Baldwin v. Estherville, Iowa et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 21 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Baldwin's claims of a federal constitutional violation in Count II and state law false arrest in Count IV; Denying in part and staying in part 27 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See order text for details. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 11/18/2016. (src)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
GREGORY BALDWIN,
No. C 15-3168-MWB
Plaintiff,
vs.
ESTHERVILLE, IOWA; MATT
REINEKE, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as an Officer of the
Estherville Police Department; and
MATT HELLICKSON, Individually and
in his Official Capacity as an Officer of
the Estherville Police Department,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING THE
PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 2 
A. 
Factual Background ............................................................... 2 
1. 
The parties ................................................................... 3 
2. 
The pertinent City ordinances............................................ 3 
3. 
Baldwin’s pre-incident operation of ATVs in the City .............. 6 
4. 
The incidents giving rise to Baldwin’s claims......................... 7 
B. 
Procedural Background ......................................................... 10 

II. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 12 
A. 
Standards For Summary Judgment ........................................... 12 
B. 
The Iowa Constitutional Claims ............................................... 14 
1. 
Arguments of the parties ................................................ 14 
2. 
Analysis .................................................................... 14 
C. 
The Federal Constitutional Claim ............................................. 15 
1. 
Arguments of the parties ................................................ 16 
2. 
Analysis .................................................................... 17 
a. 
Mere negligence .................................................. 17 
b. 
Existence of a constitutional violation ....................... 19 

D. 
III. 

Qualified immunity .............................................. 24 
c. 
The State Law False Arrest Claim ............................................. 28 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 28 

Did the defendant city police officers violate the plaintiff’s rights under the United
States and Iowa constitutions and commit the common-law tort of false arrest when they
arrested the plaintiff for riding his ATV on and in a ditch beside a city street, allegedly
in violation of a state statute that the officers believed had been, but was not, incorporated
into the city’s code of ordinances? The defendants—the city and the police officers—
have moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims of violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and false arrest. The plaintiff has
cross-moved for partial summary judgment on liability on all of his claims, which would
leave only damages issues for trial.
I.
A.

INTRODUCTION
Factual Background

This statement of the factual background does not necessarily include all of the
parties’ factual allegations and disputes, nor is it necessarily cast in precisely the terms
used by the parties. Rather, it focuses on the key facts to put the parties’ disputes in
context, stated and rearranged as I deemed appropriate. Unless otherwise indicated, the
following facts are undisputed.
2

1.

The parties

Plaintiff Greg Baldwin has lived in defendant Estherville, Iowa, (the City) at the
same address, for approximately 25 years. Defendant Matt Reineke has been employed
by the City as a police officer since 1999. Defendant Matt Hellickson has been employed
by the City as a police officer since 2007. This case arises from a citation of Baldwin by
Officer Reineke for improper operation of his ATV in the City on November 10, 2013,
for which Officer Hellickson arrested Baldwin on November 13, 2013.
2.

The pertinent City ordinances

This case involves numerous provisions that were, or that were believed to be,
part of the City’s Code of Ordinances. Specifically, on March 17, 1980, the City passed
Ordinance No. 429, which amended its Code of Ordinances, Title II (“Community
Protection”), Division 1 (“Law Enforcement”), to add Chapter 7 (“Supplemental
Estherville Traffic Code”). Defendants’ Appendix at 6-7. Chapter 7 included newlycreated Ordinance E-321.1, which provided, as follows:
E-321.1 OFFENSES. All sections of the state statutory law,
rules of the road, Chapter 321 of the Code of Iowa the offense
of which constitutes a simple misdemeanor, are hereby
adopted and incorporated by this reference the same as if set
forth in full herein into the Code of Ordinances of the City of
Estherville, Iowa, and the violation of such applicable state
statutory laws of the road shall be a violation of this chapter
if the offense occurs within the territorial city limits of the
City of Estherville.
Defendants’ Appendix at 8. Newly-adopted Ordinance E-321.2 provided, in pertinent
part, as follows:
E-321.2 CITING OFFENSES. Citations issued under this
chapter shall bear the prefix letter “E” and the applicable
corresponding state statutory section of Chapter 321 of the
Code of Iowa.
3

Defendants’ Appendix at 8.
IOWA CODE § 321.234A(1)(f), which the parties agree was incorporated into the
City’s Code of Ordinances by new Chapter 7, provides as follows:
All-terrain vehicles shall not be operated on a highway unless
one or more of the following conditions apply:
***
f.

The all-terrain vehicle is operated on a county
roadway in accordance with section 321I.10,
subsection 2, or a city street in accordance with
section 321I.10, subsection 3.

Defendants’ Appendix at 11.

The subsections of § 321I.10 cross-referenced in

§ 321.234A(1)(f) provide as follows:
2. A registered all-terrain vehicle or off-road utility vehicle
may be operated on the roadways of that portion of county
highways designated by the county board of supervisors for
such use during a specified period. The county board of
supervisors shall evaluate the traffic conditions on all county
highways and designate roadways on which all-terrain
vehicles or off-road utility vehicles may be operated for the
specified period without unduly interfering with or
constituting an undue hazard to conventional motor vehicle
traffic. In designating such roadways, the board may
authorize all-terrain vehicles and off-road utility vehicles to
stop at service stations or convenience stores along a
designated roadway.
3. Cities may designate streets under the jurisdiction of cities
within their respective corporate limits which may be used for
the operation of registered all-terrain vehicles or registered
off-road utility vehicles. In designating such streets, the city
may authorize all-terrain vehicles and off-road utility vehicles
to stop at service stations or convenience stores along a
designated street.
4

IOWA CODE § 321I.10(2)-(3).1 The parties now agree that, when the City incorporated
IOWA CODE CH. 321 into its Code of Ordinances, IOWA CODE CHS. 321A through 321M,
including IOWA CODE CH. 321I, where not incorporated.
Another chapter of the City’s Code of Ordinances, Title II, Division 1, is Chapter
9 (“All-Terrain Vehicles or ATV and Off Road Utility Vehicles or UTV”), which deals
specifically with the legal operation of ATVs within the city limits. Among other
ordinances not at issue, here, Chapter 9 includes Ordinance 219-2, which provides, as
follows:
219-2 PLACE OF OPERATION. ATV/UTVs may be
operated upon the streets of the City of Estherville, Iowa,
except as prohibited in Subsection 1 of this section, by persons
possessing a valid Iowa Driver’s License.
1.

2.

Parks and Other Public Lands. ATV/UTVs shall not
be operated off-road in city parks, playgrounds, or
upon any publicly-owned property.

3.

Private Property. ATV/UTVs may only be operated
upon private property with express consent of the
owner thereof or while engaged in snow removal,
landscaping, or other maintenance activities.

4.

1

Prohibited Streets. ATV/UTVs shall not be operated
upon any city street which is a primary road extension
through the city, to wit: Iowa Highway No. 4 and Iowa
Highway No. 9. However, ATV/UTVs may cross
such primary road extensions.

Sidewalk or Parking. No ATV/UTV shall be operated
upon sidewalks unless engaged in snow removal or
maintenance activities (except along the south sidewalk

The first subsection of § 321I.10 provides, as follows:
1. A person shall not operate an all-terrain vehicle or off-road
utility vehicle upon roadways or highways except as provided
in section 321.234A and this section.
5

from South First Street to West South First Street) nor
shall they be operated upon that portion of the street
located between the curb line and sidewalk or property
line commonly referred to as the “parking” except for
purposes of snow removal, maintenance, or
landscaping activities.
Plaintiff’s Appendix at 2-3. Chapter 9 also includes Ordinance 219-3, which provides,
as follows:
219-3 MANNER OF OPERATION. No person shall operate
an ATV/UTV in the City of Estherville except as hereinafter
provided. . . .
Plaintiff’s Appendix at 3-5. This ordinance then states, in 13 numbered subsections,
requirements for licensing and safe operation, etc., of ATVs and UTVs.
3.

Baldwin’s pre-incident operation of ATVs in the City

Since at least 2000, Greg Baldwin has, on occasion, legally operated his ATVs on
the streets of the City. Prior to November 10, 2013, Baldwin had also been cited for
what Baldwin described in his deposition as operating his ATV “in the wrong place.”
Defendants’ Appendix at 16. Baldwin included in his appendix one alleged violation of
City Ordinance 219-2 on October 19, 2006,2 and two citations for alleged violations of
IOWA CODE § 321I.10, also on October 19, 2006. One of the latter citations was
dismissed, but Baldwin paid the fine associated with the other.3 The defendants did not
2

This citation alleged that, on October 19, 2006, Baldwin “operate[d] [an] ATV
on public-owned land” in violation of “Local Ord. 219.2(2),” to which he pleaded guilty.
See Plaintiff’s Appendix at 32-33.
3

These two citations are the following: (1) a citation alleging that, on October
19, 2006, Baldwin “operate[d] [an] ATV on [a] highway right-of-way” in violation of
“#321I.10 2006 IA Code,” Plaintiff’s Appendix at 28, but it appears that this citation
was dismissed, see id. at 31; and (2) a citation alleging that, on October 19, 2006, he
“operate[d] [an] ATV on [a] railroad right-of-way” in violation of “#321I.14(1h) [i.e.,
(1)(h)] 2006 IA Code,” to which he pleaded guilty, see id. at 34-35.
6

submit to the record copies of any citations of Baldwin prior to November 10, 2013.
Baldwin’s son, Trent Baldwin, had also been cited by City police for violating City
Ordinances 219-2 and 219-3 and provisions of IOWA CODE CH. 321I in 2006 and 2007.
Plaintiff’s Appendix at 36-45.
In approximately 2006, Baldwin, accompanied by his daughter, Kayleen Baldwin,
his son, Trent Baldwin, and Jeff Jurgens, had a meeting at the City Police Station with
City police officers, who are not identified in the parties’ statements of fact, and Steve
Reighard, of the State Department of Natural Resources. Officer Reineke did not attend
that meeting, and Officer Hellickson was not employed by the City at that time. Baldwin
represents that the meeting was to sort out where ATVs could be legally operated in the
City. It is not clear from the parties’ allegations or the record whether this meeting
preceded or followed Baldwin’s various citations for illegally operating his ATV in
October 2006. Baldwin alleges that the City officers and Reighard informed the citizens
present that they could ride ATVs within the City limits on streets and designated trails
with the exception of Highways 4 and 9. The defendants deny this assertion, but cite in
support of their denial only the various citations that Baldwin had received in October
2006.
4.

The incidents giving rise to Baldwin’s claims

The incidents giving rise to Baldwin’s claims began on Sunday, November 10,
2013. At approximately 2:30 p.m. that day, Officers Reineke and Hellickson were on
patrol in the City when they received a dispatch to report to the Law Enforcement Center
concerning a “4 wheeler complaint.” They drove to the Law Enforcement Center. Upon
their arrival, they spoke with Tenner and Patti Lilland, who live in the Estherville area.
Mr. Lilland showed the officers a video of a 4-wheeler riding in the ditch on the south
side of North 4th Street. The officers were able to identify the driver of the ATV as
Greg Baldwin. They watched the ATV proceed along North 4th Street and turn into a
7

ditch, using the north Joe Hoye Park entrance, after which it continued in the ditch until
it reached West 14th Avenue North, where it returned to the roadway.

Baldwin

acknowledges that he was operating his ATV/UTV on that date in the south ditch of
North 4th Street and on North 4th Street, and the parties agree that the ditch and street
are within the City’s limits. Baldwin does not recall using the north Joe Hoye Park
entrance to enter the ditch.
Officers Reineke and Hellickson reviewed IOWA CODE CH. 321I, because the City
did not reproduce Chapter 321 in printed form, only incorporated it by reference, when
that chapter was adopted into the City Code of Ordinances.

Officer Reineke then

reviewed The Handbook of Iowa All-Terrain Vehicle and Off-Highway Motorcycle
Regulations (Handbook), which the defendants contend is a handbook frequently relied
upon by police officers when determining whether off road vehicles are operating in
compliance with applicable laws. Baldwin denies, for lack of knowledge, the assertion
that police officers rely on the Handbook, and denies that it addresses the applicable laws
of the City. Based upon their reading of the State Code and the information contained in
the video provided by the Lillands, Officers Reineke and Hellickson concluded that there
had been a violation of what they believed was City Ordinance E-321I.10 (operating on
highways). Before issuing a citation, however, Officer Reineke conferred with his
supervisor, Captain (now Chief) Brent Shatto, and (then) Chief Eric Milburn. Captain
Shatto and Chief Milburn agreed that they believed that the activity shown on the video
amounted to a violation of the local ordinance. The parties now agree, however, that
City Ordinance E-321I.10 was not a valid ordinance in effect at the time that Baldwin
operated his ATV/UTV on November 10, 2013, because it did not exist at that time, and
it still is not part of the City’s Code of Ordinances.
Officer Reineke prepared a citation (No. 131818 8) to Greg Baldwin, alleging that
“on or about 11/10/2013 at 2:30 PM defendant did unlawfully Operate Motor
8

Vehicle/Boat RED UTV . . . upon a public highway at NORTH 4TH STREET located
in the county and state aforesaid and did then and there commit the following offense:
Violation ATV OR OFF ROAD UTIL VEH/OPERATION ON HIGHWAYS AND
[sic] . . . Local Ord E-321I.10 ICIS E-S/321I.10.” Defendants’ Appendix at 17. The
citation issued on November 11, 2013. Officer Reineke went to the Baldwin residence
to serve the citation on November 11, 2013, but no one was home. Because Reineke was
scheduled to be off work in the days that followed, he e-filed the citation with the notation:
“Request Warrant.” On November 12, 2013, David D. Forsyth, Magistrate, Third
Judicial District of Iowa, entered an Order directing that a warrant issue. Defendants’
Appendix at 18. On November 13, 2013, Officer Hellickson served the warrant on
Baldwin, while he was in the parking lot at his grandchild’s school, in front of his wife
and a large number of people, arrested him, and took him to jail, where he was booked.
Baldwin’s wife came to the jail and posted bond, and Baldwin was released.
Subsequently, Baldwin entered a written plea of not guilty to the charge, and trial was
set for May 15, 2014.
The defendants allege that, in the days that followed, City Attorney Christopher
Fuhrman discovered that the City had not included IOWA CODE CH. 321I when it
incorporated IOWA CODE CH. 321 into the Code of Ordinances. They also allege that
neither Shatto, Reineke, nor Hellickson knew this; rather, all were operating under the
mistaken belief that the adoption and incorporation of IOWA CODE CH. 321 by the City
Council included IOWA CODE CHS. 321A through 321M.

Baldwin disputes these

contentions as inconsistent with the meeting that he had with City police officers in 2006
about operation of ATVs in the City; the express incorporation of “chapter 321,” not any
other chapter of the Iowa Code, into the Code of Ordinances; and the existence of Chapter
9 of the Code of Ordinances. Mr. Fuhrman was granted leave to amend the charge to
allege a violation of a different ordinance, City Ordinance 219-2(2).
9

Defendants’

Appendix at 28-29. After Baldwin’s counsel filed a Motion For Adjudication Of Law
Points And To Dismiss, and the City filed its response, the court found “that the cited
act is not in violation of the city code as written and the case is DISMISSED, costs
assessed to the City of Estherville.” Defendants’ Appendix at 30-37.4
Baldwin alleges that, because of his arrest, he suffered mental and emotional harm
and anguish, anxiety, fear, degradation, disgrace, uncertainty, apprehensiveness,
restlessness, dismay, tension, and unease. He contends that his wife confirmed the effect
on him in her deposition. The defendants deny that Baldwin has produced any evidence
to support these claims of harm.
B.

Procedural Background

On November 4, 2015, Baldwin filed his Petition, which became docket no. 3 in
this action, in the Iowa District Court in and for Emmet County, against the City and
Officers Reineke and Hellickson, in their individual and official capacities. He asserts
four claims arising from his citation and arrest for the allegedly improper operation of
his ATV on November 10, 2013. In Count I, against the City, Baldwin alleges a violation
of Article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution by subjecting him to an unreasonable
seizure. In Count II, against defendants Reineke and Hellickson, in their individual
capacities, he alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by subjecting him to an unreasonable
seizure. In Count III, against the City, he alleges a violation of Article I, section 1, of

4

Baldwin alleges, and the defendants admit, that Mr. Fuhrman wrote Baldwin’s
counsel an email about the citation for violation of “E321I.10,” prior to dismissal of that
citation, in which he said, “I don’t know what to think of the charge, but, the officers
have been having problems with the Baldwin’s [sic] and complaints over ATV’s [sic], so
here we are.” Plaintiff’s Appendix at 47.
10

the Iowa Constitution by violating his right to freedom, liberty, and happiness. Finally,
in Count IV, against all defendants, he alleges a common-law claim of “false arrest.”
He seeks damages, interest, costs of the action, attorney’s fees, and such other relief as
may be deemed just and equitable.
The defendants removed this case to this court on November 20, 2015, on the
basis of federal question jurisdiction, with supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a), 1441(a), and 1446. Notice of Removal
(docket no. 2). Thereafter, on November 23, 2015, the defendants filed a joint Answer
(docket no. 5), denying Baldwin’s claims and asserting various affirmative defenses,
including immunity from suit. On December 2, 2015, Baldwin filed his Motion For
Remand To State Court (Counts I, III, And IV) And Stay (Count II) (docket no. 6). The
defendants filed their Resistance (docket no. 7) to that motion on December 9, 2015, and
I denied it in a Memorandum Opinion And Order (docket no. 8) filed December 15,
2015. Eventually, a jury trial was set in this matter to begin on April 17, 2017.
On July 19, 2016, the defendants filed the first of the dispositive motions now
before me, their Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (docket no. 21). In their Motion,
the defendants seek summary judgment on Counts II and IV, Baldwin’s federal
constitutional claim and his state common-law false arrest claim. They seek summary
judgment on these claims on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact
as to the merits of the two claims at issue and no genuine issues of material fact that they
acted in reckless disregard of Baldwin’s rights, so that he is not entitled to punitive
damages. They also seek summary judgment on these claims, as a matter of law, because
the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Count II; negligence does
not state a claim for relief under § 1983; Baldwin’s arrest was based on probable cause;
and the actions of the individual defendants were not reckless.

Baldwin filed his

Resistance (docket no. 26) to the defendants’ Motion on August 11, 2016, and the
11

defendants filed a Reply (docket no. 30) in further support of their Motion on August 25,
2016. On August 11, 2016, Baldwin filed his Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
(docket no. 27), seeking summary judgment as to liability on all four of his claims, which
would leave only damages issues for trial. The defendants filed their Resistance (docket
no. 32) to Baldwin’s Motion on August 31, 2016, and Baldwin filed a Reply (docket no.
33) in further support of his Motion on September 6, 2016.
Baldwin requested oral arguments on his Motion. I set oral arguments on both
Motions for October 24, 2016, but later rescheduled them for November 8, 2016. After
hearing those arguments, this case is fully submitted, and I enter this ruling.
II.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Standards For Summary Judgment

Before addressing the issues raised in the parties’ cross-motions, I will summarize
the standards for summary judgment. Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis
added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

Thus, “[t]he movant ‘bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’ and must identify ‘those portions
of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.’” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In response, “[t]he nonmovant ‘must do more
12

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ and
must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87
(1986)).
When the parties have met their burden, the district judge’s task is as follows:
“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’” Ricci v.
DeStefano, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L.
Ed. 2d 490 (2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal
quotations omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000), quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). . . . . “‘Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677, quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43.
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Ryan v. Capital Contractors, Inc., 679
F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2012). However, summary judgment is particularly appropriate
when only questions of law are involved, rather than factual issues that may or may not
be subject to genuine dispute. See, e.g., Cremona v. R.S. Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d
617, 620 (8th Cir. 2006).
13

With these standards in mind, I will address the cross-motions for summary
judgment issue-by-issue, rather than consider the motions in turn.
B.
1.

The Iowa Constitutional Claims

Arguments of the parties

Baldwin argues that Iowa courts should, if they have not already done so,
recognize a cause of action for alleged violations of the Iowa Constitution, like the ones
he asserts in Counts I and III of his Petition. He also contends that there are no genuine
issues of material fact that the defendants arrested and jailed him without probable cause
in violation of his rights under Article I, Sections 1 and 8, of the Iowa Constitution. The
defendants contend that, not only was Baldwin’s arrest supported by probable cause, the
Iowa Court of Appeals recently held that there is no private cause of action for a violation
of the Iowa Constitution in State v. Conklin, No. 14–0764, 863 N.W.2d 301, 2015 WL
1332003 (Iowa Ct. App. March 25, 2015) (table op.), and the Iowa Supreme Court has
not yet decided whether to take further review of that decision.
2.

Analysis

In Peters v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 979 F. Supp. 2d 901, 971 (N.D. Iowa 2013),
I stated that I agreed with Chief Judge Reade’s analysis and conclusion in McCabe v.
Macaulay, 551 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784-85 (N.D. Iowa 2007), that Iowa likely would
recognize a private right of action for violation of the Iowa Constitution. Subsequently,
however, in Wilson v. Lamp, 142 F. Supp. 3d 763, 802-03 (N.D. Iowa 2015), I reserved
ruling on a motion to dismiss a claim for violation of Article I, Section 8, of the Iowa
Constitution, because the issue of whether or not such a cause of action is recognized in
Iowa was under consideration by the Iowa Supreme Court in Conklin. Likewise, Judge
Gritzner of the Southern District of Iowa stayed a motion to dismiss an Iowa constitutional
claim in Davis v. Simmons, 100 F. Supp. 3d 723, 737-39 (S.D. Iowa 2015), on the basis
14

that the issue of the viability of such a claim was under consideration by the Iowa Supreme
Court in Conklin, a resolution of the issue by the Iowa Supreme Court “could
fundamentally alter any decision by this Court,” and he could reconsider the stay upon
action by the Iowa Supreme Court or an unreasonable delay of the proceedings before
him.
Because the Iowa Supreme Court is still deciding whether or not to take further
review of Conklin, which will determine whether Iowa recognizes a private right of action
for violation of the Iowa Constitution, I decline Baldwin’s invitation to rule on that issue
or the further issue of whether or not state actors can raise any immunity defense to such
a claim. A ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court could fundamentally alter any decision
that I might make on this part of Baldwin’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. I
also note that trial in this matter is not set to begin until April 17, 2017, so that trial will
not necessarily be delayed by a stay on this part of Baldwin’s Motion. Therefore,
disposition of the part of Baldwin’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment seeking
summary judgment on Counts I and III of his Petition is stayed pending determination by
the Iowa Supreme Court of the question of further review in Conklin. Like Judge
Gritzner, I will reconsider the stay upon action by the Iowa Supreme Court or an
unreasonable delay of these proceedings.
C.

The Federal Constitutional Claim

The defendants and Baldwin have moved for summary judgment on Baldwin’s
claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in Count II of his Petition, alleging a violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, either in its entirety or as to
liability. I will begin my analysis of the parties’ cross-motions on this claim with a
summary of their arguments.

15

1.

Arguments of the parties

The defendants’ primary argument is that negligence simply will not support a
claim under § 1983, but all the record shows is that the defendants made a negligent
mistake of law about whether or not the City had adopted IOWA CODE CH. 321I when it
adopted IOWA CODE CH. 321 as part of the City’s Code of Ordinances. In the alternative,
the defendants argue that Officers Reineke and Hellickson are entitled to qualified
immunity, because it was not clearly established that, when the City incorporated IOWA
CODE CH. 321 into the City’s Code of Ordinances, Chapters 321A through 321M were
not included, so a reasonable officer would not have known that citing Baldwin for a
violation of “Municipal Ordinance E-321I.10” was unlawful. The defendants point to
the steps Reineke and Hellickson took to determine whether or not there had been a
violation of what they believed was a City ordinance. They also argue that Hellickson
acted pursuant to a facially valid warrant when he arrested Baldwin, shielding him from
liability. Next, they argue that Baldwin fails to state a claim against the City, because he
does not allege or argue that the alleged violation of his federal constitutional rights was
the result of an official policy, unofficial custom, or deliberate indifference, which might
provide a basis for municipal liability. Finally, they argue that the officers’ mistake of
law is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.
Baldwin argues that the defendants’ admission of negligence in failing to know or
learn the law that they were entrusted to enforce demonstrates that their mistake of law
was unreasonable, where objective reasonableness, not negligence, is the proper standard
for determining liability. He argues that the good faith and subjective understanding of
the officers involved are irrelevant.
Baldwin also argues that no seizure could be more unreasonable than an arrest for
a violation of an ordinance that does not exist. Indeed, he points out that the ordinances
list in black and white what provisions of the Iowa Code were incorporated, and IOWA
16

CODE CH. 321I is conspicuous by its absence. He concedes that officers may not be
responsible for knowing all of the contours and developing interpretations of the law.
Nevertheless, he argues that they should be expected to know, at a bare minimum, the
specific City ordinances that they were employed to enforce. He argues, further, that the
defendants’ conduct is even more unreasonable, in the face of City Ordinance 219-2,
which plainly authorizes operation of ATVs and UTVs on the streets of the City, except
on Highways 4 and 9. Thus, he argues that any prudent officer would have known that
the law of the City allowed ATV/UTV operation on the roads within the City’s limits,
and there is no dispute that he was operating his ATV within the City’s limits at the time
of his alleged violation. He also points to the meeting he had with law enforcement
officers in 2006 as demonstrating the unreasonableness of a belief that operation of an
ATV in the City’s limits was illegal. For essentially the same reasons, Baldwin argues
that Reineke and Hellickson are not entitled to qualified immunity. He argues that there
is simply no dispute that the officers were acting under color of state law, arrested him
without probable cause, and jailed him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights,
causing him harm.
Finally, Baldwin argues that there is no dispute that the officers acted with callous
indifference to his federal constitutional rights in arresting and jailing him, such that
punitive damages are available on this claim. Baldwin does clarify, however, that he is
not making any claim for violation of federal law against the City in Count II.
2.

Analysis
a.

Mere negligence

The defendants assert that Baldwin’s claim of arrest without probable cause fails,
because a § 1983 claim cannot be based on mere negligence, which is all that the record
shows in this case. As Baldwin points out, none of the cases on which the defendants
rely for this argument involves a claim of arrest without probable cause. See Corwin v.
17

City of Independence, Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2016) (deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need); Rosas v. City of Lansing, No. C04-1053, 2006 WL 897288, *4
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (excessive force allegations); Sansgard v. Bennett, No. C 99–2010,
2000 WL 34027917, *3 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (claim of an unlawful seizure under the Fourth
Amendment based on a coroner’s mistaken determination of cause of death); Schultz v.
Amick, 955 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (excessive force case). Indeed, I
have found no decision of the United States Supreme Court or any of the Circuit Courts
of Appeals holding that “negligence” is insufficient to sustain a claim of arrest without
probable cause.5 It is true that in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986), the
Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a
negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or
property.” (Emphasis in the original). On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals very recently observed, “[A] § 1983 plaintiff’s claim that he was arrested or
prosecuted without probable cause . . . ‘must be judged’ under the Fourth Amendment,
not substantive due process.”

Stewart v. Wagner, 836 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2016)

(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270–71 & n.4 (1994) (plurality opinion joined
by seven Justices on this issue)).
Discussion of “negligence” in the context of a claim of arrest without probable
cause is ultimately an unhelpful and unproductive misdirection, however, because the
standards for probable cause to support an arrest, satisfying the Fourth Amendment, are

5

Courts have held that a “negligent” investigation is insufficient to support a
§ 1983 claim. See, e.g., Montoya v. Taylor, 44 F.3d 1005, 1995 WL 10525, *3-*4 (5th
Cir. 1995) (unpubl. op.) (holding that negligent investigation was insufficient to constitute
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). Baldwin is correct, however, that his claim
is not negligent investigation, but arrest without probable cause.
18

well-settled. Thus, a determination of whether or not probable cause existed is best made
in terms of those standards, not in terms of “negligence.”
b.

Existence of a constitutional violation

Proof of an arrest without probable cause is both the substance of Baldwin’s claim
and the first issue for the defendants’ defense of qualified immunity. This is so, because
“[a] plaintiff seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show first that the
defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right and, second, that the right was clearly
established.” Bowden v. Meinberg, 807 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1717 (2016). To put
it another way, “‘[t]o overcome a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, the burden
falls on [the plaintiff] to show: “(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to [the
plaintiff], demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time of the deprivation.”’” Gilmore v. City of Minneapolis,
837 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d
1149, 1155 (8th Cir. 2014), in turn quoting Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d
465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010)); Vaughn v. Green County, Ark., 438 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir.
2006) (to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the
court ordinarily engages in a twofold inquiry, asking (1) whether there was a deprivation
of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established such that a
reasonable official would understand that his conduct was unlawful in the situation that
he confronted).
As to the constitutional right at issue, here, “[t]he Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures requires that arrests be based on probable
cause.” Williams v. City of Alexander, Ark., 772 F.3d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 2014).
“Probable cause exists if ‘the totality of facts based on
reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent
19

person in believing the individual arrested had committed ...
an offense.’” Flynn v.Brown, 395 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir.
2005) (quoting Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385,
1389 (8th Cir. 1986)).
Williams, 772 F.3d at 1310-11; accord Gilmore, 837 F.3d at 832. As the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has also clarified, “[T]he issue is whether the police officers had
probable cause to arrest [the person] for violating [a statute or ordinance], not whether
he would have been convicted for violating [that statute or ordinance].” United States v.
Hawkins, 830 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2016).
Baldwin contends that there was a constitutional violation, because there could be
no probable cause for his arrest, when the ordinance that he allegedly violated did not
exist. The defendants contend that they merely made a “mistake of law.” In Heien v.
North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), the Supreme Court recognized
that probable cause may exist, despite an arresting officer’s “mistake of law.” 135 S.
Ct. at 536. This is so, the Court concluded, even though “the inquiry is not as forgiving
as the one employed in the distinct context of deciding whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity for a constitutional or statutory violation,” and the Court recognized
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes.” Id. at 539. In Heien,
the officer had believed that a North Carolina statute required a vehicle to have two
functioning brake lights, and had stopped the vehicle in question for having only one.
The statute had never previously been construed, but a subsequent construction of the
statute established that only one functioning brake light was required. Id. at 540. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded, nevertheless, that the language of the statute
was such that it would have been reasonable for the officer to think that the statute did
require two functioning brake lights. Id. The United States Supreme Court concluded,
likewise, that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, because the Court had “little
difficulty concluding that the officer’s error of law was reasonable.” Id.
20

Here, the officers’ mistake of law was that Ordinance “E321I.10” existed, i.e.,
that it had been incorporated by reference into the City’s Code of Ordinances when IOWA
CODE CH. 321 was incorporated. This kind of mistake of law is entirely different from
the mistake in Heien, which arose from an officer’s uncertainty about the meaning of
statutory language that had not previously been construed by the courts. Instead, the
mistake at issue, here, is the result of “a sloppy study of the laws [the officers were]
duty-bound to enforce,” see Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539-40, as Baldwin contends. The
officers, here, had more authoritative resources available to them than each other or other
officers or some Handbook that purportedly summarized the applicable law statewide,
but did not purport to interpret the City’s Ordinances, to clarify that 321I was a distinct
chapter of the Iowa Code from 321. Such resources included access to printed or
electronic editions of the IOWA CODE (e.g., from a public website, such as
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/law/iowaCode) and recourse to the City Attorney. Unlike
the situation in Heien, the question of whether or not IOWA CODE CH. 321I had been
incorporated into the City’s Code of Ordinances did not depend upon obtuse or potentially
ambiguous language requiring considerable legal expertise to interpret. See id. at 540
(noting that, after construing the statute in question, the state court had concluded that
the officer’s contrary understanding was based on an arguable reading of the language
and was reasonable); see also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.
2005) (“We should not expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the traffic laws with
the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney. While an expert defense
attorney, and even a federal judge, ultimately might conclude that the plain language of
the Code technically requires only that a vehicle have one ‘stop light’ in working order,
we think it is fair to say that the Code is counterintuitive and confusing.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). More importantly, an officer can reasonably be
expected to know the laws that he or she is authorized to enforce. Martin, 411 F.3d at
21

1001 (“[O]fficers have an obligation to understand the laws that they are entrusted with
enforcing, at least to a level that is objectively reasonable.”). Thus, the officers’ mistake
of law does not establish probable cause in this case.
Nevertheless, Baldwin’s argument that—the non-existence of Ordinance
“E321I.10” means that probable cause was lacking—is incomplete. As the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has recognized,
[E]ven if [the arresting officer] cited a different offense when
he arrested [the plaintiff], “probable cause for the arrest still
exist[ed] as long as the facts known to the officer would
provide probable cause to arrest for the violation of some
other law.” United States v. Demilia, 771 F.3d 1051, 1054
(8th Cir. 2014). “In other words, an ‘arresting officer’s state
of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to
the existence of probable cause.’” Id. (quoting Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537
(2004)). “[His] subjective reason for making the arrest need
not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts
provide probable cause.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 889 (8th Cir. 2015); Demilia, 771 F.3d at 1054 (“In
Devenpeck v. Alford, the Supreme Court examined probable cause in the context of an
arrest and held that even if an officer invokes the wrong offense at the time of an arrest,
probable cause for the arrest still exists as long as the facts known to the officer would
provide probable cause to arrest for the violation of some other law.” (emphasis added)).
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals “ha[s] upheld the lawfulness of an arrest
based on probable cause even where the arresting officers testified that they believed
probable cause was lacking.” Bowden, 807 F.3d at 881 (citing Warren v. City of Lincoln,
Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1439–41 (8th Cir. 1989)). Thus, the question is whether the facts
known to the officers would have provided probable cause to arrest Baldwin for the

22

violation of some other City Ordinance. Greenman, 787 F.3d at 889; Demilia, 771 F.3d
at 1054.6
Baldwin argues that Ordinance 219-2, which was actually part of the City’s Code
of Ordinances, plainly establishes the lack of probable cause for his arrest. I believe that
the opposite is true. While Ordinance 219-2 does provide that “ATV/UTVs may be
operated upon the streets of the City,” it also provides “ATV/UTVs shall not be operated
off-road in city parks, playgrounds, or upon any publicly-owned property.” Ordinance
219-2 and (2) (quoted in its entirety, supra, beginning on page 5). The officers knew
from the video that they reviewed that Baldwin had operated his ATV in the ditch of a
City street and that ditch was publicly-owned property. See Williams, 772 F.3d at 1310
(probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting
officer). Indeed, the amended charge against Baldwin, after the City Attorney discovered
that Ordinance E321I.10 did not exist, was an alleged violation of Ordinance 219-2(2)
for driving on “publicly-owned property,” because the video showed Badwin driving his
ATV in the ditch of a City street, which was, at least arguably, publicly-owned property.
See Defendants’ Appendix at 35-37.
The Iowa District Court ultimately dismissed the amended charge against Baldwin,
but only after making two key constructions of pertinent Ordinances. First, the Iowa
District Court construed the plain meaning of “street” in City Ordinances to include the
“ditch.” This conclusion was based on the definition of “street” in City Ordinance 110102(23) as “mean[ing] and includ[ing] any public way, highway, street, avenue,
boulevard, parkway, or other public thoroughfare . . . and unless otherwise indicated in
the text, shall include the entire width between the property lines.”

6

Defendants’

Baldwin’s arguments for summary judgment on the probable cause issue did not
address this question, but, to be fair, neither did the defendants’ arguments.
23

Appendix at 35. The Iowa District Court also construed “publicly-owned property” in
Ordinance 219-2(2), to the extent that it conflicted with Ordinance 110-102(23), as not
including the “ditch” of a City street. Defendants’ Appendix at 35-36. The Iowa District
Court’s constructions would establish no more than a mistake of law as to the applicability
of the prohibition in Ordinance 219-2(2) to Baldwin’s driving his ATV in the ditch. That
mistake was of the same kind as the mistake of law at issue in Heien, involving an
arguable reading of uncertain language in the law. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. The
Iowa District Court’s after-the-fact constructions do not establish that a prudent person
could not have believed, at the time of Baldwin’s alleged offense, that he had committed
a violation of Ordinance 219-2(2). Williams, 772 F.3d at 1310. Again, “the issue is
whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest [Baldwin] for violating
[Ordinance 219-2(2)], not whether he would have been convicted for violating [that
law].” Hawkins, 830 F.3d at 746. The officers had probable cause to arrest Baldwin
for a violation of Ordinance 219-2(2).
Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Baldwin’s § 1983
claim in Count II alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment, because probable cause
was not lacking for Baldwin’s arrest, and Baldwin’s motion for summary judgment in his
favor on this claim is denied.
c.

Qualified immunity

In addition, or in the alternative, I will consider the individual defendants’
contention that they are entitled to qualified immunity, even assuming that there was no
probable cause for Baldwin’s arrest. “‘Qualified immunity shields government officials
from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct
violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Gilmore v. City of Minneapolis, 837 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1155 (8th Cir. 2014), in turn
24

citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

To put it another way,

“[q]ualified immunity ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” New v. Denver, 787
F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
“The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government
official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed
questions of law and fact.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, in the
specific context of a claim of arrest without probable cause,
[Q]ualified immunity applies when “a reasonable officer
could have believed [the] arrest to be lawful, in light of clearly
established law and the information the arresting officer[ ]
possessed.” [Hunter, 502 U.S.] at 227, 112 S.Ct. 534
(emphasis added). “[T]he issue for immunity purposes is not
probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause, that is,
whether the officer should have known that the arrest violated
plaintiff's clearly established right.” Habiger v. City of
Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1011, 117 S.Ct. 518, 136 L.Ed.2d 407
(1996).
New, 787 F.3d at 899. “‘Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before
trial.’” Id. (quoting Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228).
As pointed out, above, the inquiry for qualified immunity is more “forgiving” than
the one employed for a determination of actual probable cause. Heien, ___ U.S. at ___,
135 S. Ct. 539. Nevertheless, I cannot conclude that the officers’ error of law as to the
applicability of IOWA CODE § 321I.10 as a provision of the City’s Code of Ordinances
was reasonable. As I concluded, above, the mistake at issue, here, is the result of “a
sloppy study of the laws [the officers were] duty-bound to enforce.” See Heien, 135 S.
25

Ct. at 539-40; Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (“[O]fficers have an obligation to understand
the laws that they are entrusted with enforcing, at least to a level that is objectively
reasonable.”). To put it another way, the officers’ failure to know that Ordinance
E321I.10 did not exist was a plainly incompetent violation of the law. New, 787 F.3d at
899. Thus, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Baldwin’s federal
constitutional claim pursuant to § 1983 on the basis of qualified immunity for their failure
to know that the law they cited did not exist.
The defendants’ argument that they have qualified immunity because Baldwin was
arrested pursuant to a warrant from a neutral magistrate requires careful consideration.
The Eighth Court of Appeals has explained, in the context of qualified immunity,
“Whe[n] the alleged constitutional violation involves an arrest
pursuant to a warrant, ‘the fact that a neutral magistrate has
issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers
acted in an objectively reasonable manner[.]’” Saterdalen v.
Spencer, 725 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2013) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Messerschmidt v. Millender, ––– U.S. –
–––, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012)).
Williams, 772 F.3d at 1311. Here, Officer Hellickson arrested Baldwin pursuant to a
warrant issued by a magistrate of the Third Judicial District of Iowa.
The rub, here, is “[t]hat a warrant has issued . . . is not dispositive because ‘it is
possible that a magistrate, working under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a
magistrate should.’” Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345–46 (1986)). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained,
Accordingly, a civil rights suit against an officer who applied
for a warrant may be maintained if “on an objective basis, it
is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have
concluded that a warrant should issue[.]” [Malley, 475 U.S.]
at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092.
26

Saterdalen, 725 F.3d at 841.
Baldwin argues that it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have
concluded that a warrant should issue based on an alleged violation of Ordinance
“E321I.10,” which did not exist. I agree. The magistrate, working under docket
pressures, failed to perform as he should have when he missed the fact that the warrant
was based on a statute that was not part of the Code of Ordinances. What is critical,
here, however, is that the mistake of the officers was the result of “a sloppy study of the
laws [the officers were] duty-bound to enforce.” See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539-40;
Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (“[O]fficers have an obligation to understand the laws that they
are entrusted with enforcing, at least to a level that is objectively reasonable.”). Because
of that, “‘on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would
have concluded that a warrant should issue’” based on an alleged violation of Ordinance
“E321I.10.” Saterdalen, 725 F.3d at 841 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).
This is not to say that, “‘on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably
competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue’” based on Baldwin’s
conduct known to the officers. Id. (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). This is so, because
it was not clearly established that Baldwin’s conduct did not violate a different Ordinance
that was, in fact, part of the City’s Code of Ordinances, Ordinance 219-2(2). See
Gilmore, 837 F.3d at 832 (qualified immunity applies, unless “the official’s conduct
violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person
would have known” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Again, the officers
knew that Baldwin had operated his ATV in a ditch that was publicly-owned property.
While I have grave concerns about the officers’ lack of knowledge of the ordinances that
they were authorized to enforce, I must conclude, albeit not without hesitation and
concern, that they are entitled to qualified immunity, based on their reliance on a warrant,

27

where it was not clearly established that Baldwin’s conduct did not violate a City
Ordinance.
Therefore, in addition or in the alternative, the defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Baldwin’s federal constitutional claim pursuant to § 1983 on the basis of
qualified immunity. The part of Baldwin’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on
liability on that claim must be denied.7
D.

The State Law False Arrest Claim

The analysis of the cross-motions for summary judgment on Baldwin’s state law
claim of false arrest can be comparatively brief. The claim of false arrest under Iowa
law “has two elements: ‘(1) detention or restraint against one’s will, and (2) unlawfulness
of the detention or restraint.’” Thomas v. Marion Cty., 652 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa
2002) (quoting Kraft v. City of Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984)); Rife v.
D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Iowa 2002). As to the second element, where,
as here, the arrest was pursuant to a facially valid warrant on which it was not
unreasonable for the officers to rely, the City and the officers are protected from liability.
Id. Therefore, the defendants, not Baldwin, are entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
III.

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing,

7

In light of Baldwin’s clarification that he not is asserting a federal constitutional
claim against the City in Count II, the part of the defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment seeking summary judgment for the City on that claim is denied as moot.
28

1.

The defendants’ July 19, 2016, Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

(docket no. 21) is granted as to Baldwin’s claims of a federal constitutional violation in
Count II and state law false arrest in Count IV;
2.

Baldwin’s August 11, 2016, Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (docket

no. 27) is denied in part and stayed in part:
a.

Those parts of Baldwin’s Motion seeking summary judgment on his

claims of a federal constitutional violation in Count II and state law false arrest in
Count IV are denied;
b.

Those parts of Baldwin’s Motion seeking summary judgment on his

claims of Iowa constitutional violations in Counts I and III are stayed pending
determination by the Iowa Supreme Court of the question of further review in
Conklin. I will reconsider the stay upon action by the Iowa Supreme Court or an
unreasonable delay of these proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2016.

______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

29