Scott v. Benson et al
Filing
48
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION ORDER granting in part and denying in part 24 Motion to Dismiss and denying 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's claim against Jason Smith is hereby dismissed. Plaintiff's claim against CCUSO is hereby di smissed; and Plaintiff's claim, in as far as it seeks monetary damages for Defendant Benson's actions undertaken in her official capacity, is hereby dismissed. See text of Order. Signed by Senior Judge Donald E O'Brien on 9/28/12. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
DANIEL J. SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
No. 11-CV-4055-DEO
vs.
Memorandum and Opinion Order
MARY BENSON, IOWA CIVIL
COMMITMENT UNIT FOR SEX
OFFENDERS, AND JASON SMITH,
Defendants.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On June 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 Complaint with this Court. Docket No. 2-1. Plaintiff is
committed to the Iowa Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO)1 in Cherokee, Iowa.
Defendant Mary Benson is a nurse
at CCUSO, and Defendant Jason Smith is CCUSO’s director.
Plaintiff’s complaint generally alleges that Defendants have
provided him constitutionally deficient medical treatment,
1
CCUSO is not a prison facility; it “provides a secure,
long term, and highly structured environment for the treatment
of sexually violent predators.”
Iowa Department of Human
Services
Offer
#410-HHS-014:
CCUSO,
1
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/docs/11w-401-HHS-014-CCUSO.pdf,
last visited September 27, 2012. The patients at CCUSO “have
served their prison terms but in a separate civil trial have
been found likely to commit further violent sexual offenses.”
Id.
resulting in unnecessary pain and suffering, hospitalization,
and the amputation of a portion of his lower right leg and
foot.
Docket No. 2-1.
Currently before this Court is Defendants’ Partial Motion
to
Dismiss
and
Defendants’
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.
Docket Nos. 24 and 34. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss contends
Section 1983 claims against state entities, such as CCUSO, or
persons acting in their official capacities are improper.
Docket No. 24.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
contends Defendants’ actions were not in violation of the
Constitution
or
laws
of
the
United
States;
and
even
if
Defendants did violate the Constitution or laws of the United
States, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Docket Nos.
34 and 34-2.
II.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a Defendant
may assert a defense for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2
A.
State Actor Requirement
42 U.S.C. § 1983 specifically provides for a federal
cause of action against a “person” who, under color of state
law, violates another’s federal rights.
In Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, the Supreme Court ruled “that a State
is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”
63 (1989).
Because CCUSO is a state facility, a suit against
it pursuant to Section 1983 is improper.
Response
491 U.S. 58,
Brief
to
Defendant’s
Summary
In Plaintiff’s
Judgment
Motion,
“Plaintiff concedes that CCUSO is not a person” under Section
1983.
Docket No. 37-1.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s cause of
action against CCUSO is hereby dismissed.
B.
Failure to Allege Defendant Smith Violated the
Constitution or Laws of the United States
In order to sustain a Section 1983 action, “‘a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the
official’s
own
individual
actions,
has
violated
the
Constitution’” or laws of the United States. Parrish v. Ball,
594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009)).
In Plaintiff’s Response Brief
to Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, Plaintiff admits that
3
he has failed to allege that Defendant Jason Smith violated
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Docket No. 371.
Furthermore, though Defendant Jason Smith is Defendant
Mary Benson’s superior, and Plaintiff has clearly alleged that
Defendant Mary Benson (through her individual actions) has
violated
the
Constitution,
“‘vicarious
inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits . . . .’”
liability
is
Parrish, 594
F.3d at 1001 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948).
Therefore,
Plaintiff’s cause of action against Defendant Jason Smith is
hereby dismissed.
C.
Persons Acting in Their Official Capacities
While Defendant is correct to note that state officials
generally cannot be sued in their official capacities under §
1983,
state
officials
capacities.
Hafer
Furthermore,
all
v.
suits
can
be
Melo,
sued
502
naming
in
U.S.
state
their
21,
individual
22-23
officials
(1991).
in
their
official capacity are not per se banned from consideration
under § 1983.
In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, the
Supreme Court clearly noted that state officials sued in their
official capacity are, when injunctive relief is sought,
“persons” under § 1983, “because ‘official-capacity actions
4
for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the
State.’”2
491 U.S. 58, 71, fn 10 (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham,473 U.S. 159, 167, fn. 14 (1985)).
It is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint whether he
intended to sue Defendants in their official or individual
capacities, but pro se complaints,3 no matter how “inartfully
pleaded[,] are held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings as drafted by a lawyer.”
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.
5, 9 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff is
2
The distinction rests on a balance of three
considerations: (1) state sovereign immunity protects states
from suits that seek to “‘impose liability which must be paid
from public funds in the state treasury;’” (2) suits against
state officials in their official capacities are, in effect,
suits against the state; for instance, if a state official,
sued in his official capacity, dies or leaves office, their
successor must continue to defend the suit; and (3) § 1983 was
designed “‘to give a remedy to parties deprived of
constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an
official’s abuse of his position.’” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 25, 27, and 30 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172
(1961) and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)). In
balancing these three policy considerations, the Supreme Court
has ruled that officials may be sued in their individual
capacities for monetary damages, and, in order to prevent the
repetition of an on-going wrong under the guise of state
authority, in their official capacities for injunctive relief.
3
Though Plaintiff now has counsel, his complaint on
record was filed pro se.
5
alleging government officials are violating his constitutional
rights in a manner he perceives to have real and unjust
consequences;
the
question
of
whether
he
is
suing
the
defendants in their official or individual capacities, though
it has a real and important effect, no doubt appears academic
to the Plaintiff.
Such questions involve points of law no
layman should be expected to know.
Thus, this Court will
assume Plaintiff sought any relief which could be reasonably
inferred
against
from
his
complaint,
Defendants
in
their
including
individual
monetary
damages
capacities
and
injunctive relief against Defendants in their individual and
official capacities.
monetary
damages
However, in as far as Plaintiff seeks
against
Defendants
in
their
official
capacities, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.
III.
FACTS
The remaining Defendant, Nurse Mary Benson, is the head
nurse of Plaintiff’s unit; as such, Ms. Benson is responsible
for the day-to-day health care needs of Plaintiff and the
other patients in the unit.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 2010, he first saw
Defendant Benson in relation to an infected lump within his
6
thigh. Tr. 37-3, 1. Plaintiff claims Defendant looked at his
thigh and denied Plaintiff’s request for antibiotics.
Id.
Defendant contends that though she saw Plaintiff on August 2,
2010, he did not complain of an infected lump within his
thigh.
Docket No. 38-1, 1.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 10, 2010, he went to the
medical unit, but Defendant refused to look at the infection
on his thigh.
Docket No. 37-3, 1.
The Defendant denies she
saw Plaintiff on August 10.4
Plaintiff claims that on August 17, 2010, Defendant
agreed to look at the infected area on Plaintiff’s thigh.
Docket No. 37-3, 1.
According to Plaintiff, despite the fact
that he could squeeze puss from the infected area, Defendant
refused
to
give
him
antibiotics.
Docket
No.
37-3,
1.
Defendant contends, and the medical records corroborate, that
Plaintiff was seen on August 16, 2010, rather than August 17,
2010.
Docket No. 38-1, 1.
Defendant also contends, and the
4
Plaintiff’s response actually indicates “CCUSO has no
record of Mr. Scott seeking care on Tuesday September 10,
2010.”
Docket No. 38-1, 1.
Because it is a response to
Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, this Court is
assuming the reference to September 10, as opposed to August
10, was a typographical error.
7
medical
records
corroborate,
that
prescribed an antibiotic, Cipro.
Plaintiff
was
in
fact
Docket No. 38-1, 1 and
Docket No. 34, 32.
Plaintiff claims that on August 25, 2010, Defendant again
denied him antibiotics and screamed, “There’s nothing wrong
with you, all you are wanting is attention - stop it now.”
Docket No. 37-3, 2.
Defendant contends, and the medical
records corroborate, that Plaintiff was seen on August 23 and
again on August 27 but was not seen on August 25.
38-1, 1 and Docket No. 34, 33-35.
Docket No.
Defendant also contends,
and the medical records corroborate, that Plaintiff was placed
on the anti-biotic Augmentin on August 27, 2010.
Docket No.
38-1, 1 and Docket No. 34, 35.
Both
parties
agree
that
an
incident
report,
dated
September 1, 2010, indicates Plaintiff requested CCUSO staff
view his infected area.
2, 3.
Docket No. 34-1, 3 and Docket No. 37-
Staff notes indicate “some swelling and purplish
coloring to the alleged infected area,” as well as “what
seemed to be a sore” without drainage.
Docket No. 34-1, 3.
Plaintiff claims that on September 4, 2010, Defendant
again refused to look at Plaintiff’s infection or to prescribe
8
antibiotics.
Docket No. 37-3, 2.
Defendant notes that
September 4, 2010 was a Saturday, and she was not on duty.
Docket No. 38-1, 2.
Medical records indicate CCUSO staff
contacted Defendant at home at 3:00 a.m, and she called in to
monitor the situation throughout the morning.
39.
Docket No. 34,
Plaintiff was repeatedly gagging and placed on bed rest
and a liquid diet.
Docket No. 34, 39.
Both parties agree that on September 7, 2010, Defendant
noted a 13 by 6 centimeter necrotic patch on Plaintiff’s
scrotum;
and,
after
consult
with
Dr.
Veit,
the
medical
director at CCUSO, Plaintiff was sent to the local hospital.
Docket Nos. 34, 2, 34-1, 4, and 37-2, 3.
The local hospital
then sent Plaintiff to the University of Iowa Hospitals and
Clinics
where
portions
of
his
infection
were
surgically
removed. Docket No. 34, 2. Plaintiff contends that people at
the University of Iowa told him it “was the worst case of
gangrene they had ever seen,” and it “must have set in one and
a half to two weeks before treatment from the hospital.”
Docket No. 37-3, 2.
While at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics,
Plaintiff suffered a heart attack due to complications from
9
surgery.
Docket
No.
37-3.
The
Defendant
admits
that
Plaintiff suffered a heart attack but denies that it was
related to his infection or surgery.
Docket No. 38-1, 2 and
Docket No. 34, 4.
Plaintiff claims that on October 16, 2010, he suffered
from fluid loss, sepsis,5 and kidney failure and was again
transported to the local hospital and then to the University
of Iowa Hospitals on October 18, 2010.
Docket No. 37-3, 3.
Defendant maintains Plaintiff did not suffer from fluid loss.
Docket
No.
38-1,
2.
The
University
of
Iowa
Hospitals
amputated Plaintiff’s lower left leg on October 27, 2010.
Docket No. 37-3, 3.
The
Defendant
contends
Plaintiff
is
an
extremely
difficult patient and varies as to whether he will accept
medical treatment in relation to his various ailments. Docket
No. 34-1.
For instance, though Plaintiff is a diabetic, he
has consistently refused to adhere to recommended dietary
restriction or self-care practices.
5
Docket No. 34-1.
More
“Sepsis is an illness in which the body has a severe
response to bacteria or other germs.” Sepsis, PubMed Health,
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth
/PMH0001687/, last visited September 27, 2012.
10
specifically, in relation to Plaintiff’s recurrent boils and
ulcers, Defendant maintains Plaintiff has consistently refused
to keep them clean, free of pressure,6 and apply dressings to
protect them during the healing process.
IV.
Docket No. 34-1, 2.7
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P., Rule 56(c).
Fed.
A fact is material if it is necessary
“to establish the existence of an element essential to [a]
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.”
(1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
There is a genuine issue as to a material fact if,
based on the record before the court, a “rational trier of
fact” could find for the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec.
6
Plaintiff, though he can stand and has some ability to
walk, is in a wheelchair.
7
The Defendant also notes several instances of Plaintiff
refusing treatment or otherwise being uncooperative after his
leg was amputated, but, as these events occurred after
Plaintiff’s alleged harms, these events are not as pertinent
as the events leading up to Plaintiff’s need for an amputation
and are not specifically enumerated.
11
Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a “court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . .”
Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
63 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 1995).
This requires a court to draw
any reasonable inference from the underlying facts in favor of
the nonmoving party and to refrain from weighing the evidence,
making credibility determinations, or attempting to discern
the truth of any factual issue in a manner which favors the
moving party unless there is no reasonable alternative.
Matsushita,
475
U.S.
at
587;
and
Morris
v.
City
See
of
Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Procedurally, the movant bears the initial burden “of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of
a genuine issue.” Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the movant
has carried his burden, the non-moving party is required “to
go beyond the pleadings” and through “affidavits, or by the
12
‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 423 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
V.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Both Plaintiff and Defendant contend that the deliberate
indifference
standard
announced
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
Estelle v. Gamble, which is typically applied to Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment cases, applies in this
case.
Docket Nos. 34-2, 4 and 37-1, 4-5; 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Under the deliberate indifference standard, a plaintiff must
show: (1) he had an objectively serious medical need; and (2)
the
Defendant
knew
of
plaintiff’s
deliberately chose to disregard it.
medical
need
and
Meuir v. Greene County
Jail Employees, 487 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007).
After
persuaded
reviewing
that
relevant
deliberate
case
law,
indifference
this
is
Court
is
inapplicable.
Because deliberate indifference analysis is typically employed
in Eighth Amendment cases involving prisoners, its application
to involuntarily committed wards of the State, whom “are
entitled to more considerate treatment than criminals whose
13
conditions
of
confinement
designed
to
punish,”
is
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22
inappropriate.
(1982).
are
“The State does not acquire the power to punish with
which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has
secured a formal adjudication in accordance with due process
of law.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 199 n. 6 (1989).
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court specifically
indicated
that
the
deliberate
indifference
inapplicable to involuntarily committed persons.
312, n. 11.
test
is
457 U.S. at
Though the Eighth Circuit has subsequently used
the deliberate indifference test in relation to involuntarily
committed patients, they did so because “neither party . . .
questioned the applicability of the Eighth Amendment.”
F.3d at 874.
382
However, the parties to an action cannot alter
applicable law simply because they agree to,8 and Supreme
Court case law takes precedent over Eighth Circuit case law.
The Youngberg Court recognized that though the Eighth
Amendment is inapplicable, involuntarily committed persons
8
The exception to this rule may be within a contract, but
there is no contract at issue here.
14
have
substantive
Amendment.
rights
arising
457 U.S. at 315.
under
the
Fourteenth
Though “a State is under no
constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those
within its border . . . [w]hen a person is institutionalized,”
the State “has a duty to provide certain services and care .
. . .”
Id. at 317.
interests
to
which
Among the most basic substantive liberty
involuntarily
committed
persons
are
entitled are rights “to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and
medical” care.
Id. at 315.
However, “a State necessarily has considerable discretion
in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities.”
Id. at 317.
“In determining whether a substantive right
protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is
necessary to balance ‘the liberty of the individual’ and ‘the
demands of an organized society.’” Id. at 320 (citing Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)).
In addition, a court
should keep their interference with the operations of State
operated civil commitment facilities to a minimum.
322.
Id. at
“[T]here certainly is no reason to think judges or
juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in
15
making”
the
difficult
decisions
necessary
to
run
such
Id. at 323.
facilities.
Though specifically dealing with the treatment of an
involuntarily committed patient’s mental condition which was
the basis of his commitment, this Court is persuaded that the
standard
crafted
in
Youngberg
is
applicable
here.
See
McDonald v. Eilers, 1988 WL 131360 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying
in
Youngberg
case
involving
the
adequacy
of
medical
In Youngberg, the Court stated that the decision
treatment).
in question,
if made by a professional, is presumptively
valid; liability may be imposed only when
the decision by the professional is such a
substantial
departure
from
accepted
professional
judgment,
practice,
or
standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the
decision on such judgment.
467 U.S. at 323.
The
Plaintiff
Defendant
is,
at
has
pointed
times,
an
to
facts
extremely
indicating
that
difficult
and
uncooperative patient. However, the Plaintiff has pled facts,
which (at least for purposes of summary judgment) this Court
will accept as true, indicating Defendant repeatedly refused
to treat him for what started as a routine infection.
16
For
instance, Plaintiff alleges he first told Defendant about an
infected lump on his thigh on August 2, 2010, but Defendant
refused to give him antibiotics.
Defendant
refused
to
see
Plaintiff also alleges that
Plaintiff
on
August
10,
2010.
Plaintiff also alleges that on August 17, 2010, though he
could squeeze puss out of the infected area, Defendant refused
to prescribe antibiotics.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was
denied treatment and antibiotics on August 25, 2010, and again
on September 4, 2010.
Finally, both parties agree that on
September 7, 2010, Plaintiff was sent to the hospital, and, by
this time, his infection had gotten so bad that portions of
his
body
had
to
be
surgically
removed.
While
much
of
Plaintiff’s allegations seem to be contradicted by medical
records, those records were more than likely created by
Defendant, and it is for a jury, not this Court, to determine
issues of credibility.
When, as here, a Plaintiff, who is a ward of the state,
alleges
a
defendant
repeatedly
denied
antibiotics
and
treatment for something as simple as a spreading infection,
this
Court
is
persuaded
that
the
Defendant’s
actions
constitute a substantial departure from accepted professional
17
judgment, practice, or standards.
VI.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendant
contends
she
is
entitled
to
a
defense
qualified immunity as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.
of
The
Supreme Court has established a two step sequential evaluation
process to resolve questions of qualified immunity.9
Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The “‘threshold question’”
is whether the facts, taken in a “‘light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury,’” demonstrate the defendant’s
“‘conduct violated a constitutional right’” of the plaintiff.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (quoting Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
If there is a “violation of
constitutional right, ‘the next, sequential step is to ask
whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of
the specific context of the case.’”
Id.
The first question in the sequential evaluation process
is
straight
forward
and
merely
asks
if
constitutional violation under prevailing law.
9
there
is
a
The second
More recently, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court
ruled that the sequential evaluation process outlined in
Saucier was not mandatory; lower courts retain discretion
whether to follow the Saucier procedure. 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009).
18
question in the sequential evaluation process requires that
the “contours of the right . . . be sufficiently clear” such
“that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
“If
the law did not put the [official] on notice that his conduct
would be clearly unlawful,” a motion to dismiss “based on
qualified immunity is appropriate.”
Id.
While the first and
second steps are quite similar, the second step adds an
additional dimension in that “reasonable mistakes can be made
as to the legal constraints on particular” official conduct,
regardless
of
whether
constitutional violation.
or
not
there
was
an
actual
Id. at 205.
As previously noted, the State “has a duty to provide
certain services and care” to “institutionalized” persons.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
Among the most basic of these
duties is the duty to provide adequate medical care.
315.
Id. at
Plaintiff alleges Defendant repeatedly denied him basic
medical treatment, which when accepted as true for purposes of
summary
judgment,
constitutes
a
violation
of
Plaintiff’s
substantive due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Furthermore, this Court is persuaded that an
19
institutionalized person’s right to basic medical treatment is
a clearly established right; that is, a reasonable official
who denies basic medical services to an institutionalized
person would understand that what he or she was doing was
violative of the institutionalized person’s constitutional
rights.
VII.
CONCLUSION
As previously noted, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
Jason Smith is hereby dismissed; Plaintiff’s claim against
CCUSO is here by dismissed; and Plaintiff’s claim, in as far
as it seeks monetary damages for Defendant Benson’s actions
undertaken in her official capacity, is hereby dismissed.
Though this Court has its doubts that Plaintiff is an
accurate historian, and his allegations significantly differ
from the medical records on file, issues of credibility are
best left to the jury.
her
individual
Whether Defendant Benson, acting in
capacity,
denied
Plaintiff
basic
medical
treatment, despite repeated requests, remains a material and
genuine issue of fact.
Furthermore, Defendant, under the
circumstances here alleged, is not entitled to qualified
20
immunity. Therefore, Defendant’s request for summary judgment
is hereby denied consistent with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of September, 2012.
__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
21
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