Blair v. Wilson Trailer Company
Filing
49
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order denying 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 20 Motion for Summary Judgment (See Order Text). Signed by Senior Judge Donald E OBrien on 7/20/2012. (des) Modified text on 7/20/2012 (des).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
YORK J. BLAIR,
Plaintiff,
No. 10-CV-04126-DEO
v.
Memorandum and Opinion Order
WILSON TRAILER COMPANY,
Defendant.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2010, York J. Blair, Plaintiff, filed a
Complaint against Wilson Trailer Company, Defendant.
No. 3.
Docket
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendant violated the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et
seq..
Docket No. 3, 4.
Currently before this Court is
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff’s Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment.
II.
Docket Nos. 20 and 35.
FACTS
Plaintiff began working for Defendant on June 18, 2008,
as a manufacturer assembling grain trailers.
Docket No. 37,
1 and Docket No. 28-2, 1.
Defendant provides its employees 7 days of personal leave
per year, starting from January 1st of each year.
20-1, 2.
Docket No.
Defendant also provides its employees 40 hours of
vacation time per year, starting from the anniversary of their
initial employment date.
At the time Plaintiff applied
Id.
for leave under the FMLA in October of 2009, it is undisputed
that, pursuant to Defendant’s policies, Plaintiff had used his
personal leave and vacation time.
Id.
Sometime in October of 2009, Plaintiff’s close friend
passed away. Docket No. 28-2, 2. Plaintiff attempted to take
time off but was ineligible because he had exhausted his
personal leave, and, since the friend who passed away was not
a legal relative, Plaintiff did not qualify for additional
bereavement leave.
Docket No. 28-2, 2.
On October 20, 2009, Plaintiff informed Carol LaBrune, a
human resource employee for Defendant, that he was sick.
Docket No. 28-2.
Ms. LaBrune told Plaintiff he may be
entitled to leave pursuant to the FMLA, but there is no
indication
Ms.
LaBrune
told
Plaintiff
consequences if he did not qualify.
Docket
No.
28-3,
54).
However,
of
the
potential
Docket No. 39, 1 (citing
Defendant
did
provide
Plaintiff an FMLA Certification Form (hereinafter, the “First
Form”) to be completed by his physician.
Docket No. 37, 2.
In pertinent part, the First Form indicates that “[f]ailure to
provide a complete and sufficient medical certification may
2
result in denial of your FMLA request.”
Docket No. 20-2, 10.
Later that day, Physician’s Assistant (PA) Gary Heath saw
Plaintiff.
Docket No. 37, 2.
Plaintiff reported vomiting
diarrhea, and headaches and thought he may have the flu.
Docket No. 37, 2.
PA Heath concluded stress and anxiety
caused Plaintiff’s symptoms, rather than flu. Docket Nos. 37,
2 and 28-2, 2.
Though PA Heath’s notes, dated October 20,
2009, were not made available for Defendant until after the
initiation of this law suit, they indicate Plaintiff was
“[i]nstructed
to
make
Docket No. 28-2, 8.
an
appointment”
with
a
counselor.
Furthermore, according to Plaintiff, PA
Heath told Plaintiff he should see a counselor during their
October 20, 2009, appointment, but Plaintiff was unable “to
schedule an appointment right away because of the schedule of
the counselor.”
Docket No. 28-2, 3 (citing Docket No. 28-3,
56-58) (other citations omitted).
On October 20, 21, 22, and 26 of 2009, Plaintiff called
in sick and missed work.
Docket No. 37, 2.
On October 23, 2009, PA Heath completed the First FMLA
Form and subsequently faxed it to Defendant on October 26,
2009.
Docket No. 37, 3.
The First Form indicates Plaintiff
was unable to perform any job function but did not state why
3
other than to say that Plaintiff had “an illness that may
require him to miss work occasionally.”
Docket No. 20-2, 11.
The First Form also indicates Plaintiff would not “need to
attend follow-up treatment,” was not “referred to other health
care provider(s),” and was not prescribed any medication.
Docket No. 20-2, 12.
However, the First Form did indicate
Plaintiff would experience episodic flare-ups, periodically
preventing him from performing his job.
Docket No. 20-2, 12.
It also indicated the flare-ups would occur 2-3 times per
month for 1-2 days per episode.
Id.
Ms. LaBrune and John Kreber, Defendant’s human resource
director, reviewed the First Form and claim to have determined
Plaintiff did not qualify for leave pursuant to the FMLA.
Docket No. 37, 2.
Still, on October 27, 2009, Ms. LaBrune and
Mr. Kreber faxed the First Form to PA Heath’s office and
requested clarification.
Docket No. 37, 2.
That same day, PA Heath faxed a Second Form back.
No.
37,
3.
The
Second
Form
added
that
Docket
Plaintiff
was
experiencing anxiety and depression due to several deaths and
illnesses in his family.
Docket No. 20-2, 16.
In addition,
though the Second Form still indicated Plaintiff did not “need
to attend follow-up treatment,” PA Heath added a notation,
4
which read, “(none scheduled at this time).”
Furthermore, PA
Heath changed the Second Form to indicate Plaintiff was
“referred to other health care provider(s) for evaluation or
treatment” and added a notation reading, “counseling upstairs
recommended and offered.”
After
reviewing
the
Docket No. 20-2, 17.
more
detailed
Second
Form,
Ms.
LaBrune and Mr. Kreber again claim to have concluded Plaintiff
did not qualify for leave pursuant to the FMLA.
37, 3.
notice
Docket No.
On October 28, 2009, Plaintiff was given written
indicating
his
application
for
leave
was
denied.
Docket No. 28-2, 4.
On October 29, 2009, PA Heath’s office called Defendant
and stated a desire to file a Third Form, because, according
to Defendant, Plaintiff was threatening to sue.
37, 4.
Docket No.
Ms. LaBrune informed PA Heath’s office the decision
was already made and any subsequent information from his
office
would
be
inconsequential.
Docket
No.
37,
4.
Nevertheless, PA Heath’s office faxed a Third Form that same
day.
Docket No. 37, 4.
In pertinent part, the Third Form
noted that Plaintiff “[m]ay need counseling due to anxiety
issues.”
Docket No. 20-2, 28.
5
Though unsolicited, Mr. Kreber and Ms. LaBrune reviewed
the Third Form and again claim to have determined that it did
not permit leave under the FMLA.
In
a
deposition,
understanding
of
the
Mr.
Docket No. 37, 4.
Kreber
addition
of
was
asked
about
his
the
phrase
“may
need
counseling” and provided the following equivocating response:
My interpretation of may need counseling is
very – very vague. I – my interpretation
of that suggests that it must not have – he
must not have needed counseling or he would
have been – he would have been referred
immediately.
Docket No. 28-3, 26.
Mr. Kreber and Ms. Labrune testified they never asked
Plaintiff whether or not he was going to go to counseling;
never requested additional information from Plaintiff; and
never, after the Second Form was sent from PA Heath’s office,
asked for additional clarification from PA Heath.
Docket No.
28-3. 26-27 and Docket No. 28-2, 7-8.
Based on denial of his application for leave pursuant to
FMLA, Plaintiff’s absences were deemed unexcused, and he was
placed on suspension for three days.
Docket No. 28-2, 5.
After his suspension, on November 2, 2009, Plaintiff was
terminated though he informed Defendant he was scheduled to
see a counselor the next day.
Docket No. 28-2, 5.
6
On November 3, 2009, Plaintiff went to Counselor Jolin.
The following day, Plaintiff again saw PA Heath.
Docket No.
28-2, 9. PA Heath prescribed Plaintiff Lexapro and instructed
him to continue counseling. Docket No. 28-2, 9 (citing Docket
No. 28-3, 79-80.)
III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P., Rule 56(c).
Fed.
A fact is material if it is necessary
“to establish the existence of an element essential to [a]
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.”
(1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
There is a genuine issue as to a material fact if,
based on the record before the court, a “rational trier of
fact” could find for the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a “court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . .”
Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
63 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 1995).
This requires a court to draw
7
any reasonable inference from the underlying facts in favor of
the nonmoving party and to refrain from weighing the evidence,
making credibility determinations, or attempting to discern
the truth of any factual issue in a manner which favors the
moving party unless there is no reasonable alternative.
Matsushita,
475
U.S.
at
587;
and
Morris
v.
City
See
of
Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Procedurally, the movant bears the initial burden “of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of
a genuine issue.” Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the movant
has carried his burden, the non-moving party is required “to
go beyond the pleadings” and through “affidavits, or by the
‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 423 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
IV.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Overview of the FMLA
The FMLA was primarily designed “to balance the demands
8
of the workplace with the needs of families” and to “entitle
employees to take reasonable leave” when necessary to care for
their health or the health of their family members. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2601(a)(1).
In part pertinent to Plaintiff’s cause of
action, the FMLA provides an employee the right to take up to
12 weeks of unpaid leave per year because of “a serious health
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the
functions
of”
2612(a)(1)(D).
his
or
position.1
her
29
U.S.C.
§
In order to constitute a “serious health
condition” there must be: (1) an illness, injury, impairment,
or
physical
or
mental
condition”
that
incapacitates
the
employee “for more than three consecutive, full calendar
days,” and (2) either “inpatient care in a hospital, hospice,
or residential medical care facility; or . . . continuing
treatment by a health care provider.”
1
29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)
Other qualifying reasons for FMLA leave include: (1)
“the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order
to care for such son or daughter;” (2) “the placement of a son
or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care;”
(3) “[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or
parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or
parent has a serious health condition;” and (4) “any
qualifying exigency (as the Secretary shall, by regulation,
determine) arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son,
daughter, or parent of the employee is on covered active duty
(or has been notified of an impending call or order to covered
active duty) in the Armed Forces.”
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
9
and 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a).
Continuing treatment can involve
any condition requiring “[t]reatment two or more times, within
30 days of the first day of incapacity,” or “[t]reatment by a
health care provider on at least one occasion, which results
in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of
the health care provider.”
29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(1).
In determining whether an employee is entitled to FMLA
leave, an employer “may” require that an employee have a
qualified health care provider certify that the requisite
conditions for leave are met.
29 U.S.C. § 2613(a).
the
the
certification
process,
Department
of
In aid of
Labor
has
developed certification forms, which it provides to employers.
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.306(b).
“At the time the employer
requests certification, the employer must . . . advise an
employee of the anticipated consequences of an employee’s
failure to provide adequate certification.”
825.305(d).
29 C.F.R. §
The employee, absent a qualifying excuse, then
has 15 calendar days to return the certification.
29 C.F.R.
§ 825.305(b).
Once an employer has exercised his right to require a
certification, the employee has the burden of providing “a
complete and sufficient certification to the employer . . . .”
10
29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c).
A proper certification must contain
certain “required information,” including a
statement or description of appropriate
medical facts . . . sufficient to support
the need for leave. Such medical facts may
include information on symptoms, diagnosis,
hospitalization, doctor visits, whether
medication
has
been
prescribed,
any
referrals for evaluation or treatment
(physical therapy, for example), or any
other regimen of continuing treatment.
29 C.F.R. § 825.306(a)(3).
Once the employee or a qualified health care provider
submits a Certification Form to an employer, the employer
must:
advise an employee whenever the employer
finds
a
certification
incomplete
or
insufficient, and shall state in writing
what additional information is necessary to
make
the
certification
complete
and
sufficient. A certification is considered
incomplete if the employer receives a
certification, but one or more of the
applicable entries have not been completed.
A certification is considered insufficient
if the employer receives a complete
certification, but the information provided
is vague, ambiguous, or non-responsive.
The employer must provide the employee with
seven calendar days to cure any such
deficiency.
29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c).
There
are
two
general
types
of
FMLA
claims:
(1)
retaliation claims, or “‘claims in which the employee alleges
11
that the employer discriminated against him for exercising his
FMLA rights;’” and (2) interference claims, or “‘claims in
which
the
employee
alleges
that
an
employer
denied
or
interfered with his substantive rights under the FMLA.’”
Parsons v. Principal Life Insurance Company, 686 F. Supp. 2d
906, 910 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Stallings v. Hussmann Corp.,
447 F.3d 1041, 1050 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
2615(a)(1)-(2)).
Plaintiff, because he alleges Defendant
failed to follow the proper procedures for determining whether
he qualified for FMLA leave, raises an interference claim.
As
to
the
Motions
currently
before
this
Court,
the
Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment because
each
version
of
the
Forms
PA
Heath
provided
Plaintiff did not qualify for FMLA leave.
indicates
The Plaintiff
argues he is entitled to summary judgment on three bases: (1)
Defendant failed to advise Plaintiff of the consequences of
his potential failure to provide adequate certification; (2)
Defendant failed to give Plaintiff 15 days to provide a
response to their request for certification; and (3) Defendant
neither
provided
Plaintiff
written
notice
regarding
the
alleged deficiencies in the certification, nor provided him
seven days to cure the alleged deficiencies.
12
For purposes of organization, this Court will first
consider
Plaintiff’s
first
two
arguments
and
will
then
consider whether the Forms PA Heath provided conclusively
indicate Plaintiff was not entitled to FMLA leave or are in
some manner insufficient.
B.
Wether Defendant Failed to Advise Plaintiff of the
Consequences of His Potential Failure to Provide Adequate
Certification?
As previously noted, the regulations provide that
[a]t the time the employer requests
certification, the employer must . . .
advise [the] employee of the anticipated
consequences of [the] employee’s failure to
provide adequate certification.
29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d).
Defendant
notes
that
the
first
page
of
the
First
Certification Form it provided Plaintiff states, “[f]ailure to
provide a complete and sufficient medical certification may
result in a denial of your FMLA request,” which, according to
Defendant, provided Plaintiff adequate notification of the
potential consequences; this Court agrees.
27.
Docket No. 20-2,
The regulations do not require an employer to inform an
employee of all possible consequences that may result from the
employee’s failure to provide adequate certification.
13
It is
sufficient that an employer inform an employee that his FMLA
leave may be denied without adequate certification.
be accomplished in writing or verbally.
This may
Furthermore, the
record indicates Plaintiff understood that his FMLA leave
required approval from a qualified medical source.2
Docket
No. 20-3, 7.
The record also indicates Plaintiff understood
that
FMLA
without
unexcused.
leave,
Therefore,
any
further
Defendant
absences
sufficiently
would
be
advised
Plaintiff of the consequences of his potential failure to
provide adequate certification, and Plaintiff should have
known he could ultimately be terminated if leave was not
granted.
Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
this basis is denied.
C.
Whether an Employer’s Failure Wait 15 Days Though
Certification has Already been Received is a Violation of the
FMLA?
As previously noted, the regulations state an “employee
must provide the requested certification to the employer
within 15 calendar days after the employer’s request . . . .”
2
In his deposition, Plaintiff indicated that when Mrs.
LaBrune first told him about the possibility of FMLA leave she
indicated that it depended on the doctors approval. Docket
No. 20-3, 7.
14
29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b).
The Plaintiff would have this Court
read this regulation to require an employer to wait 15 days
before
making
regardless
any
of
certification
decision
whether
early.
in
an
In
relation
employee
this
interpretation is unjustified.
Court’s
to
FMLA
leave
in
their
turned
opinion,
such
an
Though the regulation clearly
implies an employer must wait at least 15 days prior to taking
any action before certification is received, it simply does
not require an employer to wait to reach a determination if a
form is provided in less than 15 days.
Therefore, though
Defendant in fact failed to provide Plaintiff 15 days to
provide a response to their request for certification, this
does
not
constitute
interference
established pursuant to the FMLA.
with
Plaintiff’s
rights
Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment on this Basis is Denied.
D.
Whether the Certification Forms PA Heath Provided
Defendant Conclusively Indicate Plaintiff was not Entitled to
FMLA Leave or Whether They are in Some Manner Insufficient?
As previously noted, once an employer has exercised his
right to require a certification form, as here, the employee
has
the
burden
certification
to
of
providing
the
employer
15
“a
.
complete
.
.
.”
and
29
sufficient
C.F.R.
§
825.305(c).
In order to be complete and sufficient, the
certification must include “a statement or description of
appropriate medical facts regarding the [employee’s] health
condition . . . .”
29 C.F.R. § 825.306(a)(3).
Such medical facts may include information
on symptoms, diagnosis, hospitalization,
doctor visits, whether medication has been
prescribed, any referrals for evaluation or
treatment (physical therapy, for example),
or
any
other
regimen
of
continuing
treatment.
Id.
(emphasis added).
However, as previously noted, once the employee or a
qualified health care provider submits a certification form
that is insufficient, the employer must, in writing, inform
the employee what is necessary to make the form sufficient and
provide the employee 7 days to rectify the insufficiency.
C.F.R.
§
825.305(c).
insufficient
certification,
if
“A
the
but
the
certification
employer
receives
information
ambiguous, or non-responsive.”
is
provided
29
considered
a
complete
is
vague,
Id.
Plaintiff contends that the First, Second, and Third
Certification
Forms
PA
Heath
provided
Defendant
were
insufficient; and, therefore, Defendant had a duty to provide
Plaintiff a written explanation of the Forms’ insufficiencies,
16
as well as provide him 7 days to cure said insufficiencies.
Defendant contends the Forms conclusively showed Plaintiff did
not qualify for FMLA leave, and, as such, Defendant had no
additional duties under the regulations.
This Court is
persuaded that reasonable minds could reach either conclusion.
Initially, the Defendant’s argument that they could have
based their decision on any of the Forms PA Heath provided
individually is simply unreasonable.
Prior to making an
adverse employment decision based on the denial of FMLA leave,
fairness and common sense dictate that an employer should
consider all of the medical information then available. If an
employer were allowed to pick and choose which information to
consider, the general purpose of the FMLA would be subverted.
Therefore, prior to Plaintiff’s termination on November 2,
2009,
Defendant
had
a
duty
to
consider
all
three
Forms
provided by PA Heath’s office.
Though the First Form did not establish the requirements
of
a
“serious
illness,”
construed as ambiguous.
PA
Heath’s
responses
could
be
For instance, PA Heath indicated
Plaintiff suffered from a recurrent illness sufficient to make
him incapable of performing his job which would flare-up 2-3
times per month but also indicated recurrent check-ups and
17
medication were unnecessary, which a reasonable jurist could
view as a contradiction. In addition, PA Heath’s responses on
the
First
Form
are
almost
entirely
bereft
of
useful
information and, as such, a reasonable jurist could conclude
they were vague and non-responsive.
to
describe
relevant
medical
For instance, when asked
facts,
such
as
symptoms,
diagnosis, or any regimen of continuing treatment, PA Heath
merely responded, “patient has illness that may require him to
miss work occasionally.”
Docket No. 20-2, 11.
Finally,
though Defendant now contends the First Form conclusively
established Plaintiff did not qualify for FMLA leave, their
own actions may indicate otherwise.
It is undisputed that,
after receiving the First Form, Defendant contacted PA Heath
for additional information.
As previously noted, the Second Form indicated Plaintiff
still
did
not
need
follow-up
treatment
or
medication.
However, the Second Form included a notation indicating that
follow-up treatment, though not scheduled at that time, was
recommended and offered, potentially confusing the matter as
to whether follow-up treatment or medication was in fact
needed.
In
addition,
the
Third
Form
added
a
notation
indicating Plaintiff “[m]ay need counseling due to anxiety
18
issues,” which further supported the reasonable inference that
PA Heath’s responses were ambiguous, vague, or non-responsive.
Defendant cites the Seventh and Sixth Circuits’ decisions
in Stoops v. One Call Communications, Inc. and Nawrocki v.
United
Methodist
Retirement
Communities,
Inc.
for
the
proposition that an employer is entitled “to rely on the face
of [a] certification without further inquiry.”
Nawrocki, 174
Fed. Appx. 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2006) and Stoops, 141 F.3d 309,
313
(7th
Cir.
1998).
distinguishable
in
that
Both
the
Nawrocki
information
and
Stoops
provided
are
by
the
qualified medical providers indicated the plaintiffs did not
need to miss work due to their conditions; whereas, in this
case, all of the Forms PA Heath provided clearly indicate
Plaintiff
had
a
recurrent
recurrent absences.
condition
that
would
require
Nawrocki, 174 Fed. Appx. at 335; Stoops,
141 F.3d at 311. Though hospitalization or continuing care by
a qualified health care provider is a required element of a
serious health condition under the FMLA, whether or not an
employee
is
consecutive
capable
days
is
of
performing
clearly
the
their
more
job
for
important
three
element.
Notably, the regulations do not require a certification to
include information indicating whether additional referrals
19
for evaluation or treatment are required but merely states
that
such
information
825.306(a)(3).
“may”
However,
be
the
included.
29
regulations
§
require
do
C.F.R.
a
certification to include a statement that an employee is
unable to perform the functions required to do his or her job.
29 C.F.R. § 825.306. It would appear the continuing treatment
requirement is intended to differentiate between short-lived,
acute
illnesses
and
recurrent,
conditions, such as Plaintiff’s.
chronic,
or
long-term
When a form indicates an
employee has a recurrent, chronic, or long-term condition
which incapacitates the employee but also indicates additional
treatment is not necessary, it is, in this Court’s opinion,
reasonable
to
infer
insufficient.
indicates
an
that
the
form
is
in
some
manner
However, if a medical professional clearly
employee,
despite
their
condition,
has
the
present and future ability to perform their job, there will
generally be little doubt that they are not entitled to FMLA
leave.
In addition, whether the certifications at issue were
insufficient was not an issue in Nawrocki or Stoops.
Eighth
Circuit
indicated
in
Parsons
v.
Principal
As the
Life
Insurance Company, once an employer is “on notice” that an
20
employee “might be eligible for FMLA-protected leave,” the
employer is “under a duty ‘to count’” said employee’s absences
“as FMLA leave or inquire further.”
686 F. Supp. 2d 906, 916
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scobey v. Nucor Steel-Ark., 580 F.3d
781, 787 (8th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added).
V.
CONCLUSION
In
conclusion,
when
considering
the
Forms
PA
Heath
provided Defendant, a reasonable jury could conclude they are
insufficient as that term is used in the regulations; and,
therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant had
a duty to provide Plaintiff a written explanation of why PA
Heath’s Forms were insufficient, as well as provide Plaintiff
7 days to cure.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.
However, though a reasonable jury could determine the
Forms
are
insufficient,
a
reasonable
determine the forms are not insufficient.
jury
could
also
Reasonable people
may, and often do, reach contrary conclusions.
Each Form, at
a particular location thereon, clearly indicates no further
treatment or medication were required, and a reasonable jury
could, despite some potentially contradictory entries, find
this to conclusively indicate Plaintiff was not suffering from
21
a serious illness as that term is defined under the FMLA.
Therefore,
Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
summary
judgment
for
Defendant’s failure to provide written notice and 7 days to
cure is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of July, 2012.
__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
22
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