Blaise et al v. Branstad et al

Filing 4

INITIAL Review Order Dismissing Case. Application to proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot. Clerk of Court shall file the complaint for the purpose of making a record. Appeal packet mailed to plaintiff. Signed by Senior Judge Donald E OBrien on 8/26/2011. (copy w/nef and appeal packet to non-ecf filers) (des)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
Paul Michael Blaise, John
Arnzen, Syveno J. Wright,
Plaintiffs,

No. 11-CV-4011-DEO

vs.

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Terry E. Branstad, Governor
of Iowa, et. al.,
Defendants
____________________
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Mr. Blaise, Mr. Arnzen, and Mr. Wright are currently

committed to the Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO)1 in Cherokee, Iowa.
motion

to

proceed

in

Before this Court is Plaintiffs’

forma

pauperis,

motion

for

the

appointment of counsel, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Petition. Docket
Nos. 1, 1-1, and 2.

The Plaintiffs allege that Iowa’s

Sexually Violent Predators Act of 1998 violates their 14th
Amendment

right

to

equal

protection

under

the

discriminating against them on the basis of gender.
1

law

by

Docket

CCUSO is not a prison facility; it “provides a secure,
long term, and highly structured environment for the treatment
of sexually violent predators.”
Iowa Department of Human
Services
Offer
#410-HHS-014:
CCUSO,
1
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/docs/11w-401-HHS-014-CCUSO.pdf,
last visited July 14, 2011.
The patients at CCUSO “have
served their prison terms but in a separate civil trial have
been found likely to commit further violent sexual offenses.”
Id.

No. 1-1, 2.
Recently, CCUSO committees, some more than others, have
inundated this Court with numerous complaints, imposing a
substantial strain on this Court’s resources.

Though this

Court generally favors allowing pro se indigents to proceed in
forma

pauperis

and

be

afforded

counsel

to

aid

in

the

development of their claims, a real need to screen frivolous
claims in order to give due regard to claims with merit has
arisen.

Therefore, before considering Plaintiffs’ motions,

this Court will consider whether Plaintiffs’ claim of gender
discrimination has sufficient merit to proceed.
II.

MERIT OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled

to

relief.”

Pro

se

complaints,

no

matter

how

“inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings as drafted by a lawyer.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal citations omitted).

However, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(I) allows a court to dismiss a “case at
any time if the court determines” the complaint fails “to
state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .”
Although it is a long-standing maxim that a complaint’s

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factual allegations are to be accepted as true at the early
stages of a proceeding, this does not entail that a court must
entertain any complaint no matter how implausible.

The

Supreme Court has ruled that the facts pled “must [still] be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level
. . . .”

Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

In other words, the claim to relief must be “plausible on its
face.”

Id. at 570.

A claim is only plausible if a plaintiff

pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009).

Where the complaint does “not permit the court to

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 1950 (citing Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).

In addition, “the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. at 1949.
The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Supreme Court has expressed that there is “a strong

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presumption that gender classifications are invalid” under the
Equal Protection Clause.

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511

U.S. 127, 152 (1994).
The Plaintiffs specifically allege that Iowa’s Sexually
Violent Predators Act of 1998 (the “Act”) “seeks Retribution
against only males for their sexual crimes, & not females who
commit the same type of crimes . . . .”

Docket No. 1-1, 2.

This allegation/legal conclusion, in terms of the wording of
the statute, is simply false.

The Act itself does not target

“men,” but rather sexually violent “persons.” I.C.A. § 229A.1
- 229A.16. Sexually violent persons are not a protected class
under 14th Amendment equal protection.

When a statutory

scheme does not specifically classify based on a suspect
class, such as persons of a certain race, alienage, religion,
gender, or national origin, “uneven effects upon” suspected
classes

“are

ordinarily

of

no

constitutional

concern.”

Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979).

The 14th Amendment “guarantees equal laws, not equal

results.”

Id. at 274.

Still, “when a neutral law has a disparate impact” on a
suspect class “an unconstitutional purpose may still be at
work,” and there is no doubt that the Act in question here has

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almost exclusively affected men.

Id.

In order to make a

disparate impact claim, a claimant must prove the intention of
the law was to discriminate against a suspect class.
v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135 (1996).

M.L.B.

If the impact of a law

“could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact
itself would signal that the real classification made by the
Id. at 275.

law was in fact not neutral.”

In this case, the Act’s primary purposes are to protect
the public and treat sexually violent predators.
229A.1

I.C.A. §

This Court is convinced these purposes are entirely

plausible

and

rationally

related

to

a

legitimate

state

interest.

An assertion that the Act seeks to hinder the male

gender with respect to anything other than the proclivity of
some males to be sexually violent predators is untenable.
I.C.A. §§ 229A.1 - 229A.16.

If a woman were to be deemed a

sexually violent predator, the clear terms of the Act would
apply to her.

Id.

To imply that the Iowa Legislature passed

this Act in order to fulfill a discriminatory animus they
harbor against men is pure speculation and highly implausible.
Furthermore, given the gender neutral language of the Act,
Plaintiffs’ complaint rests on a legal conclusion, i.e. the
Act “seeks Retribution against only males,” and provides no

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facts in support thereof.

Docket No. 1-1, 2.

Therefore,

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, and their complaint is dismissed. The Clerk of Court
shall file the complaint for the purpose of making a record.
Further, their request to proceed in forma pauperis and be
appointed counsel are denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of August, 2011.

__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa

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