is no evidence
that Foster’s medical complaints had previously “been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment” while he was incarcerated, the question is whether the injury was
“so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.”
Id.
Here, Foster’s medical needs concern dizziness, headaches and blurred vision.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Foster – as I must – I will assume that
he exhibited a serious medical need and move on to the issue of whether the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to that need.
b.
Were defendants deliberately indifferent?
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Foster alleges that Kintigh was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need
by taking ten minutes to respond to his emergency distress call. The defendants contend
that Kintigh responded in a timely fashion and was not deliberately indifferent to Foster’s
medical needs.
At the outset, a claim of deliberate indifference is precluded if the record does not
contain any verifying medical evidence that a delay resulted in a detrimental effect.
Coleman, 114 F.3d at 785 (citing Crowley v. Hedgepeth, 109 F.3d 500, 502 (8th Cir.
1997)).
Inmates who “alleg[e] a delay in treatment must present verifying medical
evidence that the prison officials ignored an acute or escalating situation or that [these]
delays adversely affected his prognosis.” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the record contains no evidence
that the alleged ten-minute delay resulted in a detrimental effect. As a matter of law,
then, that delay did not constitute deliberate indifference.
Additionally, Foster alleges that Dr. Andersen was deliberately indifferent by
providing inadequate medical care.
Specifically, Foster alleges that Dr. Andersen
prescribed medication that caused partial blindness.
Doc. No. 5 at 2.
“Deliberate
indifference may be found where ‘medical care [is] so inappropriate as to evidence
intentional maltreatment.’”
Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th
Cir. 2014) (citing Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1990)). The only evidence
in the record concerning Dr. Andersen’s care comes from Nurse Jana Hacker, who states
by affidavit that Dr. Andersen’s care was appropriate, timely and met all medical
standards.
As the record contains no evidence that Dr. Andersen’s care was so
inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment, I cannot find deliberate
indifference on Dr. Andersen’s part. Defendants are entitled to entry of judgment in
their favor as a matter of law on the merits of Foster’s Eighth Amendment claim.
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C.
Administrative Exhaustion
Defendants also argue that Foster failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to bringing claims in this court. They note that the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) requires Foster to utilize the prison grievance and appeals process prior to filing
claims in district court.
I agree, and find that this is an alternative reason to grant
defendants’ motion.
“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions ... by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (stating that “exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a)
is now mandatory”); Washington v. Uner, 273 Fed. Appx. 575, 576–77 (8th Cir. 2008)
(applying § 1997e(a)). Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary so
that corrections officials are afforded the “‘time and opportunity to address complaints
internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.’”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 93 (2006) (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 525). While exhaustion is an affirmative
defense that a defendant bears the burden of proving, a court may raise the issue of
exhaustion sua sponte if it is plain on the face of the complaint that a grievance procedure
is unexhausted. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214–16 (2007) (clarifying that a
complaint cannot be dismissed sua sponte for failing to plead and prove exhaustion but
failure to exhaust can be a basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations
in the complaint suffice to establish that ground).
Defendants contend that Foster failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
because he did not complete all of the available grievance procedures for his complaint.
Specifically, they note that Foster failed to appeal the initial response to his grievance.
As Foster makes no argument to the contrary and the record contains no information that
Foster exhausted the administrative process, I find that Foster failed, as a matter of law,
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to exhaust his administrative remedies. This provides an alternative basis for grating
defendants’ motion.
D.
Qualified Immunity
As another alternative argument, defendants contend that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability
in a [section] 1983 claim unless his or her conduct violated a clearly established statutory
or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Vaughn v.
Greene County, Ark., 438 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pool, 418 F.3d at
942). “To overcome qualified immunity, plaintiffs must demonstrate both that ‘(1) there
was a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly
established at the time of the deprivation.’”
Davis v. County of Gabe, Nebraska, 807
F.3d 931, 936 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Parker v. Chard, 777 F.3d 977, 980 (8th Cir.
2015)).
Here, I have already determined that Foster failed to establish that any
defendant violated his constitutional rights.
As such, the qualified immunity doctrine
provides yet another basis for granting defendants’ motion.4
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 14) for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 14) is granted with regard to all claims. This action is hereby
dismissed with prejudice. Judgment shall enter against the plaintiff.
4
Because I have found that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims, I need
not address their argument that any claim for mental or emotional injury is barred by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 29th day of February, 2016.
________________________________
LEONARD T. STRAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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