Rasch v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc et al

Filing 11

ORDER denying 6 MOTION to Remand filed by Corey Rasch. The Clerk is directed to amend the docket for this case to reflect that the correct spelling of plaintiff's name is Corey Rasch. Within 14 days of the date this order is filed, plaintif f shall comply with Local Rule 15 by filing an entirely new amended complaint that incorporates all of the changes to his initial state court petition 3 that are described in his Amendment to Petition 5 . Signed by Judge Leonard T Strand on 3/11/16. (djs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
COREY1 RASCH,
No. C16-3006-LTS

Plaintiff,

ORDER ON
MOTION TO REMAND

vs.
TYSON FRESH MEATS, INC., a/k/a
TYSON FOODS, INC.
Defendant.

____________________
This matter is before me on plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 6) to remand. Defendant
has filed a resistance (Doc. No. 7) and plaintiff has filed a reply (Doc. No. 9). No party
has requested oral argument. The motion is fully submitted and ready for decision.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Corey Rasch filed this case in the Iowa District Court for Kossuth County

on December 24, 2015, alleging a breach of his employment contract. His state court
petition (Doc. No. 3) named two defendants: (1) Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., a/k/a Tyson
Foods, Inc. (Tyson), and (2) Jack Walker. The petition concluded with the following
prayer for relief:

1

The civil cover sheet (Doc. No. 1) defendants filed when removing this case to this court listed
plaintiff’s first name as “Cory.” It appears that every other pleading, including those filed by
plaintiff’s counsel, has spelled plaintiff’s first name as “Corey.” See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 2, 3 and
5. As such, the Clerk is directed to amend the docket for this case to reflect that the correct
spelling of plaintiff’s name is “Corey Rasch.”

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants,
Jack Walker and Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. jointly and severally, in the
amount of $40,000.00 for actual damages, and $40,000.00 for liquidated
damages, together with interest as provided by law and costs in this action,
and attorney fees as applicable under state statute.
Doc. No. 3 at 3.
On January 29, 2016, the defendants filed a notice (Doc. No. 2) of removal to this
court. On February 4, 2016, Rasch filed a document (Doc. No. 5) entitled “Amendment
to Petition” in which he itemized certain changes to his initial petition.2 The changes
included the elimination of all references to Walker as being a defendant in this case.
Doc. No. 5 at 1-2. For example, Rasch edited the prayer for relief to request judgment
only against Tyson. Id. at 2. Rasch then filed the present motion to remand the next
day. Tyson has since filed an answer (Doc. No. 8).
II.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between ... citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “Except
as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C.

2

The “Amendment to Petition” violates Local Rule 15, which states as follows in relevant part:
An amended or supplemented pleading, whether filed as a matter of course
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) or as an electronic
attachment to a motion, must not, except by leave of court, incorporate any prior
pleading by reference, but must reproduce the entire new pleading.

N.D. Ia. L.R. 15. Rasch shall file an “entire new pleading” that incorporates all of the changes
described in his “Amendment to Petition.”

2

§ 1441(a). After removal, a plaintiff may request remand back to state court if either (a)
the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000 or (b) there is not true diversity. As
Judge Bennett has explained:
(1) the party seeking removal and opposing remand bears the burden
of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction; (2) a fundamental
principle of removal jurisdiction is that whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists is a question answered by looking to the complaint
as it existed at the time the petition for removal was filed; (3) lack
of subject matter jurisdiction requires remand to the state court under
the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); (4) the court's removal jurisdiction
must be strictly construed; therefore, (5) the district court is required
to resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand;
and, finally, (6) in general, remand orders issued under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) are not reviewable by appeal or writ of mandamus.
Salton v. Polyock, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035 (N.D. Iowa 2011); see also Bell v.
Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[w]here the defendant
seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, however, it bears the burden of
proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.”); James Neff Kramper Family Farm
P'ship v. IBP, Inc., 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that the rule that the party
invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the
evidence “applies even in removed cases where the party invoking jurisdiction is the
defendant.”); OnePoint Solutions, L.L.C. v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the party invoking jurisdiction “has the burden of proving the requisite
amount by a preponderance of the evidence.”).  
The Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure include the following prohibition:  
Except in small claims and cases involving only liquidated damages, a
pleading shall not state the specific amount of money damages sought but
shall state whether the amount of damages meets applicable jurisdictional
requirements for the amount in controversy. The specific amount and
elements of monetary damages sought may be obtained through discovery. 

3

See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.403(1). The process for determining the amount in controversy
when a state court petition does not specify a monetary demand is as follows: (1) the
court must determine whether the complaint is removable on its face; and (2) if the
complaint is not removable on its face, the court must provide the parties with the
opportunity to satisfy the court as to the amount in controversy.

McCorkindale v.

American Home Assur. Co./A.I.C., 909 F. Supp. 646, 653-56 (N.D. Iowa 1995). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that prior to removal, a plaintiff may
stipulate that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.  
“Stipulations . . . when filed contemporaneously with a plaintiff's
complaint and not after removal, have long been recognized as a
method of defeating federal jurisdiction. . . See, e.g., De Aguilar v.
Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Shell Oil Co.,
970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (“Litigants who want
to prevent removal must file a binding stipulation or affidavit with
their complaints.”).
Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2012), abrogated on
other grounds by Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).  

III.

DISCUSSION 

Rasch argues that remand is required because Tyson cannot prove that the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000. Tyson points to Rasch’s original state court petition as
evidence that more than $75,000 is in controversy, as Rasch specifically requested
judgment in the amount of $80,000. Rasch responds that it was inappropriate for him to
ask for a specific sum of damages in the original petition and notes that his amended
pleading includes no suggestion that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Rasch

4

argues that in light of his amendment, Tyson cannot prove the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.3 
“The district court has subject matter jurisdiction in a diversity case when a fact
finder could legally conclude, from the pleadings and proof adduced to the court before
trial, that the damages that the plaintiff suffered are greater than $75,000.” Kopp v.
Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2002). As an initial matter, Rasch is correct that
“[w]here the defendant seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal. . . it bears
the burden of proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied. . . This can be a
complex task where. . . the plaintiff prefers to litigate in state court.” Bell v. Hershey
Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

However, “[t]he

general federal rule has long been to decide what the amount in controversy is from the
complaint itself, unless it appears or is in some way shown that the amount stated in the
complaint is not claimed ‘in good faith.’ In deciding this question of good faith we have
said that it ‘must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.’” Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S.
348, 353 (1961).  

3

Rasch also makes the absurd argument that because Tyson has denied liability, it has admitted
that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. Doc. No. 9 at 2. The amount in
controversy is, of course, the “sum claimed by the plaintiff.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). The federal court is not divested of jurisdiction simply
because of the “inability of [the] plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court
jurisdiction. . . Nor does the fact that the complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense to
the claim” divest the court of jurisdiction. Id., at 289. Put another way, “the sum claimed by
the plaintiff in good faith is usually dispositive.” Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649 F.3d
817, 822 (8th Cir. 2011). The lone exception is legal impossibility. Id. In this case (as in all
cases), the mere fact that the defendant generally denies liability has no bearing on the amount
in controversy. If anything, it is the denial of liability that creates the controversy.

5

Thus, Tyson’s argument that the amount in controversy was established by Rasch’s
original state court petition complaint is sound.

Courts have long held that if the

plaintiff’s complaint includes a specific request for damages, the stated amount is
sufficient to prove the amount in controversy. Id. at 353-54 (“The claim . . . was
$14,035; the state court suit of petitioner asked that much; the conditional counterclaim
in the federal court claims the same amount. . . Thus the record before us shows beyond
a doubt that . . . petitioner claims more than $10,000 from the respondent.”). I find that
Rasch’s specific demand in his state court petition for an award of $80,000 in damages
made that petition removable on its face.4  
The two remaining questions Rasch raises are (1) what effect does his subsequent
amendment have on the analysis; and (2) does the fact that his demand for a specific
amount of damages violated the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrate that the
demand was made in bad faith? Both questions are easily disposed of. The Supreme
Court long ago stated that if “[o]n the face of the pleadings petitioner was entitled to
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court,” then “a reduction of the amount claimed
after removal, did not take away that privilege.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S.
at 296.5 Accordingly, the fact that Rasch deleted his demand for a sum certain after
removal does not divest this court of jurisdiction.6  
4

Neither party disputes that diversity of citizenship exists in this case.

5

As stated above, the Eighth Circuit recognizes that if a plaintiff stipulates prior to removal that
the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000, removal is not appropriate. In addition,
“where a plaintiff's state court complaint does not specify a specific amount of damages, post
removal stipulations indicating that the value of the claim at the time of removal did not exceed
the jurisdictional minimum [a]re permissible.” Moller v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2014 WL 4437548,
at *2 (N.D. Iowa 2014). That type of analysis is not applicable to this situation because (a)
Rasch’s state court petition included a demand in excess of $75,000 and (b) Rasch has not
stipulated that the amount in controversy is below $75,000.

6

Notably, Rasch has not reduced his claim for damages. All he did was remove the specific
dollar amount from his original petition.

6

Second, as set out above, Rasch’s claim for $80,000 in damages was in bad faith
only if it is legally certain that the value of his claim actually falls below the jurisdictional
threshold. Rasch makes no argument – legally certain or otherwise – that he is prohibited
from recovering more than $75,000 in this case. His entire argument is simply that Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.403(1) made it improper for him to claim a specific amount of
damages in his state court petition. Whether or not Rasch violated Rule 1.403(1) does
not affect the amount of damages he has placed in controversy. Through his procedural
mistake, he disclosed that he seeks to recover more than $75,000. Accordingly, Tyson
properly removed this case to federal court. 
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. No. 6) is denied.

2.

Within fourteen (14) days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff shall

comply with Local Rule 15 by filing an entirely new amended complaint that incorporates
all of the changes to his initial state court petition (Doc. No. 3) that are described in his
“Amendment to Petition” (Doc. No. 5). The document shall be entitled “First Amended
Complaint.” Because Tyson has already filed an answer (Doc. No. 8), no additional
responsive pleading by Tyson will be necessary.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 11th day of March, 2016.

________________________________
LEONARD T. STRAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7