Trevino et al v. Schroeder

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 25 Amended and Substituted Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Tyson D Bettin, Brandi Drost, Brad Jacobson, Jeff Roth, Steven Schroeder. Signed by Senior Judge Donald E OBrien on 11/28/2011. (des)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION

RAFAEL TREVINO, et. al.,
Plaintiff,

No. 11-CV-4015-DEO

THOMAS CLAYTON SCHROEDER II,
et. al.,

Memorandum and Opinion Order

v.

Defendant.

____________________
I.

INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 2011, Plaintiffs, Rafael and Julia Trevino,

on behalf of themselves and their minor children, A.T. (age
12), D.T. (age 11), and E.T. (age 9), filed a complaint
against Defendants with this Court.
eight causes of action:

The complaint alleges

(1) hate crime under Iowa Code

729A.2, (2) assault, (3) battery, (4) false imprisonment, (5)
malicious prosecution, (6) abuse of process, (7) civil rights
violations, and (8) conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ civil
rights.

Docket No. 13, 11-13.

Currently

before

this

Court

is

Defendant

Steven

Schroeder, Tyson D. Bettin, Brad Jacobson, Brandi Drost, and
Jeff

Roth’s

(hereinafter,

“movants”)

motion

to

dismiss

Plaintiffs’ claims based on three grounds:

(1) lack of

jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs’ lack of access to U.S.
courts, (2) failure to file a right to sue letter as required
under

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

Commission

(EEOC)

and/or the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), and (3)
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Docket Nos. 24 and 25.
II.

FACTS AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs

“are

married

adult

Hispanic

residents

of

Hidalgo County, Texas” and “are of Mexican origin.” Id. at 2.
All of the Defendants are Caucasian.

Id.

In June of 2009,

Rafael Trevino moved to Wall Lake, Iowa, as a migrant farm
worker detasseling corn on local farms. Julia Trevino, Rafael
Trevino’s wife, and their children remained in Texas.

Id. at

4-5.
“On the evening of August 3, 2009, Rafael Trevino and
another member of” the detasseling “crew went to a bar called
Doc’s Place . . . played pool, and then returned” to their
apartments, “two blocks away.”

Id.

Upon returning home, Mr.

Trevino ate dinner and then “went outside to his back yard to
call his wife . . . .”

Id.

Just prior to dialing her number,

“a white pickup truck with a crew cab [sped] into his back

2

yard and [knocked] over a barbeque grill.”

Id.

“One or more

of the Defendants . . . including[,] without limitation Tommy
Schroeder, Steven Schroeder, and Brad Jacobson, exited the
white truck, immediately grabbed Mr. Trevino, and forced him
into the bed of the truck” where Mr. Trevino was forcibly held
face down and driven “to a remote location on the outskirts of
Wall Lake, Iowa.”

Id. at 4-5.

Plaintiffs allege, “[o]n information and belief, the
group of people at the remote location included all or most”
of

the

following

Defendants:

Tommy

Schroeder,

Steven

Schroeder, Brad Jacobson, DeRae A. Bettin, Tyson D. Bettin,
Id. at 5.

Brandi Drost, and Jeff Roth.

Once at the remote

location, one or more of the Defendants dragged Mr. Trevino
from

the

bed

of

the

truck

and

then

severely

beat

him,

“repeatedly . . . striking him with their fists and kicking
him.”

Id.

While the beating was ongoing, “[s]ome members of

the group shouted ‘kill him’ and ‘f**king Mexican,’” as Mr.
Trevino drifted in and out of consciousness.

Id.

As a result

of the beating, Mr. Trevino suffered a broken nose, broken
rib, cuts, bruises, swelling all over his body, and blood in
his urine due to blows to his genitals and kidneys.
6.

Id. at 5-

Since suffering his injuries, Mr. Trevino “has required

3

repeated hospital treatment.”

Id. at 6.

According to Plaintiffs, after the brutal beating of Mr.
Trevino,

Defendant

Tommy

Schroeder

contacted

Defendant

Helmich, a personal friend of the Schroeder family. Id. at 8.
Defendant Helmich is also Chief of Police of the Lake view
Police Department, which serves two municipal corporations:
Wall Lake and Lake View, Iowa.

Chief Helmich, in furtherance

of covering up the actions of those who wrongfully beat the
Plaintiff, told Tommy Schroeder to take Mr. Trevino from the
remote sight back to Doc’s Place.

Id.

Tommy took Mr. Trevino

back to Doc’s and concocted a story to make it look as though
he caught Mr. Trevino breaking into a pickup outside the bar,
and, after attempting to apprehend Mr. Trevino, was forced to
defend himself.

Id. at 7.

After conversing with Tommy Schroeder via telephone,
Chief Helmich dispatched “Officer A.W. Staples to the bar.”
Id. at 8.

Officer Staples found Mr. Trevino under Tommy

Schroeder’s pickup truck in the alley behind Doc’s Place. Id.
Though Officer Staples “concluded . . . the crime scene had
been

staged,”

he

nonetheless,

in

compliance

with

the

expectations of Chief Helmich, filed criminal charges against
Mr. Trevino and failed to investigate Mr. Trevino’s report of

4

events or file charges against Tommy Schroeder or the others
involved.

Id. at 8-9.

According to Plaintiffs, Officer Staples’ decisions were
contrary

to

the

physical

evidence,

and

“the

witness

statements” supporting Tommy Schroeder’s version of events
“were not credible.”

Id. at 9.

On January 12, 2010, “Iowa

prosecutors dismissed all criminal charges against Mr. Trevino
. . . .”

Id.

Among other claims, Plaintiffs contend Chief

Helmich and Officer Staples, acting under color of Iowa law
and

in

their

official

capacities

as

employees

of

the

Municipalities of Wall Lake and Lake View, “conspired with
each other and with the other Defendants to violate” a number
of Mr. Trevino and his family members’ established rights.
Id. at 9-10.
III. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Movants argue the claims against them should be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
“[i]t is difficult to know if the Plaintiffs are residents of
the United States or entitled access to the Courts in the
United States.” This simply is not accurate. The Plaintiffs’
complaint clearly alleges they are “residents of Hidalgo
County, Texas,” and, as Plaintiffs point out, it is a long

5

standing maxim that allegations in a complaint are to be
accepted as true in the early stages of a proceeding.

Mamot

Feed Lot & Trucking v. Hobson, 539 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir.
2008).
Even assuming the compliant uses the term “resident”
merely

to

signify

that

Hidalgo

County,

Texas,

is

where

Plaintiffs live but are not “legal residents,” foreigners can
sue United States Citizens for events occurring on U.S. soil.1
The basic diversity of citizenship statute gives a district
court

original

jurisdiction

over

“all

civil

actions,”

including actions brought under state law, “where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and
is between . . . citizens of different States” or “citizens of
a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.”
U.S.C. § 1332(a).

28

For purposes of the diversity statute “an

alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence”
is “deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is
domiciled.”

Id.

Furthermore,

under

28

U.S.C.

§

1331,

“district courts . . . have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
1

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, foreigners may even sue U.S.
Citizens for events occurring outside of U.S. territory, if
the U.S. Citizen’s actions, or forbearance of action, violated
a U.S. Treaty or international law.
6

the United States,” regardless of a plaintiff’s legal status,
and so this Court clearly has original jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ civil rights claims.
The

federal

sensible result:

jurisdiction

statutes

create

the

only

if district courts were not allowed to hear

claims brought by resident aliens or illegal aliens, the kind
of heinous conduct here alleged could be undertaken without
impunity; such a result would be contrary to basic principles
of human dignity, fairness, and justice.

Therefore, the

Movants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.
IV. FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The Movants argue the complaint fails to provide a right
to sue letter from the EEOC or the ICRC.
Docket No. 25-1, 3.

Docket No. 25, 2 and

The federal legislation establishing the

EEOC and the Iowa State legislation establishing the ICRC
require potential plaintiffs to exhaust certain administrative
remedies prior to seeking relief from a court for certain
types of claims.

In this case, neither commission has any

authority in relation to any of the Plaintiff’s claims.
The

EEOC

as

its

name

suggests,

“is

responsible

for

enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate
against a job applicant or employee.”
7

About EEOC, U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/,
last visited October 17, 2011.
employment

discrimination

In order to bring a Title VII

claim

in

a

district

court,

employee must file a right to sue letter from the EEOC.

an

This

letter indicates that administrative review of the employee’s
claim has been exhausted.

Frazier v. Vilsack, 419 Fed.Appx.

685, 689-90 (8th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiffs neither contend any

Defendant was their employer, nor that Defendants’ actions
violated Title VII, and, therefore, a right to sue letter from
the EEOC is simply not required in this case, and Movants’
motion to dismiss in relation thereto is denied.
The ICRC was created under the Iowa Civil Rights Act of
1965 (hereinafter, the Act). Under the Act, a person claiming
to

be

aggrieved

by

certain

“unfair

or

discriminatory

practice[s] must initially seek . . . administrative relief by
filing a complaint with the commission.”
216.5.

Iowa Code Ann. §

Unfair and discriminatory practices are defined as

“those practices specified as unfair or discriminatory in
sections 216.6, 216.6A, 216.7, 216.8, 216.8A, 216.9, 216.11,
and 216.11A” of the Iowa Code.
Generally,
practices,

these
wage

Sections

Iowa Code Ann. § 216.16(1).

refer

discrimination,

8

to

unfair

unfair
or

employment

discriminatory

practices

in

discriminatory

providing

public

practices

accommodations,

related

to

housing,

unfair
unfair

or
and

discriminatory practices in providing education, and unfair
credit practices.

The Plaintiffs do not make claims in

relation to these issues and the provisions of the Act simply
do not apply.

Therefore, Movants’ motion to dismiss in

relation thereto is denied.
V. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
A.

Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a Defendant

may assert a defense for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Rule 8(e)

requires courts to construe pleadings “so as to do justice.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, the Supreme
Court revisited the standard for a 12(b)(6) motion.
544 (2007).

550 U.S.

The Court upheld the traditional concept of

notice pleading, whereby the primary purpose of pleading in
the federal system is to give a Defendant “‘fair notice what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
9

550 U.S.

at 544 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).

A

complaint need not include detailed factual allegations but
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .”

Id.

“Facts and allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . on the ASSUMPTION
THAT ALL THE allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).”

Id.

Overall, the Court did not “require

heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
550 U.S. at 570.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court elaborated on its ruling
in Twombly, noting two principles underlying its decision.
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009).

First, a court need not

accept allegations which constitute mere legal conclusions as
true.

Id.

action,

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

supported

suffice.”

by

mere

conclusory

statements,

Id. (citing 550 U.S. at 556).

do

not

“Second, only a

complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss.”

Id. (citing 550 U.S. at 556).2

2

Though attorneys, when their client’s needs demand,
are apt to portray the Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and
Iqbal as a sea change in motion to dismiss jurisprudence, a
decision made after Twombly,
Erickson v. Pardus, clearly
10

B.

Analysis

The Movants contend Plaintiffs’ complaint “sets forth no
specific facts or acts in relation to Defendants Bettin,
Drost, and Roth.”

Movants’ contention is not accurate.

Plaintiffs allege that “[o]ne or more” of the Defendants,
including Bettin, Drost, and Roth, were present when Mr.
Trevino was taken from the back of his home.
4.

Docket No. 13,

Plaintiffs also allege, “[o]n information and belief,”

that “all or most” of the Defendants, excluding Officer
Staples, Chief Helmich, and the Municipalities of Wall Lake
and Lake View, Iowa, were present at the remote location where
Mr. Trevino was allegedly beaten.

Id. at 5.

Furthermore, as

reiterates the
basic principles of liberal pleading in
federal district courts. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
The Court
noted,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
requires only ‘a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’
Specific facts are
not necessary; the statement need only
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.’
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 . . . (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 . . .
(1957)).
In addition, when ruling on a
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must
accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.
(citations omitted).
11

Plaintiff’s response indicates, their complaint alleges facts
as to Defendants Bettin, Drost, and Roth’s involvement at
paragraphs 3, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 41, 42, 59, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 74 of the
their complaint.

Docket No. 27, 2.

While the Plaintiffs do not allege that Bettin, Drost,
and Roth were definitely present for all events, “evaluation
of a complaint . . . is ‘a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.’”

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d

585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 195).
As previously noted, Mr. Trevino alleges that he was nabbed
from his home at night, held face down in the back of a
pickup, driven to a remote location, dragged from the pickup,
and then beaten as he drifted in and out of consciousness
while surrounded by the glare of his assailants’ vehicles’
head lights.

Assuming the facts alleged as true, it is not

surprising that Mr. Trevino cannot recite, in detail, each
minute event which happened to him that night, nor is it
surprising that he cannot remember every person that was
present.

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, a court must take into account a plaintiff’s

12

“limited access to crucial information.” U.S.A. v. Dico, 2011
WL 677448 (S.D. Iowa 2011).
the

defendant(s)

plaintiff’s

but

When a fact is in the control of

can

be

allegations,

reasonably

specific

inferred

allegations

from
are

a

not

necessary. See Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585,
598 (8th Cir. 2009) (“If plaintiffs cannot state a claim
without pleading facts which tend systematically to be in the
sole possession of defendants, the remedial scheme . . . will
fail, and . . . crucial rights . . . will suffer.”).
In addition, the Plaintiffs’ response to Movants’ motion
to dismiss notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Appendix
Form 12, Complaint for Negligence when the Plaintiff Does Not
Know Who is Responsible, provides the wording by which a
plaintiff can state a claim showing he is entitled to relief
under circumstances similar to what are at issue here.

The

Plaintiffs’ brief does, in fact, employ the kind of wording
suggested in the Form, and, this Court is persuaded that if
Congress determines this type of language sufficient, this
Court neither wants to nor is in a position to disagree.
The

standard

under

Twombly

and

Iqbal

is

one

of

plausibility not probability, and it is enough that Mr.
Trevino

alleges

Defendants

Bettin,

13

Drost,

and

Roth

were

involved in some or all of the stages of the events on which
Plaintiffs’

complaint

is

based;

under

the

circumstances

alleged, it is not necessary for and would be unreasonable to
require Plaintiffs to plead their exact role. If movants have
been wrongfully accused, later stages of civil procedure are
better suited to vindicate them.

Therefore, Movants’ motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of November, 2011.

__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa

14