Taft v. Benson et al
Filing
2
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER granting re 1 PRO SE MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Dave L Taft, Jr. The Clerk of Court shall file Plaintiff's Complaint forthwith. No filing fee will be assessed. After initial review of Plaintif f's claim, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Senior Judge Donald E O'Brien on 1/30/12. (Copy w/NEF mailed to pro se filer) (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
DAVE L. TAFT, JR.,
Plaintiff,
No. 11-CV-04106-DEO
v.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
MARY BENSON, BETH MASSMON,
CINDY OLSON, AND MARYLIN
KRAGER,
Defendants.
____________________
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This matter is before the Court on Dave L. Taft, Jr.’s
(Plaintiff’s) § 1983 suit, alleging Defendants’ failure to
provide medical treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
No. 1-1.
Docket
Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed
in forma pauperis.
Docket No. 1.
Plaintiff is currently
confined to the Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO)1 in Cherokee, Iowa.
1
Plaintiff is a repeat filer who
CCUSO is not a prison facility; it “provides a secure,
long term, and highly structured environment for the treatment
of sexually violent predators.”
Iowa Department of Human
Services
Offer
#410-HHS-014:
CCUSO,
1
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/docs/11w-401-HHS-014-CCUSO.pdf,
last visited January 30, 2012. The patients at CCUSO “have
served their prison terms but in a separate civil trial have
been found likely to commit further violent sexual offenses.”
Id.
currently has four separate § 1983 actions pending in the
Northern District of Iowa.
See 11-CV-4060-MWB, 11-CV-4112-
DEO, and 12-CV-4002-DEO.
II.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
The filing fee for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 petition is $350.
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
In forma pauperis status allows a
plaintiff to proceed without incurring filing fees or other
Court costs.2
In order to qualify for in forma pauperis
status, a plaintiff must provide this Court an affidavit3 with
the following statements:
(1) statement of the nature of the
action, (2) statement that plaintiff is entitled to redress,
(3) statement of the assets plaintiff possesses, and (4)
statement that plaintiff is unable to pay filing fees and
court
costs
1915(a)(1).
or
give
security
therefor.
28
U.S.C.
§
Though Plaintiff’s application fulfills each of
these requirements, it was not in the form of an affidavit.
2
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who
qualifies for in forma pauperis status must still pay the full
filing fee in increments. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). A prisoner is
defined as “any person incarcerated or detained in any
facility” for “violations of criminal law . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(h). CCUSO is not a prison facility and Plaintiff is
not a prisoner, thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) does not apply.
3
An affidavit is a “voluntary declaration of facts
written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer
authorized to administer oaths.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th
ed. 2009), affidavit.
2
Regardless, given that this Court has recently granted Mr.
Taft in forma pauperis status in other matters and this
Court’s knowledge of his inability to pay the requisite filing
fee, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
granted.
The Clerk of Court shall file Plaintiff’s Complaint
forthwith.
III.
No filing fee will be assessed.
MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS ACTION
Once any portion of the filing fee is waived, a court
must dismiss the case if a plaintiff’s allegations of poverty
prove untrue or the action in question turns out to be
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
After initial review of Plaintiff’s claim, this Court finds
that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled
to
relief.”
Pro
se
complaints,
no
matter
how
“inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings as drafted by a lawyer.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
3
Although it is a long-standing maxim that a complaint’s
factual allegations are to be accepted as true at the early
stages of a proceeding, this does not entail that a court must
entertain any complaint no matter how implausible.
The
Supreme Court has ruled that the facts pled “must [still] be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level
. . . .”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In other words, the claim to relief must be “plausible on its
face.”
Id. at 570.
A claim is only plausible if a plaintiff
pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009).
Where the complaint does “not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 1950 (citing Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).
In addition, “the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. at 1949.
In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true,
simply do not amount to a constitutional violation.
On
January 11, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that he fell in the
4
shower, suffering a bruise and pain emanating from his rib
cage when breathing.
Docket No. 1-1, 3-8.
Plaintiff also
alleges that CCUSO staff provided him ibuprofen but refused to
order X-rays at CCUSO’s expense.
Id.
Though Plaintiff did
not file this complaint until December 6, 2011, Plaintiff’s
last alleges pain on January 19, 2010, a mere 8 days after his
fall.
Id.
Plaintiff does not claim there were any lasting
effects from his fall.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
The primary purpose of the cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition
in
the
Eighth
Amendment
“was
to
proscribe
‘torture(s)’ and other ‘barbar(ous)’ methods of punishment. “
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citation omitted).
Implicit in the prohibition is a government “obligation to
provide
medical
care
for
those
5
whom
it
is
punishing
by
incarceration.”4
Id.
However, “an inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care” does not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment.
Id. at 106.
“Medical malpractice does
not become a constitutional violation merely because the
victim is a prisoner.”
Thus, an allegation of mere
Id.
negligence is not enough to sustain an Eighth Amendment
action; “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.”
(emphasis added)
Id.
As previously noted, Plaintiff merely claims that he was
in
pain
for
8
days,
indicating
his
injuries
were
not
sufficiently serious to invoke the Eighth Amendment, and CCUSO
staff gave him appropriate treatment.
Furthermore, “the
question of whether an X-ray” is necessary “is a classic
example of a matter for medical judgment” subject to state
tort
law
violation.
but
which
does
Id. at 107.
not
amount
to
a
constitutional
Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed with prejudice.
4
Though Plaintiff is not technically a prisoner, and this
Court has opted not to apply the Prison Litigation Reform Act
to CCUSO patients, prison case law, because Plaintiff is a
ward of the state, is on point as to the merits.
6
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of January, 2012.
__________________________________
Donald E. O’Brien, Senior Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
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