Small et al v. McCrystal et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 19 Motion for Summary Judgment, 21 Motion for Summary Judgment (See Order Text). Plaintiffs are granted leave to request an opportunity to amend their complaint (See Order Text). Signed by Senior Judge Donald E OBrien on 4/4/2012. (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
CLINT SMALL, ADAM LEE,
MICHELE HECK, JASON HOPKINS,
DERRICK POMRANKY, AMBER
GAMBOA, JONATHON FLANDERS,
NICHOLAS PALMER, AND TRACY
MERTZ,
Plaintiffs,
No. 10-CV-04088-DEO
v.
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION ORDER
JAMES MCCRYSTAL, TODD
TROBAUGH, AND WOODBURY
COUNTY, IOWA,
Defendants.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
II. FACTS
. . . . . . . . . . . .
3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
III. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS . . . . 11
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
V.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.
Whether Defendant McCrystal is Entitled to Qualified
Immunity in Relation to Plaintiff Small’s Wrongful
Arrest Claim
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.
Whether Defendant McCrystal and Trobaugh are
Entitled to Qualified Immunity in Relation to
Plaintiffs’, Other than Clint Small’s, Unlawful
Arrest Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
C.
Whether Defendant McCrystal is Entitled to Qualified
Immunity in Relation to Plaintiff Small’s Excessive
Force Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VI. INTERVENING AND SUPERSEDING CAUSES DEFENSE . . . . . 30
A.
Plaintiffs’, Other than Small’s, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Causes of Action for False Arrest in Violation of
the Fourth Amendment and all Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 Causes of Action for Retaliatory Prosecution
in Violation of the First Amendment . . . . . . 33
B.
Plaintiffs’ State Law Malicious Prosecution Claims
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
VII. IOWA STATE LAW; ASSAULT AND BATTERY
. . . . . . . . 41
VIII. IOWA STATE LAW: MALICIOUS PROSECUTION . . . . . . . 42
IX. ABUSE OF PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
X.
CIVIL CONSPIRACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.
Whether Defendants Have Made a Showing of Conspiracy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
B.
Whether Plaintiffs have Sufficiently Shown an
Underlying Constitutional Violation for Purposes of
§ 1983 or a Wrongful Act for Purposes of Common Law
Conspiracy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
C.
Whether There is a Common Law Conspiracy Claim in
Iowa
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
D.
Whether Defendant Trobaugh can be Held Responsible
for Plaintiff Small’s Claims
. . . . . . . . . 53
E.
Whether Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh are
Entitled to Qualified Immunity
. . . . . . . . 55
XI. DEFENDANT WOODBURY COUNTY’S ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . 56
A.
§ 1983
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
B.
State Law Claims
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
XII.
CONCLUSION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Exhibit A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This matter is before the Court on James McCrystal’s,
Todd Trobaugh’s, and Woodbury County, Iowa’s (Defendants’),
motions for summary judgment.
Docket Nos. 19 and 21.
II. FACTS
On October 4, 2008, in Sloan, Iowa, a fund-raising event
was held to raise money for the victim of a motorcycle
accident, Justin Larmoureux.
Docket No. 19-1, 1.
The “event
included an all-day golf outing followed by an auction, dinner
and live music” and was intended to raise money for Mr.
Larmoureux.
Id.
Late into the evening of the fund-raiser,
Doug Winters, a volunteer at the event, was injured attempting
Subsequently, Mr. Winters placed
to break up a fight.
Id.
two 911 calls.
Beyond these basic facts, the parties
Id.
agree on few others.
Deputy
McCrystal,
of
the
Woodbury
County
Sheriff’s
Office, claims he went to the Sloan Golf Course in response to
a
communication
from
dispatch
that
there
was
a
“‘large
fight.’” Docket No. 19-1, 2. Deputy Trobaugh contends he was
called to the scene due to “an assault on a peace officer.”
Docket No. 21-4, 1.
Plaintiffs note that Deputy Trobaugh’s
3
police report merely indicates a call for a “disturbance” and
fails to mention an assault on a peace officer.
1.
Docket 27-3,
Plaintiffs also note that the only other officer on the
scene at the time Deputy Trobaugh and McCrystal arrived on the
scene, Officer LaPrath of the Sloan Police Department, did not
call for assistance.
Id.
Deputy McCrystal claims that when he arrived at the Sloan
Golf Course at approximately 1:30 a.m., there were still 150
to 200 people in the parking lot, some ongoing fights, and
Officer LaPrath struggling to get a man in handcuffs into his
squad car.
Docket No. 19-1.
At the trial of Clint Small,
Deputy Trobaugh denied that there was any physical fighting
going on.
Docket No. 27-1, 10 (quoting Small Trial Tr. pg.
47; App. 53).
Plaintiffs note that, in related criminal
proceedings, multiple witnesses testified: that there were at
most 50 people in the parking lot; there had only been a
single altercation in the evening; and there were no ongoing
fights when Deputies McCrystal and Trobaugh arrived.
Docket
No. 27-3, 1.
Deputy McCrystal went into the club house bar while
Deputy
Trobaugh
stayed
outside
McCrystal, break up a fight.
to,
according
to
Docket No. 19-1, 2.
4
Deputy
Deputy
Trobaugh merely claims to have stayed outside to direct people
to leave the scene.
Docket No. 21-4, 2.
Once in the bar,
Deputy McCrystal claims he told the bar tender to close the
bar, whereupon Plaintiff Small, who, according to Deputy
McCrystal, was drinking directly from a bottle of alcohol,
began screaming at him “that he was a ‘fucking asshole.’”
Docket No. 19-1, 3 and Docket No. 27-1, 7.
According to
Deputy McCrystal, two females then pushed Plaintiff Small out
of the building as he screamed “‘Fuck you.
Fuck Woodbury
County.’”1 Id. Plaintiffs note witness’ testimony in related
criminal proceedings indicates a very different version of
events than that presented by Deputy McCrystal.
Docket No.
27-3, 2. For instance, Lori Wendt testified that she was with
Plaintiff Small when Deputy McCrystal came into the club
house, that Plaintiff Small was holding a beer rather than a
1
At the criminal trial of Plaintiff Small, Deputy
McCrystal elaborated upon what transpired within the club
house: “McCrystal testified that after (continued next page)
he turned around to leave, he saw Small and his companion
still standing there and drinking, so he told them again to
leave, and at that point Small allegedly ‘rushed up into my
face (and said) fuck you. Fuck you. And I’m like you need to
leave, okay? You need to leave or you’re going to go to jail.
Fuck you. Fuck you. Fuck you. You’re a fucking asshole.
All of you guys are fucking assholes. I’m like, You need to
leave or you’re going to jail, okay. And I just continued
on.’” Docket No. 27-1, 7 (quoting Small Trial Tr. p. 30; App.
49).
5
liquor bottle, and that no words were exchanged between Deputy
McCrystal and Plaintiff Small within the club house.
Docket
No. 27-1, 19 (citing Small Trial Tr. 158-89; App. 81).
Once
outside
the
building,
Deputies
Trobaugh
and
McCrystal claim Plaintiff Small continued to yell profanities.
Docket
No.
19-1,
3
and
21-4,
2.
Specifically,
Deputy
McCrystal claims Plaintiff Small continued to scream “‘fuck
Woodbury County, fuck the deputies, these guys are nothing but
a
bunch
of
fucking
assholes.’”2
Docket
No.
19-1,
3.
Plaintiff again notes that several witnesses have indicated
Plaintiff Small, if he said anything, made a single comment
about the Sheriff’s Office and did not repeatedly scream
profanities.
Docket No. 27-3, 2.
Both Deputy McCrystal and Trobaugh claim they repeatedly
asked
Plaintiff
Small
to
leave,
and,
eventually,
Deputy
McCrystal placed him under arrest. Docket No. 19-1, 3 and 214, 2.
According to Deputy McCrystal, he informed Plaintiff
Small he was under arrest, and, while effectuating the arrest,
2
At the criminal trial of Clint Small, Deputy McCrystal
testified that Plaintiff Small had “‘both hands above his
head, middle fingers raised, and he [was] screaming, Fuck
these guys.
Fuck Woodbury County.
(continued next page)
Come on everybody.
Fuck these guys.
They’re nothing but
fucking assholes.
Fuck these guys.’”
Docket No. 27-1, 8
(quoting Small Trial Tr. pg. 32-33; App. 49-50).
6
Plaintiff Small attempted to pull away, at which time Deputy
McCrystal executed a take-down.
Docket No. 19-1, 3.
Both
parties agree Plaintiff Small hit his head and was injured.
Once on the ground, Deputy McCrystal claims Plaintiff Small
resisted, several individuals jumped on his “back, yelling for
him to get off,” and Deputy Trobaugh intervened by pushing
them away. Docket No. 19-1, 3. Deputy Trobaugh merely claims
that, once Deputy McCrystal and Plaintiff Small were on the
ground, “[s]everal people in the vicinity began to converge on
the scene, shouting at the deputies that their actions were
unwarranted,” and he “attempted to assist Deputy McCrystal by
instructing these individuals to step away from” Plaintiff
Small.3
Docket No. 21-4, 2.
The Plaintiffs’ version of events surrounding the take
down and arrest of Plaintiff Small are markedly different.
They note that multiple witnesses in the related criminal
proceedings “testified that [Deputy] McCrystal did not inform
[Plaintiff] Small he was . . . under arrest,” Deputy McCrystal
3
At the criminal trial of Clint Small, Deputy Trobaugh’s
testimony was somewhat different; he testified that Michele
Heck had grabbed Deputy McCrystal and was trying to pull
Deputy McCrystal off Clint Small, and so Deputy Trobaugh
“‘went and pushed her away from [Deputy McCrystal] and then we
had a whole bunch of people come after us . . . trying to . .
. grab us and push us away from Clinton Small.’” Docket No.
27-1, 12 (quoting Small Trial Tr. pg. 54; App. 55).
7
“tackled”
Plaintiff
Small
“from
behind
without
warning,”
Plaintiff Small “did not resist once he was on the ground, and
no one touched the [D]eputies.”
Docket No. 27-3, 2.
Deputy McCrystal claims that once Plaintiff Small was
handcuffed, he and Deputy Trobaugh were essentially pinned
against the wall of the club house by an angry crowd who
persisted in screaming at them.
Docket No. 19-1, 3.
Both
Deputy Trobough and McCrystal claim that several individuals,
including Plaintiffs in the instant action, continued to
interfere with the Deputies’ attempts to disperse the crowd.
Docket No. 21-4, 2 and Docket No. 19-1, 3-4.
Plaintiff
admits
to
varying
degrees
of
Though each
interaction
with
Deputies McCrystal and Trobaugh after the arrest of Clint
Small, Plaintiffs note that Officer LaPrath has indicated
“that no one was yelling or screaming” at the Defendants and
“no threats were made.”
Multiple other witnesses testified
“that the crowd was not antagonistic.” Docket No. 27-3, 2 and
Docket No. 27-2, 2. For instance, Jill Black, a United States
Probation Officer, testified that people were simply asking
the Deputies why they did what they did, and the Deputies were
not in danger. Docket 27-1, 51 (citing Heck Trial Tr. 194-96;
App. 437-39).
Eventually, Plaintiff Small was taken away in
8
an ambulance and the remainder of the crowd dispersed. Docket
No. 21-4, 3.
At 2:50 a.m. the following morning, October 6, 2008 (25
and ½ hours after the event in question), Deputy McCrystal
dictated his report on the incident.
Docket No. 21-4, 3.
Deputy Trobaugh did so at 6:05 a.m. on October 6, 2008.
Id.
Also on October 6, 2008, Deputy McCrystal submitted a Warrant
Routing Sheet to the Woodbury County Attorney’s Office for a
finding of probable cause to file charges for Disorderly
Conduct, Failure to Disperse, and Unlawful Assembly against
Plaintiff Clint Small.
Id.
Plaintiff Jason Hopkins, who was at the benefit on the
night in question, testified in a deposition that around a
week after the incident in question, Deputies McCrystal and
Trobaugh came to his work place and threatened to file charges
against him and “‘put warrants out for everybody at the
benefit.’”
Docket No. 27-1, 59 (quoting Hopkins’ Deposition
Pg. 22-23; App. 604).
They then asked him where his band
would be playing in the future and warned that “‘they may . .
. show up and just haul everybody to jail.’”
9
Id.
On October 14, 2008, Deputy McCrystal submitted eight
Warrant Routing Sheets to the Woodbury County Attorney’s
Office requesting a probable cause determination for various
charges to be filed against Jonathon Flanders, Michele Heck,
Derrick Pomranky, Amber Gamboa, Tracy Mertz, Nicholas Palmer,
Adam Lee, and Paula Bainbridge.4
On October 17, 2008, Deputy Trobaugh prepared a second
report
which
Plaintiffs.5
his
included
additional
allegations
Docket No. 33, 2 and Docket No. 27-1, 2.
subsequent
report,
Deputy
Trobaugh
indicated
against
Within
he
was
actively requesting the County Attorney to review his report
for purposes of issuing warrants.
Docket No. 33, 2.
On
October 20, 2008, Deputy McCrystal also filed a supplemental
report
which
included
additional
allegations
against
Plaintiffs and specifically identified the charges he felt
they should face. Docket No. 27-1 and Docket No. 21-1, 32-35.
On
October
4
20
and
22,
2008,
the
Deputies’
reports
were
See Attached Exhibit A.
5
On October 31, 2008, Deputy Trobaugh submitted yet
another supplemental report. Docket No. 27-1, 2. However, it
appears that this report, because it (continued on next page)
post-dated the County Attorney’s issuance of arrest warrants,
did not impact the decision to bring charges against
Plaintiffs.
10
provided to the County Attorney.
Docket No. 21-4, 3.
From
October 30, 2008, to November 17, 2008, two separate County
Attorneys
filed
complaints
and
affidavits
or
trial
informations and minutes of expected testimony with four
separate
Judges,
offenses.6
charging
Plaintiffs
Docket No. 21-4, 3-6.
with
a
variety
of
Each Judge then made
separate findings of probable cause for the charges against
each Defendant.
Id.
All the Plaintiffs were eventually acquitted of the
charges through either dismissals for lack of evidence or not
guilty findings.
III.
Docket No. 27-1, 58.
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS
On October 1, 2010, Clint Small, Adam Lee, Michele Heck,
Jason Hopkins, Derrick Pomranky, Amber Gamboa, Jon Flanders,
Nicholas Palmer, and Tracy Mertz (Plaintiffs), all individuals
who
faced
criminal
charges
stemming
from
the
night
in
question, filed an amended complaint alleging numerous causes
of
action
against
Defendants.
Docket
No.
3.
Though
Plaintiffs’ complaint does not precisely delineate the causes
of action alleged, after careful consideration, this Court has
identified the following causes of action contained therein:
6
See attached Exhibit A.
11
(1) 42
U.S.C.
§
19837
claim
alleging
Defendant
McCrystal’s actions constituted excessive use of force against
Plaintiff Clint Small in violation of the Fourth Amendment;8
(2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Defendant McCrystal’s
arrest of Plaintiff Clint Small was an illegal seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment;9
(3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Defendants McCrystal
and Trobaugh’s actions constituted an unlawful arrest of
Plaintiffs, not including Clint Small, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment;
(4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Defendants McCrystal
7
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under
color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”
8
Though the Fourth Amendment, by its terms, applies only
to the Federal Government, both parties impliedly concede that
it is made applicable to state actors, such as Defendants,
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Throughout the remainder of
this Memorandum and Opinion Order, this Court simply refers to
violations of the Fourth Amendment, rather than violations of
the Fourth Amendment as made (continued on next page)
applicable through the Fourteenth.
9
Throughout this Memorandum and Opinion Order, this claim
is routinely referred to as an unlawful arrest claim.
12
and Trobaugh’s actions constituted a retaliatory inducement to
prosecute Plaintiffs in violation of the First Amendment;10
(5) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Defendants’ actions
constituted a civil conspiracy in violation of Plaintiffs’
First and Fourth Amendment Rights;
(6) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Defendant Woodbury
County is liable for Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh’s
unconstitutional actions for failing to properly train and
supervise their employees;
(7) state law claim alleging Defendant McCrystal and
Trobaugh’s
actions,
vicariously
liable,
for
which
constituted
Woodbury
assault
County
and
is
battery
also
of
Plaintiff Small;
(8) state
law
claim
alleging
Defendant
McCrystal’s
actions, for which Woodbury County is also vicariously liable,
constituted malicious prosecution of Plaintiffs;
(9) state law claim alleging Defendant McCrystal and
Trobaugh’s
actions,
for
which
10
Woodbury
County
is
also
Though the First Amendment, by its terms, applies only
to the Federal Government, both parties impliedly concede that
it is made applicable to state actors, such as Defendants,
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Throughout the remainder of
this Memorandum and Opinion Order, this Court simply refers to
violations of the First Amendment, rather than violations of
the First Amendment as made applicable through the Fourteenth.
13
vicariously
liable,
constituted
abuse
of
process
against
Plaintiffs;
(10)
state law claim alleging Defendant McCrystal and
Trobaugh’s
actions,
for
which
Woodbury
County
is
also
vicariously liable, constituted a civil conspiracy to commit
assault and battery, malicious prosecution, and abuse of
process against Plaintiffs.
The Defendants’ various arguments in their motions for
summary judgment are not always clear as to which causes of
action they apply; this, considering the number of Plaintiffs
and Defendants and the complexity of the events at issue, is
problematic.
For purposes of organization, this Court has
identified the following distinct arguments, each affecting
the following distinct causes of action:
(1) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action based on qualified immunity;
(2) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’, not
including Clint Small’s, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action for
unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, all of
Plaintiffs’
prosecute
42
U.S.C.
causes
of
§
1983
action
in
retaliatory
violation
inducement
of
the
to
First
Amendment, and all of Plaintiffs’ state law claims due to
14
intervening and superseding causes of Plaintiffs’ harms;
(3) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff Small’s
assault and battery claim based on a lawful arrest exception;
(4) motion
for
summary
judgment
against
Plaintiffs’
malicious prosecution claims for failure to establish actual
malice;
(5) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ abuse
of process claims for failure to establish the actual use of
a process;
(6) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law conspiracy causes of action for
failure to establish an actual conspiracy and failure to
establish
an
underlying
constitutional
violation
and/or
wrongful act
(7) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ state
law conspiracy cause of action because there is no such thing
as state law civil conspiracy; and
(8) motion
for
summary
judgment
against
all
of
Plaintiffs’ claims against Woodbury County for failure to
allege inadequate training in relation to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims, and a lack of underlying liability sufficient for
15
municipal liability to attach in relation to the state law
claims.
The
remainder
of
this
Memorandum
and
Opinion
Order
discusses each of Defendants’ distinct arguments.
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P., Rule 56(c).
Fed.
A fact is material if it is necessary
“to establish the existence of an element essential to [a]
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.”
(1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
There is a genuine issue as to a material fact if,
based on the record before the court, a “rational trier of
fact” could find for the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a “court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . .”
Hutson v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 63
F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 1995).
This requires a court to draw any
reasonable inference from the underlying facts in favor of the
16
nonmoving party and to refrain from weighing the evidence,
making credibility determinations, or attempting to discern
the truth of any factual issue in a manner which favors the
moving party unless there is no reasonable alternative.
Matsushita,
475
U.S.
at
587;
and
Morris
v.
City
See
of
Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2007).
Procedurally, the movant bears the initial burden “of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of
a genuine issue.” Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the movant
has carried his burden, the non-moving party is required “to
go beyond the pleadings” and through “affidavits, or by the
‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 423 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
V.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY11
11
Defendant McCrystal argues he is entitled to summary
judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity in relation
to Plaintiff Small’s § 1983 excessive force and unlawful
arrest claims; and both Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh
imply they are entitled to summary judgment in relation to all
17
The Supreme Court has established a two step sequential
evaluation
process
to
resolve
questions
of
qualified
immunity.12
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
The
“‘threshold question’” is whether the facts, taken in a
“‘light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,’”
demonstrate “‘the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right’” of the Plaintiff.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377
(2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
If there is a “violation of constitutional right, ‘the next,
sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly
established . . . in light of the specific context of the
case.’”
Id.
The first question in the sequential evaluation process
is
straight
forward
and
merely
asks
if
constitutional violation under prevailing law.
there
is
a
The second
of the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Docket No. 19-3, 8-15 and
Docket No. 21-3, 3-7.
The question of whether Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity in relation to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 civil
conspiracy claim, though Defendants’ qualified immunity
argument was never explicitly related to civil conspiracy in
Defendants’ briefs, is dealt with in Section VII of this
Memorandum and Opinion Order.
12
More recently, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme
Court ruled that the sequential evaluation process outlined in
Saucier was not mandatory; lower courts retain discretion
whether to follow the Saucier procedure. 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009).
18
question in the sequential evaluation process requires that
the “contours of the right . . . be sufficiently clear” such
“that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
“If
the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct
would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified
immunity is appropriate.”
Id.
While the first and second
steps are quite similar, the second step adds an additional
dimension in that “reasonable mistakes can be made as to the
legal constraints on particular police conduct,” regardless of
whether or not there was an actual constitutional violation.
Id.
205.
A.
Whether
Defendant
McCrystal
is
Entitled
to
Qualified Immunity in Relation to Plaintiff Small’s Wrongful
Arrest Claim
The
seizures.
Fourth
Amendment
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
under the Fourth Amendment.
420, 451 (1981).
take-down
protects
and
against
unreasonable
An “arrest is a seizure”
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
It is undisputed that Deputy McCrystal’s
subsequent
restraint
constituted a warrantless arrest.
of
Plaintiff
Small
An arrest by a law officer
without a warrant “is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
19
where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal
offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (citing United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 417-424 (1976) (other citation omitted).
A
probable
cause
determination
“is
a
‘practical,
nontechnical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’”
Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
In
other words, probable cause is “‘a fluid concept-turning on
the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.’”
Id. at 370-71 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
In determining “whether an officer had probable cause to
arrest an individual,” a court must “examine the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether the facts,
‘viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable . .
. officer, amount to’ probable cause.”
Id. at 372 (quoting
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 590, 696 (1996).
20
Defendant McCrystal contends there was probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff Small based on the following violations of
Iowa State law:
failure to disperse, disorderly conduct, and
interference with official acts.
Docket No. 19-3, 13-14.
Iowa Code § 723.3, failure to disperse, provides:
A peace officer may order the participants
in a riot or unlawful assembly or persons
in the immediate vicinity of a riot or
unlawful assembly to disperse. Any person
within hearing distance of such command,
who refuses to obey, commits a simple
misdemeanor.
Though Defendant McCrystal and Trobaugh claim there were
150 to 200 people, many of whom were fighting,13 and they have
generally
described
the
witnesses have noted that:
scene
as
chaos,
several
other
there were no more than 50 people
present, there had been only a single altercation all evening,
and there was nothing unusual about the scene given the time
of the Deputies’ arrival and the nature of the fund-raising
event.
the
Thus, there is a genuine issue as to whether or not
events
surrounding
the
arrest
of
Plaintiff
Small
constituted a riot or unlawful assembly.
Furthermore, some of the testimony from the criminal
13
As previously noted, Deputy McCrystal implies there
were actual physical altercations ongoing, but Deputy Trobaugh
denied this. Docket No. 27-1, 10 (quoting Small Trial Tr. pg.
47; App. 53).
21
proceedings indicated Plaintiff Small was not repeatedly told
to leave; and he was, in fact, on his way to his camper when
tackled from behind by Deputy McCrystal. Therefore, there are
genuine issues as to whether there actually was a viable
command
to
disperse,
and,
assuming
there
was,
whether
Plaintiff Small failed to obey that command.
Iowa Code § 723.4 outlines seven situations constituting
disorderly conduct.
Defendant McCrystal contends Plaintiff
Small violated the portion of the disorderly conduct statute
which makes it a simple misdemeanor to make a “loud and
raucous noise in the vicinity of any residence or public
building which causes unreasonable distress to the occupants
therein.”
As previously noted, Deputy McCrystal claims Plaintiff
Small, while in the club house, was yelling and screaming
profanities at him.
Both Deputy McCrystal and Trobaugh claim
Plaintiff Small’s allegedly obnoxious behavior continued much
the same as he went out into the parking lot.
However, other
people have testified that Plaintiff Small said nothing to
Deputy McCrystal while in the club house and made, at most, a
limited comment while walking to his trailer in the parking
lot.
Therefore, there are genuine issues as to whether
22
Plaintiff Small made a loud and raucous noise, and, if so,
whether it was sufficient to cause unreasonable distress in
others.
A person violates Iowa Code § 719.1, interference with
official acts, when they knowingly resist or obstruct “anyone
known by the person to be a peace officer . . . in the
performance of any act which is within the scope of the lawful
duty or authority of that officer . . . .”
As previously
noted, some of the testimony indicates there was nothing
improper or unusual about the gathering, and, therefore,
Defendant McCrystal may not have had the lawful authority to
order people to disperse in the first place. In addition, the
terms
“resist”
and
“obstruct”
do
not
include
“verbal
harassment unless the verbal harassment is accompanied by a
present ability and apparent intention to execute a verbal
threat physically.”
Iowa Code § 719.1(3).
Not even Deputy
Trobaugh or McCrystal’s version of events explicitly indicate
Plaintiff
Small
had
an
apparent
intention
to
physically
execute his alleged verbal threats, and testimony from other
witnesses indicate Plaintiff Small may not have even said
23
anything which could be reasonably construed as a verbal
threat.
Overall,
the
available
testimony
related
to
the
circumstances and events surrounding Defendant McCrystal’s
arrest of Plaintiff Small could lead a reasonable jury to
conclude that Defendant McCrystal did not have probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff Small and, therefore, violated Plaintiff
Small’s constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable
seizure/arrest.
However, as previously noted, a Plaintiff
must also show that a Defendant’s constitutional violation
violated a clearly established right.
In determining whether a right allegedly violated was
clearly established in the wrongful arrest context, the Eighth
Circuit has indicated that the question becomes not whether
there was “‘probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause
. . . that is, whether the officer should have known that the
arrest
violated
plaintiff’s
clearly
established
right.’”
Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added) (quoting Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989,
992 (8th Cir. 2005)).
Thus, “‘officers are entitled to
qualified immunity if they arrest a suspect under the mistaken
belief that they have probable cause to do so, provided that
24
the
mistake
is
objectively
reasonable.’”
Id.
(quoting
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir.
2010).
In
the
Eighth
Circuit
case
Copeland
v.
Locke,
the
plaintiff cursed, pointed at the officer, and demanded the
officer move his car, which was blocking his driveway, prior
to being arrested. Id. The Court determined “[n]o reasonable
police officer could believe that he had arguable probable
cause to arrest an individual for such protected expressive
conduct.”
The testimony in this case, viewed in a light
Id.
most favorable to Plaintiff Small, indicates Plaintiff Small’s
actions were even less abrasive than the actions of the
Plaintiff
in
Copeland.
Much
of
the
witness
testimony
indicates Plaintiff Small, while walking away from Defendant
McCrystal, merely disparaged the Woodbury County Sheriff’s
Office in a limited manner, and continued on his way to his
camper.
could
A reasonable jury, based on the varying evidence,
conclude
that
a
reasonable
person
in
Defendant
McCrystal’s situation would be well aware that an arrest would
violate
Plaintiff
Small’s
constitutional
rights;
and,
therefore, Defendant McCrystal is not entitled to qualified
immunity.
25
B.
Whether Defendant McCrystal and Trobaugh are
Entitled to Qualified Immunity in Relation to Plaintiffs’,
Other than Clint Small’s, Unlawful Arrest Claims
In Malley v. Briggs, the Supreme Court held that an
“objective reasonableness” standard applies when determining
whether the actions of “an officer whose request for a warrant
allegedly
caused
an
qualified immunity.
unconstitutional
arrest”
is
accorded
475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986).
As previously touched upon in Section II within this
Memorandum
and
Opinion
Order,
Deputies
McCrystal
and
Trobaugh’s police reports, which no doubt played a role in
Plaintiffs’ subsequent arrests,14 provide a rendition of events
greatly at odds with the testimony of others who witnessed the
events in question.
For instance, Deputy McCrystal’s initial
report indicates there were between 175 to 200 people at the
golf course when the Deputies arrived.
Deputy Trobaugh’s
report indicates there were between 150 and 200 people with a
“lot of yelling and fighting going on.”
and 14.
Docket No. 27-5, 8
Deputy McCrystal’s report further indicates that,
14
Whether there is a sufficient causal connection between
the issuance of the Deputies’ reports and the subsequent
arrest of Plaintiffs is dealt with in Section VI within this
Memorandum and Opinion Order.
26
within the Club House, Plaintiff Small was pouring liquor in
his mouth from a bottle that, because it still had the pouring
apparatus attached, appeared to come directly from the bar.
Id.
Deputy McCrystal’s report continues on to indicate that,
after
taking
Plaintiff
Small
Plaintiffs jumped on his back.
to
the
ground,
two
Docket No. 27-5, 9.
other
Deputy
Trobaugh’s report indicates that while Deputy McCrystal was
attempting to secure Plaintiff Small, he and Deputy McCrystal
“were basically rushed by 30 or 40 people coming up and
screaming and hollering at us . . . .”
Docket No. 27-5, 16.
Both reports indicate that for 30 to 40 minutes after the
incident with Plaintiff Small, the Deputies were unable to get
people to disperse and were confronted with hostility and
threats.
Docket No. 27-5, 10 and 16.
Deputy McCrystal even
went so far as to describe the scene as a “riot.”
Docket No.
27-5, 10. As previously noted, other witnesses have indicated
there were no more than 50 people at the scene when Deputies
McCrystal and Trobaugh arrived; there were no ongoing fights
and had only been one fight that evening; Plaintiff Small was
not drinking directly from a liquor bottle; no one jumped on
Deputy McCrystal’s back when he was handcuffing Plaintiff
Small; and the scene after the arrest was not antagonistic,
27
rather, and at worst, Plaintiffs and others were expressing an
appropriate amount of concern and dissatisfaction with what
they perceived as Deputy McCrystal’s excessive use of force
against Plaintiff Small.
Ultimately,
given
the
record
before
this
Court,
a
reasonable jury could conclude that Deputies McCrystal and
Trobaugh’s version of events were a gross exaggeration, if not
simply untrue; and an officer’s alleged filing of a report
which distorts or falsifies material issues which he knows
will be determinative of whether or not those mentioned in the
report will be subsequently arrested, can not be said to be
objectively reasonable.
Furthermore, reasonable officers in
Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh’s circumstances would have
known that false reports accompanied by requests for warrants
would violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to be free
from
unlawful
arrest.
Therefore,
Deputy
McCrystal
and
Trobaugh are not entitled to qualified immunity.
C.
Whether
Defendant
McCrystal
is
Entitled
to
Qualified Immunity in Relation to Plaintiff Small’s Excessive
Force Claim
When
considering
a
Fourth
Amendment
excessive
force
claim, a court must again inquire into the “reasonableness” of
28
the force applied.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96
(1989). This “requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests
at stake.”
Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place 462
U.S. 696, 703 (1983)) (internal quotations and other citations
omitted).
“[C]areful attention” must be given “to the facts
and circumstances of each particular case.”
Id.
The overall
focus is on the “totality of the circumstances.” Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
The “‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
reasonableness
of
the
Finally, when considering the
action
in
question,
a
court
must
consider that officers “are often forced to make split-second
judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving . . . .”
Id. at 396-97.
Because testimony of eye witnesses supports the inference
that Defendant McCrystal’s arrest of Plaintiff Small was
unconstitutional, a reasonable jury could also conclude that
Defendant
McCrystal
used
excessive
29
force.
Furthermore,
because the evidence supports the inference that an officer
would have known he was violating Plaintiff Small’s right not
to be subject to an unlawful arrest, a reasonable jury could
also
conclude
that
McCrystal’s
situation
constituted
excessive
a
reasonable
would
have
force;
person
known
and,
in
that
Defendant
his
therefore,
actions
Defendant
McCrystal is not entitled to qualified immunity.
VI. INTERVENING AND SUPERSEDING CAUSES DEFENSE15
15
Defendant Trobaugh argues the prosecutor and the
approving Judge’s independent determinations to pursue charges
and issue warrants against Plaintiffs were intervening and
superseding causes of Plaintiffs’ arrests and subsequent
prosecutions.
Docket Nos. 21-3, 7-11.
Though Defendant
Trobaugh does not specify all the Plaintiffs’ claims to which
his argument applies, if accepted by the Court, it could be
the basis for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’, other than
Clint Small’s, § 1983 claims for false arrest and all of
Plaintiffs’ retaliatory inducement to prosecute, malicious
prosecution, and abuse of process state law claims. However,
Defendant’s argument neither applies to Plaintiff Small’s §
1983 false arrest or excessive use of (continued on next page)
force claims nor his state assault and battery claims; these
events occurred in the morning in question and did not involve
independent decisions made by prosecutors or judges.
(Continued)
Defendant McCrystal only makes the intervening and
superseding cause argument in relation to state law malicious
prosecution; but, if Defendant Trobaugh’s argument is
successful, it may also preclude the same § 1983 and abuse of
process claims as to Defendant McCrystal. Docket No. 19-3,
21.
Finally, though Defendant Woodbury County fails to make
an
argument
specifically
related
to
intervening
and
superseding causes, they correctly point out that “in order
for municipal liability to attach, individual liability first
must be found on an underlying substantive claim.” McCoy v.
30
Traditionally, tort law has recognized a distinction
between factual and legal (or proximate) causation.
“Conduct
is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have
occurred absent the conduct.”
26.
Restatement (Third) of Torts §
For any given event, there can be a number of factual
causes, i.e., things that were necessary for the result to
come about.
For instance, temperature, past precipitation,
relative humidity, presence of dead plant material, and a
lightning strike can all be the factual causes of a forest
fire.
A
third
party
defendant’s
actions
plaintiff’s
harm
is
or
which
natural
is
called
also
an
act
a
independent
factual
intervening
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 34.
An
cause
act.
of
a
of
a
See
intervening act
sufficient to transfer blame for the harm in question from a
defendant to a third party or natural event is called an
intervening and superseding act.
Thus, though conduct of a
third party or a natural event may also be a factual cause,
the question remains as to whether that intervening act
influenced the events in question sufficiently to transfer
blame for the harm; if so, it is said that the defendant’s
City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus,
if the actions and decisions of the judges and prosecutors
involved constitute intervening and superseding causes,
Woodbury County should be granted summary judgment.
31
actions
are
not
the
legal
(or
proximate)
cause
of
the
plaintiff’s harm, and the defendant, therefore, is not liable.
In order to illustrate the distinction between factual
and
legal
(or
proximate
cause),
consider
the
following
hypothetical:
Mr. W told police that Mrs. X was guilty of
crime Y.
The police had never heard of
Mrs. X, but, upon investigating, they
determined she was a rotten person and
fabricated evidence implicating her for
crime Z.
Ultimately, based on the
fabricated information, Mrs. X was charged
for crime Z.
Mrs. X now seeks damages
against Mr. W for malicious prosecution.
In this scenario, the conduct of Mr. W is a “factual
cause” of Mrs. X’s harm in that she would not have been
charged for crime Z if police were not looking into his
allegations related to crime Y.
The police department’s
fabrication of evidence is also the “factual cause” of Mrs.
X’s harm in that she would not have been charged with crime Z
absent the fabrication of evidence.
Though it was a “factual
cause,” the conduct of Mr. W would not be considered the legal
(or proximate) cause of Mrs. X’s harm, because the fabricated
evidence was sufficient to transfer the blame for Mrs. X’s
arrest from Mr. W to the police.
In other words, the
fabrication of evidence was an intervening and superseding
32
cause of Mrs. X’s harm.
rarely
as
cut
jurisdictions
and
employ
Unfortunately, real world cases are
dry
as
various
hypotheticals,
tests
and
and
various
standards
for
determining whether a defendant’s conduct is the factual and
legal (or proximate) cause of a plaintiff’s harm.
A.
Plaintiffs’, Other than Small’s, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 Causes of Action for False Arrest in Violation of the
Fourth Amendment and all Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Causes
of Action for Retaliatory Prosecution in Violation of the
First Amendment
In Hartman v. Moore, the Supreme Court considered the
causal connection necessary between a police officer’s actions
and a subsequent prosecution in a retaliatory inducement to
prosecute case.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).16
The
Hartman court ruled that in order to make the causal link
between a police officer’s actions and a plaintiff’s harm of
16
Though a retaliatory inducement to prosecute case deals
with violations of the First Amendment, and the Plaintiffs
also claim violations of the Fourth Amendment, the causal link
between a police officer’s actions and the harm that lies at
the base of a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for wrongful arrest
and retaliatory inducement to prosecute are the same. Thus,
this Court is persuaded that Hartman, at least in terms of the
standard for establishing the element of causality, is
applicable to both First Amendment retaliatory inducement to
prosecute cases and Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest cases.
33
being prosecuted, a plaintiff must show that an officer
“induced” the actions of a prosecutor or judge that would not
have taken action “without his urging.”
262.
Hartman, 547 U.S. at
The Court also noted that there is a presumption that
prosecutorial decision making is legitimate, and so there must
be a connection between the actions of the complaining officer
and the prosecutor and judge whose actions ultimately harmed
the plaintiff.
Id. at 263.
This “connection . . . is the
absence of probable cause” within an officer’s police report
or at the time of a warrantless arrest.
detail
earlier
in
Sections
V(A)
and
As discussed in
(B)17
within
this
Memorandum and Opinion Order, the available testimony from
related criminal proceedings is sufficient for a reasonable
jury in the instant action to conclude that Defendants did not
have probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs.
However, the Hartman decision implies that, regardless of
a lack of probable cause or a defendant’s clear intent to
induce a wrongful action, a judge or prosecutor may still have
their own, independent reasons for their actions which, as an
intervening superseding cause, would break the causal chain.
Id. at 265.
17
Defendant Trobaugh points to several facts that
Pgs. 19-28 herein.
34
he alleges break the causal chain between Defendants’ actions
and the ultimate harms imposed on the Plaintiffs:
(1) the
prosecutors prepared and filed personal affidavits to go along
with the complaints they filed with the courts; (2) two
different prosecutors filed different charges, “resulting in
some individuals being charged with simple misdemeanors and
others being charged with indictable offenses,” suggesting
they “were acting independently;” (3) “the time delay between
the submission of the reports and the filing of the complaints
indicates
that”
prosecutors
were
exercising
their
“own
independent judgment in determining whether probable cause
existed
to
magistrates
file
charges;”
reviewed
the
(4)
four
complaints
different
and
judges
affidavits
or
and
independently determined that probable cause existed; and (5)
in relation to Plaintiffs Heck and Mertz, prosecutors filed
trial informations and minute testimony, which constitute an
additional break in the causal chain.
Docket No. 21-3, 8-10.
The Complaints against Plaintiffs Clint Small, Amber
Gamboa, Derrick Pomranky, Jonathon Flanders, Tracy Mertz,
Nicholas Palmer, Adam Lee, Jason Hopkins, and Michele Heck,
though they include an affidavit signed by Assistant Woodbury
County
Attorneys,
appear
to
35
be
derived
from
Plaintiff
McCrystal and Trobaugh’s version of events.
Docket No. 21-1,
49, 54, 58, 62, 65-66, 73, 77, 81, and 84-85.
It is not an
uncommon practice for County Attorneys to swear to information
provided by another.
The affidavits in question invariably
consist of situations taking place between Defendants and
Plaintiffs, for which prosecutors were not present.
So,
absent evidence indicating others provided information to
prosecutors, it is reasonable to infer that the information
the county attorneys swore to came from Defendants Trobaugh
and McCrystal.
The
different
fact
Id.
that
offenses
Plaintiffs
also
were
appears
being
charged
with
flow
directly
from
to
Defendants Trobaugh and McCrystal’s version of events.
Id.
As previously noted, one of McCrystal’s reports went so far as
to identify the charges which should be brought against
Plaintiffs. The accusations Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh
made against the various Plaintiffs were different, and the
various charges track those differences.
A time delay between the submission of reports and the
filing of the complaints does not necessitate the inference
that
the
Assistant
County
Attorneys
were
relying
on
information other than that provided by Defendants McCrystal
36
and Trobaugh, or using that time to reach an independent
conclusion based on information they somehow divined in their
own time.
It is more likely that the delays were the result
of normal administrative lag, a necessary evil with which this
Court is familiar.
The fact that two different prosecutors filed charges,
and
four
different
judges
reviewed
the
complaints
and
affidavits does not negate the overriding fact that the
substantive
charges
within
the
complaints
and
affidavits
appear to be derived from Defendant McCrystal and Trobaugh’s
version of events. Since the version of events represented in
the complaints and affidavits, whether true or not, outlined
the presence of probable cause, it is no surprise that two
different prosecutors filed charges or that four different
judges reached the same conclusion.
Finally, the informations filed against Plaintiffs Heck
and Mertz show no sign of being derived from facts other than
that provided by Defendants McCrystal and Trobough; they add
nothing beyond the initial police reports and subsequent
complaints.
Docket No. 21-1, 69 and 88-89.
Notably, the
minutes of testimony only refer to testimony to be given by
Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh and nobody else. Docket No.
37
21-1, 69-71 and 88-89.
It
is
undisputed
that
the
charges
brought
against
Plaintiffs arose from events occurring at the Sloan Golf
Course in the early morning hours of October 5, 2008.
prosecutors
and
judges
who
later
became
involved
The
in
Plaintiffs’ criminal cases were not present that morning.
Defendants neither contend that other officers or witnesses
present that morning provided information to the prosecuting
attorneys or judges, nor do they contend that the prosecuting
attorneys or judges had private agendas which influenced their
decisions.
All they allege are normal administrative steps,
which, if deemed intervening and superseding causes, would
render a cause of action against an officer for allegedly
falsifying probable cause an impossibility.
It is a general
maxim that “tort liability . . . makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions.” Based on Defendants
McCrystal and Trobaugh’s police reports and the lack of any
compelling contrary evidence, it is highly reasonable to infer
that Plaintiffs’ arrests were the natural consequence of
Defendant McCrystal and Trobaugh’s actions.
365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
Monroe v. Pape,
Absent the Defendants establishing
a viable, intervening and superseding cause, whether or not
38
Defendants filed false reports and provided false information
to prosecutors remains a genuine issue of material fact, and
summary judgment is not appropriate.
B.
Plaintiffs’
State
Law
Malicious
Prosecution
Claims18
Under the base malicious prosecution rule, a defendant
must be responsible for the “instigation or procurement” of a
prosecution for there to be a cause of action.
Reed v. Linn
County, 425 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa App. 1988). (citing Vander
Linden
v.
Crews,
231
N.W.2d
904,
905
(Iowa
1975).
Unfortunately, this standard is not very informative about the
level of instigation or procurement necessary for malicious
prosecution to apply.
In Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, the Iowa Supreme
Court ruled that “legal causation for intentional torts,” such
as malicious prosecution, “often reach a broader range of
damages” than “in cases involving unintentional torts,” such
as actions sounding in negligence. Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State
18
Though Defendants’ intervening and superseding cause
argument could be used to preclude Plaintiffs’ state law Abuse
of Process claims, Defendants argument that they did not
actually use a legal process, considered in Section VII of
this Memorandum and Opinion Order, naturally encompasses
questions of causality and so is omitted in this section.
39
Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726, 741 (Iowa 2009).
However, “even a
willful or intentional [tortfeasor] does not become an insurer
of the safety of those whom he has wronged.”
Id. (quoting
Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir. 1973).
A
“tortfeasor, is not liable to a person whom he intended to
harm and who has been harmed, unless from the standpoint of a
reasonable man, his act has in some degree increased the risk
of that harm.”
Id.
intentional
law
tort
Thus, the default rule under Iowa
is
that
conduct
is
the
legal
(or
proximate) cause of a plaintiff’s harm if it “‘enhanced (at
the
time
the
occurring.’”
defendant
acted)
the
chances
of
the
harm
Id. (quoting Zuchowicz v. United States, 140
F.3d 381, 388, fn 7 (2d Cir. 1998).
As discussed in the proceeding Section VI(A), Defendant
Trobaugh and McCrystal’s police reports not only enhanced or
increased the risk of Plaintiffs’ arrests but, at this stage
of the proceeding, appear to be the primary cause thereof.
So,
summary
prosecution
judgment
claims
of
based
Plaintiffs’
on
Defendants’
superseding cause argument is denied.
40
state
law
malicious
intervening
and
IOWA STATE LAW; ASSAULT AND BATTERY19
VII.
Plaintiff
Small
alleges
Defendant
McCrystal
Trobaugh’s actions amounted to assault and battery.
No. 3, 6-7.
and
Docket
The Iowa Civil Jury Instructions define an
assault as either:
(1) an act intended to put another in fear
of physical pain or injury; [or] (2) an act
intended to put another in fear of physical
contact which a reasonable person would
deem insulting or offensive; and the victim
reasonably believes that the act may be
carried out immediately.
1900.2 (citing State v. Straub, 190 N.W. 869 (1921) and
Restatement of Torts (Second), Sections 21, 31, and 32.
Iowa has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts for a
definition of battery.
Nelson v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.,
619 N.W.2d 385, 388-89 (Iowa 2000).
The Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 13 provides:
An actor is subject to liability to another
for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the
other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and
19
Though Plaintiffs claim that both Defendants McCrystal
and Trobaugh are liable for assault and battery, they only
claim that liability attaches to Defendant Trobaugh as a
conspirator.
This argument is considered in Section VIII
within this Memorandum and Opinion Order.
41
(b) a harmful contact with the person of
the other directly or indirectly results.
The parties agree that Defendant McCrystal’s actions,
absent a viable defense, constituted assault and battery; but
Defendant McCrystal argues, he is entitled to the defense of
justification.
Docket Nos. 19-3, 20 and 21-3, 13.
More
specifically, Iowa Code § 804.8 provides,
A peace officer, while making a lawful
arrest, is justified in the use of any
force which the peace officer reasonably
believes to be necessary to effect the
arrest or to defend any person from bodily
harm while making the arrest.
As previously discussed in Sections V(A) and (C), the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
suggests that Deputy McCrystal was not making a lawful arrest;
and, even if he were, his actions constituted excessive force.
Police
action
exceeding
the
constitute assault and battery.
limits
of
excessive
force
Lawyer v. City of Council
Bluffs, Iowa, 240 F. Supp. 2d 941, 955 (S.D. Iowa 2002).
Thus, Defendant McCrystal’s motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff Small’s assault and battery claim is denied.
VIII.
IOWA STATE LAW: MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Under Iowa law, the elements of malicious prosecution
are:
42
(1) a previous prosecution;
(2) instigation or procurement thereof by
defendant;
(3)termination of the prosecution by an
acquittal or discharge of plaintiff;
(4) want of probable cause; and
(5) malice in bringing the prosecution on
the part of the defendant.
Reed v. Linn County, 425 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa App. 1988).
(citing Vander Linden v. Crews, 231 N.W.2d 904, 905 (Iowa
1975).
In claims against public officials, a plaintiff must make
an additional showing of actual malice.
N.W.2d at 906.
Vander Linden, 231
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary
judgment because there is no evidence they acted with actual
malice.
Docket Nos. 19-3, 21 and 21-3, 15.
Actual malice “cannot simply be inferred from a lack of
probable cause, but must be the subject of an affirmative
showing” that defendant’s actions were “[p]rimarily inspired
by ill-will, hatred or other wrongful motives.”
Linden, 231 N.W.2d at 906.
Vander
Plaintiffs pled that Defendants
brought criminal charges against them in order to cover up
Defendant McCrystal’s assault and battery on and wrongful
arrest of Plaintiff Small.
Docket No. 3, 3.
Given that a
reasonable jury could infer that Plaintiff Small was falsely
arrested through excessive force and Deputies McCrystal and
Trobaugh falsified reports in relation to many of the alleged
43
events which ultimately resulted in the prosecution of all the
Plaintiffs,
a
reasonable
jury
could
also
conclude
that
Deputies McCrystal and Trobaugh’s actions constituted a coverup. The act of instigating a criminal prosecution in order to
quiet potential witnesses to an illegal act is no doubt a
wrongful motive; and therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment
on
Plaintiffs’
malicious
prosecution
claims
are
denied.
IX. ABUSE OF PROCESS
Abuse of process is “‘the use of legal process, whether
criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a
purpose for which it was not designed.’”
Fuller v. Local
Union No. 106, 567 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Palmer
Tandem Management Servs., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Iowa
1993). There are three elements to an abuse of process claim:
“(1) the use of a legal process; (2) its use in an improper
or unauthorized manner; and (3) the plaintiff suffered damages
as a result of the abuse.”
Dobratz v. Krier, 2011 WL 5867067,
3 (Iowa App. 2011).
Defendants
claim
they
did
not
actually
use
a
legal
process because prosecutors, rather than Defendants, actually
filed the charges against Plaintiffs. Docket Nos. 19-3, 22-23
44
and 21-3, 16.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has ruled that a
“mere report to police of possible criminal activity does not
constitute
legal
process.”
Fuller,
567
N.W.2d
at
421.
However, this begs the question of what constitutes a “mere
report.”
There is some case law indicating that a false
report is not a “mere report.”
In Lyons v. Midwest Glazing,
L.L.C., the Honorable Judge Mark W. Bennett of the Northern
District of Iowa, ruled that an allegedly false report from a
private citizen that instigated the issuance of a search
warrant was sufficient to sustain an abuse of process claim.
235 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1040-42.
Court,
though
they
sustained
In addition, the Iowa Supreme
a
directed
verdict
against
Plaintiff on unrelated grounds, considered an abuse of process
claim against a private citizen who initiated debt collection
proceedings though the state was in fact prosecuting the
matter.
See Tomash v. John Deere Indus. Equipment Co., 399
N.W.2d 387, 390 (1987).
In this case, there is even more reason to suppose that
Defendants’ actions constituted use of a legal process.
This
case does not involve complaints filed by common citizens;
rather, it emanates from alleged false reports from officers
of the law who are more closely related to the office of a
45
prosecutor than the average citizen.
In addition, the legal
definition of abuse of process specifically provides that it
applies to the use of criminal proceedings.
prosecutors
are
the
criminal
proceedings
absolute
immunity,
only
and
police
people
they
who
are
officers
Since government
can
actually
bring
generally
entitled
who
the
file
to
reports
underlying a prosecution but are not entitled to absolute
immunity should also be subject to abuse of process claims if
such claims are to have any meaning in the criminal context.
Finally, the common meaning of the term “use” is “to put into
action or service,” and, as discussed in the Section VI of
this Memorandum and Opinion Order, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh’s actions were
the proximate (or legal) cause of Plaintiffs’ prosecution.
use, Merriam-Webster, available at http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/use, last visited January 28, 2012. Thus, the
reports filed by Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh were not
“mere
reports,”
they
were
official
reports
which,
as
previously discussed, were likely the predominant cause of the
prosecution of Plaintiffs.
As such, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim is
denied.
46
X.
CIVIL CONSPIRACY
The elements of a § 1983 conspiracy claim are: (1)
defendant(s) “conspired with others;” (2) “that at least one
of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy;” (3) the conspiracy resulted in
the “deprivation” of a plaintiff’s constitutional right or
privilege; and (4) plaintiff(s) sustained an injury. Askew v.
Millerd, 191 F.3d 953,
957 (8th Cir. 1999).
Iowa Courts have favorably cited Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 876 for the basis of a civil conspiracy claim.
v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W. 2d 159, 172 (Iowa 2002).
provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the
other or pursuant to a common design with
him, or
(b)
knows
that
the
other’s
conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the
other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 867.
47
Wright
§ 876
Taken together, Defendants’ arguments against Plaintiffs’
§ 1983 and state law conspiracy claims are:
(1) Plaintiffs
have failed to show that Defendants conspired;20 (2) Plaintiffs
have
failed
to
show
either
an
underlying
constitutional
violation for purposes of § 1983 or an underlying wrongful act
for purposes of state law conspiracy; (3) there is no common
law conspiracy claim in Iowa; (4) Defendant Trobaugh can
neither be held liable for conspiracy on Plaintiff Small’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 wrongful arrest and excessive force claims, nor
Plaintiff Small’s state law assault and battery claims; and
(5)
Defendants
McCrystal
and
Trobaugh
are
entitled
to
qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy claims.
Docket No. 19-3, 16-19 and Docket No. 21-3, 11, 12, and 14.
A.
Whether
Defendants
Have
Made
a
Showing
of
Conspiracy
At the heart of a “[c]onspiracy is . . . a combination of
two or more persons to accomplish, through concerted actions,
an unlawful end or a lawful end by unlawful means.”
Tubbs v.
United Cent. Bank, 451 N.W.2d 177, 183-84 (Iowa 1990) (citing
20
This argument could be construed as a request for a
motion to dismiss; however, because Defendants’ motions are
entitled “motions for summary judgment,” this Court has
determined to construe them as such.
48
Countryman v. Mount Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 357 N.W. 2d
599, 602 (Iowa 1984).
“The principal element of a conspiracy
is an agreement to or understanding to effect a wrong against
another.”
Id. (citing Basic Chemicals, Inc. v. Benson, 251
N.W.2d 220, 233 (Iowa 1977).
Defendant Trobaugh contends Plaintiffs have been unable
“to articulate or point to any proof that there was an
agreement
between”
Defendants.
Docket
No.
21-3,
14.
Likewise, Defendant McCrystal claims Plaintiffs “failed to
allege any specific facts tending to show a meeting of the
minds amongst the Defendants.”
As
previously
noted,
Docket No. 19-3, 17.
Plaintiffs’
amended
complaint
alleges Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh conspired to cover
up Defendant McCrystal’s alleged illegal action in relation to
Plaintiff Small by bringing false criminal charges and making
false statements against the other Plaintiffs.
3.
Docket No. 3,
While Plaintiffs do not point to a signed agreement
between
Defendants
McCrystal
or
Trobaugh
or
any
other
conclusive, direct evidence, they are not required to do so.
Iowa Model Civil Jury Instructions provide that the agreement
in a civil conspiracy “need not be expressed in words and may
be implied and understood to exist from the conduct itself.”
49
3500.2 (2004). In other words, a conspiracy “may be proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence.”
Id.
Trobaugh
Since Defendants
which
and
McCrystal’s
reports,
are
strikingly
similar, are so different than other eyewitness testimony
related to the events in question, it is reasonable to infer
that
Defendants
conspired
to
falsify
their
reports.
Therefore, Defendants’ requests for summary judgment based on
a
failure
to
demonstrate
an
agreement
are
denied.
A
reasonable jury, based on the differences between eyewitness
testimony and Defendants Trobaugh and McCrystal’s reports,
could conclude that Defendant McCrystal and Trobaugh agreed to
falsify
their
reports
in
order
to
cover
up
Defendant
McCrystal’s action in relation to Plaintiff Small.
B.
Whether Plaintiffs have Sufficiently Shown an
Underlying Constitutional Violation for Purposes of § 1983 or
a Wrongful Act for Purposes of Common Law Conspiracy
Under Iowa Law, a “‘[c]ivil conspiracy is not in itself
actionable; rather, it is the” injuries caused “in furtherance
of the conspiracy [that] give rise to the action.’” Wright v.
Brooke Group, Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 171 (Iowa 2002) (quoting
Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 233 (Iowa 1977).
Under Federal Law, and as previously noted, a Plaintiff must
50
make a showing of a “deprivation” of a constitutional right or
privilege.
Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953,
957 (8th Cir.
1999).
A constitutional deprivation may consist of a separate
claim sought to be submitted to the jury.
Askew v. Millerd,
191 F.3d 953, 957-58 (8th Cir. 1999) (considering separate
claims as a basis for a constitutional deprivation).
As
previously noted, Plaintiffs have properly alleged and made a
prima
facie
showing
of
both
First
and
Fourth
Amendment
violations.
Furthermore, and as previously noted, a conspiracy may
consist of an agreement to commit an unlawful act or a lawful
act by unlawful means.
1990)
(citations
Tubbs, 451 N.W.2d 177, 183-84 (Iowa
omitted).
Again,
there
is
testimony
supporting the reasonable inference that Defendants falsified
police
reports
prosecution,
as
and
ultimately
well
as
abuse
engaged
of
in
process.
malicious
Malicious
prosecution and abuse of process are unlawful acts, and the
falsification of police reports constitutes unlawful means.
Therefore, there remains genuine issues of material fact
as to whether Defendants acted in concert to violate
51
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights or commit a wrongful act,
and summary judgment is inappropriate.
C.
Whether There is a Common Law Conspiracy Claim
in Iowa
Defendant
McCrystal’s
brief
in
relation
to
civil
conspiracy consists of a long quote from the Iowa Supreme
Court’s decision in Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., but fails to
elaborate on the import of the quoted passage. Docket No. 193, 18-19.
Defendant
At the hearing of January 30, 2012, it seemed
McCrystal
was
arguing
that
there
is
no
civil
conspiracy cause of action in Iowa; in as far as this was
Defendant McCrystal’s intended argument, this Court disagrees.
As previously noted, the Wright Court stated a “‘[c]ivil
conspiracy is not in itself actionable; rather, it is the”
injuries caused “in furtherance of the conspiracy [that] give
rise to the action.’”
652 N.W.2d 159, 171 (Iowa 2002)
(quoting Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 233
(Iowa 1977)).
While this may be read in isolation to imply
that civil conspiracy does not exist in Iowa, this Court is
persuaded that it merely requires allegations of an underlying
wrongful act.
Therefore, Defendant McCrystal’s motion for
summary judgment is denied as to this argument.
52
D.
Whether
Defendant
Trobaugh
can
be
Held
Responsible for Plaintiff Small’s Claims
Defendant Trobaugh notes that he, in fact, “made no
physical contact with” Plaintiff Small.
Docket No. 21-3.
Though Defendant Trobaugh only raises the defense in relation
to Plaintiff Small’s state law assault and battery claim, if
successful, it should also preclude Plaintiff Small’s § 1983
wrongful arrest and excessive force claims as well.
Plaintiff Small concedes that he was not physically
touched by Defendant Trobaugh; but, he asserts that, because
Trobaugh was in a conspiracy to cover up Defendant McCrystal’s
actions, “he can be held liable” for Defendant McCrystal’s
actions prior to their conspiracy.
Docket No. 27-19, 20.
This is not the law.
As previously noted, under both Federal and Iowa law, in
order for liability to attach to conspirators, there must be
an agreement between “‘two persons to commit a wrong against
another.’”
F.3d at 957.
Wright, 652 N.W.2d at 171; see also Askew, 191
Further, the wrong must result or be committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id.; see also Rotermund v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting
that the “‘gist’” of a civil conspiracy is “‘the wrong done by
53
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy’”) (internal quotations
omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff Small does not allege and
there is no evidence to indicate that Defendant McCrystal and
Trobaugh agreed to wrongfully arrest/seize, use excessive
force against, or commit an assault and battery on Plaintiff
Small.
On the contrary, Plaintiff Small’s allegations are
that Defendant McCrystal and Trobaugh agreed to cover up
Deputy
McCrystal’s
alleged
actions.
Stated
differently,
Deputy McCrystal’s alleged actions were not in furtherance of
the
alleged
conspiracy.
conspiracy,
but
precipitated
the
alleged
Thus, Defendant Trobaugh’s motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff Small’s § 1983 claims for wrongful
arrest and excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and state law assault and battery claim is granted.
However, because some of the witness’ testimony from the
related criminal proceedings supports the reasonable inference
that Deputy Trobaugh may have falsified reports for purposes
of prosecuting Plaintiff Small, Deputy Trobaugh’s motion for
summary judgment, in as far as it relates to Plaintiff Small’s
§ 1983 retaliatory inducement to prosecute claim, is denied.
54
E.
Whether Defendants McCrystal and Trobaugh are
Entitled to Qualified Immunity21
As previously noted, Plaintiffs have made a sufficient
showing of various constitutional violations.
Furthermore,
the differences between the eyewitness’ testimony and Deputies
Trobaugh and McCrystal’s police reports is sufficient to
establish the reasonable inference that Defendants McCrystal
and Trobaugh conspired to falsify their police reports and
cover
up
Defendant
Plaintiff Small.
most
favorable
McCrystal’s
actions
in
relation
to
Finally, viewing the evidence in a light
to
Plaintiffs,
reasonable
officers
in
circumstances identical to those faced by Defendants Trobough
and McCrystal would have known their alleged agreement to
submit similar false reports against Plaintiffs would violate
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right not to be subject to false
arrest,
and
First
Amendment
right
not
to
be
subject
to
retaliatory prosecution.
However,
this
Court
is
persuaded
that
a
reasonable
officer in Defendant Trobaugh’s position would not have known
that he may be held liable for Defendant McCrystal’s actions
21
See pages 17-19 within this Memorandum and Opinion
Order for an explanation of the standard applicable to
qualified immunity.
55
prior to the agreement. Thus, Defendant Trobaugh’s motion for
summary judgment of Plaintiff Small’s § 1983 wrongful arrest
and excessive force claim based on qualified immunity is
granted;
but,
because
a
reasonable
jury
could
conclude
Defendant Trobaugh falsified his reports, in as far as he
seeks a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Small’s
retaliatory inducement to prosecute claim, his motion for
summary judgment is denied.
XI. DEFENDANT WOODBURY COUNTY’S ARGUMENT
A.
§ 1983
“‘[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for
an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents’ on a
respondeat superior theory of liability.”
Parrish v. Ball,
594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Monnell v. New York
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
local
governments
can
be
held
liable
under
§
inadequate training where:
(1) the [county’s] . . . training practices
[were] inadequate; (2) the [county] was
deliberately indifferent to the rights of
others in adopting them, such that the
failure to train reflects a deliberate or
conscious choice by [the county]; and (3)
an alleged deficiency in the . . . training
procedures actually caused the plaintiff’s
injury.
56
However,
1983
for
Id. (quotation omitted).
This standard is difficult to meet.
A plaintiff must
show that:
in light of the duties assigned to specific
officers . . . the need for more or
different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that
the policymakers of the [county] can
reasonably
be
said
to
have
been
deliberately indifferent to the need.
Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390
(1989).
Plaintiff provided no information related to Woodbury
County’s training practices and would have this Court infer
that they were inadequate based on the Defendants’ conduct.
Docket No. 28-1, 23.
limitations
on
If such an inference were allowed, the
local
government
liability
would
be
meaningless; each case in which a reasonable jury could
conclude an employee was liable would necessitate a finding
that a reasonable jury could also conclude that the local
government employer is also liable.
In this Court’s view, it
is not reasonable to infer that Defendants’ conduct was caused
by
inadequate
training
when
nothing
is
known
of
their
training. Therefore, Defendant Woodbury County’s motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is granted.
57
However, Plaintiffs are granted leave to motion this Court to
amend their complaint to properly allege Woodbury County’s
training practices, if they desire.
B.
State Law Claims
Defendant Woodbury County’s only defense to the state law
claims appears to be that they cannot be held liable for the
claims for which Defendants Trobaugh or McCrystal are not
liable.
Docket No. 19-3, 23.
This is correct:
“in order for
municipal liability to attach, individual liability first must
be found on an underlying substantive claim.”
McCoy v. City
of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005).
Thus, in
keeping with this Court’s rulings within this Memorandum and
Opinion Order, Defendant Woodbury County’s motion for summary
judgment is granted in relation to Plaintiff Small’s assault
and battery claim against Defendant Trobaugh, but denied in
relation
to
all
of
Plaintiffs’
other
state
law
claims,
including Plaintiff Small’s assault and battery claim against
Defendant McCrystal.
XII.
Defendant
CONCLUSION
Trobaugh’s
motion
for
summary
judgment
in
relation to Plaintiff Small’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of
action for wrongful arrest, excessive use of force, and civil
58
conspiracy to commit a wrongful arrest and excessive use of
force
are
granted.
Docket
No.
21.
Defendant
Woodbury
County’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C.
§
1983
however,
claims
based
Plaintiffs
opportunity
to
amend
on
inadequate
are
granted
their
County’s training practices.
training
leave
complaint
to
to
is
granted;
request
allege
an
Woodbury
Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment in relation to all of Plaintiffs’ other claims
identified on pages 11-14 of this Memorandum and Opinion Order
are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of April, 2012.
__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
59
Exhibit A
Assault on a
Peace Officer
Disorderly
Conduct
Unlawful
Assembly
Failure to
Disperse
Interference
with
Official
Acts
Tracy Mertz,
Michele Heck
Derrick Pomranky,
Amber Gamboa,
Jon Flanders,
Nicholas Palmer,
Adam Lee,
Jason Hopkins,
Clint Small
Derrick Pomranky,
Amber Gamboa,
Jon Flanders,
Nicholas Palmer,
Adam Lee,
Jason Hopkins,
Clint Small
Derrick Pomranky,
Amber Gamboa,
Jon Flanders,
Nicholas Palmer,
Adam Lee,
Jason Hopkins,
Clint Small
Clint Small
60
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