Doss v. Department of Corrections et al
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Accepting 30 Report and Recommendation. The defendants' 21 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, as to all claims in Doss's December 30, 2014, Pro Se Complaint (docket no. 1 ) and March 16, 2015, Amended Complaint (docket no. 12 ). The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 01/13/2016. (src)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
KENNETH L. DOSS,
No. C 14-3084-MWB
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES McKINNEY, JANA HACKER,
KAREN ANDERSON, DAWN
FULTON, DON HARRIS, LESLIE
WAGERS, and MIKE STANTON,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants.
___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 2
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 3
A.
Standard Of Review ................................................................ 3
B.
Standards For Summary Judgment ............................................. 5
C.
Doss’s Deliberate Indifference Claim ........................................... 6
1.
Applicable standards ....................................................... 6
2.
The objection to the deliberate indifference
conclusion ................................................................... 7
3.
The objection to the characterization of the claim ................... 9
D.
Doss’s Retaliation Claim ........................................................ 11
1.
Applicable standards ..................................................... 11
2.
The objection to the causation determination ....................... 12
III.
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 14
I.
INTRODUCTION
In this case, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Kenneth L. Doss alleges that
the defendants, who are associated with the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC),
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs regarding his hand, back, and
shoulder while he was incarcerated at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility (FDCF) in
Fort Dodge, Iowa. Doss also alleges that the defendants retaliated against him for filing
this case.1 On June 16, 2015, the defendants filed a Motion For Summary Judgment
(docket no. 21), to which Doss filed a Resistance (docket no. 28) on August 12, 2015.
On September 4, 2015, I referred this case, including the pending Motion For Summary
Judgment, to United States Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B).
On November 4, 2015, Judge Strand filed a Report And
Recommendation (docket no. 30) that the defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment be
granted, that this case be dismissed with prejudice, and that judgment be entered
accordingly.
This case is now before me on Doss’s November 18, 2015, Objections To
Magistrate Judge’s Report And Recommendation (docket no. 31). Doss objects to the
following conclusions by Judge Strand: (1) that Doss did not show that the defendants
were “deliberately indifferent” to his serious medical needs; (2) that Doss’s sole
complaint of “deliberate indifference” was that he was not seen by medical staff as
quickly or as often as he desired; and (3) that Doss failed to show that he was retaliated
against for engaging in protected activity. Thus, Doss argues that I should deny the
defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment. On November 30, 2015, the defendants
filed a Response To Objections To Report And Recommendation (docket no. 32),
asserting that Doss’s Objections should be overruled and that their Motion For Summary
1
Doss was represented by court-appointed counsel in these proceedings.
2
Judgment should be granted, because Judge Strand properly decided the challenged
issues.
II.
A.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Standard Of Review
The applicable statute expressly provides for de novo review by a district judge of
a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation when objections are made, as follows:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added); see FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) (stating
identical requirements); N.D. IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive
matters to a magistrate judge but not articulating any standards to review the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation).
Thus, “[a]ny party that desires plenary
consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask.” Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 154 (1985). In other words, the specific standard of review depends, in the
first instance, upon whether or not a party has objected to portions of the report and
recommendation. In most cases, to trigger de novo review, “objections must be timely
and specific.” Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1990).2 The statutory
2
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been willing to “liberally construe[]”
otherwise general pro se objections to require a de novo review of all “alleged errors,”
see Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995), and has also been willing to
conclude that general objections require “full de novo review” if the record is concise,
Belk, 15 F.3d at 815 (“Therefore, even had petitioner’s objections lacked specificity, a
de novo review would still have been appropriate given such a concise record.”). Here,
3
standard does not preclude de novo review by the district court in other circumstances,
however. Rather, “while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de
novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge,
sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.” Id.3
When objections have been made, and the magistrate judge’s report is based upon
an evidentiary hearing, “‘the district court must, at a minimum, listen to a tape recording
or read a transcript of the evidentiary hearing.’” United States v. Azure, 539 F.3d 904,
910 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jones v. Pillow, 47 F.3d 251, 252 (8th Cir. 1995), in turn
quoting Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989)). Judge Strand did not
Doss is represented by counsel, so the first basis for liberal construction does not apply.
Although counsel framed Doss’s objections quite generally, I conclude that the question
is whether counsel has identified with sufficient specificity the bases for those objections
for me to determine whether those objections have any merit. This framing of the
question is also consistent with the obligations of a non-movant to cite portions of the
record that demonstrate that there are genuine issues of material fact in order to preclude
summary judgment. See generally, infra.
3
In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required “to give any more
consideration to the magistrate’s report than the court considers appropriate.” Thomas,
474 U.S. at 150; see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991) (stating that
§ 636(b)(1) “provide[s] for de novo review only when a party objected to the magistrate’s
findings or recommendations” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ewing, 632 F.3d 412,
415 (8th Cir. 2011) (“By failing to file objections, Ewing waived his right to de novo
review [of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on a suppression motion] by
the district court.”). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated, however, that
a district court should review the portions of a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation to which no objections have been made under a “clearly erroneous”
standard of review. See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting
that, when no objections are filed and the time for filing objections has expired, “[the
district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for
clear error”); Taylor v. Farrier, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Advisory Committee’s Note to FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) indicates “when no timely objection
is filed the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
record”).
4
hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment or hear
oral arguments on the merits of the Motion. Rather, he considered only the parties’
written submissions, and I have done the same.
B.
Standards For Summary Judgment
In this case, where I am reviewing objections to a report and recommendation on
a motion for summary judgment, the standards against which I must consider objections
include the standards for summary judgment. Summary judgment is only appropriate
when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)
(emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.
2005) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); see generally Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
Thus, “[t]he movant ‘bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’ and must identify
‘those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.’” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In response, “[t]he nonmovant ‘must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’
and must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586–87 (1986)).
When the parties have met their burden, the district judge’s task is as follows:
“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’” Ricci v.
5
DeStefano, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L.
Ed. 2d 490 (2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal
quotations omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000), quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). . . . . “‘Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677, quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Ryan v. Capital
Contractors, Inc., 679 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2012). Also, summary judgment is
particularly appropriate when only questions of law are involved, rather than factual
issues that may or may not be subject to genuine dispute. See, e.g., Cremona v. R.S.
Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2006).
I will review Judge Strand’s Report And Recommendation with these standards in
mind.
C.
1.
Doss’s Deliberate Indifference Claim
Applicable standards
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently concisely stated the “governing law”
for Doss’s “deliberate indifference” claim, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (explaining
that only genuine issues of material fact “under the governing law” will prevent summary
judgment), as follows:
6
“A prima facie case alleging ... deliberate indifference
requires the inmate-plaintiff to demonstrate that [s]he suffered
from an objectively serious medical need and that prison
officials actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, that
need.” Meuir v. Greene Cty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118
(8th Cir.2007) (citing Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234,
1239 (8th Cir.1997)). . . . [An inmate’s] disagreement with
[prison medical staffs’] diagnoses and treatment decisions is
not actionable under § 1983. See Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239
(holding that prison doctors remain free to exercise
independent medical judgment and that inmates have no
constitutional right to their requested course of
treatment). . . .
Reid v. Griffin, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 9239134, *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015);
accord Fourte v. Faulkner Cty., Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that
establishing deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, an objectively serious medical need; even gross negligence does
not establish deliberate indifference); Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir.
2010) (explaining that an inmate’s mere difference of opinion over matters of expert
medical judgment or the course of medical treatment do not amount to a constitutional
violation); Popoalii v. Correctional Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir.2008)
(explaining that deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness). Upon de novo
review, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154, even in light of
Doss’s objections, I agree with Judge Strand that Doss has not met these requirements as
a matter of law.
2.
The objection to the deliberate indifference conclusion
Doss’s first objection is that Judge Strand erred in concluding that he did not show
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Doss
provides somewhat more specificity to this objection by pointing out that, while the
defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment was pending, he was released from
7
incarceration and transferred to a home in Council Bluffs, Iowa. He explains that, while
there, he was able to see a specialist in hand injury treatment who determined that he
needed surgery on his hand as soon as possible. Specifically, the specialist found that xrays he had ordered showed a “chronic 5th metacarpal fracture” that had healed, but was
causing pain, a “small finger PIP joint volar plate rupture causing subluxation of the joint
and pain,” and “carpal tunnel syndrome,” all on the right hand that is the focus of Doss’s
“deliberate indifference” claim. See Plaintiff’s Objections, Exhibit A (docket no. 31-1),
1. Doss argues that the new examination and records from the specialist support his
claim that the defendants did not provide adequate care to his injuries and that his injuries
were, in fact, exacerbated by their lack of care. Doss contends that the treatment that he
received from the defendants, including x-rays, ice, Ibuprofen, and a splint, over the
course of numerous meetings, on which Judge Strand focused, do nothing to demonstrate
that his care was adequate. Doss also argues that Judge Strand gave excessive weight to
the fact that he was seen multiple times by IDOC medical staff, because many of the
notes show that he was not actually seen by medical staff and that some of the visits were
actually for his back and shoulder, not his hand. Doss contends that medical staff often
simply responded to kites and requests for care without doing any further examinations.
Strangely, Doss made no attempt to present the additional medical records from
the specialist in response to the defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment, even though
he acknowledges, and the records in question show, that those records were developed
while the defendants’ Motion was pending. Although I clearly have the power to “receive
further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions,” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006), I would certainly not need to do so in the circumstances
presented, here. Doss should have been under no illusions that he was required to submit
all relevant evidence in support of his resistance to summary judgment before the court
ruled and that, if necessary, he could have asked to supplement the record and his
resistance to summary judgment with new evidence while the summary judgment motion
8
was pending. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (d); N.D. IA. L.R. 56(b) and (h).
Thus, Doss’s submission of “new” evidence to support his “deliberate indifference”
claim is untimely.
Yet, even if I consider Doss’s “new” evidence, it does not generate any genuine
issues of material fact on Doss’s “deliberate indifference” claim. Such “new” evidence
does nothing to demonstrate that “‘prison officials actually knew of, but deliberately
disregarded,’” his need for more extensive treatment of his hand injury. See Reid, ___
F.3d at ___, 2015 WL 9239134 at *1. As in Reid, prison medical staff had made
numerous evaluations of Doss’s hand and other injuries, including taking x-rays, but
before Doss’s specialist diagnosed the problems that the specialist has now found, no
medical professional had suggested that more extensive examination or treatment was
required. Id. Doss’s “disagreement with [the prison medical staff’s] diagnoses and
treatment decisions is not actionable under § 1983,” id., particularly where there is no
showing of a gross deviation from professional standards in the care that was provided,
in light of what was known to the defendants. See Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 772
(8th Cir. 2015); see also Fourte, 746 F.3d at 387 (explaining that establishing deliberate
indifference requires a showing that the defendants knew of, but deliberately disregarded,
an objectively serious medical need; even gross negligence does not establish deliberate
indifference). Doss’s first objection is overruled.
3.
The objection to the characterization of the claim
Doss’s second objection is that Judge Strand erred in concluding that his sole
complaint of “deliberate indifference” was that he was not seen by medical staff as
quickly or as often as he desired. The pertinent part of Judge Strand’s Report And
Recommendation, cited by Doss, states the following:
Here, Doss was seen just days after his initial complaint
concerning his hand, had the hand rechecked on four
occasions over the course of a week, was referred to the nurse
practitioner and ultimately had a negative x-ray. The delay
9
between his initial injury and first seeing a nurse was minor
and the delay between the injury and an x-ray did not rise to
the level of deliberate indifference. Additionally Doss makes
no claim that the delay affected his prognosis or escalated the
situation. Rather, Doss’ sole complaint seems to be that he
was not seen as quickly or as often as he desired.
Report And Recommendation at 9. Judge Strand went on to recount further injuries to
Doss’s hand and further treatment, then observed,
Moreover, again, Doss has presented no evidence that the
failure to order an x-ray after this injury affected his prognosis
or enhanced his injury. Rather, Doss’ sole complaint seems
to be that he was not seen as quickly or as often as he desired.
Report And Recommendation at 9.
Doss argues that he has marshaled sufficient evidence to support a “deliberate
indifference” claim, not just disagreement with the timing and frequency of treatment.
He argues that he has pointed to evidence that he requested medical care for his hand
numerous times, but he was not treated “accordingly,” where he did not receive
appropriate treatment and, at times, was not even seen by a medical staff member in
response to his complaints.
He contends that the fact that the defendants did not
completely “ignore” his medical needs does not mean that the defendants were not
“deliberately indifferent.”
I am not persuaded that, on the record before him, Judge Strand erroneously
characterized Doss’s factual contentions when he observed that Doss’s complaint seemed
to be that he was not seen as quickly or as often as he desired. Again, it is only now, in
support of his Objections, that Doss has even attempted to show that the medical treatment
that the defendants provided was somehow inadequate, as opposed to less speedy, less
frequent, or less effective than Doss desired.
Moreover, upon de novo review, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); Thomas, 474
U.S. at 154, I conclude that the crux of Doss’s claim is that he did not get the treatment
10
that he thinks he should have. Again, Doss still has not pointed to any evidence that
before Doss’s specialist diagnosed the problems that the specialist has now found, any
medical professional had suggested that more extensive examination or treatment was
required. See Reid, ___ F.3d at ___, 2015 WL 9239134 at *1. Doss still has not pointed
to any evidence showing a gross deviation from professional standards in the care that
was provided, in light of what was known to the defendants. See Allard, 779 F.3d at
772; see also Fourte, 746 F.3d at 387 (explaining that establishing deliberate indifference
requires a showing that the defendants knew of, but deliberately disregarded, an
objectively serious medical need; even gross negligence does not establish deliberate
indifference).
Doss’s “disagreement with [prison medical staffs’] diagnoses and
treatment decisions is not actionable under § 1983.” Reid, ___ F.3d at ___, 2015 WL
9239134 at *1. Doss’s second objection is overruled.
D.
1.
Doss’s Retaliation Claim
Applicable standards
Doss’s remaining claim is that he was retaliated against for engaging in protected
activity. As the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
In order to demonstrate retaliation in violation of the
First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [an inmate] must
“show (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the
government official took adverse action against him that
would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in
the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least
in part by the exercise of the protected activity.” Revels v.
Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir.2004) (citing Naucke v.
City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927–28 (8th Cir.2002)).
Spencer v. Jackson Cty., Mo., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013). Where, as here, the
inmate alleges that the retaliation, at least in part, took the form of prison discipline for
rules violations, the defendants may successfully defend by showing that there was “some
11
evidence” that the inmate actually committed a rule violation warranting discipline. See
Sanders v. Hobbs, 773 F.3d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 2014); but see Spencer, 738 F.3d at 911
(where the retaliation alleged is not retaliatory prison discipline, the “some evidence”
standard does not apply). Similarly, where, as here, an inmate alleges that the retaliation,
at least in part, took the form of a retaliatory transfer to another facility, the inmate must
show that “but for” impermissible retaliation, he would not have been transferred. See
Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737-38 (8th Cir. 1993).
2.
The objection to the causation determination
Doss’s objection to Judge Strand’s recommendation concerning this claim is that
Judge Strand erred in concluding that he had failed to show that he was retaliated against
for engaging in protected activity. Doss argues that Judge Strand concluded that he was
disciplined and transferred for recent disciplinary violations. In his Objections, Doss
does not dispute his history of prison rules violations or that there was at least “some
evidence” supporting each of the determinations of rules violations. See Sanders, 773
F.3d at 190. What he does argue is that the records show that the processing of his
transfer was completed on a Sunday, but the staff required to complete this paperwork
ordinarily was not present over the weekends, so that there must be some error in the
records.
He contends that this disputed fact precludes summary judgment on his
“retaliation” claim. I disagree.
To preclude summary judgment, Doss must point to “disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Here, Doss must show that, “but for” impermissible retaliation, he would not have been
transferred. See Goff, 7 F.3d at 737-38. When his transfer paperwork was signed does
not even remotely suggest impermissible retaliation, where Doss does not dispute the
evidence identified by Judge Strand in his Report And Recommendation as showing that
the transfer was based on Doss’s disciplinary problems.
Specifically, Judge Strand observed,
12
On February 15, 2015, FDCF staff prepared an offender
transfer request, recommending that Doss be sent to the
Anamosa State Penitentiary (ASP) due to his ongoing
behavior. The request noted that since arriving at FDCF,
“Doss has received four major reports and is currently
awaiting a decision on his fifth.” The document also
referenced Doss’ history of inappropriate behavior toward
female staff and noted that the pending report was based on
alleged threats to a female staff member. The transfer request
was approved by the Iowa Department of Corrections on
February 19, 2015.
Report And Recommendation at 4. Judge Strand also observed,
Other than mere timing, Doss has offered no evidence
that would allow a finding that the defendants acted with a
retaliatory motive. It is undisputed that Doss was charged
with, and ultimately found guilty of, multiple violations while
incarcerated at FDCF. While Doss denies some or all of the
charged conduct, he was determined to be guilty by
administrative law judges, not by any of the defendants. See
Doc. No. 21-3 at 49-50, 54, 57-58, 60-62. The offenses
included sexual misconduct, obstructive/disruptive conduct,
verbal abuse, and disobeying orders and directions. See, e.g.,
id. at 48-50, 53-54. In addition to these fully-adjudicated
violations, Doss was placed in segregation again on February
4, 2015, based on allegations that he (1) attempted to get
personal information about staff members, (2) became
disruptive with FDCF staff and (3) ran from an FDCF officer.
Id. at 65. FDCF initiated its transfer request after the
February 4 incident.
Clearly, the defendants had more than “some
evidence” that Doss actually committed rule violations. He
had been found guilty of multiple violations in four separate
proceedings and a fifth proceeding was about to commence.
In contrast to these undisputed facts, Doss points to no
evidence suggesting that any of the defendants were motivated
13
by this lawsuit, rather than by his habitual pattern of
misconduct.
Report And Recommendation at 12 (emphasis added). Upon de novo review, see 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154, I agree wholeheartedly with Judge
Strand’s analysis. Doss’s failure to point to any evidence that, “but for” retaliatory
animus, he would not have been transferred, is fatal to Doss’s last objection and to his
“retaliation” claim. See Goff, 7 F.3d at 737-38. Consequently, Doss’s last objection is
also overruled.
III.
CONCLUSION
Upon the foregoing:
1.
Doss’s November 18, 2015, Objections To Magistrate Judge’s Report And
Recommendation (docket no. 31) are overruled, in their entirety;
2.
Judge Strand’s November 4, 2015, Report And Recommendation (docket
no. 30) is accepted, without modification;
3.
The defendants’ June 16, 2015, Motion For Summary Judgment (docket
no. 21) is granted, as to all claims in Doss’s December 30, 2014, Pro Se Complaint
(docket no. 1) and March 16, 2015, Amended Complaint (docket no. 12); and
4.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2016.
______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
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