Jackson v. McDonalds et al
Filing
62
ORDER granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 32 . Amended Complaint 12 is hereby dismissed. Trial scheduled 9/24/2012 and final pretrial conference scheduled 9/12/2012 is cancelled. Any and all other pending motions are denied as moot. Signed by Magistrate Judge Leonard T Strand on 6/26/2012. (copy w/nef mailed to non-ecf filer) (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
RODNEY F. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
No. C10-4058-LTS
vs.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SCOTT GREEN; KATHLEEN PETRIE;
KEITH PETRIE, and KPTOO, INC.;
Defendants.
____________________
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After several attempts to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a), on December 23, 2010, pro se plaintiff Rodney Jackson filed an
amended complaint (Doc. No. 12) against “McDonalds,” Scott Green, Kathleen Petrie,
and Keith Petrie. The amended complaint describes the cause of action as follows:
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
[O]n or about March, 2008, I Rodney Jackson was on
parole to th[e] small, all white, town/community of Sheldon,
Iowa, with a population of about 5000 people.
[O]n or abut July or August, 2008, I ... became
employed at this McDonald of Sheldon, Iowa, and ... since my
date of hire ..., I [was] harassed by two fellow co-workers,
Russell and [an]other co-worker who[se name I] do not know,
and [both of the] co-workers who did such harassment [were]
white.
I ... immediately brought [the] matter/complaint to the
attention of [the] McDonald store manager, Toni Delf ..., and
reported [the] matter to ... Delf on 2 or 3 occasions to no
reply.
I ... then decided to contact th[e] McDonald District
Manager Scott Green concerning [my] complaint, and ... [he]
stated to me that he [would] investigate [the] complaint and ...
get back with me. I ... also notified [Mr. Green] concerning
[my] complaint[s] on 2 or 3 occasions to no reply.
[Due] to my making such complaint, ... my hour[s] of
work were cut in half, from 32 hours per week to 16 hours per
week. Once again, I ... attempted to contact [the] District
Manager Scott Green concerning all matter[s] mentioned in
this complaint, once again to no reply. I ... left messages for
[him] to return my call, [but] never received any.
[O]n or about September 12, 2008, I [broke] my ankle
... [during a] robbery [in which] I was the [victim].
I ... notified th[e] store manager Toni Delf of [the
robbery], and [Delf told] me to save any and all [of] my doctor
medical documents together and ... when I [was] released to
return to work, ... to bring [her] copies of such medical
record[s].
I ... also notified [the] store manager (Toni Delf) of my
hospitalization for 2 to 3 days [due] to such ankle injury.
Upon my ... being released by the doctor to return to work
with some work restrictions, I ... notified [the] store manager
Toni Delf, ... [who] ... stated to me ... that [I] no longer
work[ed] at [the] McDonald of Sheldon. Toni Delf failed to
state any reasons [for] my termination. Once again I attempted
to contact Scott Greene ... to no reply.
[This] McDonald only employed two black males at the
time frame mentioned above, and the other black male [had]
mix[ed] race kids [who] also worked at this McDonalds.
I ... believe that because of my race ... I was terminated
and ... because I am an African American who [filed/made] a
complaint against two fellow white co-workers at ...
McDonalds, this termination did occur.
I ... do believe that such termination did occur by this
store manager Toni Delf as a form of retaliation for my ...
calling on this Scott Green District Manager.
[O]ne of the harassing co-work[ers] (Russell) was
getting about 20 to 80 hours per week after my hours were cut
in half.
[I] was replaced by a white person, [who] was paid
$1 dollar more [per hour] than [what I was paid].
[On] or about January 30, 2008, this McDonald owner
Keith Petrie did file/make bogus false charges against me
2
[which] [I] believe [were] illegal actions by this Keith Peterie
to prevent me from receiving my unemployment benefit[s] ....
[I] was denied by ... Store Manager Toni Delf the
training to close the store at closing time.
On January 12, 2011, the named defendants appeared and answered (Doc. No. 16)
the amended complaint. On February 18, 2011, Mr. Jackson moved (Doc. No. 19) to
amend his complaint to substitute “KPTOO, Inc.” for McDonalds as the proper partydefendant. The court granted the motion on February 22, 2011 (Doc. No. 20).
On December 8, 2011, the defendants filed a motion (Doc. No. 32) for summary
judgment, together with a brief (Doc. No. 32-1), a statement of material facts (Doc.
No. 32-2), and an appendix (Doc. No. 32-2). Mr. Jackson responded to the motion on
January 6, 2012 (Doc. No. 36) and supplemented his response later that same day (Doc.
No. 40). On February 13, 2012, Mr. Jackson filed additional materials (Doc. No. 48).1
On February 24, 2012, the court held initial telephonic arguments on the motion for
summary judgment. Mr. Jackson appeared personally and the defendants appeared by
attorney Jeffrey R. Mohrhauser. As a result of a discussion during that hearing, the court
granted Mr. Jackson time to submit an amended resistance to the defendants’ motion by
no later than April 1, 2012 (Doc. No. 53). On March 8, 2012, Mr. Jackson filed a
response (Doc. No. 56) to the defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. On March 23,
2012, Mr. Jackson filed a brief (Doc. No. 57) in support of his amended resistance to
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants filed a reply (Doc. No. 59) on
April 30, 2012.
On June 19, 2012, the court held additional telephonic arguments on the motion for
summary judgment. Mr. Jackson appeared personally and the defendants appeared by
attorney Robert N. Stewart. The matter is now fully submitted.
1
On the same day, Mr. Jackson also filed a motion (Doc. No. 47) to amend his complaint to
allege a conspiracy among the defendants to have his parole revoked. The court denied that motion on
February 24, 2012 (Doc. No. 53).
3
II. RELEVANT FACTS
The parties. Mr. Jackson is a 47 year-old African-American male who currently
resides in Atlanta, Georgia. Defendant KPTOO, Inc. (“KPTOO”) is an Iowa corporation
with its principal place of business in Sioux City, Iowa. KPTOO operates various
McDonalds restaurants in Northwest Iowa, Northeast Nebraska and Southeast South
Dakota, including one located in Sheldon, Iowa (“Sheldon McDonalds”). Defendants
Keith Petrie (“Keith”) and Kathleen Petrie (“Kathy”) are the shareholders of KPTOO.
Defendant Scott Green (“Green”) is the Director of Operations.
Mr. Jackson’s Employment.
Mr. Jackson became employed at the Sheldon
McDonalds on July 14, 2008. His title was “crew member” and his responsibilities
included cooking, assembling sandwiches, stocking freezers, preparing dress tables and
cleaning. Mr. Jackson’s direct supervisor was Will Collins, an African-American male
who was the shift manager. Toni Delfs was the general manager of the restaurant and
Green was the operations manager.
Mr. Jackson was an hourly employee. During the two months he worked at
Sheldon McDonalds, he worked between 40 and 60 hours per two-week pay period. He
earned $8.10 per hour.
Mr. Jackson’s supervisors cited him for disciplinary reasons on multiple occasions.
On August 16, 2008, Manager Jennifer Chancellor cited Mr. Jackson for abusive
language/arguing/fighting; being uncooperative; and insubordination.
Apparently
Mr. Jackson was yelling at co-workers because they were bumping into each other. When
Chancellor tried to talk with Jackson, he was not receptive. Chancellor wrote: “I told
[Jackson] to settle down and he still continued with his disrespectful behavior. I told
[Jackson] he needs to respect everyone here and he didn’t like what I was saying so plans
on talking to Toni [Delfs].” On August 21, 2008, Delfs wrote: “Have received numerous
complaints about threatening behavior from [Jackson] to other crew members. This is
unacceptable and is a form of harassment. If I get further complaints concerning this issue
4
will be terminated as all of our employees are entitled to a safe work environment and this
is creating a hostile work environment.”
Mr. Jackson’s Complaints. Mr. Jackson claims he was having conflicts with two
Caucasian co-workers, Russell Koerting and Richard Haller. Around September 11, 2008,
he reported these problems to Delfs. Delfs spoke with both Koerting and Haller about
these problems on September 11, 2008. There is no evidence that the conflicts were of a
racial nature or that Mr. Jackson alleged that he was being harassed on the basis of his
race.
Mr. Jackson also alleges he complained to Green regarding his hours being cut. He
claims Green promised to investigate this matter and follow up with him, but never did.
According to the defendants, Mr. Jackson contacted Green on two occasions. During the
first contact, Mr. Jackson complained about his hours being cut. Green told Mr. Jackson
that he would follow-up by contacting Delfs. Mr. Jackson later called Green again to
complain about his hours. He alleged that management at the Sheldon McDonalds
retaliated against him for his prior call to Green. Mr. Jackson also informed Green about
his run-in with Koerting and Haller. Green told Mr. Jackson that he would talk with Delfs
and call him back. According to the defendants, Green attempted to call Mr. Jackson back
on two occasions but was unsuccessful both times. The first time, Mr. Jackson was so
impaired that he did not know who Green was or why Green was calling. The second
time, Green left a voice-mail message for Mr. Jackson but never heard back.
Mr. Jackson’s Injury. On September 13, 2008, Jackson contacted a McDonalds
store in Sioux City and advised that he was in the hospital with a broken ankle. This
information was relayed to Delfs at the Sheldon McDonalds. After his release from the
hospital, Mr. Jackson came into the restaurant and spoke with Delfs about returning to
work. At the time he came into the restaurant, he was on crutches and had not been
medically cleared to return to work. Pursuant to store policy, Mr. Jackson was required
to have a doctor’s note authorizing him to return to work. Defendants allege Mr. Jackson
5
was told to return to work on October 14 and that he would need a doctor’s note. Mr.
Jackson denies this and contends he was simply told to maintain monthly contact with
Delfs and to let her know when he was cleared to return to work.
It is undisputed that Mr. Jackson failed to show up for work on October 14, 2008.
In response to his failure to show, Delfs contacted Kathy at KPTOO’s corporate office in
Sioux City. Delfs informed her that Jackson was supposed to come in for work that day
but did not show or call. The result of the telephone conversation was that Delfs was to
wait and see if Jackson would show up or call the restaurant within the next few days.
Termination of Employment. Mr. Jackson never returned to work. During October
or November 2008, Delfs felt that Mr. Jackson’s position needed to be filled. Since Mr.
Jackson had not called in and had not returned, Delfs hired another person to replace
Jackson. In November 2008, Mr. Jackson called the Sheldon McDonalds and asked Delfs
about the status of his position. Delfs informed Mr. Jackson that she had terminated his
employment because he had not shown up for one month and had not called. She told Mr.
Jackson that although his position had been filled, he could reapply. Mr. Jackson became
enraged and swore at Delfs. Delfs told Mr. Jackson that he could discuss this matter with
Keith or Kathy.
After her conversation with Mr. Jackson, Delfs called KPTOO’s corporate office
and spoke with Kathy. She told Kathy that she had decided to terminate Mr. Jackson’s
employment and hire another employee because he had abandoned his position. Kathy told
Delfs she agreed with this decision.
Mr. Jackson’s Threats. On January 27, 2009, Mr. Jackson called KPTOO’s
corporate office and spoke to Kellie Wagner. Mr. Jackson was irate during this phone
call. He swore at Wagner and referred to Keith as a motherf---er and a son of a b--ch.
Jackson told Wagner to “tell Keith and tell Keith’s wife that I’ll kill the motherf---ers.”
He also told Wagner that he wanted to “beat that b--ch.” Wagner recorded this telephone
call. She then contacted Keith and informed him of Mr. Jackson’s threats. According to
6
the defendants, Jackson is no longer eligible for re-hire because of the threats made during
this telephone call.2
African-Americans Employed at the Sheldon McDonalds. Mr. Jackson has alleged
that he was one of only two African-Americans employed at the Sheldon McDonalds.
However, the defendants have produced evidence showing that as of September 13, 2008,
which was the last day Mr. Jackson worked at the store, five of the fourteen employees in
Jackson’s department were African-American males.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims
asserted in a case. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
A material fact is one that “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.’” Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, “the substantive law
will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Facts that are
“critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or
unnecessary” are not. Id.
An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v.
Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
2
Mr. Jackson’s response to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts contains a general denial
of the allegations concerning this telephone call. Doc. No. 56 at 4. However, he has cited to nothing
in the record supporting his denial. The defendants submitted a recording of the call and caller ID
evidence indicating that the call originated from Mr. Jackson’s then-residence in Sheldon, Iowa.
7
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party’ on the question,” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409
F.3d 984, at 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Evidence that only
provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586,
or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.
As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting
the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. Essentially, a
genuine issue of material fact determination, and thus the availability of summary
judgment, is a determination of “whether a proper jury question [is] presented.” Id. at 249.
A proper jury question is present if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id.
The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of
the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving
party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate
“specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.” Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415
F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmovant must show an alleged
issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to
make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to
which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, the court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 58788. Further, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable
8
inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, “because we view the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt
to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383
F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, “the court's function is to determine whether a
dispute about a material fact is genuine.” Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372,
1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996).
While it has sometimes been suggested that summary judgment should be granted
sparingly in employment discrimination cases,3 the Eighth Circuit has made it clear that
such cases are not subject to unique summary judgment standards:
The panel statements asserting a different standard of review for
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases are contrary to
Supreme Court precedent. The Court has reiterated that district courts should
not “treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.”
Reeves [v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.], 530 U.S. [133] at 148, 120
S.Ct. 2097 [(2000)], quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
524, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), quoting USPS Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403
(1983). In a landmark case, the Court wrote:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of
the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed “to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”
Celotex Corp. [v. Catrett], 477 U.S. [317] at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 [(1986)]
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). Because summary judgment is not disfavored and
is designed for “every action,” panel statements to the contrary are
unauthorized and should not be followed. There is no “discrimination case
exception” to the application of summary judgment, which is a useful
pretrial tool to determine whether any case, including one alleging
discrimination, merits a trial. Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069,
3
See, e.g., Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works, 425 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2005); Woods v.
Perry, 375 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[S]ummary judgment should be used sparingly in
employment discrimination cases....”); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“[S]ummary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases.”).
9
1077 (8th Cir.2010), citing Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d
1112, 1118 (8th Cir.2006), and quoting Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d
1140, 1144 (8th Cir.1999).
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
B. Employment Discrimination
Mr. Jackson claims the defendants violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. et seq., by terminating his employment with KTPOO because
of his race. The defendants deny this allegation.
A plaintiff can prove a Title VII claim by either direct evidence or by the indirect
method of proof set out under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). Mr. Jackson has submitted no direct evidence of race discrimination. In the
absence of direct evidence, Mr. Jackson’s claim is subject to the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis. See Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 934 (8th Cir.
2006). The first step of that analysis requires the plaintiff to establish the following
elements of a prima facie case: (1) that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2)
that he was meeting the employer's legitimate job expectations; (3) that he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) that similarly situated employees outside the protected
class were treated differently. Twymon, 462 F.3d at 934; Green v. Franklin Nat'l Bank
of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 913 (8th Cir. 2006); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817,
820 (8th Cir. 2006). “If a prima facie case is established, a ‘burden of production then
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing the
plaintiff.’” Twymon, 462 F.3d at 934-35 (quoting Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co.,
424 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2005)).
If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden returns to the plaintiff to
present evidence that the reason offered by the employer is actually a pretext for
discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1993); McDonnell
10
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. To prove pretext, a plaintiff must both (a) discredit the
employer's asserted reason for termination and (b) show the circumstances permit drawing
the reasonable inference that the real reason for terminating the plaintiff was his race.
Johnson v. AT & T Corp., 422 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 2005).
The proffered
non-discriminatory reason for termination need not be factually correct so long as the
employer honestly believed the asserted grounds at the time of the termination. Id. at 762.
The Prima Facie Case. The evidence permits a finding for Mr. Jackson on the first
three elements of his prima facie case. However, he has failed to show similarly-situated
employees outside the protected class were treated differently. He could have established
the fourth element with evidence of KPTOO employees outside the protected class who
engaged in similar conduct but were disciplined less harshly. Chappell v. The Bilco Co.,
675 F.3d 1110, 1119 (8th Cir. 2012).
No such evidence is in the record.
More
specifically, there is no evidence of any other employee who failed to appear for work for
an extended period of time, failed to provide documentation concerning the need for
medical leave, but remained employed by KPTOO. In short, Mr. Jackson’s claim of
unlawful discrimination fails as a matter of law because he has failed to produce evidence
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Pretext. Even if Mr. Jackson established a prima facie case, his discrimination
claim would fail as a matter of law due to the lack of evidence of pretext. As noted above,
if he would have established a prima facie case, then the defendants would have the burden
of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his discharge. The defendants
have done so by submitting evidence that Mr. Jackson’s employment was terminated
because he failed to call or appear for work for an extended period of time. This shifts the
burden to Mr. Jackson to (a) discredit the asserted reason and (b) show that the
circumstances permit drawing the reasonable inference that Mr. Jackson’s race was the real
reason. He has not done so.
11
Mr. Jackson contends it was his understanding that he was to check in with KPTOO
each month and let the company know when he was cleared to return to work. Even
accepting this to be true, however, would not end the analysis. In other words, Mr.
Jackson must do more than simply dispute the facts surrounding his discharge. He must
point the court to evidence that would allow the jury to find he was discharged because of
his race. Not only does the record lack any such evidence, but the relevant evidence
actually supports the opposite inference. First, defendants have produced evidence that
as of September 2008, five of the fourteen employees in Mr. Jackson’s department were
African-American males. Mr. Jackson has produced no evidence suggesting that the
defendants engaged, or ever were accused of engaging, in discriminatory conduct toward
other African-American employees.
Moreover, defendants have produced evidence that Toni Delfs was the store
manager during Mr. Jackson’s employment at the Sheldon McDonalds, that her duties
included hiring, handling disciplinary issues and terminating employees, and that she was
the person who made the decision to terminate Mr. Jackson’s employment. Mr. Jackson
was employed for only three months, from July 14, 2008, to October 14, 2008. As the
Eighth Circuit has held,“[t]here is a strong inference that discrimination was not a
motivating factor if the same person hired and fired the plaintiff within a relatively short
period of time.” Herr v. Airborne Freight Corp., 130 F.3d 359, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1997);
see also Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006); Lowe v. J.B.
Hunt Transp., 963 F.2d 173, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1992). The rationale for this inference is
that it is “simply incredible” to believe that the same person who made the decision to hire
a member of a protected class would suddenly develop a discriminatory aversion to
members of that class. See, e.g., Lowe, 963 F.2d at 174-75 (addressing alleged age
discrimination).
In short, not only has Mr. Jackson failed to produce evidence supporting a finding
that he was discharged because of race, the relevant evidence in the record points the other
12
direction. As a matter of law, Mr. Jackson has failed to establish a prima facie case and
has failed to rebut the defendants’ articulated, non-discriminatory reason for discharge.
The court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Mr. Jackson’s claim
of employment discrimination under Title VII.
C. Unlawful Retaliation
Mr. Jackson claims he was discharged in retaliation for complaining about other
employees. As with his discrimination claim, Mr. Jackson has presented no direct
evidence of a retaliatory motive. As such, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis
applies. Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 936 (8th Cir. 2006). First, the
plaintiff must put forth a prima facie case of retaliation. Eliserio v. United Steelworkers
of Am. Local 310, 398 F.3d 1071, 1078 (8th Cir. 2005). To establish a prima facie case
of retaliatory discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in activity protected by
Title VII; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal connection existed
between participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Twymon, 462 F.3d at 936 (citing Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 713-14
(8th Cir. 2000)). If the plaintiff puts forth a prima facie case, the employer may rebut the
resulting presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for the adverse employment action. Eliserio, 398 F.3d at 1078. If the employer proffers
a race-neutral rationale, the plaintiff may attempt to refute the asserted reason as mere
pretext. Id.
The Prima Facie Case. Mr. Jackson cannot establish a prima facie case because he
has failed to provide the court with evidence that he engaged in activity protected by Title
VII. Protected activity is “an informal or formal complaint about, or other opposition to,
an employer's practice or act ... if the employee reasonably believes such an act to be in
violation of the statute in question.” Sherman v. Runyon, 235 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir.
2000). Opposition to a Title VII violation need not rise to the level of a formal complaint
13
to receive statutory protection. See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566
(2nd Cir. 2000). An employee may oppose discrimination by filing formal charges or by
informal action such as “making complaints to management, writing critical letters to
customers protesting against discrimination by industry or by society in general, and
expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges." Id. (quoting Sumner v.
United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)). However, to have engaged
in protected activity, Mr. Jackson must have protested what he perceived as discriminatory
acts by the defendants. Sherman, 253 F.3d at 410. In other words, not every complaint
about workplace conditions or events qualifies as activity protected by Title VII. Instead,
Mr. Jackson’s complaints must have involved allegations of conduct that violated Title VII.
Here, even after reviewing the record in a light most favorable to Mr. Jackson, the
court is unable to conclude that he engaged in protected activity. He does allege he was
“harassed by” and had “problems” with two Caucasian co-workers, but he has not alleged
that those problems were based on or related to his race. He does not, for example, claim
that the co-workers directed racial slurs toward him or otherwise created a harassing or
hostile atmosphere because of his race. Nor has he disclosed the substance of his
complaint to the defendants about the situation. For example, he has not alleged he told
the defendants that he was being harassed because of his race.
According to the
defendants, he simply reported that he was “not getting along” with two co-workers and
that the defendants talked to everyone involved to resolve the situation. At most, the
evidence Mr. Jackson has submitted demonstrates he had unspecified conflicts with two
co-workers and he complained to the defendants about those conflicts. Because there is
no evidence his complaint involved perceived harassment or discrimination based on race,
the complaint does not rise to the level of protected activity under Title VII.
Mr. Jackson also alleges he complained to the defendants about his hours being cut.
Again, however, he has never alleged, let alone produced evidence, indicating that his
complaints about his hours were complaints of unlawful discrimination based on race. He
14
does not claim, for example, that he accused the defendants of reducing his hours because
he is African-American. At most, Mr. Jackson has shown he was unhappy about the
amount of hours he was receiving and he expressed this unhappiness to the defendants.
Because there is no evidence his complaint involved perceived harassment or
discrimination based on race, the complaint does not constitute protected activity.
Mr. Jackson has also failed to establish the third element of his prima facie case,
a causal connection between protected activity and the adverse employment action. In
other words, even if his complaints rose to the level of protected activity, he would still
have the burden of producing evidence of some connection between those complaints and
the defendants’ decision to terminate his employment. The record simply contains no such
evidence. At most, Mr. Jackson has shown (a) he made complaints while employed by
KPTOO and (b) his employment was subsequently terminated. The Eighth Circuit has held
that “more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse
employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation.” Kiel v.
Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In other words,
the mere fact a decision was made at some point after an event occurred is not, by itself,
evidence that the decision was motivated by the event.
Mr. Jackson has failed to produce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation. Specifically, he has failed to show that he engaged in protected activity and
has failed to show a causal connection between his complaints and his discharge.
Pretext. Even if Mr. Jackson satisfied the elements of a prima facie case, he would
have to rebut the defendants’ non-discriminatory explanation for his discharge. See, e.g.,
Eliserio, 398 F.3d at 1078. For the same reasons discussed, supra, with regard to his
claim of unlawful discrimination, he has failed to produce evidence raising a genuine issue
of material fact on this issue. There is simply no evidence in the record that could allow
reasonable jurors to find the defendants’ proffered explanation false and that their decision
to terminate Mr. Jackson’s employment arose from retaliatory motives.
15
Due to Mr. Jackson’s failure to establish a prima facie case and the lack of evidence
rebutting the defendants’ non-discriminatory explanation, the court finds the defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on his claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of Title
VII.
D. Liability of Individual Defendants
During the June 19, 2012, hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
counsel for the defendants raised an additional issue as to the liability of the individual
defendants. Specifically, counsel argued that KPTOO, as Mr. Jackson’s former employer,
is the only defendant subject to potential liability under Title VII. Counsel requested that
the court grant summary judgment in favor of the three individual defendants even if there
are genuine issues of material fact precluding entry of summary judgment against KPTOO.
Mr. Jackson orally resisted this request during the hearing.
Because the court has determined that all of the defendants are entitled to summary
judgment, the issue of the individual defendants’ potential liability is moot. As such, the
court will not separately analyze the arguments relating to that issue.
IV. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 32) is hereby
GRANTED.
2.
The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 12) filed by plaintiff Rodney F. Jackson
on December 23, 2010, is hereby DISMISSED.
3.
The trial scheduled on September 24, 2012, and the final pretrial conference
set for September 12, 2012, are hereby CANCELLED.
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4.
Any and all other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 26th day of June, 2012.
________________________________
LEONARD T. STRAND
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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