Sharp et al v. Tyson Foods Inc

Filing 316

ORDER denying 305 Motion for Directed Verdict. Signed by Judge John A Jarvey on 09/26/2012. (Cavanagh, Maura)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
PEG BOUAPHAKEO, et al., individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

No. 5:07-cv-04009

vs.
ORDER

TYSON FOODS, INC.,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for a judgment as a
matter of law and motion to decertify or, in the alternative, for a new trial on damages,
filed on October 24, 2011. [Dkt. No. 305]. Plaintiffs filed their resistance to Defendant’s
motion on November 15, 2011.

[Dkt. No. 310].

Defendant replied to Plaintiffs’

resistance on December 1, 2011. [Dkt. No. 313]. For reasons more fully explained
below, the Court denies Defendant’s motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
These motions stem from a five-year dispute between the parties that culminated in
a two-week trial in Sioux City, Iowa in September of 2011. The Plaintiffs are all current
or former employees of Defendant at their Storm Lake, Iowa facility.

All Tyson

production workers at the Storm Lake plant wear at least some items of personal
protective equipment (“PPE”), which includes hard hats, ear plugs, boots, frocks, hair
nets, hard plastic arm guards, mesh aprons, mesh sleeves or Kevlar sleeves, scabbards,
cotton gloves, rubber gloves, cut-resistant (Kevlar) gloves, and mesh gloves.

Tyson Storm Lake hourly production workers must have all required and cleaned
PPE on before the first piece of meat product reaches their work station on the assembly

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line.

Employees are not permitted to perform work on the production line without

wearing all required PPE, and they are disciplined if they are not wearing their required
PPE. Tyson pays its Storm Lake hourly production workers, in part, on a “gang time”
basis. “Gang time” is the time that the processing lines are moving and during which
production workers are physically at the assembly line while the lines are moving and
producing product. In and of itself, “gang time” does not record time that production
workers spend donning, doffing, and cleaning themselves and their PPE before and after
“gang time” and at unpaid meal breaks. In addition to “gang time” Tyson pays its hourly
production workers “extra” minutes per day to compensate them for donning, doffing, and
washing their PPE. The payment of “extra” minutes beyond the “gang time” for donning
and doffing activities is referred to as “K-Code” time.

The parties have long disputed whether or not this K-Code time adequately
compensates employees for the time they spend donning and doffing their PPE.

In

February 2007 Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant alleging violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection law. Both a collective action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and a Rule 23 class were certified in this matter, and the case
proceeded as a collective and class action. In September of 2011 a jury trial was held
among the parties to resolve these issues. After the parties presented evidence to the jury
for nine days, the case was submitted to the jury on September 23, 2011. The jury
returned with a verdict on September 26, 2011. The jury found that the plaintiffs proved
that the time spent donning and doffing their PPE was “work” within the meaning of the
Fair Labor Standards Act; that this “work” was “integral and indispensable” to the
employees’ gang-time work; that the meal break was a bona fide meal period; that the
donning and doffing activities at issue in the case were not “de minimis,” and that the
plaintiffs proved that they were entitled to additional compensation for their donning and
doffing activities. The jury awarded $2,892,378.70 in damages to the Plaintiffs.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD
a. Judgment as a Matter of Law

“Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when no reasonable jury could have
found for the nonmoving party.” S. Wine and Spirits of Nev. v. Mountain Valley Spring Co., LLC,
646 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Mattis v. Carlon Elec. Prods., 295 F.3d 856, 860 (8th
Cir. 2002)). In the Court’s analysis, “we may not weigh the credibility of evidence, and conflicts
in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the verdict.” Id. (citing Schooley v. Orkin
Extermination, Co., Inc., 502 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2007)). If no evidence supports the
nonmoving party—that is, if all the evidence points in favor of the moving party—then the Court
may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. Texarkana Ark. Sch. Dist. No. 7,
Slip Copy, 2012 WL 527907, at *1 (W.D. Ark. February 16, 2012).

“Where conflicting inferences reasonably can be drawn from the evidence, it is the role of
the jury, not the court, to determine which inferences shall be drawn.” Hunt v. Neb. Pub. Power
Dist., 282 F.3d 1021, 1029 (8th Cir. 2002). Therefore, it is inappropriate for this Court to
overturn a jury verdict “unless, after giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, there still
exists a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached so that no
reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

b. New Trial

This Court may order a new trial only under the circumstances where a “miscarriage of
justice” would occur without one. White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1992) (“When
through judicial balancing the trial court determines that the first trial has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice, the court may order a new trial, otherwise not.” Id.) “A new trial may not be granted
on the grounds that a jury’s verdict is excessive unless the court concludes that the jury’s verdict

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is a plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking result.” Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811
F.2d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
In this case it cannot be said that no reasonable juror could have found for the Plaintiffs, or
that the jury’s verdict was a monstrous or shocking result. Defendant argues that the evidence at
trial was not sufficient to support liability because Plaintiffs failed to show that each individual
employee had not already been fully compensated for any overtime hours they worked.
However, Plaintiffs called two experts to help determine both liability and damages. Dr. Kenneth
Mericle conducted a time study at Defendant’s facility and determined how much time Plaintiffs
spent donning and doffing their PPE. Dr. Leisle Fox used these numbers to calculate the amount
of money owed to each Plaintiff for these activities. Dr. Fox did this by creating a database that
included all Plaintiffs. [Tr. Ex. 349]. In this database, she made calculations for each Plaintiff
individually by subtracting what was already paid to the employee in K-code time or determining
if the employee was not owed extra payment for the week because their work did not exceed 40
hours and calculated what was owed to them on a week-by-week basis.

Additionally, Plaintiffs provided evidence from several opt-in plaintiffs, as well as Tyson
employees, who testified to the general practices of employees regarding the donning and doffing
of PPE. This included which PPE items were used by different groups of employees—including
knife-wielders and non-knife-wielders—how often people donned and doffed these items, how
these items were stored, cleaned, and sanitized, and how long it generally took for people to don
and doff the items. Also included in the evidence was testimony regarding Defendant’s practice
of paying on the “gang time” system and adding K-code time to individual employees’ paychecks
in order to compensate them for the time the company believed it should take the employees to
don and doff their PPE. Witnesses also testified that Plaintiffs spent more time donning and
doffing their PPE than Defendant paid them in K-code time.

The Court finds this evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Defendant was
liable for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law,

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and that it was also sufficient for their damages calculations. It is not the role of the Court to
attempt to divine the motivations of the jury or to determine the precise calculations of the
damages they awarded. See LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342, 354 (8th Cir.
1981) (“The trial judge is not free to speculate as to the reasons for the jury’s verdict.” Id.)
Instead, the Court must only look to see if there was sufficient evidence in the record from which
the jury could make the determinations they did. Plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence in the
form of witness testimony and the expert calculations of Dr. Mericle and Dr. Fox. In this case,
there is not a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion, nor did a miscarriage
of justice occur. The Court concludes that the Defendant failed to meet the heavy burden the law
requires to overturn a jury’s verdict and award of damages.

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law and

Motion to Decertify or, in the alternative, for a New Trial on Damages [Dkt. No. 305] is
DENIED.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2012.

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