Lira-Zaragoza v. United States of America
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying in its entirety 1 Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255)(CR12-4044-MWB). This matter is dismissed in its entirety. No certificate of appealability will issue for any claim or contention in this case. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 06/27/2013. (src)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
GONZALO LIRA-ZARAGOZA,
Petitioner,
No. C 13-4001-MWB
(No. CR 12-4044-MWB)
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING
PETITIONER’S SECTION 2255
MOTION
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. The Criminal Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. The § 2255 Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Standards For § 2255 Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Procedural Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.
Preliminary matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.
Procedural default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.
Applicable standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.
Failure to request variance based on absence of fast track
program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
D. Certificate Of Appealability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before me on petitioner Gonzalo Lira-Zaragoza’s Pro Se Motion For
Relief Pursuant to Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 52(B)(Civ. docket no. 1),
filed on January 2, 2013, which I have construed as a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To
Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody. See Civ. docket
no. 2. Lira-Zaragoza claims that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance
in various ways. The respondent denies that Lira-Zaragoza is entitled to any relief on his
claims.
A. The Criminal Proceedings
On March 21, 2012, Lira-Zaragoza was charged by a one-count Indictment (Crim.
docket no. 2) with illegally re-entering the United States after a prior deportation. On
March 30, 2012, Lira-Zaragoza appeared in front of then Chief United States Magistrate
Judge Paul A. Zoss to plead not guilty to the Indictment. See Crim. docket no. 10.
On April 26, 2012, Lira-Zaragoza appeared before Judge Zoss to change his plea
to guilty to the Indictment. See Crim. docket no. 21. On April 26, 2012, Judge Zoss filed
his Report And Recommendation Concerning Plea Of Guilty, recommending acceptance
of Lira-Zaragoza’s guilty plea. See Crim. docket no. 22. I filed an Order Regarding
Magistrate’s Report And Recommendation Concerning Defendant’s Guilty Plea, accepting
Lira-Zaragoza’s guilty plea, on April 26, 2012. See Crim. docket no. 25.
On July 25, 2012, Lira-Zaragoza, by counsel, filed a Motion For Downward
Variance (Crim. docket no. 34), based on the remoteness in time of the prior felony that
led to Lira-Zaragoza’s deportation from the United States and the instant offense. See
Petitioner’s Brief at 3.
2
Lira-Zaragoza appeared before me on August 1, 2012, for a sentencing hearing.
See Crim. docket no. 35. I found that Lira-Zaragoza’s total offense level was 21 with a
criminal history category of IV, for an advisory United States Sentencing Guideline range
of 57 to 71 months. See Sent. Trans. at 11. I granted Lira-Zaragoza’s Motion for
downward variance, and sentenced Lira-Zaragoza to 50 months. See Sent. Trans. at 12.
B. The § 2255 Motion
On January 2, 2013, Lira-Zaragoza filed a Pro Se Motion for relief (Civ. docket
no. 1) (“Motion”), which I subsequently construed as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
See docket no. 2. The Respondent filed an Answer (Civ. docket no. 3), on January 4,
2013. On April 8, 2013, counsel appointed to represent Lira-Zaragoza in this matter filed
a Petitioner’s Brief (Civ. docket no. 6), addressing the issues raised by Lira-Zaragoza.
The Respondent filed its Response To Defendant’s Motion (Civ. docket no. 7), on April
16, 2013.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standards For § 2255 Relief
Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides as follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground [1] that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
[2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or [4] is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255; Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 a defendant in federal custody may seek post conviction relief on the
3
ground that his sentence was imposed in the absence of jurisdiction or in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d
777, 781 (8th Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the petitioner must demonstrate
a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”). Thus, a motion pursuant
to § 2255 “is ‘intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal
Habeas corpus.’” United States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974)); accord Auman v. United States, 67
F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson).
One “well established principle” of § 2255 law is that “‘[i]ssues raised and decided
on direct appeal cannot ordinarily be relitigated in a collateral proceeding based on 28
U.S.C. § 2255.’” Theus v. United States, 611 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Wiley, 245 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 2001)); Bear Stops, 339 F.3d at 780.
One exception to that principle arises when there is a “miscarriage of justice,” although
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “recognized such an exception only when
petitioners have produced convincing new evidence of actual innocence,” and the Supreme
Court has not extended the exception beyond situations involving actual innocence. Wiley,
245 F.3d at 752 (citing cases, and also noting that “the Court has emphasized the
narrowness of the exception and has expressed its desire that it remain ‘rare’ and available
only in the ‘extraordinary case.’” (citations omitted)). Just as § 2255 may not be used to
relitigate issues raised and decided on direct appeal, it also ordinarily “is not available to
correct errors which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Ramey v. United
States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). “Where a defendant has
procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be
raised in Habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either cause and actual
4
prejudice, or that he is actually innocent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622
(1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“Cause and prejudice” to resuscitate a procedurally defaulted claim may include
ineffective assistance of counsel, as defined by the Strickland test, discussed below.
Theus, 611 F.3d at 449. Indeed, Strickland claims are not procedurally defaulted when
brought for the first time pursuant to § 2255, because of the advantages of that form of
proceeding for hearing such claims. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
Otherwise, “[t]he Supreme Court recognized in Bousley that ‘a claim that “is so novel that
its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel” may constitute cause for a procedural
default.’” United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bousley,
523 U.S. at 622, with emphasis added, in turn quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16
(1984)). The “actual innocence” that may overcome either procedural default or allow
relitigation of a claim that was raised and rejected on direct appeal is a demonstration
“‘that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
Have convicted [the petitioner].’” Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir.
2002) (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37
(2006). “‘This is a strict standard; generally, a petitioner cannot show actual innocence
where the evidence is sufficient to support a [conviction on the challenged offense].’” Id.
(quoting McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2001)).
With these standards in mind, I turn to analysis of Lira-Zaragoza’s claims for
§ 2255 relief.
B. Procedural Matters
1.
Preliminary matters
Even though ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be raised on a § 2255
motion, because of the advantages of that form of proceeding for hearing such claims,
5
see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509, that does not mean that an evidentiary
hearing is required for every ineffective assistance claim presented in a § 2255 motion.
A district court may not “grant a prisoner § 2255 relief without resolving outstanding
factual disputes against the government.” Grady v. United States, 269 F.3d 913, 919 (8th
Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). Where a motion raises no disputed questions of fact,
however, no hearing is required. See United States v. Meyer, 417 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th
Cir. 1969). In this case, I conclude that no evidentiary hearing is required on any issue
because the record either conclusively resolves all material factual disputes against the
government or raises no disputed questions of fact that are material to my decision.
2.
Procedural default
Section 2255 relief is not available to correct errors which could have been raised
at trial or on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or a showing that the
alleged errors were fundamental defects resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. See
Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993). “[C]ause and prejudice” to
overcome such default may include “ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Becht v.
United States, 403 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
expressly recognized that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in
a § 2255 proceeding, rather than on direct appeal. See United States v. Hughes, 330 F.3d
1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003) (“When claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are
asserted on direct appeal, we ordinarily defer them to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings.”).
To the extent that I can construe Lira-Zaragoza’s claims as claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, I will consider them on the merits.
6
C. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
1.
Applicable standards
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. Thus, a criminal defendant is
constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct
appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d
777, 780 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Steele v United States, 518 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir.
2008). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that, if a defendant was denied
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, “then his sentence
was imposed ‘in violation of the Constitution,’ . . . and he is entitled to relief” pursuant
to § 2255(a). King v. United States, 595 F.3d 844, 852 (8th Cir. 2010). Both the
Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have expressly recognized that a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in a § 2255 proceeding, rather
than on direct appeal, because such a claim often involves facts outside of the original
record. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504-05 (2003); United States v. Hughes, 330 F.3d
1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003) (“When claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are
asserted on direct appeal, we ordinarily defer them to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings.”).
The Supreme Court has reiterated that “‘the purpose of the effective assistance
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation . . .
[but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.’” Cullen v. Pinholster,
___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). That being the case, “‘[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, with emphasis added). To assess
7
counsel’s performance against this benchmark, the Supreme Court developed in Strickland
a two-pronged test requiring the petitioner to show “both deficient performance by counsel
and prejudice.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 697; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance,
556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009). “‘Unless a defendant makes both showings,
it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.’” Gianakos v. United States, 560 F.3d 817, 821
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
As to the deficient performance prong, “The Court acknowledged [in Strickland]
that ‘[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,’ and that
‘[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way.’” Pinholster, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689). Moreover,
Recognizing the “tempt[ation] for a defendant to
second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence,” [Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689], the Court established
that counsel should be “strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment,” id., at 690, 104
S. Ct. 2052. To overcome that presumption, a defendant must
show that counsel failed to act “reasonabl[y] considering all
the circumstances.” Id., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052. The Court
cautioned that “[t]he availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry
into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its
evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness
challenges.” Id., at 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Pinholster, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1403. To put it another way,
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging
a conviction must show that “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” [Strickland,]
466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052. . . . The challenger’s
burden is to show “that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
8
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052.
Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011); Premo v. Moore,
___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (quoting Richter). There are two substantial
impediments to making the required showing of deficient performance. First, “‘[s]trategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable.’” United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Second, “[t]here is a ‘strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Id.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 877 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“To satisfy this prong [the movant] must overcome the strong presumption that his
counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”).
Also, the court “‘must “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”’” King, 595 F.3d
at 852-53 (quoting Ruff v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996), in turn quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
The second prong of the Strickland analysis requires the challenger to prove
prejudice. Pinholster, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 691-92). “‘An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment.’” Gianakos, 560 F.3d at 821 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). As the
Supreme Court has explained,
“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”
[Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052. “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Ibid. That requires a “substantial,” not just
9
“conceivable,” likelihood of a different result. Richter, 562
U.S., at ––––, 131 S. Ct., at 791.
Pinholster, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1403. However, even where the petitioner
“suffered prejudice from his lawyer’s error,” he is not entitled to § 2255 relief unless the
lawyer’s error was also the result of conduct that was professionally unreasonable at the
time. King, 595 F.3d at 852-53.
The two prongs of the “ineffective assistance” analysis are usually described as
sequential. Thus, if the movant fails to show deficient performance by counsel, the court
need proceed no further in its analysis of an “ineffective assistance” claim. United States
v. Walker, 324 F.3d 1032, 1040 (8th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, courts “do not . . .
need to address the performance prong if petitioner does not affirmatively prove
prejudice.” Boysiewick v. Schriro, 179 F.3d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Pryor v.
Norris, 103 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 1997)); accord Gianakos, 560 F.3d at 821 (“‘We need not
inquire into the effectiveness of counsel, however, if we determine that no prejudice
resulted from counsel’s alleged deficiencies.’ Hoon v. Iowa, 313 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th
Cir. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052).”).
2.
Failure to request variance based on absence of fast track program
Lira-Zaragoza alleges that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to request a downward variance based on the absence of a “Fast-Track” program in the
Northern District of Iowa. Motion at 8; Petitioner’s Brief at 7. The respondent asserts
that Lira-Zaragoza has not raised any non-frivolous issues in his Motion. Response at 2.
“Fast-Track” programs were initially developed by United States Attorneys to help
manage large volumes of immigration related cases in federal district courts. See United
States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2011). Congress later formalized
the program by enacting the PROTECT Act and the Feeney Amendment. Id. Pursuant
to this legislation, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated U.S.S.G.
10
§5K3.1. Jiminez-Perez, 659 F3d. at 707. U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 provides that “[u]pon motion
of the Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an
early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the United States
Attorney for the district.” However, in those federal district courts where no Fast Track
program exists, “the absence of a [F]ast-[T]rack program and the resulting difference in
the guidelines range should not be categorically excluded as a sentencing consideration.”
Jiminez-Perez, 659 F.3d at 711. A district judge in a district without a Fast-Track
program may “consider a facially obvious disparity created by [F]ast-[T]rack programs
among the totality of § 3553(a) factors considered.” Id. (citing United States v. ReyesHermandez, 624 F.3d 405, 421 (8th Cir. 2010)). A defendant seeking consideration of a
variance based on a Fast-Track disparity must first demonstrate a sufficient showing of a
disparity with similarly situated defendants in a Fast-Track district. See United States v.
Longarica, 699 F.3d 1010, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012).
Counsel appointed to represent Lira-Zaragoza in this matter, concedes that LiraZaragoza is unable to establish that he would have been eligible for a Fast-Track program,
because he has a prior conviction for a violent felony (arson), and three prior deportations.
Petitioner’s Brief at 10. Lira-Zaragoza’s failure to establish that he would have been
eligible for a Fast-Track program renders him unable to establish any disparity between
himself and similarly situated defendants in a Fast-Track district; therefore, a motion for
a downward variance in his case, on this ground, would have been without merit. Failure
to raise meritless claims does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Dodge v.
Robinson, 625 F.3d 1014, 1019 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Thomas v. United States, 951 F.2d
902, 905 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Lira-Zaragoza has not established that his trial
counsel’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. For this reason, Lira-Zaragoza’s claim that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel, fails.
11
D. Certificate Of Appealability
Denial of Lira-Zaragoza’s § 2255 Motion raises the question of whether or not he
should be issued a certificate of appealability for his claims therein. The requirement of
a certificate of appealability is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), which provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the
court of appeals from—
***
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); accord FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). To obtain a certificate of
appealability on claims for § 2255 relief, a defendant must make “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir.
2000); Mills v. Norris, 187 F.3d 881, 882 n.1 (8th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Hopkins, 151
F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1998);
Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998). “A
substantial showing is a showing that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court
could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox, 133
F.3d at 569. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Miller-El that
“‘[w]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. Ct. at 338 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
12
I find that Lira-Zaragoza has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right on his § 2255 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, there
is no showing that reasonable jurists would find my assessment of Lira-Zaragoza’s claims
debatable or wrong, Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338; Cox, 133 F.3d at 569, or that any court
would resolve those issues differently. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569. Therefore, Lira-Zaragoza
does not make the requisite showing to satisfy § 2253(c) on his claims for relief, and no
certificate of appealability will issue in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); FED. R.
APP. P. 22(b).
III. CONCLUSION
Upon the foregoing, Lira-Zaragoza’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civ. docket
no. 1), is denied in its entirety. This matter is dismissed in its entirety. No certificate
of appealability will issue for any claim or contention in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 27th day of June, 2013.
__________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?