Brumfield v. Barrett et al
ORDER granting 2 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is directed to submit an initial partial filing fee of $12.00 by no later than 11/21/16. Additionally, after plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the institution having custody of plaintiff is directed to collect and remit monthly payments. See text of Order for details. The clerk's office is directed to send a copy of this order and the notice of collection of filing fee to the appropriate official a t the place where plaintiff is an inmate. Plaintiff's action is dismissed. The clerk's office is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. (Copy w/nef mailed to pro se plaintiff; copy mailed to Warden/Administrator of Fort Dodge Correctional Facility.) Signed by Judge Leonard T Strand on 10/26/16. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
REBECCA BARRETT, NETTI
RENSHAW, DON HARRIS, ROBERT
This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s October 14, 2016, application to
proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). Along with his application, plaintiff submitted
a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1) and supporting documentation (Doc.
I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Plaintiff did not submit the statutory filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (requiring
filing fee). In order for a court to authorize the commencement of an action without the
prepayment of the filing fee, a person must submit an affidavit that includes a statement
of all the assets the person possesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In addition, a prisoner
must submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent)
for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint, obtained from
the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner was or is confined. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Based on the plaintiff’s statements, it is clear that he does not have
sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee. Thus, in forma pauperis status shall be
granted to plaintiff. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
A prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full
$350.00 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The full filing fee will be collected even
if the court dismisses the case because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted or seeks money damages against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Because the court deems it appropriate to
grant plaintiff in forma pauperis status, plaintiff is required to pay the full filing fee by
making payments on an installment basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see also In re
Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he [Prisoner Litigation Reform Act]
makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner brings a civil
action or files an appeal.”).
Concerning the computation of the initial partial filing fee, plaintiff is required to
submit 20 percent of the greater of his average monthly account balance or average
monthly deposits for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). Based on plaintiff’s statements, the court finds that the initial partial filing
fee is $12.00. Id. Plaintiff shall submit $12.00 by no later than November 21, 2016. Id.
If necessary, plaintiff may request in a written motion an extension of time to pay the
initial partial filing fee.
In addition to the initial partial filing fee, plaintiff must “make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the prisoner’s institution to collect
the additional monthly payments and forward them to the court. Specifically,
[a]fter payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner
shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of
the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall
forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of
the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10
until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Therefore, after plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the
remaining installments shall be collected by the institution having custody of plaintiff. See
id. The clerk’s office shall send a copy of this order and the notice of collection of filing
fee to the appropriate official at the place where plaintiff is an inmate.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se complaint must be liberally construed. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,
9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Bernards
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). In addition, unless the facts alleged
are clearly baseless, they must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). A court, however, can dismiss at any time a complaint filed
in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A claim is “frivolous”
if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989); accord Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994). An action fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). Accordingly, a court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those
claims that fail “‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .’”, see Parkhurst
v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555), or that
are premised on meritless legal theories or clearly lack any factual basis, see Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 325. See, e.g., Denton, 504 U.S. at 27 (considering frivolousness); Myers v.
Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a district court may dismiss an
action if an affirmative defense exists).
III. CLAIMS ASSERTED
Currently confined at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility in Fort Dodge, Iowa,
plaintiff submitted a complaint to redress issues that are related to the execution of his
sentence and his confinement within the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. Jurisdiction is
predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue appears to be proper
as the events giving rise to the instant action occurred in this district and the defendants are
located in this district.
In the statement of claim portion of the complaint, plaintiff generally asserts that the
defendants: discriminated against him and interfered with his relationship with his wife and
an ex-girlfriend to whom he tried to write, deprived him of the opportunity to be with his
family, retaliated against him, violated policies and procedures, harassed and defamed him
and refused to remedy the situation.
As relief, plaintiff states that he wants: the
disciplinary report dismissed, a transfer to another facility, parole to be granted, the
defendants to be terminated and punitive damages in light of the burden that the
defendants’ actions have placed on his marriage and the cruel and unusual punishment that
Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally
protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978).
However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides no substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). “One cannot go into court and claim a
‘violation of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983’ — for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 by itself does not protect
anyone against anything.” Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides a remedy for violations of all “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws [of the United States].” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright, 510
U.S. at 271 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 “merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.”); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (“Constitution and laws” means 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides remedies for
violations of rights created by federal statute, as well as those created by the
Constitution.). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) the
alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Plaintiff’s Claims
Given the facts alleged in the complaint, the court concludes that the plaintiff is
unable to rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is primarily challenging the execution of his state
sentence, not the conditions of his confinement, and, therefore, he can only bring this
action as a habeas corpus action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005)
(stating that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is barred if the plaintiff’s claims necessarily imply
the invalidity of his confinement or its duration); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500
(1973) (finding that a writ of habeas corpus is the only federal remedy available if a
plaintiff is challenging the validity of his conviction or the duration of his incarceration and
seeking a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release); Deloria v.
Lightenberg, 400 F. App’x 117, 118 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); see also Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641, 643-44 (1997) (concluding that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damage action in which the inmate did not seek restoration
of good time credits to avoid being out of court under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973)); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding that an
inmate is unable to seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for prison discipline that
resulted in a loss of good time credits until the inmate has successfully challenged such
discipline through habeas or some other proceeding).
Stated differently, plaintiff’s
challenge cannot be brought in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he would
necessarily have to demonstrate the invalidity of his loss of good time to successfully
obtain relief. Because he is primarily attacking the validity of his confinement, rather than
the conditions of his confinement, the plaintiff can only bring an action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 after exhausting state remedies.
Alternatively, the court concludes that the plaintiff’s assertions do not give rise to
a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see
also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (stating that “exhaustion in cases covered
by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory”); Washington v. Uner, 273 F. App’x 575, 576-77 (8th
Cir. 2008) (applying § 1997e(a)).
Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is
necessary so that corrections officials are afforded the “‘time and opportunity to address
complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.’” Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 525). And, despite the fact that
exhaustion is an affirmative defense that a defendant bears the burden of proving, a court
may still raise the issue of exhaustion sua sponte if it is plain on the face of the complaint
that a grievance procedure is unexhausted. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-16
(2007) (clarifying that a complaint cannot be dismissed sua sponte for failing to plead and
prove exhaustion but failure to exhaust can be a basis for dismissal for failure to state a
claim if the allegations in the complaint suffice to establish that ground).
Here, plaintiff acknowledges in his complaint that a prisoner grievance procedure
is available to him.1 He also acknowledges that prior to filing the instant action, he did not
exhaust the procedures that are available to him. And, the record indicates that plaintiff
did not submit a grievance or exhaust the procedure available to him prior to commencing
the instant lawsuit. Consequently, plaintiff did not properly exhaust any of his claims. See
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84 (stating that the exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if an
inmate files “an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or
appeal” or effectively bypasses the administrative process simply by waiting until the
grievance procedure is no longer available); Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157
(11th Cir. 2005) (same); Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 2005)
(stating that a prisoner must take advantage of the procedure offered); Jernigan v.
Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that an inmate must
properly complete the grievance process); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th
Cir. 2002) (stating that a person must follow the rules governing the filing and prosecution
of a claim); Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488-89 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that exhaustion
requirements are not met if an inmate made some error in following the grievance
procedure); Poro v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring
complaints and appeals to be filed in the place and at the time the prison’s administrative
rules require); Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) (reiterating that a
plaintiff cannot claim that it is futile to exhaust his remedies because he is now time-barred
under the regulations).
The Iowa Department of Corrections provides its policies online:
http://www.doc.state.ia.us/Policies.asp. A review of IO-OR-06 indicates that a grievance
must be filed with the grievance officer within 30 days of the alleged incident.
Because the record demonstrates that the plaintiff did not comply with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a), it is appropriate to dismiss the plaintiff’s action. See Castano v. Neb. Dep’t
of Corr., 201 F.3d 1023, 1024 (8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
barred plaintiffs’ assertion that defendants failed to provide qualified interpreters at
disciplinary hearings and institutional programs that bear on eligibility for parole); accord
Martin v. Iowa, 752 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2014). Further, plaintiff’s allegations do not
indicate that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right. See
Van Zee v. Hanson, 630 F.3d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 2011) (“To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) that the
alleged conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right.”).
Plaintiff asserts that the defendants are interfering with his parole, but he does not have a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the possibility of parole. See Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 9-11 (1979); see also Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d
643, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that there is no liberty interest in the possibility of
parole that arises from the Constitution); Stewart v. Davies, 954 F.2d 515, 516 (8th Cir.
1992) (concluding that the plaintiff has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
possibility of parole and, therefore, his transfer to Iowa did not violate due process of
Although liberty interests may arise from state law, see Bd. of Pardons v. Allen,
482 U.S. 369, 376-81 (1987); Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 2009), the
focus of the inquiry is on whether the alleged change in the conditions of confinement
imposes “‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life’”, Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The denial of parole is insufficient
to confer a liberty interest because the duration of plaintiff’s original sentence was not
altered. See Morgan v. Bartruff, 545 F. App’x 592, 592-93 (8th Cir. 2013) (deciding that
Iowa inmate did not state a valid due process claim based on his inability to be heard and
considered for parole eligibility); Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility,
88 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that removing an inmate from a work release
program and returning him to prison did not deprive the inmate of a liberty interest
because prison was not atypical of what inmates have to endure in daily prison life); cf.
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219-20 (2011) (stating that the conclusion that state law
created a liberty interest in parole was a reasonable application of Allen, 482 U.S. at 37381, and Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12); Hamilton v. Brownlee, 237 F. App’x 114, 115 (8th
Cir. 2007) (finding that parole statutes of Arkansas do not create a protectable liberty
interest in discretionary parole procedures).2
Aside from being unable to seek parole or to be released, plaintiff is unable to seek
a transfer. A prisoner has no constitutional right to a prison transfer or to be housed in the
prison of his choice. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Lyon
v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 1984). In addition, no claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 exists because a violation of state statutory law is not the equivalent of the federal
Constitution. See Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325, 328-29 (8th Cir. 1993) (assuming that
Iowa Code section 903A.5 required the plaintiff to be given the credit he requested and
concluding that the failure to give credit does not amount to a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983). Absent the existence of a protected liberty interest, the mere violation of state law
does not state a claim under the federal Constitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 328; see
also Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the failure to
follow state law or policy does not in and of itself state a constitutional claim); Gardner
v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no § 1983 liability for violating
Having determined that the adverse consequences from the denial of parole do not
give rise to a liberty interest, the court declines to consider whether the procedures
surrounding the decision to deny parole are constitutionally adequate. See Persechini, 651
F.3d at 808.
prison policy.”); Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause does not federalize state-law procedural requirements.”); Hughes v. Lee
Cty. Dist. Court, 9 F.3d 1366, 1367 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that the assertion that the
state violated its own procedural guidelines does not state a federal claim); Swenson v.
Trickey, 995 F.2d 132, 135 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding that an inmate may not base a
procedural due process claim on a violation of state procedural law). As such, the alleged
failure to follow the policies and procedures of the Iowa Department of Corrections does
not state a valid claim.
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding retaliation by the defendants also fail as a matter of
law. “To prevail on a retaliation claim, [a plaintiff] must show 1) he engaged in a
protected expression, 2) he suffered an adverse action, and 3) the adverse action was
causally related to the protected expression.” Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 450 (8th
Cir. 2010) (citing Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir. 2004)). An inmate
claiming retaliation is required to meet a substantial burden of proving the actual
motivating factor for the adverse action, such as placement in administrative segregation,
is as alleged. See Griggs v. Norris, 297 F. App’x 553, 555 (8th Cir. 2008); Sisneros v.
Nix, 95 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 1996); Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 736-38 (8th Cir.
1993); see also Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1155-57 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing
prima facie case of retaliatory discipline). “Merely alleging that an act was retaliatory is
Meuir v. Green Cnty. Jail Emp., 487 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2007)
(citing Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985)). Here, it is clear that plaintiff
does not state a viable claim because there is some evidence of a rule violation. See
Sanders v. Hobbs, 773 F.3d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that some evidence that an
inmate actually committed a rule violation defeats a retaliatory discipline claim).
Moreover, plaintiff did not assert that he was suing the defendants in their individual
capacities. Consequently, he has sued the defendants only in their official capacities. See
Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d 762, 766 n.4 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that it is assumed
that a plaintiff is suing a defendant only in his or her official capacity if a plaintiff does not
expressly and unambiguously state that a defendant is being sued in his or her individual
Plaintiff, however, does not allege that his disciplinary proceedings were
conducted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or as a result of a failure to properly
supervise or train an employee. Given his allegations, plaintiff’s action is subject to
dismissal. See id. at 766-67 (determining that plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts
to show a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
Lastly, because plaintiff does not allege that he suffered a physical injury, his
ability to recover compensatory damages is limited. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also
Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the availability of
compensatory damages); Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) limits the recovery for mental or emotional injury in all federal
actions brought by prisoners). The alleged facts do not justify the award of compensatory
damages, which are only available if an inmate has the requisite physical injury to support
a claim for mental or emotional suffering. And, the alleged facts do not justify the award
of punitive damages, which are only available if an inmate establishes that the defendants
acted with evil motive or reckless indifference. See Williams, 662 F.3d at 1011-12
(discussing the standard for awarding punitive damages). Even if plaintiff stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted, only nominal damages would only be available.3
To the extent plaintiff is attempting to assert state-law claims, the court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Brown v. Peterson, 156 F. App’x 870, 871 (8th
Cir. 2005) (concluding that the decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over statelaw claim is discretionary); see also McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1994)
(indicating that subsection (c) of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 clearly gives a court discretion to reject
jurisdiction over supplemental claims). In light of the court’s initial review of plaintiff’s
claims and his statement as to the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, there is no reason to
retain jurisdiction over the supplemental claims, if any, that plaintiff desires to pursue.
In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed as frivolous or for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because the court deems it
appropriate to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and/or 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), the dismissal of this action shall count against plaintiff for purposes
of the three-dismissal rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted.
Plaintiff is directed to submit an initial partial filing of $12.00 by no later
than November 21, 2016. If necessary, plaintiff may request in a written
motion an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee. Additionally,
after plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the institution having custody
of plaintiff is directed to collect and remit monthly payments in the manner
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Until the $350.00 filing fee is paid in
full, plaintiff is obligated to pay and the institution having custody of him is
obligated to forward 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to
his account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00.
The clerk’s office is directed to send a copy of this order and the notice of
collection of filing fee to the appropriate official at the place where plaintiff
is an inmate.
Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is dismissed pursuant to pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The dismissal of the instant action counts against plaintiff for purposes of the
three-dismissal rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The clerk’s office is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 26th day of October, 2016.
LEONARD T. STRAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Fort Dodge Correctional Facility, Fort Dodge, Iowa
NOTICE OF COLLECTION OF FILING FEE
You are hereby given notice that Marquis Brumfield, #6269639, an inmate at your
facility, filed the following lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa: Brumfield v. Barrett et al., Case No. C16-3109-LTS. The inmate was
granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), which requires partial
payments of the $350.00 filing fee. Based on the inmate’s account information, the court
has assessed an initial partial filing fee of $12.00, which the inmate must pay now to the
clerk of court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the [inmate] shall
be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the
preceding month’s income credited to [his] account. The
agency having custody of the [inmate] shall forward payments
from [his] account to the clerk of the court each time the
amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Therefore, you must monitor the account and send payments to
the clerk of court according to the system provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), that is,
after the plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee of $12.00, you should begin making
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the inmate’s
account. Please make the appropriate arrangements to have these fees deducted and sent
to the court as instructed.
/s/ djs, Deputy Clerk
Robert L. Phelps
U.S. District Court Clerk
Northern District of Iowa
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