Postma v. Altena

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Regarding Petitioner's Request for a Temporary Writ. Petitioner Harold O Postma's 1 Application For Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking a temporary writ for his immediate release, on bail, from his sentence for con tempt and an order temporarily enjoining further action by the state court against him, are denied. The rest of Postma's Section 2254 Petition remains pending. Signed by Judge Mark W Bennett on 1/31/13. (copy w/nef mailed to pro se petitioner) (djs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
HAROLD O. POSTMA,
No. C 13-4012-MWB
Petitioner,
vs.
DANIEL ALTENA, Sheriff of Sioux
County,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER REGARDING PETITIONER’S
REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY
WRIT

___________________________
Petitioner Harold O. Postma filed his Application For Writ Of Habeas Corpus
[Pursuant To] 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (§ 2254 Petition) (docket no. 1) in this court on
January 29, 2013, seeking relief from a state sentence for contempt and challenging the
underlying state court proceedings leading to the contempt sentence. In a Ruling On
Application For Order To Show Cause (Contempt Ruling), filed May 17, 2012, a
magistrate judge of the Iowa District Court for Sioux County imposed a sentence of
seven days of imprisonment on Postma for contempt, pursuant to IOWA CODE § 665.4,
for failure to pay sums of $180 and $397.50, respectively, due in two cases in that
court, but suspended that sentence if Postma purged the contempt by July 17, 2012.
Postma was arrested on January 23, 2013, on a warrant issued after he failed to purge
the contempt. Postma filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in Iowa District Court
challenging his contempt sentence. By Order filed January 28, 2013 (State Habeas
Ruling), the Iowa District Court for Sioux County denied Postma’s state habeas
petitions. Postma then filed his § 2254 Petition in this court. In the part of Postma’s
§ 2254 Petition now before me, Postma requests that I issue a “temporary writ” for his

immediate release, on bail, from his sentence for contempt and temporarily enjoin
further action by the state court against him.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that, pursuant to the “Younger
abstention doctrine,” based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “absent
extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal
prosecutions.”

Hudson v. Campbell, 663 F.3d 985, 987 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing

Younger, 401 U.S. at 54). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also observed that,
although the traditional restraint on federal courts enjoining state criminal prosecutions
“has been loosened, . . . ‘in the past few decades, the Supreme Court has upheld
federal injunctions to restrain state criminal proceedings only where the threatened
prosecution chilled exercise of First Amendment rights.’” Bacon v. Neer, 631 F.3d
875, 879 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir.
1987), with citations omitted, and also citing Stolt–Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442
F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006)). The court held that a federal district court had properly
declined to enjoin a state court criminal proceeding that, like Postma’s cases, did not
involve any First Amendment claim. Id. Other circumstances that may warrant an
injunction on state criminal proceedings as exceptions to the “Younger abstention
doctrine” include “‘bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that
would call for equitable relief.’” Gillette v. North Dakota Disciplinary Bd. Counsel,
610 F.3d 1045, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54).
Although Postma alleges harassment by and corruption in the state courts, the
limited record before me does not support his bare allegations sufficiently to grant even
a “temporary” injunction on state criminal proceedings or on the execution of his
contempt sentence.

Rather, the record that Postma has provided indicates that the

contempt proceedings and state habeas proceedings were conducted in proper course—
indeed, the state habeas proceedings were expedited—and there is no hint that the
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decisions of the state courts in those proceedings resulted in decisions contrary to or
involving unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law, or decisions that
were based on unreasonable determinations of the facts in light of the evidence. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Moreover, it appears that Postma’s claims for relief, in
both these proceedings and the state habeas proceedings, actually challenged the
underlying state actions, in which he incurred the costs that he failed to pay, resulting
in his contempt sentence, but that he did not exhaust his appeals of the judgments in
those underlying actions, the judgment in the contempt proceeding, or the judgment of
the Iowa District Court in his state habeas proceeding.
Postma’s § 2254 claims are procedurally defaulted.

As such, it appears that
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

(providing that § 2254 relief may be granted only if the applicant has exhausted state
court remedies). Thus, the Younger abstention doctrine counsels against any stay or
injunction on the state court proceedings or Postma’s state contempt sentence.
In the alternative, 28 U.S.C. § 2251 provides, in pertinent part,
A justice or judge of the United States before whom a
habeas corpus proceeding is pending, may, before final
judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending
appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in
any State court or by or under the authority of any State for
any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.
28 U.S.C § 2251. The statute does not set any standards, but instead “dedicates the
exercise of stay jurisdiction to the sound discretion of a federal court.” McFarland
v.Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 858 (1994). Some federal courts have concluded that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2251 provides federal district courts with the power to stay the execution of state noncapital sentences, as well as state capital sentences. See, e.g., Perry v. Maine, Civil
No. 06-217-P-H, 2007 WL 530381, *1 (D. Maine Feb. 13, 2007) (citing cases). All
courts to consider the issue that I have so far found require a showing of “special
circumstances,” however, to warrant the intrusion on state criminal proceedings,
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whether the state case is capital or non-capital. See, e.g., Coleman v. California, No.
C 09–5742 MHP (pr), 2010 WL 695380, *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010).
More specifically, some courts have required a showing of “substantial grounds”
for the stay, requiring the petitioner to “demonstrate that there are issues that are
debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues differently under
the law, or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.”

Mansanares v. Arpaio, No. CV 09-0284-PHX-MHM (LOA), 2009 WL

1456858, *2 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2009) (citing Schillaci v. Peyton, 328 F.Supp.2d 1103,
1104 (D. Hawai’i 2004)).

Others have required a showing in non-capital cases

comparable to the showing required to grant a preliminary injunction.

See, e.g.,

Lawrence v. 48th Dist. Court, No. 05-72701-DT, 2006 WL 83479, *1 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 12, 2006) (citing Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 297 (M.D.N.C. 2003), in
turn citing Gilliam v. Foster, 61 F.3d 1070, 1078 (4th Cir. 1995)). Consequently, they
have considered the likelihood of irreparable harm to the petitioner without a temporary
injunction, the likelihood of harm to the respondent with a temporary injunction, the
habeas petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest. Id.
Assuming, without deciding, that § 2251 would grant me the authority to stay
Postma’s non-capital state sentence pending disposition of his federal § 2254 Petition, I
cannot find that Postma has met the “special circumstances” requirement for such
relief. See Coleman, 2010 WL 695380 at *2. First, applying a “substantial grounds”
standard, see Mansanares, 2009 WL 1456858 at *2, Postma has not “demonstrate[d]
there are issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the
issues differently under the law, or that the questions are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,” as to the contempt action or the state habeas action
see id., where his claims in his § 2254 Petition are claims concerning the underlying
actions that he did not appeal and, consequently, those claims appear to be procedurally
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defaulted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (providing that § 2254 relief may be granted only
if the applicant has exhausted state court remedies). Similarly, applying a “preliminary
injunction” standard, see Lawrence, 2006 WL 83479 at *1, Postma’s federal habeas
claims appear to be procedurally defaulted, because he did not exhaust state remedies,
as required by § 2254(b), where he did not exhaust his appeals of the judgments in the
underlying state actions, the judgment in the contempt proceeding, or the judgment of
the Iowa District Court in his state habeas proceeding. Thus, he has no likelihood of
success on the merits of his federal § 2254 Petition, the public has no interest in
granting him a stay, and he cannot credibly assert that he is irreparably harmed without
the temporary injunction, because any harm flows from his failure to pursue state
remedies, not from the lack of temporary injunctive relief. See id.
THEREFORE, those parts of petitioner Harold O. Postma’s Application For
Writ Of Habeas Corpus [Pursuant To] 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket no. 1) seeking a
“temporary writ” for his immediate release, on bail, from his sentence for contempt
and an order temporarily enjoining further action by the state court against him, are
denied. The rest of Postma’s § 2254 Petition remains pending.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013.

______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

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