Thompson v. Benson et al

Filing 13

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Partial Motion to Dismiss (See Order Text). Signed by Senior Judge Donald E OBrien on 3/5/2012. (des)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
ELWOOD THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,

No. 11-CV-4052-DEO

vs.

ORDER

MARY BENSON, ET. AL.,
Defendants.
____________________
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This matter is before this Court on Mary Benson, Jason

Smith,

and

the

Iowa

Department

of

Human

Services’,

Defendants’, partial motion to dismiss Elwood Thompson’s,
Plaintiff’s, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, alleging Defendants
are refusing to provide him essential medical treatment for
his diabetes.

Docket No. 4 and 10.

Plaintiff has been

adjudicated a sexually violent predator and is currently
committed to the Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO),
Services.

which

is

part

of

the

Iowa

Department

of

Human

Mary Benson is a Nurse at the facility, and Jason

Smith is the Director of the facility.
On August 5, 2011, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis and request for appointment of
counsel.

Docket No. 3.

On September 16, 2011, Plaintiff’s

appointed counsel declined to file an amended complaint.

Docket No. 7.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any
statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant

may motion a court to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .”

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6).
Defendants contend they are entitled to a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) Plaintiff’s claims

against the Iowa Department of Human Services and other
Defendants, CCUSO employees, are inappropriate in that state
agencies and state officials sued in their official capacities
do not constitute a “person” as contemplated under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; (2) the State of Iowa, including the Iowa Department
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of Human Services, is immune from claims for money damages;
and (3) Plaintiff’s claims related to events occurring more
than two years prior to the filing of his complaint are barred
by the statute of limitations.

Docket No. 10.

Plaintiff concedes that the events that occurred two
years prior to Plaintiff filing his complaint are barred under
the

applicable

statute

of

limitations.

See

Iowa

Code

§614.1(2) (providing that actions “founded on injuries to the
person . . . whether based on contract or tort, or for a
statute penalty” must be brought “within two years”).

The

Plaintiff also concedes that state sovereign immunity prevents
any claim for monetary damages against the State of Iowa.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).

The

Plaintiff also concedes that the Iowa Department of Human
Services is not a person as contemplated under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1991).

Finally,

though the Plaintiff concedes that suits brought against
public

officials

in

their

official

capacity

are

often

improper, the Plaintiff maintains they are appropriate to the
extent injunctive relief is sought.

Thus, the sole question

before this Court is whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims seeking

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injunctive relief against Defendants acting in their official
capacities are appropriate.
While

Defendant

is

correct

to

note,

and

Plaintiff

concedes, that state officials generally cannot be sued in
their official capacities under § 1983, state officials can be
sued in their individual capacities.
21,

22-23

(1991).

Furthermore,

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
all

suits

naming

state

officials in their official capacity are not per se banned
from consideration under § 1983. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, the Supreme Court clearly noted that state
officials sued in their official capacity are, when injunctive
relief is sought, “persons” under § 1983, “because ‘officialcapacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State.’”1

491 U.S. 58, 71, fn 10 (quoting

1

The distinction rests on a balance of three
considerations: (1) state sovereign immunity protects states
from suits that seek to “‘impose liability which must be paid
from public funds in the state treasury;’” (2) suits against
state officials in their official capacities are, in effect,
suits against the state; for instance, if a state official,
sued in his official capacity, dies or leaves office, their
successor must continue to defend the suit; and (3) § 1983 was
designed “‘to give a remedy to parties deprived of
constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an
official’s abuse of his position.’” Hafer, 502 U.S. 21, 25,
27, and 30 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)
and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). In balancing
these three policy considerations, the Supreme Court has ruled
that officials may be sued in their individual capacities for
monetary damages, and, in order to prevent the repetition of
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Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, fn. 14 (1985)).
It is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint whether he
intended to sue Defendants Smith and Benson in their official
or individual capacities, but pro se complaints,2 no matter
how

“inartfully

pleaded[,]

are

held

to

less

stringent

standards than formal pleadings as drafted by a lawyer.”
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal citations
omitted).

Plaintiff is alleging government officials are

violating his constitutional rights in a manner he perceives
to have real and unjust consequences; the question of whether
he is suing the alleged perpetrators in their official or
individual capacities, though it has a real and important
effect, no doubt appears academic to the Plaintiff.

Such

questions involve points of law no layman should be expected
to know.

Thus, this Court will assume Plaintiff sought any

relief which could be reasonably inferred from his complaint,
including monetary damages against Defendants Benson and Smith
in their individual capacities and injunctive relief against
Defendants Benson and Smith in their individual and official

an on-going wrong under the guise of state authority, in their
official capacities for injunctive relief.
2

Though Plaintiff now has counsel, his complaint on
record was filed pro se.
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capacities.
It is Hereby Ordered:
(1)

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

related to events that occurred prior to the running of the
two year statute of limitations is granted.
(2)

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against the Iowa Department of Human Services is granted.
(3)

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

brought against Defendants Benson and Smith in their official
capacities are granted to the extent that Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages.
(4)

To

the

extent

Defendants

seeks

dismissal

of

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Benson and Smith in
their individual capacities, Defendants’ motions are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of March, 2012.

__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa

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