Scott v. Benson et al
Filing
87
ORDER denying 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. See text of Order for details. Signed by Senior Judge Donald E OBrien on 5/12/14. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
DANIEL J. SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
No. 11-CV-4055-DEO
vs.
ORDER
MARY BENSON,
Defendant.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION
Presently before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment of the 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Complaint filed
by Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott is a patient committed to the the
Iowa Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders (CCUSO)1 in
Cherokee, Iowa.
II.
Defendant Mary Benson is a nurse at CCUSO.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
A.
Procedural History
Mr. Scott filed a Complaint against Mary Benson, Jason
Smith and CCUSO on June 14, 2011, alleging that the medical
staff at CCUSO had caused him to suffer a severe infection.
1
The patients at CCUSO “have served their prison terms
but in a separate civil trial have been found likely to commit
further violent sexual offenses.”
Iowa Department of Human
Services Offer #401-HHS-014:
CCUSO,
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/docs/11w-401-HHS-014CCUSO.pdf, last visited May 9, 2014.
Docket No. 2, Att. 1.
On August 5, 2011, the Court entered an
Initial Review Order allowing Mr. Scott’s case to proceed
(Complaint filed at Docket No. 11) and appointing attorney Pat
Parry to represent him.
Docket No. 10.
On February 23, 2012,
the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Docket No. 24.
Meanwhile, on March 19, 2012, Magistrate Judge Paul Zoss
conducted a hearing on an unrelated preliminary injunction Mr.
Scott requested regarding his access to food at CCUSO.
Zoss
issued
a
report
injunction be denied.
recommending
Docket No. 33.
that
the
Judge
preliminary
On April 16, 2012, the
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Mr. Scott’s
primary Complaint.
On April 30, 2012, this Court accepted
Judge Zoss’ Report and Recommendation and denied Mr. Scott’s
request for broader access to certain foods at CCUSO.
No. 36.
Docket
On June 11, 2012, the Court held a combined hearing
on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment.
On
Docket No. 46.
September
28,
2012,
this
Court
entered
an
Order
granting in part and denying in part the Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss.
Docket No. 48.
Specifically, the Court granted the Defendants’ Motion to
2
Dismiss Defendants CCUSO and Jason Smith.
The Court also
granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss monetary claims
against Ms. Benson in her official capacity.
However, the
Court denied the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
related to Mr. Scott’s medical claim and the Defendants’
request for qualified immunity.
Shortly thereafter, the
remaining Defendant, Ms. Benson, appealed the Court’s Order
denying her qualified immunity.
Docket No. 50.
While the appeal was pending, both Mr. Scott and the
Defendant
filed
various
emergency
Scott’s ongoing medical care.
motions
regarding
Mr.
See, for example, Docket No.’s
58 and 74. Those matters were materially different than those
contained in Mr. Scott’s Complaint.
(In his Complaint, Mr.
Scott argued that CCUSO refused him adequate medical care,
while the subsequent emergency motions dealt with CCUSO’s
desire
to
treat
aggressively.)
Mr.
Scott’s
medical
situation
more
Accordingly, the Court ordered that the new
issues proceed as a separate case.
Docket No. 64.
Mr.
Scott’s other case is 13-CV-4028-DEO.
On February 5, 2014, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
entered an Order vacating this Court’s denial of summary
3
judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The 8th Circuit found
that his Court had used the wrong standard regarding Mr.
Scott’s medical claim.
The 8th Circuit stated:
[b]oth parties argued to the district court
that the deliberate indifference standard
from the Eighth Amendment should govern
Scott’s
Fourteenth
Amendment
claim.
Relying on a non-binding case, McDonald v.
Eilers, Civ. No. 88-2751, 1988 WL 131360,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1988), the district
court instead analyzed Scott’s claim under
the professional judgment standard from
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 2014).
No. 76.
Docket
The 8th Circuit went onto say:
where a patient's Fourteenth Amendment
claim is for constitutionally deficient
medical care, we apply the deliberate
indifference standard from the Eighth
Amendment.
Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462
F.3d
876,
889-90
(8th
Cir.
2006).
Accordingly, the district court should have
applied
the
deliberate
indifference
standard to Scott's claim.
Scott, 742 F.3d at 339.
Based on the 8th Circuit’s ruling, the Court requested
that the parties file supplemental briefs, which they have now
done.
See Docket No.’s 79 and 84.
4
B.
Facts
As the 8th Circuit stated, “[t]he relevant facts, almost
all of which are disputed, occurred in August and September
2010.”
Scott, 742 F.3d at 337.
Mr. Scott alleges that on August 2, 2010, he first
presented to Ms. Benson to complain of a an infected lump
within his thigh.
Docket No. 37, Att. 3, p. 1.
Mr. Scott
claims that Ms. Benson looked at his thigh and denied his
request for antibiotics.
Id.
Ms. Benson contends that,
though she saw Mr. Scott on August 2, 2010, he did not
complain of an infected lump within his thigh. Docket No. 38,
Att. 1, p. 1.
Mr. Scott alleges that he returned to the medical clinic
on August 10, 2010, but Ms. Benson refused to look at the
infection on the backside of his thigh.
3, p. 1.
Docket No. 37, Att.
The Defendant denies she saw Mr. Scott on August 10.
The parties agree that on either August 16 or 17, 2010,
Ms. Benson examined the affected infected area on Mr. Scott’s
thigh.
Docket No. 37, Att. 3, p. 1 and Docket No. 45, p. 1.
According to Mr. Scott, despite the fact that he could squeeze
puss from the infected area, Ms. Benson refused to give him
5
antibiotics.
Docket No. 37, Att. 3, 1.
Defendant contends,
and the medical records corroborate, that Plaintiff was seen
on August 16, 2010, rather than August 17, 2010.
38, Att. 1, p. 1.
Docket No.
Based on the medical records, Ms. Benson
states that Mr. Scott was prescribed an antibiotic, Cipro.
Docket No. 38, Att. 1, p. 1 and Docket No. 34, Att. 1, p. 2.
Mr. Scott argues that on August 25, 2010, Ms. Benson
again denied him antibiotics and screamed, “There’s nothing
wrong with you, all you are wanting is attention - stop it
now.”
Docket No. 37, Att. 3, p. 2.
Based on the medical
records, Ms. Benson argues that Mr. Scott attended medical
clinic on August 23.
It seems that Ms. Benson observed four
‘ulcers’ and acknowledges that Mr. Scott periodically had a
slight fever.
Docket No. 34, Att 1, p. 2-3.
The medical
records suggest that Mr. Scott was seen again on August 27,
2010.
Ms Benson argues that on that date, she prescribed the
antibiotic Augmentin to treat a “pinpoint hole that exuded
thick purulent drainage.”
Both
parties
agree
Docket No. 34, Att. 1, p. 3.
that
an
incident
report,
dated
September 1, 2010, indicates Plaintiff requested CCUSO staff
view his infected area.
Docket No. 34, Att. 1, p. 3 and
6
Docket No. 37, Att. 2, p. 3.
Staff notes indicate “some
swelling and purplish coloring to the alleged infected area,”
as well as “what seemed to be a sore” without drainage.
Docket No. 34, Att. 1, p. 3.
Mr. Scott was seen again on
September 2, 2010, but no abnormalities were noted.
Docket
No. 34, Att. 1, p. 3.
Mr. Scott alleges that on September 4, 2010, Defendant
again
refused
antibiotics.
to
look
at
his
infection
Docket No. 37, Att. 3, p. 2.
or
to
prescribe
Ms. Benson argues
that September 4, 2010, was a Saturday, and she was not on
duty.
Docket No. 38, Att. 1, p. 2.
Medical records indicate
CCUSO staff contacted Ms. Benson at home at 3:00 a.m., and she
called in to monitor the situation throughout the morning.
Docket No. 35, p. 39.
Plaintiff was repeatedly gagging and
placed on bed rest an a liquid diet.
Docket No. 35, p. 39.
Both parties agree that on September 7, 2010, Ms. Benson
noted a 13 by 6 centimeter necrotic (dead) area on Mr. Scott’s
scrotum;
and,
after
consult
with
Dr.
Veit,
the
medical
director at CCUSO, Mr. Scott was sent to the local hospital.
Docket Nos. 34, Att 1, p. 3-4 and Docket No. 37, Att. 2, p. 3.
Mr. Scott was then transferred to the University of Iowa
7
Hospitals and Clinics where portions of his infection were
surgically removed.
Docket No. 34, Att. 1, p. 4.
Mr. Scott
states that people at the University of Iowa told him it “was
the worst case of gangrene they had ever seen,” and it “must
have set in one and a half to two weeks before treatment from
the hospital.”
Docket No. 37, Att. 3, p. 2.
While at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics,
Plaintiff suffered a heart attack.
4.
Docket No. 34, Att. 1, p.
The parties dispute the cause of the heart attack.
Mr.
Scott contends it was caused by the stress of the infection
and surgery, while the Defendant cite Mr. Scott’s alleged poor
lifestyle choices.
Following his trip to Iowa City, Mr. Scott’s infection
did not heal adequately and his leg remained swollen.
No. 34, Att. 1, p. 4-5.
Docket
Mr. Scott states that on October 16,
2010, he suffered from fluid loss, sepsis,2 and kidney failure
and was again transported to the local hospital and then to
the University of Iowa Hospitals on October 18, 2010.
2
Docket
“Sepsis is an illness in which the body has a severe
response to bacteria or other germs.” Sepsis, PubMed Health,
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth
/PMH0001687/, last visited May 9, 2014.
8
No. 37, Att. 3, p. 3.
suffer from fluid loss.
is
no
dispute
Defendant maintains Plaintiff did not
Docket No. 38, Att. 1, p. 2.
University
of
Iowa
Hospitals
Plaintiff’s lower right leg on October 27, 2010.
There
amputated
Docket No.
37-3, 3.
A bulk of the Defendant’s argument is that Mr. Scott has
an extremely difficult personality and is non-compliant with
medical rules and recommendations. See Docket No. 34, Att. 1,
generally.
That argument is a factual dispute regarding Mr.
Scott’s credibility and is not ripe of adjudication during a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
III.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
9
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P., Rule 56(c).
Fed.
A fact is material if it is necessary
“to establish the existence of an element essential to [a]
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.”
(1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
There is a genuine issue as to a material fact if,
based on the record before the court, a “rational trier of
fact” could find for the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a “court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . .”
Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
63 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 1995).
This requires a court to draw
any reasonable inference from the underlying facts in favor of
the nonmoving party and to refrain from weighing the evidence,
making credibility determinations, or attempting to discern
the truth of any factual issue in a manner which favors the
moving party unless there is no reasonable alternative.
10
See
Matsushita,
475
U.S.
at
587;
and
Morris
v.
City
of
Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2007).
Procedurally, the movant bears the initial burden “of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of
a genuine issue.” Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the movant
has carried his burden, the non-moving party is required “to
go beyond the pleadings” and through “affidavits, or by the
‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
IV.
ISSUES
There are two issues before the Court:
(1) has the
Plaintiff alleged a sufficient factual dispute such that his
deliberate indifference claim should survive summary judgment;
and (2) is Ms. Benson entitled to qualified immunity.
11
V.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.
Deliberate Indifference
The Defendant first argues that there is no genuine issue
of material fact, because the Plaintiff has failed to allege
any facts that would constitute deliberate indifference.
At
the outset, the Court notes that, “[p]ersons who have been
involuntarily
committed
are
entitled
to
more
considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 321-22.
In the context of inmate medical-care
claims, Courts have stated that:
[t]he
Eighth
Amendment's
prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, which
embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency,” prohibits punishments which are
incompatible with “the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976). It thus requires that
the government provide “medical care for
those
whom
it
is
punishing
by
incarceration.” Id. at 103. The Eighth
Amendment safeguards the prisoner against
a lack of medical care that “may result in
pain and suffering which no one suggests
would serve any penological purpose.” Id.
Accordingly, “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs” of a prisoner
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton
12
infliction of pain forbidden
Constitution. Id. at 104.
by
the
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th
Cir. 2009) (parallel citations omitted).
This deliberate
indifference standard is used routinely in prisoner cases
related to medical care.
Courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard
to civilly committed individuals. See Senty-Haugen v. Goodno,
462 F.3d 876, 889 (8th Cir. 2006) which applied the deliberate
indifference standard to a medical-care claim raised by a
patient involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator
under the 14th Amendment.
affirmed
that
deliberate
In this case, the 8th Circuit
indifference
is
the
appropriate
standard, stating, “where a patient's Fourteenth Amendment
claim is for constitutionally deficient medical care, we apply
the
deliberate
Amendment.
indifference
standard
from
Senty-Haugen, 462 F.3d at 889-90.”
the
Eighth
Scott, 742
F.3d at 339.
Under the deliberate indifference standard, Mr. Scott
must show the Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a
serious illness or injury.
Senty-Haugen, 462 F.3d at 889.
A
successful deliberate indifference claim is comprised of both
13
an objective and a subjective element. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994). First, Mr. Scott must demonstrate that,
objectively, the deprivation he suffered was “sufficiently
serious; that is, it must result in the denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.” Walker v. Benjamin,
293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002).
In the medical care
context, this objective element is satisfied when a plaintiff
demonstrates that his medical need itself was sufficiently
serious.
1997).
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir.
Serious medical need is a medical need diagnosed as
requiring treatment, or a medical need so obvious that even a
lay person would recognize the need for a doctor's attention.
Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995).
Second, Mr. Scott must establish that the defendants acted
with a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’” to support
liability under § 1983.
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653
(7th Cir. 2005).
To succeed on deliberate-indifference claim, a plaintiff
must show more than negligence or gross negligence.
Jolly v.
Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000).
Although
negligence or inadvertence will not support a deliberate
14
indifference
claim,
a
plaintiff
need
not
establish
that
officials actually intended harm from the failure to provide
adequate care.
Walker, 293 F.3d at 1037.
“[I]t is enough to
show that the defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm to
[the plaintiff] and disregarded the risk.”
at 653.
Greeno, 414 F.3d
A successful plaintiff need not show that he was
literally ignored in his demands for medical treatment, and a
defendant's showing that a plaintiff received some treatment
does not resolve the issue conclusively if the treatment was
“blatantly
inappropriate.”
Greeno,
414
F.3d
(internal citations and quotation omitted).
Eighth
Amendment
“protects
[a
plaintiff]
at
653–54
Finally, the
not
only
from
deliberate indifference to his or her current serious health
problems, but also from deliberate indifference to conditions
posing an unreasonable risk of serious damage to future
health.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2005).
“Deliberate indifference must be measured by the official’s
knowledge at the time in question, not by ‘hindsight’s perfect
vision.’”
Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir.
15
2011) (citing Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 993 n.1 (8th Cir.
2007)).
The Defendant’s filings are replete with references to
the alleged fact that Mr. Scott is extremely difficult to work
with or have sympathy for.
That may well be true.
However,
that issue is not ripe for disposition at the summary judgment
stage.
The Defendant argues or implies that Mr. Scott’s
serious medical situation is a result of his own belligerence.
However,
that
same
implication
could
lead
the
opposite
conclusion; the fact that Mr. Scott has angered Ms. Benson and
other CCUSO staff members is a possible motivation as to why
Mr. Scott may have received deficient medical care. In either
case, that is a fact intensive question that cannot be decided
by summary judgment.
Rather, the Court must weigh the actual
allegations regarding the care Mr. Scott actually received and
the medical condition he actually suffered.
As stated above, to show deliberate indifference, Mr.
Scott
must
first
demonstrate
that,
objectively,
the
deprivation he suffered was "sufficiently serious; that is, it
must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities."
Walker, 293 F.3d at 1037.
16
In the
medical care context, this objective element is satisfied when
a plaintiff demonstrates that his medical need itself was
sufficiently serious.
Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1369.
In this case, there is no real allegation that Mr.
Scott’s situation did constitute a serious medical need.
Scott is a diabetic.
Mr.
He had suffered from serious, even life
threatening infections in the past.
The infected area that
Mr. Scott began complaining about in August 2010 eventually
required surgical intervention.
As the situation progressed,
Mr. Scott had a heart attack and eventually lost his leg.
If
Mr. Scott’s situation was not “sufficiently serious,” nothing
short of death is.
Second, Mr. Scott must establish that the defendants
acted with a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’” to
support liability under § 1983.
Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653.
This second element is the real question in this case.
Mr.
Scott alleges that he first told Ms. Benson about an infected
lump on his thigh on August 2, 2010.
looked at a lump at that time.
Ms. Benson denies she
Mr. Scott alleges that he
again tried to seek treatment for the affected area on August
10, 2010.
Mr. Scott argues that on August 16 or 17, 2010,
17
though he could squeeze puss out of the infected area, Ms.
Benson refused to prescribe antibiotics.
It is undisputed
that Ms. Benson looked at Mr. Scott’s affected area on August
17, 2010, and the records indicate she proscribed Cipro, an
antibiotic.
Mr. Scott argues that on August 25, 2010 (which
may have been August 23), he tried to complain about his
growing infection, but Ms. Benson yelled at him and dismissed
his concern.
Her records from August 23, 2010, indicate that
he had four new ulcers.
Then, on August 27, 2010, when Ms.
Benson did look at Mr. Scott’s leg, she found a lesion which
was draining pus and prescribed a new medicine.
On September
1 and 2, Ms. Benson found no problem with Mr. Scott.
on
September
4,
she
consulted
with
CCUSO
by
determined that Mr. Scott should be on bed rest.
However,
PHONE
and
Finally, on
September 7, 2010, Mr. Scott was sent to the hospital.
His
infection
was
was
so
severe
that
Court
is
persuaded
surgical
intervention
required.
The
that
Mr.
Scott
has
alleged
sufficient facts to show that the Defendant acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. There is one fact agreed
to by the parties that is extremely important to make this
18
determination:
that by September 7, 2010, Mr. Scott had a
sufficiently serious infection that it required surgery.
medical situation was not fictitious or exaggerated.
His
It was
real and very serious.
Moreover, his September 7, 2010,
infection
in
was
generally
the
same
complained about on August 2, 2010.
place
that
he
had
Accordingly, Mr. Scott,
at the very least, has created a fact issue of whether his
infection was left unresolved by Ms. Benson for over a month.
Additionally, it is undisputed that Ms. Benson knew of Mr.
Scott’s medical history and she knew of the dangers associated
with diabetes and infections.
Moreover, it is clear that on
September 1 and 2, CCUSO medical staff failed to note any
issues with Mr. Scott’s leg, even though, we know now that he
was suffering from an increasingly severe infection.
On
September 4, 2010, CCUSO reached out to Ms. Benson, who was
home for the weekend, regarding Mr. Scott’s deteriorating
situation.
previously
Even though Ms. Benson alleges that she had
prescribed
two
medications
for
Mr.
Scott’s
infection, she simply ordered bed rest without examining him
or directing he be examined by another medical professional.
Thus, it is clear from the record that, especially as pertains
19
to
the
first
increasingly
week
severe
of
September
infection
2010,
which
Mr.
he
Scott
repeatedly
had
an
sought
treatment for, but Ms. Benson did nothing other than recommend
bed rest. Accordingly, Mr. Scott has raised factual questions
as to whether Ms. Benson acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind and his deliberate indifference claim must
survive summary judgment.
Additionally, in Ms. Benson’s brief, she argues that many
of Mr. Scott’s allegations are directly contradicted by the
medical record.
The Court notes that medical records were
more than likely created by Defendant, and it is for the fact
finder,
not
the
Court
sitting
on
a
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment, to determine if the medical records are so credible
that they are beyond the impact of all possible contrary
evidence.
B.
Qualified Immunity
Ms. Benson’s real argument is that she is entitled to a
defense of qualified immunity.
As a government official, Ms.
Benson argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity for
the performance of discretionary functions.
375 F.3d 703, 711 (8th Cir. 2004).
20
Davis v. Hall,
Qualified immunity exists
“to
protect
public
officials
from
the
‘broad-ranging
discovery’ that can be ‘peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.’” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982)).
To defeat the Defendant’s claim of qualified immunity,
the Plaintiff must show how Ms. Benson’s individual conduct
violated a “clearly established statutory or constitutional
right of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Id.
The Supreme Court has established a two step sequential
evaluation
process
to
resolve
questions
of
qualified
immunity.3
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
The
“‘threshold question’” is whether the facts, taken in a
“‘light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,’”
demonstrate
the
defendant’s
“‘conduct
violated
a
constitutional right’” of the plaintiff. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S.
372,
377
(2007).
If
there
is
a
“violation
of
constitutional right, ‘the next, sequential step is to ask
3
More recently, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme
Court ruled that the sequential evaluation process outlined in
Saucier was not mandatory; lower courts retain discretion
whether to follow the Saucier procedure. 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009).
21
whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of
the specific context of the case.’”
Id.
The first question in the sequential evaluation process
is
straight
forward
and
merely
asks
if
there
constitutional violation under prevailing law.
is
a
The second
question in the sequential evaluation process requires that
the “contours of the right . . . be sufficiently clear” such
“that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
“If
the law did not put the [official] on notice that his conduct
would be clearly unlawful,” a motion to dismiss “based on
qualified immunity is appropriate.”
Id.
While the first and
second steps are quite similar, the second step adds an
additional dimension in that “reasonable mistakes can be made
as to the legal constraints on particular” official conduct,
regardless
of
whether
constitutional violation.
The
Iowa
AG’s
or
not
there
was
an
actual
Id., at 205.
office
has
previously
conceded
that
“treating patient’s medical needs with deliberate indifference
is prohibited by the Constitution.”
See, for example, 12-CV-
4063-DEO, Docket No. 16, Att. 2, p. 6.
22
Ms. Benson argues that
the
facts
of
indifference.
this
case
However,
do
as
not
stated
establish
above,
deliberate
the
Court
is
persuaded that the there is a genuine issue of material fact
related to Mr. Scott’s deliberate indifference medical claim.
In her brief, Ms. Benson argues:
"[w]hen considering the issue of qualified
immunity, however, the district court is to
"view those facts in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party as long as those
facts are not so ‘blatantly contradicted by
the record ... that no reasonable jury
could believe [them].'" O'Neil v. City of
Iowa City, 496 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir.
2007) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007)). Then the court should
determine if those facts demonstrate a
constitutional violation that is clearly
established."
Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d
939, 945 (8th Cir. 2012).
Docket No. 79, p. 5-6.
As set out in the proceeding section,
the Court has analyzed the specific facts in the light most
favorable to Mr. Scott and determined that he has alleged
sufficient
facts
indifference.
to
constitute
a
claim
for
deliberate
It is beyond dispute that being deliberate
indifferent to serious medical needs is a constitutional
violation.
Moreover, deliberate indifference is well defined
such that Ms. Benson knew or should have known that being
deliberately
indifferent
violated
23
Mr.
Scott’s
rights.
Accordingly, Ms. Benson is not entitled to qualified immunity.
VII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, Ms. Benson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Docket No. 34, is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of May, 2014.
__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
24
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