Estate of David Paul McFarlin et al v. Lakeside Marina, Inc.
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Lakesides motion for summary judgment is granted and this case is dismissed. See text of Order. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 10/24/13. (djs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
ESTATE
OF
DAVID
PAUL
MCFARLIN,
BY
its
Personal
Representative, JAMIE LAASS; JAMIE
LAASS, Individually; JAMIE LAASS, As
Parent and Next Friend of S.L.,
No. C12-4055-MWB
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LAKESIDE MARINA, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
___________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................................. 2
A.
Factual Background ............................................................... 2
B.
Procedural Background ........................................................... 8
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 10
A.
Summary Judgment Standards ................................................. 10
B.
Does Lakeside Have A Duty To Warn Boaters? ............................ 12
III.
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 17
This case arises from a terrible boating tragedy. On May 31, 2010, plaintiff
Jamie Laass was riding with her two children, ten-year old David Paul McFarlin and
S.L., in a boat operating on Storm Lake when the boat struck a submerged dredge pipe
causing the boat's motor to flip up into the boat with the propeller still running. The
motor, including the spinning prop, struck David, causing his death. The issue that
confronts me here is whether the defendant marina, from which the boat was launched,
owed a duty to warn plaintiffs about the dredging operations on Storm Lake.
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
I set out only those facts, disputed and undisputed, sufficient to put in context the
parties’ arguments concerning the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
resistance to it. At least for the purposes of summary judgment, the facts recited here
are undisputed. I will discuss additional factual allegations, and the extent to which
they are or are not disputed or material, if necessary, in my legal analysis.
Defendant Lakeside Marina, Inc. (“Lakeside”) is a privately owned Iowa
corporation doing business in Buena Vista County, Iowa. Jim Davis and his wife,
Mary Jo Davis (collectively, “the Davises”), are Lakeside’s owners and managers.
The Davises do not own the premises on which Lakeside is located, but lease the
property from the City of Lakeside, Iowa (“the City”).
On March 5, 1998, the City
and Lakeside entered into a lease agreement under which the City leased lakefront
property to Lakeside for 25 years (“the Lease”).
The Lease provides, in pertinent part, that:
3. TENANT agrees that during the terms of this
lease, that they will use and occupy the leased premises for
lawful purposes, but primarily for the operation of a boat
marina. TENANT is not restricted only to the operation of
the demised premises as a boat marina, provided that the
additional, lawful business purposes bear some logical and
reasonable relationship to the recreational use of the lake.
2
TENANT also covenants and agrees that boat marina
services shall be available to the public a minimum from
Memorial Day through Labor Day of each year.
4. TENANT covenants and agrees to maintain the
demised premises in a reasonably clean and presentable
condition, to pick up debris, and to maintain all buildings
and other structures in a serviceable, safe and presentable
condition.
The Lease at ¶¶ 3-4; Plaintiffs’ App. at 66. The Lease further provides that:
9.
TENANT will protect, indemnify and save
harmless the landlord from and against any and all loss,
costs, damage and expenses including attorney fees and
expenses occasioned by or arising out of, any accident or
other occurrence causing or inflicting injury and/or damage
to any person or property, happening or done, in, upon or
about the leased premises or due directly or indirectly to the
tenancy, use or occupancy thereof or any part thereof by the
TENANT or any person claiming to act under or at the
direction of the TENANT.
The Lease at ¶ 9; Plaintiffs’ App. at 67-68.
The Lease also contains the following
provision:
11. TENANT further covenants and agrees that it
will, at its own expense, procure and maintain casualty and
liability insurance in a responsible company or companies
authorized to do business in the state of Iowa with coverages
to include the docks and appurtenant structures ascending
into or abutting Storm Lake (the lake not the city), in
amounts not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000.00)
for any one injured and one million dollars ($1,000,000.00)
for any one accident (occurrence) and with limits not less
than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) for
property damage protecting the CITY against such claims,
damages, costs and expenses on account of injury to any
person or persons by reason of such casualty, accident or
3
happening on or about the demised premises during the
terms of this lease.
The Lease at ¶ 11; Plaintiffs’ App. at 68. In addition, the Lease provides that:
15. TENANT agrees that the above described leased
premises will not be used for any unlawful purpose and that
the right of the public to enter said premises for any lawful
purpose is expressly preserved.
16. TENANT agrees to maintain a boat marina on
said premises which shall be available for the
accommodation of the public and for the purpose of
encouraging and facilitating recreational use of Storm Lake
by citizens of Iowa for boating, fishing and related purposes.
....
19. TENANT is advised that all signs that it intends
to use on the above described premises, must comply with
the city ordinances of the city of Lakeside, Iowa.
....
23. The demised premises are being used by the
TENANT for the principal purposes of providing boating
and similar recreational services for the use and benefit of
the citizens of Lakeside, Storm Lake, and the public at
large.
The Lease at ¶¶ 15-16, 19, and 23; Plaintiffs’ App. at 69-71.
Lakeside is located on property adjacent to the east side of Storm Lake. It
provides the public free access to Storm Lake via a boat ramp on its premises.
Lakeside also provides supplemental services to boaters, including: renting docking
space; providing some engine repair; renting campsites; and selling gasoline, bait,
fishing licenses, snacks, and beverages at its convenience store. Lakeside does not
4
charge a fee of any kind for use of the boat ramp on its premises. No one in plaintiffs’
boating party was charged a fee for use of Lakeside’s boat ramp.
On May 31, 2010, Harry Foote, David McFarlin, Jamie Laass, her two
children, David Paul McFarlin and S.L., and two other children traveled to Storm Lake
to go fishing from their boat. Foote had been boating on Storm Lake three or four
times before May 2010. Foote was aware about the dredging operations taking place
on the lake. Foote and the others in his party arrived at Lakeside at approximately 9:00
a.m. to 9:30 a.m. and launched their boat from the Lakeside boat ramp. While at
Lakeside, Jamie Laass purchased a fishing license from Lakeside’s convenience store,
but no one in their boating party was charged any money for using Lakeside’s boat
ramp.
After launching his boat, once out of the no wake zone, Foote began to
accelerate and head west across the lake toward the dredging operations.
As he
approached the dredge, Foote became confused by the warning buoys and thought he
was being directed to maneuver his boat between the main dredge and the auxiliary
dredge, rather than being directed to avoid the area between the two dredges. Because
of this confusion, Foote continued to drive his boat between the two dredges. As Foote
drove closer to the pipe that connected the two dredges, he approached approximately
six fishing boats, including Mr. and Mrs. Charles Greth’s boat, who were fishing close
to the pipe. The Greths began signaling Foote to slow his boat down by waiving their
arms and making hand signals. These were signals they had learned, through boating
experience, meant a boat should slow down. Foote did not see the Greths’ signals and
continued to proceed toward the pipe without slowing down. At this point, Foote’s
boat’s motor assembly hit the dredge pipe, causing the outboard motor to flip up into
the boat. David McFarlin was hit by the outboard motor’s still rotating propellers,
fatally injuring him. After the collision, Foote returned to the public boat ramp where
emergency personnel were located.
At the hospital, Foote told Sheriff Gary
5
Launderville that he had become confused by the placement of the buoys.
Foote
explained that, as a result of his confusion, he drove his boat between the dredges,
rather than around them. Foote viewed his confusion as the cause of the accident.
The area on Storm Lake where the accident occurred is not part of Lakeside’s
leasehold.
Since 2002, there have been ongoing dredging operations on Storm Lake. In
2002, the dredging operations were run by the State of Iowa. Since then, the dredging
operations have been run by the Lake Improvement Commission (“LIC”). Patrick J.
Kelly is the Public Works Director for the City of Storm Lake, Iowa. As Public Works
Director, Kelly is “the direct supervisor of the dredging on Storm Lake and the City of
Storm Lake employee responsible for structures maintained by the City of Storm Lake
on and along the lake.” Kelly Aff. at ¶ 1; Defendant’s App. at 001. Kelly maintained
this supervisory role even though LIC was running the dredging operation.
Over the years, Lakeside has received brochures from the City that provided
warning information about the dredging operations at Storm Lake.
Every year,
Lakeside placed the brochures next to its convenience store cash register. Kelly has
seen the brochures on Lakeside’s convenience store counter. Lakeside’s employees and
managers answered questions from the public about the dredging operations by, inter
alia, directing those individuals to the brochures provided by the City. Jamie Laass
admits there is a “possibility” that the brochures were present in the Lakeside
convenience store on the date of the accident and that she simply did not notice the
brochures when she was in the convenience store to buy a fishing license.
From approximately 2003 through 2007, the State of Iowa had placed a portable
sign at the Lakeside boat ramp warning boaters that dredging operations were taking
place on the lake. At some point prior to 2008, the sign was removed because the
6
sign’s post had rotted through and was no longer capable of supporting the sign.1
Posting a new warning sign on the premises was feasible. Sometime in 2008 or 2009,
Kelly and Jim Davis discussed placing a new warning sign at Lakeside to replace the
one that had been removed. During this conversation, Kelly asked to erect a warning
sign at the top of the boat ramp. Kelly did not explain why he though the best location
for the warning sign was at the top of the boat ramp. Kelly did tell Davis that, at other
locations along Storm Lake, the warning signs had been placed at the boat ramp. Davis
told Kelly that he would not like the warning sign placed at the top of the boat ramp
and suggested placing it by the road near Lakeside’s entrance. Davis also suggested
that the LIC could place a portable warning sign on the boat ramp, so that it could be
moved and would not involve drilling holes in the concrete. Kelly decided not to put a
warning sign by the road because he did not think it would be effective at that location.
Kelly has no training or education in how people respond to signs and warnings. The
day after the accident, personnel affiliated with LIC came to Lakeside and placed a
portable warning sign near the boat ramp without ever consulting with Lakeside. Foote
admits that his actions on the day of the accident would not have been any different if a
warning sign, identical to the other warning signs around Storm Lake, had been placed
at Lakeside on the day of the accident.2
The record does not indicate who removed the original warning sign at
Lakeside.
2
The warning sign read:
1
WARNING!
DREDGING WORK ONGOING
BEWARE OF EQUIPMENT, CABLE
AND PIPE, BOTH ABOVE AND
7
Lakeside’s owners, managers, and employees had no control over or ownership
interest in Storm Lake’s open boating areas. On the day of the accident, Lakeside’s
owners, managers, and employees did not have any input or control over, or
communications with, the individuals involved in the dredging operations taking place
on Storm Lake. Lakeside’s owners, managers, and employees did not have any control
over, or involvement with, the dredging equipment, the dredging pipe, or the buoys
near the dredging equipment. Lakeside’s owners, managers, and employees did not
have any input or control over the needs of the dredging operation. Neither of the
Davises, nor any of Lakeside’s employees has any specialized knowledge associated
with running a dredging operation on a lake. Lakeside, its owners, managers, and
employees are not agents or representatives of the LIC, the City, or any entity
associated with the dredging operations that were occurring on Storm Lake at the time
of the accident.
Kelly opined that it was the City/the LIC’s responsibility to make the dredge
operation safe for boaters. Kelly admits that he never consulted the Storm Lake City
Attorney to attempt to determine what legal authority or responsibility he had to place a
warning sign at Lakeside.
B.
Procedural Background
On May 30, 2012, Laass filed her Complaint initiating this diversity lawsuit
against Lakeside on behalf of David's estate, herself, and her surviving minor child,
BELOW WATER SURFACE, PLEASE
KEEP ALL WATER CRAFT AWAY
FROM WORK AREA!
Defendant’s App. at 55.
8
S.L., to recover damages related to the boating accident that resulted in David's death.3
Laass asserts a claim on behalf of David's estate for damages related to David's injury
and death allegedly resulting from Lakeside’s negligence. She also asserts claims on
behalf of herself and her surviving minor child, S.L., for damages for emotional
distress related to their presence as bystanders during the accident and for loss of
consortium.
On July 10, 2013, Lakeside filed a motion for summary judgment contending
that it owed no duty to warn boaters about the hazards of an ongoing dredging
operation on Storm Lake.
Alternatively, Lakeside argues that under the Iowa
recreational use statute, Iowa Code § 461C.1 et seq., it was immune from liability for
its alleged negligence, and that plaintiffs cannot establish “willful or malicious” conduct
on the part of Lakeside so as to fall within one of the statutory exceptions to the general
rule of immunity.
On August 12, 2013, plaintiffs resisted Lakeside’s motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that Lakeside had a duty to warn them about the
dredging operations on Storm Lake. Plaintiffs also argue that summary judgment is
improper because the Iowa recreational use statute is inapplicable to Lakeside.
Lakeside filed its reply on August 21, 2013.
Plaintiffs previously brought a case in this court involving the same accident.
In that lawsuit, however, plaintiffs named as defendants Foote; the manufacturer of the
boat's motor, Brunswick Corporation, d/b/a Mercury Marine and Lund Boat Company;
and the parties allegedly responsible for the dredge pipe and dredging operation on
Storm Lake, the City of Storm Lake, Buena Vista County, the LIC, Randy Redig,
Fussell Harrington, and David Botine. See Estate of McFarlin ex rel. Laass v. City of
Storm Lake, 277 F.R.D. 384, 387 (N.D. Iowa 2011). The parties settled that case on
June 12, 2012.
3
9
II.
A.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standards
Motions for summary judgment essentially “define disputed facts and issues
and . . . dispose of unmeritorious claims [or defenses].”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 585 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (“One of the principal purposes
of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
or defenses. . . .”). Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added);
see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Summary
judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
A fact is material when it “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.’” Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, “the substantive
law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of
material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953
F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when “‘a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party’ on the question,” Woods, 409 F.3d at 990 (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248); see Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418
F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating genuineness depends on “whether a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party based on the evidence”).
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Procedurally, the moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record
which show a lack of a genuine issue,” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323), and demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment according to law. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.”). Once the moving party
has successfully carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an
affirmative burden to go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or
otherwise, designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir.
2005) (“The nonmoving party may not ‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but must
demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue
for trial.’” (quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995))).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’” Ricci v.
DeStefano, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L.
Ed. 2d 490 (2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal
quotations omitted).
“Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000),
quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The
nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” and must
come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a
11
genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S. Ct.
1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). “‘Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677, quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Summary judgment is particularly appropriate when only questions of law are
involved, rather than factual issues that may or may not be subject to genuine dispute.
See, e.g., Cremona v. R.S. Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2006).
Consequently, I turn to consider the parties’ arguments for and against summary
judgment.
B.
Does Lakeside Have A Duty To Warn Boaters?
In order to hold Lakeside liable on their negligence claim, plaintiffs must
establish that Lakeside had a duty to warn them about the dredging operations on Storm
Lake. See Pitts v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 818 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Iowa 2012) (“[A]n
actionable claim of negligence requires the existence of a duty to conform to a standard
of conduct to protect others, a failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and
damages.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Thompson v. Kaczinski,
774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009) (same). The central question Lakeside raises in its
motion for summary judgment is whether it had a duty to warn Storm Lake boaters
about the dangers of the dredging operation under Iowa law.4 “The existence of a legal
duty is a question of law for the court to decide.” McCormick v. Nikkel & Assocs.,
4
I need not make a determination as to a choice of laws in this case because the
parties are in agreement that Iowa law is controlling on the issues raised by Lakeside’s
motion for summary judgment.
12
Inc., 819 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy
Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 692–92 (2009)); Estate of Pearson ex rel. Latta v. Interstate
Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 341 (Iowa 2005). (“Whether a legal duty existed
between the parties is a question of law.”); J.A.H. ex rel. R.M.H. v. Wadle & Assocs.,
P.C., 589 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1999) (instructing that whether a legal duty “exists
is a question of law.”) (quoting Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508, 509 (Iowa 1992));
Rieger v. Jacque, 584 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 1998) (observing that whether the
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff arising “out of the parties’ relationship is always
a matter of law for the court.”).
In McCormick, the Iowa Supreme Court offered the following instruction on how
to determine whether one party owes a duty to another:
An actionable negligence claim requires the existence of a
duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, a
failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and
damages. Whether a duty arises out of a given relationship
is a matter of law for the court's determination.
Historically, the duty determination focused on three
factors: the relationship between the parties, the
foreseeability of harm, and public policy. In Thompson we
said that foreseeability should not enter into the duty
calculus but should be considered only in determining
whether the defendant was negligent. But we did not erase
the remaining law of duty; rather, we reaffirmed it. In
short, a lack of duty may be found if either the relationship
between the parties or public considerations warrants such a
conclusion.
McCormick v. Nikkel & Assocs., Inc., 819 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 2012) (citing
Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009) (internal citations and
quotations omitted)). The court reiterated “that our previous law of duty was otherwise
still alive and well.” McCormick, 819 N.W.2d at 371.
13
My starting point is the “‘common principle:
control.’”
liability is premised upon
McCormick, 819 N.W.2d at 372 (quoting Van Essen v. McCormick
Enterprises Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 720 n.3 (Iowa 1999) (quoting, in turn, Allison ex rel
Fox v. Page, 545 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Iowa 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A
brief review of the decisions cited above illustrates this principle. In McCormick, the
Iowa Supreme Court held that a subcontractor, who properly performed electrical work
on a jobsite, then locked up the work and transferred control of the work site to the
property owner, owed no duty of care to an employee of the owner injured when the
owner failed to deenergize the work site. McCormick, 819 N.W.2d at 372. In Van
Essen, the Iowa Supreme Court held a landlord that had installed a grain bin, but no
longer controlled it, owed no duty to an employee of the lessee who was subsequently
injured due to the allegedly hazardous condition of the bin. Van Essen, 599 N.W.2d at
720. In Allison, the Iowa Supreme Court had to determine whether a landlord was
liable for injuries caused by a tenant's dog in the tenant's fenced-in yard when the
landlord knew or had reason to know the dog was dangerous. Allison, 545 N.W.2d at
282. Significantly, the tenant acquired the dog after taking possession of the premises.
Id. at 283. The court determined that, because the landlords did not have any right to
control their tenant's dog, acquired after the tenant took possession, the landlords
“owed no duty to third persons to protect them from the dog.” Id. at 284.
Here, the uncontested facts are that Lakeside’s lease with the City gave Lakeside
a leasehold only in premises adjacent to the east side of Storm Lake and no interest or
control whatsoever over the area of Storm Lake where the accident occurred.
Additionally, Lakeside had no specific contact with the dredging operations being
conducted on Storm Lake. As a result, Lakeside was not privy to the dredge operator’s
daily plans for and movement of the dredging operations. Lakeside also had no control
or input into the dredging operator’s actions to warn boaters about the dredging
14
operations. Plaintiffs direct me to no Iowa authority imposing a duty to warn under
such circumstances. To the contrary, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have
refused to impose a duty on landowners to warn of dangerous off-shore conditions.
Swann v. Olivier, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (1994), is illustrative of
this line of authorities. In Swann, the plaintiff was injured in the surf while attending a
beach party. He brought an action alleging that the beach’s owner failed to warn him
of riptides, submerged rocks, and other hazardous ocean conditions. See id. at 23-24.
The California Court of Appeals explained that the decisive factor in the case was the
“relatively straightforward” one of “where the injury took place and whether the
defendants had any duty to warn of hazards in that area.” Id. at 25. After observing
the general rule under California law that a landowner “cannot be liable” for “injuries
that occur on property outside one's ownership, possession or control,” the court held
that a beachfront landowner “has no duty to warn of dangers beyond his or her own
property when the owner did not create those dangers.”5 Id. at 26. Because Iowa law
Decisions from other courts are in accord with the Swann decision. See Poleyeff
v. Seville Beach Hotel Corp.,782 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that hotels and beach rental company had no “duty to warn, correct, or safeguard others
from naturally occurring, even if hidden, dangers common to the waters in which they
are found” because they did “not control the area or undertake a particular
responsibility to do so.”) (footnotes omitted); Darby v. Compagnie Nat’l Air France, 96
N.Y.2d 343, 753 N.E.2d 160, 163-64 (2001) (holding that hotel, which encouraged and
facilitated use of beach by its guests but exercised no management, supervision, or
oversight with respect to it, owed no duty to guests to warn of rip tides); DeWick v.
Village of Penn Yan, 275 A.D.2d 1011, 713 N.Y.S.2d 592 (2000) (holding that
proprietor of private beach owes no duty to warn of presence of sandbar and its natural
transitory conditions); Princess Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App.4th
645, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (1995) (owner of property adjacent to federally owned beach
owes no duty to warn guest of ocean’s dangers); Sperka v. Little Sabine Bay, Inc., 642
So. 2d 654, 655–656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an innkeeper owed no
duty to warn its guest of a hidden sandbar in an adjacent public beach); Adika v.
Beekman Towers, Inc., 633 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
5
15
has tied the question of duty to the issue of control, see McCormick, 819 N.W.2d at
372; Van Essen, 599 N.W.2d at 720; Allison, 545 N.W.2d at 284, I conclude that the
Swann line of authority would be followed in Iowa.
In contrast, plaintiffs would, in effect, require lessees, like Lakeside, to oversee
the entity performing the dredging operation. A duty of this kind would create the
prospect of unlimited responsibility to warn of all manner of risks and hazards over
which such a lessee has no control. It is this sort of liability which the Iowa Supreme
Court rejected in McCormick, Van Essen, and Allison. Accordingly, I conclude that
Lakeside had no common law duty to plaintiffs to warn them of the dredging operations
on Storm Lake.
Even if no common law duty exists, plaintiffs argue that under Lakeside’s lease
with the City, Lakeside assumed a duty to warn the public about dangers on Storm
Lake. Plaintiffs point to nothing in the lease that imposes a duty on Lakeside to inspect
the lake itself or to warn the public of dangerous conditions. Plaintiffs argue that by
agreeing to operate a Marina for use by the public, see the Lease at ¶ 3, Lakeside
assumed a duty to warn the public about dangerous conditions on the lake. This
provision does not advance plaintiffs’ argument, because nothing in it requires Lakeside
to inspect the lake or to take responsibility for warning the public of dangerous
conditions on the lake. Accordingly, I find that Lakeside owed plaintiffs no duty to
an innkeeper “has no duty to warn its guests of naturally occurring surf conditions off
of a public beach.”). But see Tarshis v. Lahaina Investment Corporation, 480 F.2d
1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that Hawaiian ocean-front hotel operator had a
duty to warn its guests of dangerous conditions in the ocean which were known or
should have been known to the operator but of which the guests were unaware, if the
dangerous conditions were not obvious).
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warn them of the dangers of the dredging operation on Storm Lake. Therefore, I grant
Lakeside’s motion for summary judgment.6
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Lakeside’s motion for summary judgment is
granted and this case is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2013.
______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
Having decided the case on the duty issue, I need not address Lakeside’s
alternative argument that it has immunity under Iowa’s recreational use statute.
6
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