Sanchez-Reyes v. United States of America
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order denying in its entirety 2 Pro Se Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255) (Criminal Action CR11-4069-MWB) filed by Venancio Sanchez-Reyes. This matter is dismissed in its entirety. No certificate of appealability will issue for any claim or contention in this case. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 6/13/2013. (copy w/nef mailed to non-ecf petitioner) (des)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
VENANCIO SANCHEZ-REYES,
Petitioner,
No. C 12-4066-MWB
(No. CR 11-4069-MWB)
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING
PETITIONER’S MOTION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2255
____________________
This case is before me on petitioner Venancio Sanchez-Reyes’s Pro Se Motion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In
Federal Custody (Civ. docket no. 2), filed on July 9, 2012. Sanchez-Reyes claims that the
attorney who represented him at the trial level provided him with ineffective assistance of
counsel. The respondent denies that Sanchez-Reyes is entitled to any relief on his claims.
On May 18, 2011, Sanchez-Reyes was charged by a one-count Indictment (Crim.
docket no. 1) with having illegally reentered the United States. On June 1, 2011,
Sanchez-Reyes, by counsel, filed a Waiver of Personal Appearance and Entry of Plea of
Not Guilty (Crim. docket no. 7), entering his plea of not guilty to the Indictment.
On June 14, 2011, Sanchez-Reyes appeared before former United States Chief
Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss to enter a guilty plea to the Indictment. See Crim. docket
no. 18. Judge Zoss filed a Report And Recommendation To Accept Guilty Plea (docket
no. 19), on June 14, 2011, recommending acceptance of Sanchez-Reyes’s plea of guilty.
Both parties filed waivers of objections to the Report And Recommendation later that same
day. See Crim. docket nos. 20, 21. Therefore, also on June 14, 2011, I entered an Order
(Crim. docket no. 22), accepting Sanchez-Reyes’s guilty plea. Sanchez-Reyes appeared
before me on September 9, 2011, for a sentencing hearing. See Crim. docket no. 30. I
sentenced Sanchez-Reyes to 24 months imprisonment. See Crim. docket nos. 30 and 31.
On July 9, 2012, Sanchez-Reyes filed a Pro Se Motion Under § 2255 To Vacate,
Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody (Civ. docket no. 2). On
August 8, 2012, the respondent filed an Answer (Civ. docket no. 4). On November 15,
2012, counsel appointed to represent Sanchez-Reyes in this matter filed a Report To The
Court And Motion For Permission To Withdraw (Civ. docket no. 14) and a Petitioner’s
Brief In Support Of Motion To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence Pursuant To 28
U.S.C. Section 2255 (Civ. docket no. 15). The respondent filed its Response and
Memorandum In Support Of Government’s Response To Defendant’s Motion (Civ. docket
no. 19), on February 19, 2013.
Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides as follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground [1] that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
[2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or [4] is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255; Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 a defendant in federal custody may seek post conviction relief on the
ground that his sentence was imposed in the absence of jurisdiction or in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d
777, 781 (8th Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the petitioner must demonstrate
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a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”). Thus, a motion pursuant
to § 2255 “is ‘intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal
Habeas corpus.’” United States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974)); accord Auman v. United States, 67
F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson).
The “case-or-controversy” requirement imposes a limit on a federal court’s
jurisdiction over habeas cases, just as it does on a federal court’s jurisdiction over other
cases. See, e.g., Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (§ 2241 habeas case).
The “case or controversy” requirement is not met if “the question sought to be adjudicated
has been mooted by subsequent developments.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
“[The] case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial
proceedings, trial and appellate. . . . The parties must continue to have a ‘personal stake
in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis
v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 478 (1990)). “[T]hroughout the litigation, the
plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Id. Thus, because
“judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy,” see DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974), the circumstances of this case, subsequent to the
filing of Sanchez-Reyes’s § 2255 Motion, require me to consider whether the Motion is
moot, before I consider it on the merits, even though neither party raised the issue of
whether Sanchez-Reyes’s § 2255 Motion is moot.
“An incarcerated convict’s (or a parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction
always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the
restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the
conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.
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The record reveals that Sanchez-Reyes filed his § 2255 motion on July 9, 2012, see Civ.
docket no. 2, while he was still incarcerated. When mail to Sanchez-Reyes was returned
as undeliverable on April 1, 2013, however, a check of the website of the Bureau of
Prisons by a deputy Clerk of Court revealed that Sanchez-Reyes was released from prison
on April 19, 2013. See unnumbered Civ. docket entry for April 1, 2013. Thus, SanchezReyes cannot rely on his continued incarceration to satisfy the “case or controversy”
requirement and avoid mootness. Compare Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.
Sanchez-Reyes’s release from prison would not necessarily moot his § 2255 Motion,
however.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “Once the convict’s sentence has
expired . . . some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration
or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit is to be
maintained.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Even after a convict’s release, the Supreme Court
has been “willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral
consequences.” Id. at 8, (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1968)); see also
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1968) (once attached, federal jurisdiction is
not defeated by release of a habeas petitioner before habeas proceedings challenging
conviction are completed); accord Nyguen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.
1997) (observing, in the case of a petitioner who had completed his imprisonment and
supervised parole prior to the district court’s adjudication of his § 2255 motion, that “‘[t]he
case is nevertheless not moot, because the federal conviction could have collateral
consequences in the future, and [Nguyen] was still in federal custody when he instituted
these § 2255 proceedings’” (citing Clemmons v. United States, 721 F.2d 235, 237 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1983)).
The problem here is that, although Sanchez-Reyes was incarcerated at the time that
he filed this § 2255 motion, he has been released from custody, and he is not challenging
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his conviction in his § 2255 Motion, but only his sentence. See Motion at 4, Motion at 6,
and Motion at 15. Here, Sanchez-Reyes alleges only that his trial counsel should have
requested a downward departure based on Sanchez-Reyes’s willingness to accept a final
deportation order. Motion at 4. In his request for relief, Sanchez-Reyes requests only a
[r]eduction of time of my sentencing between 1 or 2 points. . . .” Motion at 15. SanchezReyes contends, in his § 2255 Motion, that his trial counsel “could have used his
concession to immediate deportation as a bargaining chip with the prosecuting attorney in
reaching an agreed sentence of incarceration that would have been less than 24 months.”
Brief at 4. At no point does Sanchez-Reyes challenge his conviction.
The Supreme Court has held that, where a habeas petitioner did not attack his
convictions for felony offenses, and had completed his sentence, the Court would not
presume collateral consequences from his parolee status alone; rather, the petitioner must
prove such collateral consequences existed to keep his habeas petition from being moot.
See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8-12; see also Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982)
(“Since respondents elected only to attack their sentences, and since those sentences
expired during the course of these proceedings, this case is moot.”); Leonard v. Nix, 55
F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Where the allegedly illegal punishment does not produce
any collateral consequences independent of the underlying conviction, the case will be
mooted by physical release.” (citing Lane, 455 U.S. at 632-33)). Because Sanchez-Reyes
has challenged only his sentence, not his conviction; he has not alleged any “collateral
consequences” from his sentence; and he has not alleged any concrete or continuing injury
beyond the now-ended incarceration, his § 2255 Motion is moot. See Lane, 455 U.S. at
631.
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THEREFORE, Sanchez-Reyes’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civ. docket
no. 2), is denied in its entirety. This matter is dismissed in its entirety. No certificate
of appealability will issue for any claim or contention in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2013.
__________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
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